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W S O



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OPENING REMARKS

MG James E. Taylor
Interamerican Defense College Director

Ladies and Gentlemen, good morning. It is a pleasure to be able to welcome you to our Conference on the World Situation. It is an important conference. It is specifically designed to increase your understanding of the current world situation based on world regions, and assess global geopolitical characteristics.

Our speakers will share some insights on trends that influence individual nations and regions of our world. You will then be able to consider their impact on the design and implementation of defense, security, and development policies in our hemisphere.

The reality is this; you are certainly going to be working on trying to solve these problems for the next fifteen to twenty years that you have remaining in your careers.

Many entities publish their perspective on the most significant problems facing our world today. The United Nations recently published twenty-two global challenges. Many academic institutions publish their assessments. Governments publish their assessments. Think tanks publish their assessments.

Global Complex Problems

- Great power conflict
- Global Governance
- Governance of outer space
- Voting reform
- Global commodity distribution
- Malevolent actors
- Safeguarding liberal democracy

The key question: In what ways are the Security, Defense, and Diplomatic sectors part of the solution?

Source: 80000hours.org, University of Oxford, A Guide to Using your Career to Solve the World's Most Pressing Problems, 2020.

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Image 1: Global Complex Problems

I am saying that there is a lot of analysis and thought that is going into identifying global problems. I recently read an analysis from the University of Oxford that extracted some common themes in these numerous assessments. I want to highlight a few of them to set the stage as we start this Conference.

Great Power Conflict is a **major** concern. It is an existential threat. It must **never** happen. A large violent conflict between major powers such as the US, Russia, or China could be the most devastating event to occur in human history and could result in billions of deaths. Also, mistrust between major powers makes it harder for them to coordinate on other issues such as arms control or the safe use of new technologies, or trade.

Let me spend a moment on this. World War II was the worst disaster in the history of our world. It killed 85 million people. That was about 3% of the world population. That was pre-nuclear. The possession of nuclear weapons and biological weapons, and chemical weapons make a great power conflict potentially apocalyptic. It must never happen. As leaders in security, defense, and diplomacy, we must do our part never to let it happen.

I will consider this from another angle. Disease. The pandemic of 1918 infected 500 million people. It killed somewhere between 20 and 50 million people. It lasted two years. It did not kill as many as World War II.

Historians believe that the worst pandemic of all time was the Black Plague. Records from the black plague of 1347 suggest that it killed 75 million people. That is still less than World War II.

Let me last consider this from the perspective of a natural disaster. Historians believe that the worst catastrophe in history aside from the biblical flood at Noah's time is the Yellow River flood of 1931 in China. This event killed four million.

I am saying that great power conflict is deadlier than a disease or disaster, and we must never allow it to happen again.

Global governance is an area that requires investment. International institutions might play a crucial role in our ability to navigate global challenges. So improving them has the potential to reduce risks of global catastrophes and potentially find and implement solutions to global challenges.

The governance of space is becoming increasingly important. The world is increasingly using the domain of space. The sheer scale of the accessible universe makes our emerging policies and actions in space enormously important. Currently, there is no agreement on how to decide what happens in space. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits countries from claiming sovereignty over anything in space, but attempts to agree on more than that have failed to achieve consensus. Whoever ends up in control of resources in space will naturally shift how they are used, and might influence vast numbers of lives.

The demand for voting reform is increasingly manifested throughout the world. Current events are showing that many countries are having trouble with elections. The single-member plurality voting system employed by the democratic countries uses techniques and processes that are antiquated and problematic and are having difficulty keeping pace with societal and technology.

Global commodity distribution is at the root of many conflicts and disputes. Human populations do not align with the natural distribution of resources and goods.

The influence of malevolent actors exacerbates, or causes, complex problems. When people with some, or all, of the “dark tetrad” traits: narcissism, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and sadism are in positions of power or influence, this increases the risk of complex transnational problems that could influence the long-term future.

Last, safeguarding liberal democracy is a need. Liberal democracies seem much more conducive to intellectual progress and economic growth than other forms of governance that have been tried so far, and perhaps also to peace, security, and cooperation (at least with other democracies). Political developments that threaten to shift liberal democracies toward authoritarianism seem to be risk factors for a variety of disasters (like great power conflicts), as well as for society generally going in a more negative direction.

The speakers you will hear from over the course of these next three days will share some valuable insights into the predominant geopolitical characteristics today and in the medium to long-term based upon different regions of this world.

You will be able to consider some of these challenges from a political, sociocultural, economic, defense, security, science, and technology perspective.

It is altogether too easy to collectively admire problems than analyze them from the perspective of developing future policies in the context of defense, security, and diplomacy that might contribute to their solution.

And, that, ladies and gentlemen, is precisely what you need to be doing during this Conference. You need to ask yourself in what ways are the security, defense, and diplomatic sectors part of the solution to the complexities you are being exposed to.

My academic background includes the hard sciences. I have an extensive background in physics and chemistry. From a scientific perspective, a perfect solution is one that is ideal throughout its compositional range.

Given that definition, you should ask yourselves what the role of security, defense, and diplomacy across the compositional range of these problems that face our world is? If you do that, you might contribute to the development of policies and responses that would help generate the perfect solution.

And, that ladies and gentlemen, is the objective of this Conference. You will be exposed to fifteen magnificent speakers, and participate in some great discussion. We express our appreciation to those who will speak to us and all those who made this Conference possible. I extend a special thanks to our information technology team and our world-class interpreters who enable us to transcend the barriers of distance and language!

VISIONS OF ORDER IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

Dr. James J. Przystup¹
National Defense University

“All foreign policy is a struggle for the minds of men.”²
Hans J. Morgenthau

Author’s Note

This research project began focused on the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific Vision as set out by the President in his remarks of November 2017 in Danang, Vietnam. It soon became apparent, however, that to focus solely on the President’s vision and U.S policies toward the region, would be to overlook the efforts of U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to respond to and shape strategic change and sustain the existing rules-based order across the region. Their collective endeavors represent a policy mosaic of efforts to support a balance of influence based on a balance of power

I. Introduction

“The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order ‘within’ the various regions, and to relate the regional orders to one another.”³ Henry Kissinger

¹ Dr. James J. Przystup has worked on Asia-related issues for over thirty years: on the staff on the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs; in the private sector with Itochu Corporation and IBM World Trade Americas/Far East Corporation; in the United States Government, on the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff under Secretary of State George P. Shultz and under Secretary of State James A. Baker III, as Senior Member responsible for East Asia and the Pacific; and in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy as Director for Regional Security Strategies on the Policy Planning Staff. During the administration of President Ronald Reagan, Dr. Przystup served as the Deputy Director of the Presidential Advisory Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations. He also served on the State Department delegation to the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia. Before accepting his current position, he was Director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation. Dr. Przystup was presented with the State Department’s Meritorious Honor award in 1989; the Defense Department’s Outstanding Achievement Award in 1992; and cited for his Exceptional Performance by the National Defense University on three separate occasions. Dr. Przystup graduated summa cum laude from the University of Detroit and holds an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. in Diplomatic History also from the University of Chicago. He studied Japanese at Columbia University and Keio University in Tokyo and was Fellow on the Law Faculty of Keio University.

² Barry Gewen, *The Inevitability of Tragedy Henry Kissinger and his World*, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, New York, 2020, 205

³ Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, Penguin Books, New York, New York, 2014, 371

In 1990, as the Cold War was winding down, Japanese economists began to peer in to the future to envisage the contours of an evolving post-Cold War order in Asia. At Keidanren and Keizaidoyukai, economists had run the numbers and were anticipating that China would surpass Japan as the world's second largest economy sometime in the first decade of the 21st century. They were unanimous in their conclusions: managing the rise of China in all its manifestations would be Japan's and Asia's defining strategic challenge through 2050.⁴ After averaging 9.91% in GDP growth from 1979 to 2010, China passed Japan at the end of 2010 to become the world's second largest economy.⁵

In August 1997, Australia's Prime Minister John Howard released "In the National Interest," the first White Paper of his government. Looking toward the 21st century, the government assessed that Asia's "rapid economic growth is changing strategic realities among regional countries" and, in that context, "China's economic growth, with attendant confidence and enhanced influence, will be the most important strategic development of the next fifteen years."⁶ Twenty years later, the Australian government in its "2017 Foreign Policy White Paper" judged that "Today, the Indo-Pacific is undergoing a strategic transition as profound as the economic transition that preceded it."⁷

This following study is focused on efforts by governments of the region, primarily, the United States, Japan, and Australia to understand strategic change -- to respond to the multi-faceted challenges posed by and inextricably tied to the rise of China, to shape and structure the evolving Indo-Pacific order and, in the process, to define and maintain a rules-based order across the region and beyond.⁸ Their various responses represent, in effect, a mosaic of foreign policy initiatives. The study will conclude with a number of policy recommendations for the United States and the administration that will take office on January 20, 2021.

⁴ Author's interviews in Tokyo, Japan; summer 1990. In 1993, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund came to the same conclusion. See "World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating World" (London: Oxford University Press, 1995) and "World Economic Outlook," International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, 1995.

⁵ China National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) available at www.stats.gov.cn/english

⁶ Government of Australia, "In the National Interest," available at http://repository.jeffmalone.org/files/foreign/In_the_National_Interest.pdf

⁷ Government of Australia, "2017 Foreign Policy White Paper" available at <https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper/fpwhitepaper/index.html>

⁸ In his *World Order*, published in 2014, nine years after Robert Zoellick's "Responsible Stakeholder" remarks, Henry Kissinger noted that the existing western "rules-based" was now being challenged. Kissinger wrote: "Outside the Western world, regions that have played a minimal role in these rules original formulation question their validity in their present form and have made clear that they would work to modify them." Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, Penguin Boks, New York, New York 2014. 2

II. Visions of Order: Early Efforts to Engage a Rising China

By the beginning of the 21st century, China's opening and reform, launched by Deng Xiaoping, had produced two decades of breathtaking economic growth, expanding China's standing and influence across the globe. In his September 21, 2005 remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility," Robert B Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State, observed "China is big, it is growing, and it will influence the world in the years ahead...the central question is how China will use its influence."

Zoellick argued that China, having benefited from an "open, rules-based international economic system" had "a responsibility to strengthen the order that has enabled its success."⁹ U.S. policy should "encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system," working with the United States "to shape the future international system" and avoid a destabilizing competition. Zoellick recognized China's growing power and influence in Asia but cautioned Beijing that concerns will grow "if China seeks to maneuver toward a preponderance of power."¹⁰

Three months after his "Wither China" remarks, Zoellick brought China's Vice Foreign Minister, Dai Bingguo, to Franklin Roosevelt's Hyde Park estate. The visit represented an effort to rekindle the idea of "great power cooperation."¹¹

As explored in the Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Forum of June 2006, "Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy," a focus on China as a potential "constructive global actor is an enduring thread in U.S. Asia policy." President Franklin Roosevelt recognized China as one of "Big Five" great powers, central to managing the Post World War II international order. The quest for strategic cooperation with China, interrupted by the onset of the Cold War and Mao's victory in China's civil, resumed with the Kissinger and Nixon visits to China in 1971 and 1972 and continued through the end of the Cold War two decades later. The Tiananmen

⁹ The reference to a rules-based system became the leitmotif of the evolving visions of an Indo-Pacific order

¹⁰ Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility," Remarks to the National Council on U.S.-China Relations, New York, NY, September 21, 2005, available at <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>

For a discussion of China's reaction to the Zoellick speech and Chinese understanding of the concepts of "responsibility" and governance as set out in his remarks, see David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global, The Partial Power*, Oxford University Press 2013, 128-136.

¹¹ James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders, "Visions of Order: Japan and China in U.S. Strategy, Strategic Forum No. 220, June 2006, available at <http://www.ndu.edu/inss>.

massacre, June 1991, complicated the political and strategic evolution of U.S.-China relations for the better part of a decade.

III. Visions of Order Evolving in the Indo-Pacific

At the same time, other visions of the future order in the Asia-Pacific region were beginning to emerge in Japan, India, and ASEAN, while China too began to think about the nature of a post-Cold War regional order.

Japan

The early years of the 21st century in Japan-China relations were marked by controversies over history. The visit of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine resulted in the breakdown of high-level diplomatic and political contacts,

Under Koizumi's successor, Shinzo Abe, Tokyo and Beijing worked to stabilize relations. During Abe's October 2006 "ice breaking" visit to China, the two governments reached agreement on a framework to manage bilateral ties: "A Mutually Beneficial Relationship based on Common Strategic Interests."¹² The construct made possible the restoration of high-level diplomatic and political contacts; increased cooperation on economic issues; the environment; and North Korea while leaving unresolved fundamental issues relating to maritime boundaries and sovereignty over disputed territories -- issues that would continue exacerbate ties in the years ahead.

Meanwhile, China's dynamic economy and its increasingly sophisticated diplomacy began to challenge long-held Japanese assumptions of regional leadership and international standing that had been based on Japan's post-war economic strength.

In November 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso in remarks to the Japan Institute of International Affairs, "The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan's Expanding Diplomatic Horizons" staked a claim to Japan's leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. A forerunner of Indo-Pacific visions, Aso's Arc of Freedom and Prosperity extended geographically from Northeast Asia to Central Asia and the Middle East, governed by "values-oriented diplomacy," with an emphasis on "universal values, such as democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law and the

¹² Japan-China Joint Press Statement, October 8, 2006, available at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region-Aaia-paci/china/joint0610.html>

market economy.” Aso challenged Japan to lead in bringing into being “an arc of freedom and prosperity based on the western values”¹³

Aso’s vision was widely interpreted as an effort by Japan to set standards for governance in the emerging Asian community -- standards that stood in stark contrast to the values and practices of China. The emphasis on universal values, democracy, freedom, human rights, rule of law, and a market economy continued to reappear in Japanese government documents championing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Eight months later, Prime Minister Abe, in remarks to the Indian Parliament, “The Confluence of the Two Seas,” expanded on the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity. Reflecting a Japan-India Global Strategic Partnership of “shared fundamental values, such as freedom, democracy and the respect for human rights as well as strategic interests,” Abe envisioned a “broader Asia” evolving “into an immense network spanning the Pacific Ocean” and incorporating both the United States and Australia. The envisioned “open and transparent” structure would “allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.” Abe asserted that Japan and India, as maritime states, “have vital interests in the security of the sea lanes.” Future security cooperation would be left to Japanese and Indian diplomats and defense officials to “consider jointly.”¹⁴

Nine years later, in August 2016, Abe returned to “The Confluence of the Two Seas.” Addressing the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, Abe told his Nairobi, Kenya audience “what will give stability and prosperity to the world is none other than the enormous liveliness brought forth from the union of two free and open oceans and continents.” Abe committed Japan to “fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values, freedom, rule of law and the market economy, free from force or coercion....” Subsequently, The Free and Open Indo-Pacific became Japanese policy, with the Abe government playing a leading role in advancing the concept.¹⁵ Abe’s successor Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga set out his government’s vision of a Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific during his first official travel outside Japan to Vietnam and Indonesia in

¹³ Speech of Mr. Taro Aso, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons”, November 30, 2006, available at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html>

¹⁴ H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, Remarks at the Parliament of the Republic of India, “The Confluence of the Two Seas,” August 22, 2007. Available at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region-asia-pacnmy0708/speech-2html>

¹⁵ H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, Address at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, August 27, 2016 at the Kenyan International Conference Center, Nairobi Kenya, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af2/page_4-e000496html

October 2020. Suga made clear Japan's full support for the ASEAN Outlook, noting the many commonalities with Japan's vision of the Indo Pacific. (For the ASEAN Outlook, see below, page 12)

While in office, Abe also moved in short order to strengthen the Japan-U.S. Alliance -- in 2014, reinterpreting Japan's constitution to allow for the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense and, in 2015, joining with the United States to issue the new Guidelines for Defense Cooperation -- raising security concerns in Beijing.

China

In the decade following the end of the Cold War, China returned to its long-standing opposition to alliances and military blocs.

President Jiang Zemin, in his 1997 report to the 15th Party Congress, asserted that "expanding military blocs and strengthening alliances will not be conducive to safeguarding peace and security"¹⁶ China's New Security Concept called for "an end to Cold War thinking and opposition to alliance politics."¹⁷ In 1998, the People's Daily observed that since the end of the Cold War "military alliances had lost much of their cohesive force as the enemies they were directed at containing no longer existed" but found the United States attempting to "maintain old alliances, hoping to act as their hegemonic leader."¹⁸

Under President Xi Jinping, China too was developing a positive vision. In 2013, in remarks delivered in Kazakhstan and Indonesia, Xi previewed the Belt and Road Initiative, a massive infrastructure project to link China to Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region and beyond to Africa and Europe. In his address to the parliament of Indonesia, President Xi told his audience:

"Southeast Asia has since ancient times been an important hub along the ancient Maritime Silk Road and China will vigorously develop maritime partnership in an effort to build the

¹⁶ Jiang Zemin, "Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping's Theory for an All-round Advancement of the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics to the 21st Century," China Daily, September 23, 1997. Available at <https://www.amazon.com/Xiaoping-Thought-Socialist-Socialism-Characteristics-ebook/dp/B008BQ8JV2>

¹⁷ China, "New Security Concept," 1997, available at, https://www.academia.edu/5295607/Chinas_new_Concept_of_Security

¹⁸ Quoted in Chu Shulong, "China and the U.S.-Japan and U.S. Korea Alliances in a Changing Northeast Asia," Walter H. Shorenstein Center, Freeman Spogli Institute, June 1999, available at https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/chu_shulong.pdf.5

Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century. China is ready to expand its practical cooperation with ASEAN countries across the board.”¹⁹

In 2014, China established the Silk Road Fund, subscribing \$40 billion, to support infrastructure projects.²⁰ And in 2015, China launched the multinational Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank.²¹ The Belt Road Initiative was formally adopted at the 19th National Party Congress in 2017.²²

As the BRI energized China’s economic engagement with the region, President Xi advanced a vision of a new, multilateral Asian Security Concept.

Speaking to the Fourth Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Xi declared that “Asia has come to a crucial stage in security cooperation where we need to build on the past achievements and strive for new progress.” He argued that it was time to do away with “the outdated thinking from the age of the Cold War and zero-sum game,” toward “a new regional security cooperation architecture, and jointly build a road for security in Asia that is shared by and win-win to all.” At the same time, he cautioned that strengthening “a military alliance that is targeted at a third country is not conducive to maintaining common security.” “In the final analysis,” Xi concluded, “it is time for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.”²³ An accompanying Xinhua article cast the United States alliances as “the Achilles heel” of and major impediment to “a peaceful Asia.”²⁴ In contrast to his multilateral vision, Xi was also staking out a unilateral line on China’s core interests, which included maritime rights and interests. In July 2013, Xi told the Politburo’s study group on maritime policy, that China would never “give up our core national interests” and “resolutely safeguard our country’s maritime rights and interests.”²⁵

¹⁹ Address of President Xi Jinping to the Parliament of Indonesia, October 2, 2013, available at https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xiapcc/2013-10/02/content_17007915.htm

²⁰ Silk Road Fund, available at <http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/>

²¹ Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, available at <https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html>

²² 19th CCP National Congress, available at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/2017-11/03/c_136725942.htm

²³ Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept for Progress in Security Cooperation,” remarks at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building, delivered at the Shanghai Expo Center, May 21, 2014, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2014-05/28/content_32511846.

²⁴ Adam P. Lift, “China and the U.S. Alliance System,” available at <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/china-and-the-us-alliance-system/1FF369905B4A8110DC8693A3C8A7857B/core-reader>

²⁵ People’s Daily, August 1, 2013, as quoted in NIDS China Security report 2019, available at http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2019_A01.pdf

Even as President Xi focused on advancing China's new Asian Security Concept, he was also positioning China to play a leading role in the reform of the existing international order. Xi's vision was that of "a new type of international relations," one differing from that of past great power struggles for "profits and hegemony" but now following "a formula in which countries coordinate their relations and profits through rules and mechanisms." Through BRI, China would fulfill its role as a responsible great power and leader of the developing world in reforming "the unjust and improper arrangement positions in the global governance system."²⁶

Xi's apotheosis came at World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017. In his remarks, Xi championed globalization, while citing the shortcomings of existing development models and calling for reform of global governance toward greater fairness and equity toward the realization of a Community of Common Destiny. As for China, Xi said that reform efforts would "enable the market to play a decisive role in resources allocation."²⁷ He did not mention that, under his direction, state power over the economy was increasing and remained the driving force in China's growth.

India

India too was developing a vision of the Indo-Pacific. In a keynote address to the Shangri-la Dialogue, June 1, 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke of India's historic ties to the Indo-Pacific region, and, against the background of an international environment marked by "shifts in global power," of "clashing and competing visions," and "the assertion of power over recourse to international norms," Modi set out his vision of an Indo-Pacific order.

Modi's vision was of a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific region, with ASEAN "central to its future." He argued that the pursuit of "common security and prosperity require us to evolve, through dialogue, a common rules-based order;" one in which "rules and norms should be based on the consent of all," marked by the "sovereignty and territorial integrity and equality of all nations, irrespective of size and strength." Modi emphasized the importance of "equal access as a

²⁶ People's Daily, October 13, 2015, available at *ibid*.

²⁷ Xi Jinping, "Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promoting Global Growth," Keynote Speech at the Opening Session of the World Economic Forum, Davos, January 17, 2017, available at <https://america.ctgn.com2017/01/17/full-text-keynote-at-the-world-economic-forum>. The vision of a Community of Common Destiny was first articulated by former President Hu Jintao at the 18th National People's Congress in November 2012 and advanced by Xi Jinping in remarks to the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in March, 2013 and at the inaugural Belt-Road Forum, May 14-15, 2017.

right under international law to the use of commons on the sea and in the air,” requiring “freedom of navigation, unimpeded commerce and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law.”²⁸

Modi also touched on India’s key bilateral relations with Japan and China, making clear that “India’s economic and strategic ties to Japan are a cornerstone of India’s Act East Policy.” As for China, Modi expressed his hope that India and China could “work together in trust and confidence, sensitive to each other interests.”²⁹ Modi did not mention the Quad in his address.³⁰

The Prime Minister’s statement reflected India’s long-standing commitment to the principle of non-alignment. At a time of increasing tensions in U.S-China relations, Modi called for a region defined by inclusiveness and committed to dialogue in the resolution of disputes. While Modi avoided aligning India with the Quad concept (the United States, Japan, Australia and India), which some strategists viewed as aimed at constraining China, his references to a rules-based order, freedom of navigation and respect for international law and peaceful change aligned India with Japanese visions of the Indo-Pacific and tangentially with elements of the evolving U.S. vision of the Trump administration.

Under Modi, India has moved toward a more active engagement with the Indo-Pacific, transforming the 1991 Look East Policy, which focused on building cultural and commercial ties with Southeast Asia, into the Act East Policy in 2014, which aimed at expanding political and strategic ties across the region. Modi has ordered India’s diplomacy toward the development of strategic partnerships with ASEAN as well as with Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,

²⁸ Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Keynote Address to the Shangri-la Dialogue, June 1, 2018, available at <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018>

²⁹ Ibid, <https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018>

³⁰ The revival of the “Quad” (See below under “Pushback: Evolving Alliances) raised concerns within ASEAN of the Quad’s relation to ASEAN and ASEAN Centrality. The 2019 initial Quad’s Ministerial held in New York during the United Nations General Assembly Meeting in September did not touch on the Quad’s relation to ASEAN. However, following the November Ministerial in Bangkok, India and the United States, in separate statements expressed their support for ASEAN Centrality, and the United States, Australia, India, and Japan, respective policy documents and statements, have expressed their commitment to ASEAN Centrality. Most recently, the State Departments, June 2019, “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” speaks to the centrality of ASEAN in supporting a strong, rules- based architecture in the Indo-Pacific region.

For a discussion of ASEAN and the Quad, see: Australian Security Policy Institute, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” October 2018... available at <https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2018-10/SR%20130%20Quadrilateral%20security%20d>

Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea,³¹ In 2015, India aligned with the United States and Japan in key policy documents supporting a rules-based regional order – the U.S.-India Strategic Vision of January 2015 and the India-Japan Vision 2025 of December 2015.³²

ASEAN

Late to articulate a vision, ASEAN released the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” in June 2019. The document reflects growing concerns about the effects of an increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship on regional stability and ASEAN’s own standing in the regional architecture. The Outlook recognized both the “geopolitical and geostrategic shifts” affecting the region and the emphasized the importance of “avoiding the deepening of mistrust, miscalculation, and patterns of behavior based on a zero-sum game.” In this context, the Outlook championed ASEAN’s “central role in evolving the regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions...to continue being an honest broker within the strategic environment of competing interests.”

The Outlook aimed “to promote an enabling environment for peace, stability, and prosperity... in addressing common challenges, upholding the rules-based regional architecture, and promoting close economic cooperation, and thus strengthening confidence and trust...enhancing ASEAN’s Community building process and further strengthening the existing ASEAN-led mechanisms...”³³

The document set out the principles to guide implementation of the ASEAN vision: “transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty, non-intervention, complementarity with existing cooperation frameworks, equality, mutual

³¹ Prabir De, “India’s Act East policy is slowly becoming Act Indo-Pacific under the Modi government,” The Print, March 27, 2020, available at <https://theprint.in/pageturner/excerpt/india-act-east-policy-is-becoming-act-indo-pacific/389502/>

³² See: “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions,” available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacific-and-indian-ocean-region> and “Japan and India Vision 2025 Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/sa/sw/in/page3e_000432.html

³³ Major ASEAN institutions and mechanisms are: The ASEAN Ministerial; the ASEAN Regional Forum; the ASEAN Plus 3 (Japan, China, Korea); the ASEAN plus Six (India, Australia and New Zealand, expanded in 2011 to include the United States and Russia); the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting; the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting-Plus; the East Asian Summit (EAS); and the ASEAN-Europe Meeting (ASEM).

³⁵ ASEAN Outlook on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf.24 available at https://asean.org/storage/2019/06/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf

³⁶ Ibid

respect, mutual trust, mutual benefit, and respect for international law, such as UN Charter, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, other relevant UN treaties and conventions, the ASEAN Charter and various ASEAN treaties and agreements.”³⁴

In his wide-ranging ISEAS Yusof Institute ASEAN Lecture, “How to Think about the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook,” Singapore’s Ambassador-at-large, Bilahari Kausikan, former Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, observed found the document significant “in that it preserves ASEAN’s fundamental consensus...and fulfills ASEAN’s fundamental purpose of maintaining at least minimal level of cohesion.” Considering the different visions of the Indo-Pacific, he found the ASEAN vision to have the “most in common with the Japanese and Australian” visions. The Outlook shared Japan’s “emphasis on economics and connectivity” and Australia’s approach, “essentially a diplomatic expedient to finesse strategic complexities and buy time.” At the same time, The Outlook represented an “an opportunity for ASEAN to regain centrality, but no more than an opportunity.”³⁵

At the strategic level, the Outlook aimed to position ASEAN as the region’s “inclusive convening power.....”³⁶ In a region increasingly concerned about being forced to choose between economic prosperity and national security, ASEAN, with its focus on inclusion and honest brokering, set itself as an institution that would obviate the need for its members, and the region, to make a strategic choice between the United States and China. Both the ASEAN Outlook and Modi’s Shangri-la vision attempt to straddle the emerging dynamic of an increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship.

IV. The United States and Asia:

From Post-Cold War Engagement to the Pivot-Rebalance and the Trump administration

1992-1998

At the end of the Cold War, U.S. strategy toward the Asia-Pacific focused on the preserving the U.S.-bilateral alliance structure. In its 1992 report to the Congress, “A Strategic Framework

³⁵ Bilahari Kausikan, “How to Think about the ASEAN-Indo-Pacific Outlook,” The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute ASEAN Lecture , August 16, 2019, available at <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/mec-events/the-20th-asean-lecture-how-to-think-about-the-indopacific/>
38 ASEAN Outlook, Ibid

for the Asia-Pacific Rim,” the Department of Defense defined the Asian alliance structure as “perhaps our nation’s most significant achievement since the end of the Second World War.” The Department observed that “this system of alliances constitutes a prosperous, largely, democratic, market-oriented zone of peace.” The report argued that “In the long run preserving and expanding these alliances and friendships will be as important as the successful containment of the former Soviet Union or the Coalition to the defeat of Iraq.”³⁷

The Report called attention to an evolution in U.S. strategic orientation, noting that “United States regional roles, which had been secondary in our strategic calculus, have now assumed primary importance in our security engagement in the Pacific theater ... the key to our military presence has been and remains a network of largely bilateral security alliances.”³⁸

In 1995, the Department of Defense issued “The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.” The report reiterated the importance of the alliance structure and emphasized the United States’ ‘stake in maintaining the alliance structure in Asia as a foundation of regional stability and a means of promoting American influence on key Asian issues.’³⁹ In 1998, The Department updated the 1995 document, reaffirming “the critical role our alliances play in securing peace and stability in Asia,” while, redefining the role of late 20th Century alliances as “not directed at any third party” but serving “the interests of all who benefit from stability and security”⁴⁰

The U.S. vision, then, was that of an alliance-based security system that, under U.S. leadership, provided for regional stability as the foundation of economic prosperity. The vision remained unchanged for almost a decade.⁴¹ Taking office in January 2001, President Bush initially

³⁷Department of Defense, “Report to the Congress, A Strategic Framework for the Asia-Pacific Rim,” January 1, 1992, available at <https://www.amazon.com/strategic-framework-Asian-Pacific-Rim/dp/B009XX5JOC>

³⁸ Ibid

³⁹ Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Region, 1995, 2. available at <https://nautilus.org/global-problem-solving/us-security-strategy-for-the-east-asia-pacific-region/>

⁴⁰ Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998, 19, available at <https://nautilus.org/global-problem-solving/us-security-strategy-for-the-east-asia-pacific-region/>

⁴¹ At the same time, during the 1990s the United States, under the Clinton administration, advanced a universalist foreign policy aimed at the enlargement of democracy and the market economy. In remarks to the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake told his audience that, as the world’s “dominant power” and “at the great risk of oversimplification, we might visualize our security mission as promoting the enlargement of the ‘blue areas’ of market democracies.” Lake recognized that “we cannot impose democracy on regimes that appear to be opting for liberalization, but we may be able to help steer some of them down that path, while providing penalties that raise the cost of repression and aggressive behavior.” Turning to China specifically, Lake observed that “these efforts have special meaning for our relations with China...It is in the interest

directed foreign policy toward the management of great power relations. However, the terror attacks on 9/11 re-directed the Bush administration's focus to the Middle East, where it overwhelmingly remained through 2008.

2009-2017

The Obama administration took office, January 20, 2009. In his book, *Obama and China's Rise*, Jeffery A. Bader, Senior Director for East Asian Affairs at the National Security Council, wrote of the Bush years: "whatever success the Bush administration had achieved in the region, they were contaminated by the fallout of problems elsewhere...the general perception in Asia in 2009 was that the United States was distracted by the war in Iraq and the global war on terrorism and was economically weakened."⁴² Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, makes a similar point in his book, *The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia*. To address Asian concerns, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made Asia the destination for her first overseas travel.

Two landmark events underscored the administration's turn toward Asia: Secretary Clinton's remarks to the ASEAN Regional Forum in July, 2010, and President Obama's address to the Australian Parliament in, November 2011. Secretary Clinton, in addressing the intensifying South China Sea dispute, declared: "The United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation and open access to Asia's maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea."⁴³ Clinton went on to offer U.S. good offices to advance a peaceful resolution of the dispute. The Secretary's remarks drew a protest from China's Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, who exited the meeting, only to return the following day to remind attendees "China is a big

of both our nations to continue its economic liberalization, while respecting the human rights of its people...." Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for national Security Affairs, "From Containment to Enlargement" John Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1993, available at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/lakedoc.html>.

Lake's remarks came just two years after Tiananmen, when the CCP leadership made clear its determination to forcefully oppose democratization in order to maintain its authoritarian rule. While China has moved toward marketization, the CCP remains unalterably opposed to any movement toward political liberalization. The CCP's determination has only intensified under President Xi Jinping.

⁴² Jeffery A. Bader, *Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy*, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2013, 2

⁴³ Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, remarks to the ASEAN Regional Forum, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 2010, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24diplo.html>

country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact.⁴⁴” In reviewing the Hanoi meeting, Foreign Policy viewed Yang's remarks as the "End of the Charm Offensive."

President Obama, in his address to the Australian Parliament, announced that "after a decade in which we fought two wars...the United States is now turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region." The turn, soon identified as the Rebalance, reflected "a deliberate and strategic decision...the United States will play a larger role in shaping this region and its future." The United States would work toward "an international order...where international law and norms are enforced. Where commerce and freedom of navigation are not impeded. Where emerging powers contribute to regional security and where disagreements are resolved peacefully. That's the future we seek."

Obama told his audience that the United States "presence and mission in the Asia-Pacific" was "a top priority" of his administration. The "enduring interests" of the United States demanded an enduring presence." The President went on: "The United States is a Pacific power and we are here to stay." To shape the future, the United States would work to strengthen alliances, engage with the region's multilateral organizations, and build a cooperative relationship with China, one emphasizing the importance of "upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people."

The United States would also work to promote a rules-based international economy, one that advanced broad and sustainable growth. In the Asia-Pacific region, the United States diplomacy would aim "to create a seamless regional economy" and bring into being the Trans Pacific Partnership.⁴⁵

The Trans Pacific Partnership was central to the Rebalance. In the words of TPP negotiator Ambassador Michael Froman, TPP represented: "the most concrete manifestation of the President's rebalancing strategy toward Asia. It reflects the fact that we are a Pacific power and that our economic well-being is inextricably linked with the economic well-being of this region...TPP's significance is not just economic, it's strategic -- as a means of embedding the

⁴⁴ John Lee, "End of the Charm Offensive," Foreign Policy, October 26, 2010, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/10/26/the-end-of-the-charm-offensive/>

⁴⁵ President Barack Obama, Remarks to the Parliament of Australia, November 17, 2015, available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-australian-parliament> For Chinese perspectives on the Rebalance and the BRI, see Nadege Rolland, *China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative*, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017, 115-120

United States in the region,”⁴⁶ TPP, however, fell victim to domestic politics in the 2016 election. On January 23, 2017, President Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Eleven months later, President Trump set out his vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”—one focused on economic engagement. In remarks to the APEC CEO Summit in Danang, Vietnam, on November 10, 2017, the President promised the region a “renewed partnership with America, based on “trade relationships rooted in the principles of fairness and reciprocity.” The United States would expect “that our partners will faithfully follow the rules...that markets will be open to an equal degree on both sides, and that private industry, not government planners will direct investment.”⁴⁷

The private sector would be the primary engine of United States engagement. Trump pledged that his administration would “work to find opportunities for our private sector to work with yours.” It was for this reason that the United States would refocus economic development efforts and call on the World Bank and Asian Development Bank to support “high-quality, infrastructure investment that promotes economic growth.” The President committed his administration to reforming America’s “development finance institutions so that they better incentivize private sector investment in your economies, and provide strong alternatives to state-directed initiatives that come with many strings attached.”⁴⁸

The President’s references to “fair” trade, echoed those of President Obama in his remarks to the Australian Parliament. In references to the rule of law and freedom of navigation, he was aligning the United States, to a significant degree, with the Indo-Pacific visions of Prime Minister Abe as well as Prime Minister Modi and ASEAN. His call for investment in “high quality” infrastructure projects previewed what would be a key element in an evolving “pushback” strategy to compete with China and the BRI⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Ambassador Michael Froman, remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asian Architecture Conference, September 22, 2015, Washington, DC available at <https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speechestranscripts/2015/september/remarks->

⁴⁷ President Donald J. Trump, “Remarks to the APEC CEO Summit,” November 10, 2017, Danang Vietnam, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presid-ent-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/>

⁴⁸ President Donald J. Trump, “Remarks to the APEC CEO Summit,” November 10, 2017, Danang Vietnam, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presid-ent-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam/>

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Shortly after the Danang meeting, Trump administration released its National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. The two documents moved the United States-China relationship from a framework of cooperation to one of competition.

In the summer of 2019, Bilahari Kausikan, considered the various visions of order at play in the region. In his “How to Think about the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook” address, the ambassador observed that the various vision of the Indo-Pacific, including the U.S. Pivot and Rebalance, cannot be considered in isolation from the BRI and are best understood “as slogans” rather than “precise concepts” -- attempts to grasp and shape “new geopolitical realities that are “still fluid and malleable.” He found the various visions all sharing a “Rashomon-like quality.”⁵⁰

As for China, the ambassador noted that BRI too had its own Rashomon-like characteristics – was it “primarily an economic idea? Or military-strategic? Or both? If both, where is the emphasis? “He cast a jaundiced eye on Chinese claims that the BRI is “win-win, or more grandiosely, intended to benefit all of mankind.” Such assertions, he observed “are no longer taken at face value, if they ever were, except perhaps by the terminally naïve or the irredeemably corrupt.”⁵¹ --

V. Behind the Visions: Perceptions of Strategic Change and an Assertive China

Visions of order in the Indo-Pacific did not emerge in a strategic vacuum. Behind the various visions was the reality of strategic change, marked across the region, by the actions of an increasingly assertive China.

In 2010, the Japan-China “Mutually Beneficial Strategic Partnership” encountered the force of Chinese nationalism.⁵² To protest Japan’s seizure of a Chinese fishing boat in the Senkaku

⁵⁰ Bilahari Kausikan, “How to Think about the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook”, remarks delivered to the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, ASEAN Lecture, August 16, 2019, available at <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/media/video-gallery/20th-asean-lecture-how-to-think-about-the-indopacific-by-mr-bilahari-kausikan/>. Author has written hard copy text in his possession ti

⁵¹ Bilahari Kausikan, “How to Think about the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook”, remarks delivered to the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, ASEAN Lecture, August 16, 2019, available at <https://www.iseas.edu.sg/media/video-gallery/20th-asean-lecture-how-to-think-about-the-indopacific-by-mr-bilahari-kausikan/>. For an interpretation of BRI, see Nadege Rolland, *China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative*, National Bureau of Asian Research, 2027, Chapter Six 177-191.

Jonathan E. Hillman, *The Emperor’s New Road: China and the Project of the Century*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 2020

⁵² At the end of a difficult turn-of-the-century period in Japan-China relations, marked by China’s breaking off high-level diplomatic and political contact, the result of disputes over history, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited China. in

islands, Beijing cut off rare earth exports to Japan, slowed customs procedures, issued tourist guidance against travel to Japan, and cut off high-level political and ministerial contacts. Two years later, Beijing, in response to Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku islands, allowed anti-Japanese protests to gather strength across the country, resulting in significant damage to Japanese commercial property and injury to Japanese residents.

In Southeast Asia, China likewise flexed its growing economic power. In 2012, Beijing banned the import of Philippine bananas to express its displeasure over a confrontation between a Philippine warship and Chinese fishermen in the area of the Scarborough Shoal.

In 2013, Beijing initiated construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, which it later militarized contravening what was understood by U.S. officials as a commitment President Xi made to President Obama. And in 2016, China disregarded the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague in the South Seas Arbitration Case, which denied China's assertion of historic rights within its claimed nine-dash line. China's former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and State Councilor Dai Bingguo dismissed the judgment as "Nothing but a piece of paper."⁵³

In 2014, China's state-owned China National Offshore Oil Company initiated unilateral exploration in an area south of the Paracel islands, an area claimed by Vietnam as within its Exclusive Economic Zone. To protest, Hanoi sent patrol ships and fishing boats into the area which were water-cannoned and rammed by Chinese coast guard ships. To date, China has continued to engage in confrontations with Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia over natural resources.

In November, 2017, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade released its "2017 Foreign Policy White Paper." The document assessed that the United States would remain the "most powerful" international actor, but that "its long dominance of the international order is being challenged by other powers. A post-Cold War lull in major power rivalry has ended ..." ⁵⁴,

October 2006. The visit resulted in a restoration of high-level political and diplomatic contacts and agreement on a framework for the relationship, "A Mutually Beneficial Relationship based on Common Strategic Interests."

⁵³ Catherine Wong, "Former Chinese Envoy Dismisses Upcoming Rulings on South China Sea Claims," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 6, 2016, available at <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1986029/nothing-more-piece-paper-former-chinese-envoy-dismisses>

⁵⁴ Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "2017 Foreign Policy White Paper," 20, available at <https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/2017-foreign-policy-white-paper/fpwhitepaper/index.html>

⁵⁷ Ibid. 25 In his review of the White Paper, Rory Medcalf, Head of the National Security College at the Australia National University, wrote that the Indo-Pacific "is defined by its fundamental quality of multipolarity (which also makes it the natural setting for balancing a rising power)...China, the United States, Japan and India and more – are

The White paper found the Indo-Pacific to be a region in the process of a “strategic transition” as profound as its earlier economic transformation. As in the economic transformation, China again was driving the strategic transformation. China’s surging economic strength was “accelerating shifts in relative economic and strategic weight,” giving China, in parts of the region, “power and influence... to match, and in some cases, exceed that of the United States.”⁵⁵

The White Paper noted that “Like all great powers, China will seek to influence the region to suit its own interests,” and, as it does so, present Australia with “an increasingly complex and contested Indo-Pacific.” The document postulated that economic and security interests would continue to anchor the United States to the region and that the United States would continue to play a “significant role” as a “stabilizing influence. Looking ahead, the White Paper observed that “In this dynamic environment, competition is intensifying, over both power and principles and values on which the regional order should be based.” Future stability will depend “more than ever” on the evolution of U.S-China relations.⁵⁶

The White Paper’s numerous references to norms, values and respect for international rules define Australia’s interest in supporting the liberal international order, now under challenge in the region. Asked a year later to comment on the judgments of the White Paper, a senior Australian intelligence officer observed “what has surprised us is the pace of change.” He went on to comment that China represented “the greatest security challenge Australia has faced since the Coral Sea.”⁵⁷

now striving to shape the region and to define their Indo-Pacific strategies for doing so. Chinese rejection of the rhetoric of the Indo-Pacific is, well, rhetorical: through the so-called Belt and Road geo-economic initiative and its growing naval footprint in the Indian Ocean, Beijing is already executing its own Indo-Pacific strategy with Chinese characteristics.” Rory Medcalf, “Australia’s Foreign Policy White: Navigating Uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific,” available at https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/2018-09/medcalf.pdf

Australian scholars Mathew Sussex and Michael Clarke in their “Policy Options Paper” write “The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is both a blueprint for a China centric order in the Indo-Pacific and a means to address internal economic and political challenges.” Mathew Sussex and Michael Clarke, One Belt, One Road, multiple rules-based orders, “Policy Options Paper, No. 7,” November, 2017 National Security College, Australian National University, available at https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/2017-11/pop7_one_belt_many_orders.pdf

⁵⁵ Ibid 26

Australia’s emphasis on maintenance of a rules based international order is also reflected in the government’s 2016 Defence White Paper which expresses the concern that “The framework of the rules-based global order is under increasing pressure and has shown signs of fragility. The balance of military and economic power between countries is changing and newly powerful countries want greater influence to challenge some of the rules in the global architecture established some 7year ago.” Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 45 available at <https://defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>.

⁵⁷ James J. Przystup, Visions of Order in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Singapore and Australia, National Defense University, October 11, 2018, available at <Http://www.ndu.edu/inss>.

Of strategic concern were China's actions regions east, north and west of Australia -- in Vanuatu in the South Pacific, in militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea, and in a growing presence in the Indian Ocean region and Africa.

The above analysis is echoed in Prime Minister Scott Morrison's remarks introducing the 2020 Defence Strategic Update.⁵⁸ "Australia," Morrison observed, "has not seen the conflation of global, economic and strategic uncertainty...since the existential threat we faced when the global and regional order collapsed in the 1930s and 1940s." Morrison called attention to the rapid acceleration of trends outlined in the earlier 2016 Defence White Paper -- intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region; challenges to the rules-based global order, military modernization with increasing capabilities; and the wide-spread use of coercion and disinformation – presenting Australia with "a never less benign strategic environment."⁵⁹

VI. Push Back: Defining the Challenge

"A fundamental divergence of values that leads to incompatible visions of the future...Beijing is working to form its ideology in order to bend, break and replace the existing rules-based order...to create a new international order, one with 'Chinese characteristics,' and led by China...."⁶⁰

Admiral Phil Davidson

The "Push Back" involves policies of individual governments, bilateral alliance-based cooperation, as well as multilateral efforts to deal with the security, economic and diplomatic challenges posed to the existing regional order by China. The policies adopted by the United States, Japan and Australia reflect their respective national interests, which, while not identical, are congruent and mutually reinforcing in their efforts to maintain a rules-based order that sustains western values and supports a balance of influence based on a balance of power.

⁵⁸ Australia, Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, July 1, 2020, available at <https://www.defence.gov.au/StrategicUpdate-2020/#:~:text=The%202020%20Defence%20Strategic%20Update,their%20implications%20for%20Defence%20planning>.

⁵⁹ Remarks of Prime Minister Scott Morrison, July 1, 2020, available at <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/address-launch-2020-defence-strategic-update>

⁶⁰ Remarks of Admiral Philip Davidson, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 12, 2019 available at <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1755357/indo-pacific-command-worried-about-chinas-path/>

It is difficult to assign a precise date to the beginning of the “Push Back.” Arguably, it could begin as early as 2006 with Foreign Minister Aso’s “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” address, which set out a framework for a western-values, rules-based order for what would become the Indo-Pacific region, followed by Prime Minister Abe’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Other landmarks along the way would include the Obama administration’s Rebalance, and Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper which recognized the on-going strategic transformation of the region and the existence of a contest to define the values, rules, and norms of the Indo-Pacific region. It would include President Trump’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy documents, which mark a clear transition in the U.S.-China relationship --from cooperation to competition.⁶¹ Finally, it would include Secretary of State Pompeo’s July 13, 2020 statement aligning U.S policy toward the South China with the 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which denied China’s claim to historic rights in the South China Sea.⁶²

The United States

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy characterized the Indo-Pacific region in which a “geopolitical competition between Free and repressive visions of world order is taking place.” The document found China to be using economic inducements, investment strategies, and the militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea “to reinforce its geopolitical aspirations...and undermine regional stability.” China had designed its military modernization “to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China with a free hand there.”⁶³ The National Defense Strategy characterized the international order as “resilient but weakening,” challenged by revisionist powers. The document found China “continuing to pursue a military

⁶¹ At the end of the 20th century, the Asia policy debate in Washington revolved around China policy. In 1998, President Clinton defined China as a “strategic partner” and directed U.S. policy toward engagement. Meanwhile, a different view of China was emerging in Republican foreign policy circles, one that postulated China as a “strategic competitor.” In remarks to the Ronald Reagan Library in November 1999, George W. Bush told his audience “If I am President, China will find itself respected as great power, but in region of strong democratic alliances, it will be unthreatened, but not unchecked.”⁶¹ Following the Bush years, the Obama administration, while recognizing competition in the U.S.-China relationship, focused on cooperation and returned to an engagement strategy. Michael J. Green, *By More Than Providence*, Columbia University Press 2017, 484. See also James Mann. *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet*, Penguin Group (USA) LLC, 2004.

⁶² Remarks of Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, July 13, 2020, available at <https://www.state.gov/remarks-secretary-pompeo/>

⁶³ National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, 45, 46, available at, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=4421220-The-White-House-National-Security-Strategy>

modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”⁶⁴ Both documents called for the strengthening of U.S. alliances and renewed U.S. leadership in the face of challenges posed by China to the existing regional and international order.

In remarks to the 2019 Shangri-la Dialogue, then Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan expanded on the themes of the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy telling his Singapore audience: “Perhaps, the greatest long-term threat to the vital interest of states across the region comes from *actors* (italics added) who seek to undermine, rather than uphold, the rules-based international order. He went on: “In contrast to the free and open vision broadly shared by the region “*some* (italics added) seem to want a future where power determines place and debt determines destiny.”⁶⁵

Japan

Japan’s Diplomatic Blue Book 2019 reiterates long-standing concerns with China – its ongoing military modernization program; lack of transparency, militarization of outposts in the South China Sea; continuing incursions into Japan’s Senkaku islands, and stepped up PLA Navy activities in the seas around Japan. Striking are numerous references to China’s disregard for the norms, values, and the rule of law that have served as the foundation for region’s stability and prosperity, China’s included.

The Blue Book cites China for “unilateral actions and attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion at sea and in the airspace in the East China Sea and South China Sea based on its own assertions which are incompatible with the existing order of international law of the sea.” The Blue Book cited China’s “unique assertions concerning its territorial rights in the South China Sea, including rejecting the legally binding force of the final award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal which confirmed the lawlessness of China’s land reclamation and other actions...”⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of Defense, 2 available at <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>

⁶⁵ Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan, Remarks to Shangri-la Dialogue, Singapore June 1, 2019, available at <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/1871584/acting-secretary-shanahans-remarks-at-the-iiss-shangri-la-dialogue-2019/>

⁶⁶ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Blue Book 2019, 15 available at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html>

Beyond the direct security challenges posed by China, Tokyo focused on the broader challenges posed by China to the norms, values and rule of law that sustain the existing international order. In 2019 Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, published the 9th of its NIDS China Security Reports, "China's Strategy for Reshaping the Asian Order and its Ramifications." Addressing China's broader challenges, the study considered "China's Quest to Build a New International Order."⁶⁷

Australia and New Zealand

Canberra's building concern with China and its activities in the South Pacific is reflected in the 2015 the Department of Defence study, "China's Growing Influence in the South-West Pacific: Australian policies that could respond to China's intentions and objectives."⁶⁸

The study put China's activities in in the South-West Pacific in the broader context of China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea and its on-going military modernization, which raised for Australia the question of China's "intentions." As for intentions, the document set out contending interpretations: the first, that Beijing's aim is to prevail in a strategic competition with the United States and establish China's regional hegemony; the second, that China's activities are essentially resource driven, to support its economy and provide sustenance for its people. The study called for efforts to "better understand China's interests and objectives."
(8)

In the South-West Pacific, however, the study noted, that "China growing influence has come at the expense of Australia" and cautioned that Australia's "decreasing influence will lead to a decreased ability to control Australia's security." The document framed the choice for policy makers – whether to accept China's growing influence as "a "benefit" for Pacific Island countries or "whether that influence is coming at the expense of Australia's influence and supporting outcomes...inimical to Australia's influence." The study called for greater efforts to "rebalance China's influence." 3, 1⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Japan, National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2019, available at <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp>.

⁶⁸ Department of Defence (Australia), China's Growing Influence in the South-West Pacific, available at [https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/150327%20Hegarty%20IPS%20Paper%20China's%20Gro](https://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/150327%20Hegarty%20IPS%20Paper%20China's%20Growing%20In)

⁶⁹ Ibid.1 3,4,8,19

Australia's 2016 Defence White Paper identified a strategic defense line, beyond Australia's own homeland, extending from Papua New Guinea, to Timor L-Este to the Pacific Island countries and expressed concerns about "a foreign military power seeking influence in ways that could challenge the security of our maritime approaches... The White Paper underscored Australia's interest in a "stable Indo-Pacific region and a rules-based global order."⁷⁰

Two years later, New Zealand's Strategic Defence Policy Statement found the country facing "a more challenging and complex strategic environment-one in which the international rules-based order, the foundation of New Zealand's security and prosperity, is coming under increasing pressure...of a scope and magnitude not previously seen in our neighborhood." In this environment, the Statement cautioned that "states may be compelled to make choices, small and large, in ways they had previously avoided."

The White Paper found China deeply invested and integrated in the rules-based order, yet "not consistently" acting in accordance with "the rules championed by the order's traditional leaders." Citing China's construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, the policy statement noted that Beijing's "more confident assertion of its interests has a times raised tensions with neighboring states and the United States." The document judged that China is seeking to "restore claimed historical levels of influence in its periphery as well as an enhanced global leadership role;" yet "some actions in pursuit of these aims challenge the existing order," such as Beijing's rejection of the Hague Tribunal's ruling on sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. In this environment, "it will remain in New Zealand's vital interest to act in support of this order," starting in concert with Australia.⁷¹ In March 2018 Australia-New Zealand released a Joint Statement on Closer Defence Relations.

VII. Push Back: A Foreign Policy Mosaic:

Diplomacy and Defense; Infrastructure and Development; Economics and Trade

"Beijing cannot bully its way to superpower status without engendering a strong pushback from other countries, which is exactly what's happening now." ⁷² Orville Schell

⁷⁰ Department of Defence (Australia) Defense White Paper 2016, 69, 70

⁷¹ New Zealand, Strategic Defence Policy Statement ,2018, 17,available at <https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/8958486b29/Strategic-Defence-Policy-Statement-2018.pdf>

⁷² Orville Schell, "The Birth, Life and Death of Engagement," The China Wire, June 7, 2020, available at

The following section focuses on three lines of effort, diplomacy and defense, finance and infrastructure, economics and trade, that highlight responses of the United States, Japan, and Australia to the challenges posed by China. Some are individual country initiatives, others bilateral and multilateral in nature. The examples below are not meant to be exhaustive but illustrative of actions taken in Washington, Tokyo and Canberra to support the shared vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific -- all aimed at strengthening the rules-based order and maintaining a balance of influence and power in the region.

***Push Back: Diplomacy and Defense --
Expanding Alliance-based Cooperation:***

The United States

President Obama, in his 2011 remarks to the Parliament of Australia, announced that the United States by 2020, would deploy 60% of its naval forces to the Asia-Pacific region. On July 12, 2018, Seventh Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Joseph Aucoin reported that 60 percent of the Navy's submarine force was already deployed to the region and that the transfer of an additional 10-15 ships would realize the full 60 percent deployment by 2019.⁷³ The Department of Defense, in its June 1, 2019, "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report" announced that 200 ships and submarines are now under INDOPACOM command⁷⁴

In the "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report," Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan declared "We will not accept policies or actions that threaten or undermine the rule-based international order...We are committed to defending and enhancing these shared values."⁷⁵ The conduct of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) by the United States Navy in the South China Sea is a case in point. In 2015, the Obama administration authorized 2 FONOPS and 2

<https://thewirchina.com/2020/06/07the-birth-life-and-death-of-engagement>

⁷³ "US Navy to have 60% Surface Ships in Indo-Pacific", Economic Times of India, July 12, 2018, available at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/us-navy-to-have-60-surface-ships-in-indo-asia-pacific-region/articleshow/51778769.cms>

⁷⁴ Department of Defense, Message from the Secretary of Defense "Indo-Pacific Strategy Report," June 1, 2019, available at <https://www.pacom.mil/Portals/55/DOD-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-JUNE-2019.pdf>, 19

⁷⁵ Ibid, Message From the Secretary of Defense

again in 2016. Under the Trump administration, the Navy conducted 6 in 2017; 5 in 2018 and 9 in 2019.⁷⁶

In the first quarter of 2020, the Navy conducted 4 FONOPS in the South China Sea and two in April along with two “presence operations” near the Malaysian drill ship, West Capella, which was being harassed by Chinese ships.⁷⁷ On July 14, 2020, the USS Ralph Johnson conducted a FONOP within Chinese held land-features in the Spratly Islands. In the same month, the United States Navy deployed two aircraft carrier battlegroups to the region, with the USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan conducting exercises in the South China Sea and combined exercise with Japan and Australia in the Philippine Sea.⁷⁸ The joint exercise followed the Nimitz earlier exercise with the Indian Navy. Commenting on the South China exercise, Rear Admiral George Wikoff told the media “The purpose is to show an unambiguous signal to our partners and allies that we are committed to regional security and stability.”⁷⁹

The “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” reiterates concerns about China’s military modernization and coercive actions, citing China’s development of anti-access/area denial capabilities and intimidating actions in the maritime and air domains, which threaten to undermine the rules-based international order. The Report recognizes that the wide-ranging challenges presented in the Indo-Pacific “are beyond what any single country can address alone” –the United States values “allies and partners as a force multiplier for peace....”⁸⁰

During 2019, the United States moved to strengthen alliance relationships with Australia and Japan.

The United States-Australia Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) of August 4, 2019, committed the Alliance to building a “secure and prosperous future” in the Indo-Pacific region,

⁷⁶David B. Larter, “In Challenging China’s Claims in the South China Sea, the US Navy is Getting More Assertive,” Defense News, February 5, 2019=0, available at <https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/02/05/in-challenging-chinas-claims-in-the-south-china-sea-the-us-navy-is-getting-more-assertive>

⁷⁷ Jesse Johnson, “U.S. Military faces down two challenges in western Pacific: COVID-19 and China, The Japan Times, May 20, 2020, U.S. embassy, Japan Media Highlights.

⁷⁸ Sam LaGrone, “U.S. Chinese navies Hold Dueling Exercises in South China Sea, USNI News, July, 6, 2020, available at <https://news.usni.org/2020/07/06/u-s-china-navies-hold-dueling-exercises-in-the-south-china-sea>. And : Ken Moriyasu and Wajahat Khan, “U.S., Japan, India, and Australia simulate “Quad” drill in Indo-Pacific, July 22, 2020, available at <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/US-Japan-India-and-Australia-simulate-Quad-drill-in-Indo-Pacific>.

⁷⁹ Rear Admiral George Wikoff, the United Press, July 4, 2020, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/7/4/us-aircraft-carriers-conduct-military-drills-in-south-china-sea>.

⁸⁰ Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, June 1 2019, 16, available at <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>

specifically to “promote freedom of navigation and overflight...in accordance with international law;” to cooperate and coordinate “in capacity building on maritime issues with Indo-Pacific countries;” to “further deepen trilateral cooperation with Japan and enhance engagement with India, including through the Quad;” and to coordinate “approaches to the Indian Ocean, including enhancing maritime security and ocean governance.”⁸¹

The Joint Statement issued following AUSMIN 2020 echoed the themes of the 2019 consultations and, at the same time, underscored the growing U.S.-Australia strategic alignment, announcing that “the Indo-Pacific is the focus of the Alliance.” The document committed the two countries to working “side-by-side” with ASEAN, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea to strengthen our networked structure of alliances and partnerships to maintain a region that is secure, prosperous, inclusive and rules-based.” Toward the South China Sea, the Joint Statement “affirmed that Beijing’s maritime claims are not valid under international law. Specifically...that the PRC cannot assert maritime claims based on the ‘nine-dash line, ‘historic rights,’ or entire South China Sea island groups which are incompatible with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea...”

In terms of U.S.-Australia defense cooperation, the Secretaries and Ministers signed a classified document, “Statement of Principles on Alliance Defense Cooperation and Force Posture Priorities” that set up a Force Posture Working Group to advance “cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to promote a secure and stable region, and deter coercive acts and the use of force.”⁸²

Earlier, the Joint Statement of the United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, April 19, 2019, welcomed “the alignment of the strategic policy documents of both countries, namely the United States National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy and Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines.” This strategic evolution reflected the “stronger, more advanced, more effective” defense cooperation effected following the adoption of the 2015 Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation. The Joint Statement expressed the concern that “geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules,

⁸¹ Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) April 19, 2019 available at <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-australia-u-s-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2019/t>

⁸² “Joint Statement of Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN)” July 28, 2020, available at <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2290911/joint-statement-on-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2020/source/GovDelivery/>

norms, and institutions present challenges to the Alliance and the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”⁸³

Japan

At the same time, Japan, under the Abe government’s Mid-Term Defense Plan has strengthened Japan’s own defense capabilities, including the purchase of 105 U.S. F-35 aircraft; 63 F-35 model A and 42 F35 model B aircraft. The government’s defense plans also called for the refitting of Japan’s helicopter carriers, Izumo and Kaga, to accommodate the vertical takeoff F-35B, including operational use by U.S. aircraft and the creation of multidimensional joint defense force. Total expenditures for the Mid-Term Defense Plan totaled a record 27.47 trillion yen (approximately \$243 billion) a 2-trillion yen increase over the previous Mid Term Defense Plan and an annualized increase of 1.1 percent. Japan’s defense spending under the Abe government increased for seven consecutive years.⁸⁴

Japan’s defense policy reforms, namely the 2014 decision to reinterpret the constitution to allow for limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense opened the door to greater security cooperation with the United States. The following year, the United States and Japan adopted the 2015 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, which expanded the scope of functional defense cooperation, allowing for greater security cooperation in missile defense, in response to gray zone contingencies, and in defense cooperation with third countries.⁸⁵

Increasing U.S.-Japan defense cooperation is reflected in stepped-up bilateral training exercises in the East and South China Seas – in the East China Sea with the USS Carl Vinson, in March 2017; again with the USS Carl Vinson in the western Pacific in April; in the Sea of Japan with the USS Carl Vinson and the USS Ronald Reagan in June, in the South China Sea with the USS Carl Vinson and Japan’s helicopter carrier, Ise, in March 2018; and in the South China, in

⁸³ “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, Japan, April 19, 2019, available at https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/201904_js.html

⁸⁴ “Defense Outlay for 5-Year Period to Reach Record 25 Trillion Yen,” The Asahi Shimbun, December 13, 2018; Available at <https://www.bing.com/search?q=%E2%80%9CDefense+Outlay+for+5-Year+Period+to+Reach+Record+25+Trillion+Yen%2C%E2%80%9D+The+Asahi+Shimbun%2C+December+13%2C+2018%3B&cvid=7045cf80e46e4a54812cf7fb35927c86&pglt=43&FORM=ANNTA1&PC=LCTS>.

and Masaya Kato, “Japan’s F-35Orders to Lift Defense Spending to New Heights,” Nikkei Asian Review, December 14, 2018 available at https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/201904_js.html

⁸⁵ The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, Japan, 2015, available at https://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/201904_js.html

June 2019, with the carrier strike groups of the USS Ronald Reagan and Japan's helicopter carrier Izumo. In 2017, Japan and the United States conducted 74 publicized joint exercises, almost 4 times as the 19 joint exercises conducted in Japan's fiscal year 2015, before the Abe government's new security legislation was adopted.⁸⁶

Japan has also moved to advance bilateral security cooperation beyond the Japan-U.S. alliance, expanding defense engagement across the region, strengthening the security pillar of regional order.

In 2015, Japan, at the invitation of India, joined the U.S.-India Malabar Exercise as a permanent exercise partner. In August 2018, the JMSDF dispatched three ships, including the helicopter carrier Kaga, for an extended 3-month deployment through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean that featured port calls and training exercises with the United States and the navies of Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and India.⁸⁷ Meanwhile, the Abe government, based on the December 2013 National Security Strategy, revised Japan's arms export policy to provide for the transfer of defense equipment to allies and strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region.⁸⁸

Abe's successor Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide underscored the strategic importance of Southeast Asia by making his first foreign travel to Vietnam, October 19 and Indonesia, October 21. In Hanoi, he concluded an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology. In Jakarta, Suga and Indonesia's President Joko Widodo agreed to work toward the conclusion of an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology. On November 2 Japanese and Indonesian Defense Ministers followed up via teleconference, agreeing to cooperate toward the early conclusion of an agreement on the transfer of defense technology and equipment

Japan has also initiated maritime capacity building programs with the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, enhancing capabilities to resist challenges to their sovereignty.

⁸⁶ Author's communication with Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, September 13, 2018

⁸⁷ Jesse Johnson, "Japan to send Helicopter Destroyer for Rare Long-Term Exercises in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean," The Japan Times, August 22, 2018. available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/08/22/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-send-three-destro>

⁸⁸ Japan's 2013 National Security Strategy reads: "Japan will take measures to address threats in the sea lanes of communication...to ensure safe maritime transport and provide maritime security cooperation (and) provide assistance to those coastal states alongside sea and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities and strengthen communication with partners on sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan. See: National Security Strategy of Japan (Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2013, available at <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryoku/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf>

And in 2016 Japan and ASEAN adopted the Vientiane Vision statement setting out a comprehensive plan for defense cooperation

In 2009, Japan and Australia launched Nichi Gou Trident, an annual maritime exercise. In 2019, Japan, for the first time, joined, the Australia-United States biennial exercise “Talisman Sabre,” sending the helicopter carrier, Ise, along with a component of 500 Maritime Self Defense Force personnel.⁸⁹ On November 17, Tokyo and Canberra concluded a Reciprocal Access Agreement aimed at enhancing defense cooperation. The document, the first covering foreign forces in Japan since the 1960 U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement, extends to Japanese SDF activities in Australia and Australian military activities in Japan.⁹⁰ In announcing the Agreement, beside Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Prime Minister Suga declared that it is “increasingly important” for countries with both the “will and capacity to contribute to regional peace and stability;” the agreement has taken Japan-Australia security and defense cooperation “to a new level. Prime Minister Morrison defined the agreement as “a landmark defense treaty, enhancing “our special strategic partnership.”⁹¹

In a July 26, 2020, interview with the Asahi Shimbun Ryosei Kokubun, President of Japan’s National Defense University and China scholar, addressed the challenges posed by China in the East China Sea and its stepped-up activities in the Senkaku islands, where at the end of July Chinese ships had operated for over 100 consecutive days. Kokubun observed that “it will be difficult for Japan to act alone -- to deal effectively with China, Tokyo must show that “Japan-U.S. cooperation is strong and it must cooperate with Australia and other Asian nations.”⁹²

Of similar importance in the evolution of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific has been the development of the Japan-India strategic relationship. Geographically located on the East-West axis of the region, the two countries share a commitment to democratic values, the rule of law and

⁸⁹ Ankit Panda, “A First: Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force Joins U.S-Australia Talisman Sabre Exercise, The Diplomat, June 25, 2019, available at, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/a-first-japans-maritime-self-defense-force-joins-us-australia-talisman-sabre-exercises/> Japan participated in previous Talisman exercises, 2015 and 2017 as embedded in U.S. forces. Talisman Sabre is described as a joint forces high-end war fighting exercise with a near-peer rival.” Scott W. Herald et al., *The Thickening Web of Asian Security Cooperation*, The Rand Corporation, 2019, 194

⁹⁰ Japan Times, June 12, 2020, Japan Media Highlights, available at <https://jmh.usembassy.gov/20200615145671>

⁹¹ Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, “Suga says broad agreement reached on military pact with Australia, The Japan Times, November 17, 2020, available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/11/17/national/politics-diplomacy/australia-scott-morrison>.

⁹² Ryosei Kokubun, interview, the Asahi Shimbun, July 26, 2020, available at <http://www.bing.com/search?q=Ryosei+Kokubun%2C+interview%2C+the+Asahi+Shimbun%2C+July+26%2C> .

a cultural heritage, dating back to the arrival of Buddhist monks in Japan from India in the sixth and seventh centuries. The two countries also share a concern about China's increasing influence and assertiveness across the region. Japan's focus overwhelmingly is on the maritime domain, while India's attention is focused on its northeastern border with China. In recent years, however, India too has become increasingly concerned with China's growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the implications of the BRI for the security environment of the subcontinent. Under President George W. Bush, the United States moved to expand its ties with India, and, in the process, encouraged the development of the Japan-India relationship.⁹³

Australia

On the North-South axis of the Indian Ocean, Australia and India have been developing defense and security ties in the framework of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Australia's 2016 Defense White Paper defined India as key security and defense partner in support of regional stability and a rules-based order⁹⁴ And, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper cast India as a "front rank partner"⁹⁵ The AUSINDEX exercises began in 2015, moa and were most recently conducted in the Bay of Bengal in 2019.

Indicative of burgeoning ties, Prime Ministers Morrison and Modi conducted a "Virtual Summit on June 4, 2020." In a joint statement, the two leaders committed to support "a free, open, inclusive and rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific Region ...freedom of navigation, overflight...and adherence of all nations to international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and peaceful resolution of disputes rather than

⁹³ For a fuller discussion of the Japan-India relationship, see Thomas L. Lynch and James J. Przystup "India, Japan Strategic Cooperation and Implications for U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region," Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, available at <https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1112325/india-japan-strategic-cooperation-and-implications-for-us-strategy-in-the-indo/>

⁹⁴ Australia, Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, available at <https://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf>

⁹⁵ The reality of strengthened U.S. alliances is recognized in China's 2019 Defense White Paper "The US is strengthening its Asia-Pacific military alliances and reinforcing military deployment...." Quoted in Li Hao, "Key Points in China's New Defence White Paper," JIIA Strategic Comments, No. 14 available at <https://irdb.nii.ac.jp/en/02975/0004300758> and https://jiiia.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=pages_view_main&active_action=repository_view_main_item_detail&item_id=1124&it.

through unilateral or coercive actions.”⁹⁶ The Joint statement’s reference to “inclusion” left the door open for China, while expressing opposition to China’s actions in the South China Sea.

Also in June, at the conclusion of the annual ASEAN summit, Vietnam, the ASEAN chair for 2020, issued a Chairman’s statement on the South China Sea that reads “We reaffirm that the 1982 UNCLOS is basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones and the 1982 UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the ocean and seas must be carried out.”⁹⁷ The statement again underscored the growing regional pushback against Chinese assertiveness.

Alliance Evolution

The growing alliance-based security cooperation among the United States, Japan, and Australian points to the evolution of a strengthened alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific region.⁹⁸ Cold War in origin, the bilateral “hub and spokes” alliance structure has been evolving towards a comprehensive and networked architecture, one that features increased security cooperation between U.S. alliance partners, most notably between Australia and Japan; between Japan and the Philippines; as well as quadrilateral engagement, involving the United States, Japan, Australia and India. Meanwhile, the United States has developed Comprehensive Partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam and a Strategic Partnership with Singapore, while Japan and Australia have developed similar partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.⁹⁹

In 2017, the United States, Japan, Australia, and India joined together during the East Asian Summit in Manila in to resurrect “The Quad,” a strategic concept originally proposed by Prime Minister Abe in 2007 but shortly beset with political and diplomatic inertia and concerns about

⁹⁶ Suhasini Haidar, “India-Australia Meeting Strengthens Ties,” *The Hindu*, June 4, 20220, available at <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/glad-to-be-joining-the-first-india-australia-virtual-summit-pm-modi/article31745133.ece>

⁹⁷ Lucio B. Pitlo III, “ASEAN stops pulling punches over South China Sea”, *Asia Times*, July 3, 2010, available at <https://asiatimes.com/2020/07/asean-stops-pulling-punches-over-south-china-sea/>

⁹⁸ See, Yuki Tatsumi, ed, *US-Japan-Australia Security Cooperation*, The Stimson Center, April 16, 2015 available at <https://www.stimson.org/2015/us-japan-australia-security-cooperation-prospects-and-challenges-1/>

⁹⁹ For the full range of U.S. alliance and partner relationships in the Indo-Pacific, see Department of Defense, “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report” June 1, 2019 and Department of State, *A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision*, November 4, 2019 The evolving nature of the U.S. alliance structure is noted in the 2016 INSS publication, *Charting a Course*, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C. Chapter 8, 191-94

being perceived as provocative toward China.¹⁰⁰ Since 2017, the Quad has met three times at a senior Assistant Secretary level; in 2019 the dialogue was raised to the Ministerial level.

At the November 4, 2019, Ministerial in Bangkok, discussion focused on shared values and interests, respective Indo-Pacific visions, in particular maintenance of a rules-based order, combatting terrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, development finance and cyber security. In a readout of the meeting, senior U.S. diplomats called attention to the role of India in the Quad as reflecting “the many ways that the U.S. and India are now cooperating closely on shared strategic objectives.” The U.S. diplomat pointed to the creation of the U.S.-India Two-Plus Two Ministerial Dialogue, the deepening of defense ties and the development of trilateral relations with Japan, as underscored by Japan’s participation in the Malabar exercise.¹⁰¹

After a summer of growing discontent with China’s internal and external conduct, the Quad Ministerial met again in Tokyo on October 6, 2020.¹⁰² In his welcoming remarks, Japan’s Foreign Minister Motegi noted that the rules-based international order is now being challenged in various fields and called on Quad members, as countries sharing basic values, to cooperate in dealing with the corona virus pandemic, in strengthening maritime security, and in advancing high

¹⁰⁰ Shortly before returning to office in December 2012, Abe authored “Asia’s Democratic Strategic Diamond,” in which he argued that “peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Developments affecting each are more closely connected than ever.” He was concerned that China’s was turning the South China Sea into “Lake Beijing.” Alarmed at the pace of “China’s naval and territorial expansion,” Abe reiterated his earlier call for Japan and India “to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.” Abe called for the creation of a strategic diamond in which Japan, Australia, India and the United States would act to “to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean to the western Pacific.” Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December, 27, 2012, available at <https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe?barrier=accesspaylog>
Also, See Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’” War on the Rocks, November 16, 2017, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/>

¹⁰¹ <https://in.usembassy.gov/readout-of-u-s-australia-india-japan-ministerial-the-quad/> For an Australian perspective on the prospects of the Quad, see “Debating the Quad,” Australian National University, the Centre of Gravity Series, March 2018. Available at http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/uploads/2018-03/cog_39_web_debating_the_quad.pdf. The U.S.-India Two-Plus-Two met October 27, 2020 in New Delhi.

¹⁰² Indicative of the growing concerns: in early May,, In 2020 Indian and Chinese forces clashed along India’s northeast boundary; in the late spring and summer, Chinese ships entered Japan’s contiguous zone in the Senkaku islands for over 100 consecutive days, at time times entering Japan’s sovereign waters; in Canberra and Washington, political leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with China’s management of the coronavirus crisis and concern with Beijing’s repression of its Uighur minority , clampdown on human rights in Hong Kong and an increasingly threatening posture toward Taiwan.

quality infrastructure projects toward the realization of a Free and Open Indo Pacific ¹⁰³ The Sankei Shimbun observed that the meeting, the first in-person international meeting hosted by Japan since the onset of the pandemic in March and the arrival of the new Suga government in September, reflected the respective governments' increasing concerns about international challenges being posed by China.¹⁰⁴

The Vice President of Japan's National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Narushige Michishita, in commenting on the meeting, observed that the Quad was becoming "more serious and concrete." He noted that "All four Quad members feel threatened by China in one way or another: political-influence activities, cyber-attacks, intellectual property theft, territorial disputes, and, most importantly, China's increasingly clear intention to challenge and reshape existing international systems and values."¹⁰⁵

Over the past decade, Japan and Australia, conscious of the multiple challenges being posed by China, have moved to play greater roles in support of a rules-based order, by advancing security and defense cooperation with countries across the region. For both countries, their alliance with the United States remains the foundational element in their respective foreign policy and national security strategies. But both countries, concerned about U.S. leadership and commitment, dating at least as far back as President Obama's "Red Line" retreat in Syria as well as the Trump administration's transactional and idiosyncratic approach to alliance management, have moved proactively to hedge against uncertainty. Collectively, their actions have served to reinforce prospects for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, in turn complementing U.S. strategy.

Europe and the Free and Open Pacific

European countries likewise have voiced increasing concerns about China's assertiveness and, while this study is centered on the United States, Japan and Australia, it would be remiss not to acknowledge the growing engagement of the EU, France, the United Kingdom as well as the Republic of Korea in activities that support a rules-based order in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

¹⁰³ Prime Minister Abe, at the end of August, announced his intention to resign as Prime Minister; Yoshihide Suga succeeded Abe as President of the LDP and Prime Minister on September 16, 2020. Sankei Shimbun, (in Japanese/author's translation) October 6, 2020, https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/202010060043_n.1.html

¹⁰⁴ Ibid In separate bilateral meeting with Secretary of State Pompeo, Motegi reaffirmed that the Japan-U.S. Alliance remained the "cornerstone" of international stability and security and the unchanging commitment of the Suga government to continue to strengthen the Alliance., Sankei Shimbun, October 6, 2020.

¹⁰⁵ Simon Denyer, "Pompeo seeks unity against China," The Washington Post, October 7, 2020 A 16

In 2014, as Chinese artificial island construction in the South China Sea accelerated, the EU issued its maritime security strategy. The document emphasized freedom of navigation, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with the Law of the Sea. As Liselotte Odgaard points out in her study, “European Engagement in the Indo-Pacific,” the EU, given internal divisions on China, has been reluctant to criticize Beijing and refrained from acting in support of declaratory statements, leaving individual states to advance policy initiatives toward the South China Sea. France and the United Kingdom have taken the lead.¹⁰⁶

At the 2016 Shangri-la Dialogue, French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian defined France as an Indo-Pacific country, with “85% of its EEZ in Asia and Oceania.” For France, “stability in the Asia-Pacific is “not a theoretical issue.” To support stability and address maritime challenges in the region, he set out three principles: respect for a rules-based order governed by the Law of the Sea; dialogue and peaceful resolution of disputes; and firmness in the face of challenges to the rules-based order --“if the Law of the Sea is not respected in the China Seas, it will be threatened tomorrow...elsewhere.” The Minister proposed that, given the EU’s commitment to the rules-based order, European navies should “coordinate to ensure a presence that is as regular and as visible as possible in the maritime areas of Asia.” Le Drian noted that France had deployed its navy to the region for several years in support of the principle of freedom of navigation -- “this will continue,” he pledged”¹⁰⁷

French naval deployments began in 2014. French ships transited the Taiwan Straits in 2016 and, in 2017-18 were joined in the South China Sea by ships from the United Kingdom. In 2019, France deployed the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle through the Indo-Pacific, accompanied by ships from the United Kingdom, Portugal, Denmark, Italy, Australia and the United States. In the Bay of Bengal, the Charles de Gaulle was joined by Japan’s helicopter carrier Izumo and destroyer Murasame; Australia’s frigate Toowomba and a Collins submarine; and the

¹⁰⁶ Liselotte Odgaard, *European Engagement in the Indo-Pacific: The Interplay between Institutional and Naval Diplomacy*, published in August, 2020 by the Finnish Institute for International Affairs, available at <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publications>

Also see, Yong Deng, “The Role of the EU in Asian Security: Between Transatlantic Coordination and Strategic Autonomy,” *Asia Policy*, Volume 15, Number 1, January 2020, available at <http://asiapolicy.nbr.org>

¹⁰⁷ Remarks of French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian, available at <https://sg.ambafrance.org/Jean-Yves-Le-Drian-in-Singapore-for-the-15th-Shangri-la-Dialogue>

USS destroyer William P. Lawrence for the La Perouse exercise.¹⁰⁸ In April 2019, the French frigate Vendemiaire transited the Taiwan Straits.¹⁰⁹

Addressing China's island construction in the South China Sea, Minister of Defense Florence Parly, told the Shangri-la Dialogue that "The fiat accompli is not a fiat accepted."¹¹⁰ During his 2018 visit to Australia, French President Emmanuel Macron proposed "a strategic Axis" of France, Australia and India. Marcon cautioned against one power domination of the region, emphasized the importance of maintaining a rules-based order, and committed France to playing a larger role in the region. The strategic objective of the "axis" would not be to contain China, but to ensure "balances" within the region.¹¹¹ To this end, Macron and Abe moved to expand the France-Japan Two-Plus-Two strategic dialogue, agreeing in in June, 2019 to a five-year road map for the strategic partnership.¹¹² Reflecting enhanced defense cooperation, France and Japan, in the spring of 2019, carried out their first joint naval exercise in the Indian Ocean -- Japan's helicopter carrier Izumo and France's aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle participating. In September, the two governments initiated a comprehensive maritime dialogue.¹¹³

The United Kingdom's 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review called for enhanced defense engagement with the Asia-Pacific region.¹¹⁴ In 2016 and again in 2017, the United Kingdom's Minister of Defense Michael Fallon addressed the

¹⁰⁸ Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, See <https://www.c7f.navy.mil/Media/News/Display/Article/1849388/us-allied-forces-begin-la-perouse-exercises-with-french-aircraft-carrier-in-gul/>

¹⁰⁹ Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, "Exclusive: in rare move French warship passes through Taiwan Straits," Reuters, April 25, 2019, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-france-warship-china/exclusive-in-rare-move-french-warship-passes-through-taiwan-strait-idUSKCN1S10Q7>

¹¹⁰ Jonas Parello-Plesener, "The French navy Stands Up to China," Wall Street Journal, June 8 2018, available at <https://www.hudson.org/research/14384-the-french-navy-stands-up-to-china>

¹¹¹ Andrew Tillett, "Emmanuel Marcon's Australia- France-India 'strategic axis' a bit of a stretch," Financial Review, May3, 2018, available at <https://www.afr.com/politics/emmanuel-macrons-australiafranceindia-strategic-axis-a-bit-of-a-stretch-20180503-h0zkxy> Marcon's proposal drew mixed reviews from the Australian strategic community

¹¹² France with departments and territories in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific, has the world's largest Exclusive Economic Zone, see, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-largest-exclusive-economic-zones.html>

¹¹³ Celine Pajon, "Macron in Japan: Upgrading the Franco-Japanese Strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific," The Diplomat, June 26, 2019, available at, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/macron-in-japan-upgrading-the-franco-japanese-strategic-partnership-in-the-indo-pacific/> The France-Japan Strategic Partnership was reaffirmed during the visit of Foreign Minister Motegi to Paris, October 1, 2020 as was the commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, which remains Japanese government policy under Abe's successor, Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. The day before, the Sankei Shimbun reported that, during a video conference between Motegi and Germany's Foreign Minister Maas, Germany had announced its alignment with the Free and Open Indo-Pacific reflecting Germany's growing concerns about China's aspirations.

¹¹⁴ United Kingdom , "National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review," available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015-annual-report-2016>

Shangri-la Dialogue. Fallon emphasized the UK’s commitment to a rules-based international order and a maritime order defined by UNCLOS. He expressed the UK’s concern with the “the scale and speed of current land reclamation activities and the risk these actions may pose to maritime freedom of navigation and to the stability of the South China Sea”¹¹⁵

At the 2019 Shangri-la Dialogue, Minister of Defense Penny Mordaunt set out the principles underlying the UK’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific: “support for fundamental global rules, human rights, democracy, and respect for the rules-based international order.” Mordaunt committed the UK to a “persistent” presence in the region: -- to strengthening alliances and partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and India; to exercises with the Five Power Defense Arrangements partners (Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand); and to deploying to the region the aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth within “a couple of years’ time.”¹¹⁶

The Republic of Korea: The New South Policy

In 2017, the Moon government launched its “New South Policy” toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN, in part a response to Beijing’s reaction to Seoul’s acceptance of the THAAD missile defense system. China’s economic boycott of Korean products highlighted for Seoul the ROK’s growing dependence on the China market. As one senior Foreign Ministry official told the author, China’s boycott, after years of dedicated ROK diplomacy aimed at enhancing ROK-China ties, had come as “a rude wake-up call,”¹¹⁷ The New South Policy initial focus was on Indonesia and a reported \$1.9 billion light-rail infrastructure project..¹¹⁸ Korea is now targeting its Official Development Assistance to Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos Vietnam and Myanmar, which now are among the top ten countries in terms of Korea’s ODA disbursements¹¹⁹.

¹¹⁵ Remarks of Michael Fallon, United Kingdom Minister of Defense, Shangri-la Dialogue 2016 and 2017 available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-speaks-at-shangri-la-dialogue> and <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/shangri-la-dialogue-singapores-50th-birthday>

¹¹⁶ Remarks of UK Minister of Defense, Penny Mordaunt, Shangri-la Dialogue, June 1, 2019, available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-secretary-speech-at-the-shangri-la-dialogue-in-singapore>

¹¹⁷ Author’s notes of discussions in Seoul, Winter, 2017,

¹¹⁸ David Whiteside, “South Korea’s Moon unveils new focus on Southeast Asia,” Reuters, November 11, 2017, available at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-indonesia-southkorea/south-koreas-moon-unveils-new-focus-on-southeast-asia-idUSKBN1D900C>

¹¹⁹ Lee Jaehyon, “Korea’s New Southern Policy: Motivations of Peace Cooperation and Implications for the Korean Peninsula,” Center for ASEAN and Oceanic Studies, available at <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/koreas-new-southern-policy-motivations-of-peace-cooperation-and-implications-for-the-korean-peninsula/>

Push Back: Responding to the Infrastructure and Development Challenge:

The United States

The United States 2017 National Security Strategy concluded that “China’s infrastructure investment and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations.¹²⁰” In its study, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” the Center for Global Development estimated that China, under BRI, had committed as much as \$8 trillion in support of projects in Asia, Africa and Europe.¹²¹

Belt-Road recipients, however, soon began to experience financial strains, debt servicing posing a major problem for a number of countries. In 2017, Sri Lanka, in a debt swap, granted China Merchant Port Holdings a 99-year lease on its Hambantota port, while Malaysia suspended work on three major Belt-Road projects worth an estimated \$22 billion, with Prime Minister Mahathir cautioning against “a new version of colonialism.”¹²² And Myanmar scaled back the Kyaukpyu port project out of debt servicing concerns.

The Center for Global Development identified Pakistan, Djibouti, Laos, Mongolia, Montenegro, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as facing debt servicing problems. The study found that “China has not signed onto a binding set of rules of the road when it comes to avoiding unsustainable lending and addressing debt problems when they arrive.” The Center judged that BRI in general was “unlikely to cause systemic debt problems’ but, that BRI had “significantly increased the risk of sovereign debt default.” Of 68 potential borrowers, the study judged that 23 faced a “quite high” risk¹²³

¹²⁰ United States of America, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 46

¹²¹ John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailya Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” CGD, Policy Paper 121, Washington DC< Center for Global Development, March 4, 2018, available at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334096436> Examining the debt implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a policy perspective.

¹²² “Malaysia’s Mahathir warns against ‘new colonialism’ during China visit,” available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-20/mahathir-warns-against-new-colonialism-during-visit-to-china> Mahathir later amended his remarks, saying “I did not accuse the Chinese...I was only saying that there were other forms of colonialism and one of them was neocolonialism.” Available at <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2166693/chinas-belt-and-road-colonialism-mahathir-not-all>; <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2166693/chinas-belt-and-road-colonialism-c> Mahathir later re-negotiated the deal on terms more favorable to Malaysia

¹²³ Center for Global Development, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective.” On April 30 2020, The Financial Times reported that numerous countries BRI recipient countries, now experiencing economic distress as a result of the Corona Virus, were asking China for debt relief.

The United States response to the BRI infrastructure challenge can be dated to President Trump's remarks to APEC Leaders Meeting in November 2017, in which he refocused U.S. development efforts to "high quality infrastructure investment that promotes economic growth." The President committed his administration to a reorganization of the U.S. development agencies "to spur private sector investment in your economies, and provide strong alternatives to state-directed initiatives that come with many strings attached."¹²⁴

A year later Vice President Pence, in remarks at the APEC CEO meeting in Papua New Guinea, took up the infrastructure challenge. Pence told his audience:

"We are also making infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific a top priority...And the United States has a principled approach that stands in contrast to some other nations."

Contrasting the infrastructure loan terms of other governments – "often opaque at best;" supporting projects "often unsustainable and of poor quality;" "too often with strings attached," and "resulting in staggering debt," the Vice President declared that "the United States has a better

In April, 2019 China hosted a second Belt and Road Conference to address concerns that had come to trouble BRI projects: a lack of transparency, inflated project cost, the need for enhanced monitoring, issues related to debt sustainability, and the environment. In its study "The Belt and Road Initiative – Six Years On," Moody's Analytics reviewed the numerous problems posed by the BRI: easy money, infrastructure financing without conditionality tied to economic reform, recipients potentially taking on unsustainable debt, poor project management undercutting economic benefits, favoring of Chinese contractors and Chinese labor, corruption, lack of transparency, and inflated project costs. Nevertheless, Moody's was cautiously optimistic that the second BRI conference "may mark turning point for the initiative ...future projects will likely involve more local input and greater scrutiny, be less expensive and of higher quality and increasingly sponsored by multiple agencies." The Moody's report concluded that the potential changes "if implemented may improve transparency, generate more efficient planning and execution and include more appropriate risk assessment for future BRI projects." See Moody's Analytics, "The Belt and Road Initiative – Six Years On", available at <https://www.moodyanalytics.com/-/media/article/2019/belt-and-road-initiative.pdf>

¹²⁴ President Donald J. Trump, Remarks to the APEC CEO Summit, November 19, 2017.

On July 30, 2018 Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, in remarks to U.S. Chamber of Commerce, highlighted the role the private sector will play in advancing the President's Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision. The Secretary emphasized that the "Trump administration is committed to expanding our economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. He announced \$113.5 million in new initiatives to support foundational areas of the future, digital economy, energy and infrastructure, the initiatives being "just a down payment on a new era of U.S. commitment to peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region." Addressing the infrastructure challenge, the Secretary announced the launch of the Infrastructure Transition and Assistance Network "to boost the development of infrastructure done right," – a whole of government initiative, seeded with \$13 million dollars...to coordinate, strength, and share U.S. tools for project scouting, financing and technical assistance. Pompeo also endorsed the Better Utilization of Investment Lending to Development Act (BUILD Act), which would "more than double development assistance to \$60 billion." Michael R. Pompeo, "America's Indo-Pacific Economic Vision, Business Forum, July 30, 2018, available at <https://www.state.gov/remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/>

Two months later, on October 5, 2018, President Trump signed the Better Utilization of Investment Lending to Development Act. The legislation authorized \$1.5 billion to support, economic, diplomatic and military engagement and assistance across the Indo-Pacific region

2018-2023 and 2 ships to Timor L'Este in 2023.¹²⁸ In 2019, Australia earmarked nearly a quarter of its foreign aid budget to the Pacific -- \$1.3 billion out of a total a foreign aid budget of \$4.2 billion.¹²⁹

Meanwhile, Canberra, on August 22, 2018, banned Huawei and ZTE from Australia's 5G network out of security concerns and passed legislation aimed at addressing growing concerns about Chinese influence in Australia's media, academic institutions and domestic politics. The government's actions followed several months after April reports in the Sydney Morning Herald of Chinese efforts to construct a wharf in Vanuatu to advance military access to port facilities.¹³⁰ Prime Minister Scott Morrison underscored his government's commitment to the Pacific in his remarks, "Australia and the Pacific: A New Chapter," November 8, 2018 and in his Lowy Lecture, "Where We Live," October 3, 2019.¹³¹

In Auckland, the government of New Zealand announced its Pacific Reset policy.¹³² Recognizing the growing strategic competition in the region, Wellington moved to step up its engagement with the Pacific Island countries, in particular Tokelau, the Cook Islands and Niue, territories and countries closely related to New Zealand. Programs focused on climate change, economic and human development, and joint training with the region's military and police forces. New Zealand also joined with Australia to support engagement programs with Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and the Cook Islands.

Japan

Under Prime Minister Abe, Japan, in support a Free and Open Indo Pacific, increased development assistance in infrastructure projects.

¹²⁸ Australia, Pacific Maritime Security Program, Department of Defence, available at <https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/17-18/Features/Maritime.asp>

¹²⁹ "Australia Supplants China to build undersea cable for Solomon Islands," The Guardian, June 23, 2018, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/13/australia-supplants-china-to-build-undersea-cable-for-solomon-islands>. ..

¹³⁰ Davir Wroe, "China eyes Vanuatu military base in plan with global implications," Sydney Morning Herald, April 9, 2018, available at <https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/china-eyes-vanuatu-military-base-in-plan-with-global-ramifications-20180409-p4z8j9.html>.

¹³¹ Scott Morison, "Australia and the Pacific: A New Chapter," November 8, 2018 available at <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/address-australia-and-pacific-new-chapter> and "Where We Live," October 3, 2019, available at <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2019-lowy-lecture-prime-minister-scott-morrison> <https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/stories/australia-and-the-indo-pacific-an-address-by-prime-minister-scott-morrison>

¹³² New Zealand "Pacific Reset", available at <https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/OIA/R-R-The-Pacific-reset-The-First-Year.PDF>

In the New Tokyo Strategy of 2015, Japan committed 750 billion Yen (approximately \$6.7 billion) to enhance connectivity through infrastructure development with Mekong partners – Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.¹³³ Also, in 2015, the Abe government announced that Japan, in conjunction with the Asian Development Bank, would provide Asia with \$110 billion in innovative infrastructure financing over the coming five years.

At the 2016 G-7 Summit, the Prime Minister announced Japan's \$200 billion investment in high-quality infrastructure projects for the next five years¹³⁴ Japan and its Mekong partners also adopted the Tokyo Strategy 2018, with three new policy pillars: vibrant and effective connectivity (industrial infrastructure), hard connectivity (land and maritime infrastructure), and soft connectivity (customs regulations, telecommunication and cyber infrastructure).¹³⁵ Reflecting the Abe government's focus on the Indo-Pacific, the Foreign Ministry, in its 2020 budget submission, proposed that 70 percent its \$7 billion ODA program be earmarked for the Indo-Pacific region to provide capital for high-quality infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa.¹³⁶ At the same time, on August 3, 2020, Japan moved to enhance its private sector engagement with Southeast Asia, amending the first Protocol of 2008 ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership, to liberalize trade, investment and services.¹³⁷

Abe also brought his vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific to Europe. In his keynote speech at the European Connectivity Forum, September 27, 2019, Abe spoke to the values of the Japan-Europe Economic and Strategic Partnership Agreements – democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedom. In that framework, he pointed to the Japan-EU Connectivity Partnership as a “concrete expression” of the Strategic Partnership. Abe argued that working together “the EU and Japan can create sustainable, unbiased and rules-based connectivity from the Indo-Pacific to the West Balkans and Africa,” and advance “connectivity across all domains from transportation,

¹³³ Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “New Tokyo Strategy 2015,” available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/sa/sea1/page1e_000044.html#:~:text=New%20Tokyo%20Strategy%202015%20fo

¹³⁴ Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Official Development Assistance (ODA) Priority Policy for Development Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 2017, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page23e_000434.html

¹³⁵ Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Tokyo Strategy 2018 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, October 9, 2018), available at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000406731.pdf>

¹³⁶ Nikkei Staff Writers, “Japan Shifts Focus of its Development Assistance to Indo-Pacific,” Nikkei Asian Review, August 15, 2018, available at <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-shifts-focus-of-its-development-assistance-to-Indo-Pacific>

¹³⁷ Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement,” available at <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/fta/asean.html>

communications, power to reliable free distribution of data and space.”¹³⁸ He cited the example of Burkina Faso as an example of Japan-EU connectivity cooperation.

A Financial Times report on the partnership noted “while the agreement does not mention China by name, the overriding ideas and the language used to promote the project were clearly crafted with Beijing’s Belt and Road infrastructure-building initiative in mind.” The FT observed that the EU “has begun to take a tougher approach to China, making a landmark declaration earlier this year that Beijing was a ‘systemic rival’...”¹³⁹

Push Back: Preserving a Rules-Based Commercial Order

“In East Asia, trade is strategy.” Ambassador-at-large, Bilahari Kausikan, ”¹⁴⁰

The structuring of a rules based commercial order in the Indo-Pacific is a story of United States retreat and Japan’s advance as the champion of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

President Obama in his address to the Parliament of Australia had set out the economic rationale for the Rebalance -- America’s economic stake in the region: “Here we see the future...the world’s fastest growing region...creating jobs and opportunity for the American people.”¹⁴¹.. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would serve as the economic pillar of the United States strategic engagement with the region. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton initially advanced TPP as the “gold standard in trade agreements.to open free, transparent, fair trade – that has the rule of law and a level playing field:¹⁴²”

¹³⁸ Prime Minister Abe Keynote speech in Belgium, available at <https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/190927/pl1909270042-n6.html>

¹³⁹ Michael Pell, “Japan and EU sign deal in riposte to China Belt and Road, the Financial Times, September 27, 2019, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/dd14ce1e-e11d-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc>
The EU-China Strategic Outlook, in addition to defining China as a “strategic competitor,” found China to be “an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” Available at European Commission, [communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf \(europa.eu\)](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/default/files/2019/09/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf)

¹⁴⁰ Billahari Kausikan, “How to Think about Geopolitics in East Asia,” March 20, 2018, available at <https://sldinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/03-Thinking-About-Geopolitics-in-East-Asia-Kausikan.p>

¹⁴¹ Ibid. Remarks by President Obama to the Australian Parliament

¹⁴² Ian Kullgren, “Yes, Clinton did call TPP the ‘Gold Standard,’ Politico, October, 9. 2016.available at <https://www.politico.com/blogs/2016-presidential-debate-fact-check/2016/10/yes-clinton-did-call-tpp-the-gold-standard-229501>

TPP, despite the strong support from the US Chamber of Commerce and the American business community,¹⁴³ fell victim to domestic politics, disavowed in 2016 by Democratic Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and attacked by Republican candidate Donald Trump. On January 23, 2017, President Trump withdrew the United States from TPP,¹⁴⁴ The President's trade policy focused on bilateral trade deals – in Asia, an FTA with the Republic of Korea, a Market Access agreement with Japan and a Phase One trade agreement with China.

In the vacuum created by President Trump's decision, the Abe government reassembled the TPP pieces and through dedicated diplomacy successfully brought into being, on December 30, 2018, The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP Eleven. The agreement established a free trade zone of eleven countries, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Brunei, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Peru, Mexico and Canada, a market with a population approximately 500 million people, with an estimated annual GDP of \$10 trillion.

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In withdrawing from TPP, however, President Trump compromised a long-standing American vision of a rules-based order. His decision placed the United States outside the rules setting norms of the TPP Eleven, at a time when the economic dynamism of the region, despite the U.S.-China trade war and the disruptions caused by the Corona virus, continues to move toward integration and a rules-based commercial order. And, given the uncertainties arising from the administration's trade war approach to commerce, allies and strategic partners have moved to consider other trading structures.

On November 15 at the ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, the member states of ASEAN plus China, Japan the Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand reached agreement on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) free trade agreement. RCEP countries make up 30

¹⁴³ U.S. Chamber Statement of Support for the Trans Pacific Partnership , January 6, 2016 available at <https://www.uschamber.com/press-release/us-chamber-statement-support-the-trans-pacific-partnership>Support

¹⁴⁴ Bilahari Kausikan, in considering the Trump administration's foreign policies, commented "The main risks ..are in trade. The greatest weakness of the Trump administration's emerging strategy is the failure to make the connection between security and foreign policies and trade policy. In East Asia trade is strategy." Bilahari Kausikan, "How to Think about Geopolitics in East Asia, remarks delivered to the Royal Australian Air Force 2018 Air Power Conference, March 20, 2018, Canberra, Australia, hard copy available on request to author. A short version of the address "How Not to Think about Geopolitics in East Asia is available at <https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/how-not-to-think-about-geopolitics-in-east-asia>

¹⁴⁵ Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, available at <https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/cptpp/Pages/comprehensive-and-progressive-agreement-for-trans-pacific-> and SEE <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp>

percent of the world's gross domestic product and account for 30 percent of the world's population.¹⁴⁶ Commenting on RCEP, Alexander Capri, professor at the Singapore National University Business School, said the agreement “solidifies China’s broader regional geopolitical ambitions around the Belt and Road Initiative.”¹⁴⁷ With the largest market in the region, RCEP allows China to claim a leadership role as a “champion in globalization and multilateral cooperation,” according to Gareth Leather, Senior Asia Economist for Capital Economics at Asian Economics.¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea continue discussions toward a trilateral FTA. And the Japan-EU FTA went into effect on February 1, 2019.

Notwithstanding the withdraw from TPP, United States economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific is significant. The United States stands as the “largest source of foreign direct investment” with a two-way trade with the region totaling \$1.8 trillion in the region in 2017. U.S. economic initiatives toward the region, reflected in the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, emphasize the role of the private sector “as the path to sustainable development.” The United States is also engaged in the development of “human capital” through the Young Southeast Asian Leadership Initiative, involving over 142,000 young leaders “working with the United States on leadership and regional cooperation.”¹⁴⁹

These are substantial stakes in a region that is fast moving forward to structure a rules-based trading order – without the United States. As underscored by TPP 11 and RCEP, Asia is hedging against the downside risks of the Trump administration’s trade policies and the uncertainties of the next administration– hedging that may have long-term, yet now unforeseen, political and strategic consequences for the United States. Managing America’s economic ties to the region will be a major challenge for the administration that takes office on January 20, 2021.

¹⁴⁶ Eric Johnston, “What does RCEP mean for Japan and its Asian neighbors?,” The Japan Times, November 15, 2020, available at <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/11/15/national/politics-diplomacy/rcep-japan-asia-trade/>

¹⁴⁷ Alice Philpson and martin Abbugao, “World’s Largest Free Trade Agreement signed in Coup for China,” International Business Times, November 16, 2020, available at <https://www.ibtimes.com/worlds-largest-free-trade-agreement-signed-coup-china-3082404>

¹⁴⁸ The Associated Press, “China and 14 other countries agree to set up world’s largest trading bloc,” November 15, 2020, available at <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/china-14-other-countries-set-world-s-largest-trading-bloc-n-1247855>.

¹⁴⁹ Testimony of David Stillwell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 18, 2019, <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/us-policy-in-the-indo-pacific-region-hong-kong-alliances-and-partnerships-and-other-issues>

VIII. The Road Ahead: Conclusion and Recommendations

“Contiguity and strategic weight will always give China significant influence in Southeast Asia and indeed East Asia as a whole. But significant influence is not exclusive influence or even dominant influence.”¹⁵⁰ Ambassador-at-large Bilahari Kausikan

This study has focused on the Visions of Order that have evolved since the turn of the century to shape strategic change in the Indo-Pacific region, change inextricably tied to the rise of China, and on the policies adopted in response by the various governments to preserve a rules-based regional and international order.

While the Visions of Order outlined here vary from country to country, they collectively reflect commitments to the rule of law, democracy, freedom, human rights, and market economies. Notwithstanding individual country differences, the diplomatic, security and economic policies adopted are mutually reinforcing. As much as economic strength, military power and technology will shape the contours of U.S.-China competition, they are but individual elements in the evolution of a much larger composition – the definition of regional and, ultimately, global order. So, if the United States is to compete successfully with China for influence in Asia and across the globe, where to begin? In short, back to basics – our alliances.

In contrast to a long-standing tradition in Democratic and Republican governments alike -- to define our alliances as based on shared values and interests -- the Trump administration adopted a transactional and idiosyncratic approach to alliance management that has raised concerns about U.S. leadership and commitment across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. President Trump is right to have called for increased support from our allies, but to cast requests for greater host nation support as payment for protection is not conducive to keeping long-standing friends or positively influencing those not so favorably inclined to the United States.

The President has also failed to pay sufficient attention to the diplomatic doctrine of “No Surprises.” The announcement of the Singapore Summit by South Korean officials at the White

¹⁵⁰ Bilahari Kausikan, “How to Think about Geopolitics in East Asia,” Keynote address at the RAAF Air Power Conference, March 20, 2018, available at https://airpower.airforce.gov.au/APDC/media/Events-Media/RAAF%20AP%20CONF%202018/03_Thinking-About-Geopolitics-in-East-Asia-Kausikan.pdf.

A slightly different exposition can be found at Bilahari Kausikan, “How to not to think about Geopolitics in East Asia,” The Straits Times, June 2, 2018 available at <https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/how-not-to-think-about-geopolitics-in-east-asia> “

Accordingly, for the next national security team that will take office on January 20, 2021, the starting point of a comprehensive strategy toward China should be the reaffirmation that our alliances reflect shared values and interests – that the U.S. commitment to our common defense is enduring. This would be playing to our residual strengths in a region that continues, in its strategic documents, to look to U.S. for leadership as the foundation of Indo-Pacific stability and security. At the same time, recognizing that our respective interests – those of the United States and our alliance partners in Asia and Europe toward China -- are congruent but not identical, U.S. alliance policy should aim to address concerns and narrow differences, both at regional and global levels. This is the foundation of a strategic, alliance-based approach toward engaging China.

Responding successfully to the multi-faceted challenges posed by China -- whether assertiveness in the South China Sea, predatory trade practices, or in international rules-making bodies -- cannot be an America Alone project. Rather, it will require focused U.S. engagement and involve international institutions – among them the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization – through which China-related issues can be addressed and concerted diplomacy marshalled to support western values and interests.

Here again, our global alliances should be the starting point of strategy toward engaging China. Toward the South China Sea, U.S. diplomacy should challenge China's disregard for international law -- the ruling of the Hague Tribunal on the South China Sea should be referenced and highlighted in all policy statements, emphasizing, in the words of France's former Minister of Defense, Florence Parly, that China's fiat accompli in the South China Sea "is not a fiat accepted." Secretary of State Pompeo's July 13 policy statement should drive U.S. diplomacy toward a re-energized engagement with ASEAN toward the conclusion of an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The U.S. advocacy of a rules-based maritime order would be immeasurably strengthened by Senate ratification of UNCLOS.

It is noteworthy that 2021 will mark the 101st anniversary of the Washington Conference called by Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes to address issues related to Asian security following the Versailles settlement. With significant alliance-based preparation, the calling of an international conference on the South China Sea, involving the EU, European and Asian Allies, and China, to address territorial issues as well as international cooperation in resource management and development could reassert U.S. leadership in the face of China's continuing disregard for international law.

At the same time, the United States should actively engage in reform of the WTO and give serious consideration to joining the TPP 11. As underscored by the realization of the TPP 11 and RCEP, the Indo-Pacific has moved on to structure a rules-based trade order – without the United States. The absence of the United States in these rule-making trade bodies points glaringly to a missing piece in the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Re-engaging international as well as regional trade structures stands as a major challenge of the administration that takes office on January 20,2021. The United States should be inside, not outside, of international institutions that develop and support a rules-based international economic order. Being inside only serve to enhance U.S. influence and interests.

At the macro-level, the benefits of globalization are undeniable; but, significantly, costs have not been evenly distributed. Revitalizing the domestic economy -- repairing the losses suffered by American industry, caused by globalization and political neglect by both parties, while protecting and advancing America’s high-tech industries -- should stand as a national priority for the next administration. As in the past, and as it will be in the years ahead, it will be the strength of the economy that will determine U.S. strategy and sustain U.S. leadership in the competitive decades ahead.

Notwithstanding the concerns of many, the United States and China are not entering a new Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China cannot be isolated, contained or excluded from the regional and global orders.

Acknowledging this reality, U.S. strategy should aim to sustain the existing rules-based order that upholds western values, one that supports a balance of influence based on a balance of power. This alliance-based construct, can, over time, tilt the playing field favorably toward the United States, its allies and strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

The challenge for the next administration will be, not to contain but to engage and compete with China, from a position of alliance-based strength.

WORLD SITUATION CONFERENCE: EUROPE¹

Lecture delivered by Mr. Pierre Morcos²
Center for Strategic and International Studies - CSIS
(Notes of the presentation)

Defining Europe is difficult. Geographically, Europe has imprecise and variable borders depending on regional organizations. The European Union has 27 members, whereas the Council of Europe is composed of 47 countries. Culturally, European countries are marked by their linguistic, religious and intellectual diversity. Politically, European states share common values while having political systems of great variety ranging from constitutional monarchy to presidential republics.

However, since the end of the Second World War, Europe has been driven by a common political project with an unprecedented ambition, that of integration embodied in the European Union. My presentation will therefore focus on the promises and challenges of the European Union, which has had to face many shocks in recent years, the latest being the Covid-19 health crisis.

In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, European integration has made significant progress.

- Often associated with the "end of History", the end of the Cold War actually marked the beginning of a new era for the European Union, whose integration progressed substantially in the 1990s and early 2000s.

- A **political integration** first of all with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which went beyond the initial economic objective of the European Community by giving it a political vocation. Community competences were extended (to education, public health and industrial policy notably). A common foreign and security policy is established. An intergovernmental pillar on home affairs and justice is created.

- **Economic integration** followed, with the creation of an Economic and Monetary Union embodied by the introduction of a single currency, the euro, used by 19 member countries today, and a European Central Bank. This integration stimulated European economic growth, which reached 3% in average at the end of the 1990s.

¹ Views expressed in this lecture are strictly personal.

² Pierre Morcos is a visiting fellow in the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he focuses on European security issues. A career diplomat with the French Foreign Service, he most recently served as deputy head of the Strategic Affairs and Cybersecurity Division, focusing on NATO and European defense issues. Trained as a civil servant in the National School for Administration (Ecole Nationale d'Administration), he holds a B.A and an M.P.A. from de Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po).

- Finally, **geographical integration**. The European Union was enlarged to include Austria, Sweden and Finland in 1995 and then almost doubled its membership from 15 to 27 member states in 2004 and 2007. Like Spain and Portugal at the end of the 1980s, enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had a major impact on their democratization and the modernization of their economies.

- However, these integrations had **flaws**. The end of the Cold War led to a deceptive sense of security leading member states to significantly reduce their defense budgets and to revise their army models downwards. For example, the French budget fell from 3.6% of GDP in 1988 to 2.3% in 2007. Economic and Monetary Union was incomplete, with the absence of budgetary solidarity, which is essential for managing macroeconomic shocks. Finally, the large number of member states complicated the Union's decision-making and responsiveness.

Nevertheless, Europe was confronted with a succession of shocks that called into question its political project.

- An **economic shock** first of all with the financial crisis in 2008 and then the euro crisis in 2010-2011. Statistics speak for themselves: in 2009 alone, the Gross Domestic Product of the EU declined by more than 4 percent, followed by years of slow growth. Unemployment went from 6.8 percent in 2008 to 11 percent in 2013 and did not return to its pre-crisis level until the end of 2018. Public debt skyrocketed from 58 percent of the GDP in 2007 to 87 percent in 2014 and still remained high in 2019, at 79 percent. But this crisis also had a major political impact, with for the first time the risk of a European deconstruction, especially when Greece's exit from the euro zone was considered.

- This was followed by a **strategic shock** with the war in Georgia in 2008 and the invasion of the Crimea in 2014, which marked the return of the logic of power in Europe. Europe was also hit by a new wave of terrorist attacks, culminating on November 13, 2015 in Paris with attacks that killed 137 people and injured 416. These shocks have raised awareness of the significant deterioration in Europe's strategic environment, in a context where Washington was redirecting its efforts towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

- A **migratory shock** also with the 2015 migration crisis and the influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants mainly from Syria. An influx that puts the Schengen area under tension and deeply divides Europeans on how to manage this crisis. This migratory shock was moreover followed by a political shock with the rise of populism throughout Europe. This rise in populism also led to the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, the first major setback for European integration.

If we are witnessing a European awakening, the road to European sovereignty is still long and full of pitfalls.

- Nevertheless, as one of the founding fathers of European construction, Jean Monnet, put it: "**Europe will be made in crises** and will be the sum of the solutions brought to these crises". Europeans have indeed been able to overcome these successive or even concomitant crises and advance European integration.

- Genuine **budgetary solidarity** has been put in place following the euro crisis and especially in response to the Covid-19 health crisis with the mutualization of part of the debt under the authority of the European Commission.

- The **migration** crisis was overcome, notably through strong gestures of solidarity from Germany in particular, and a strengthening of European Union agencies. The wave of **populism** also seems to have been slowed down, as the last European elections of 2019 proved, where the populist parties did not emerge as winners, contrary to predictions.

- On the **military** front, the Europeans have begun to increase their defense budgets again and have launched numerous initiatives to strengthen their collective capacity for action. With a budget of 8 billion euros for the period 2021-2027, the European Defense Fund should encourage member states to develop military capabilities together. Composed of 13 able and willing states, the European Intervention Initiative launched by France is a framework for enhanced cooperation between the headquarters of these states in order to facilitate joint deployments. The Europeans are also engaged together in many theaters, whether in the Sahel, the Levant or the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.

- Finally, on the **diplomatic** front, Europeans have demonstrated agility. France, the United Kingdom and Germany have been at the forefront of the Iranian nuclear issue. Paris and London played a decisive role in the intervention in Libya in 2011. The Franco-German couple continues to play a leading role in the deepening of European defense, notably through their joint air and land capability programs.

- However, these advances must not hide **deep-seated weaknesses**. European armies are still weak after years of budget cuts and depend significantly on American support. The strategic challenges have only worsened in recent years, as demonstrated by the recent terrorist attacks in Europe, Turkey's aggressive behavior and the deterioration of relations with Iran. Political unity within Europe remains fragile, as illustrated by the debate on the rule of law and the decline of democracy in Poland and Hungary.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the European project, despite the challenges surrounding it, remains solid. The progress made in European solidarity during the health crisis is a strong testimony to this. The arrival of the Biden administration should make it possible to make progress on important issues for Europe, such as the climate or the defense of human rights, and to put an end to the sterile debate according to which a more autonomous Europe would necessarily be detrimental to the transatlantic relationship. In any case, European construction must be analyzed over a long period of time. As another founding father of the European Union, Robert Schuman, said: **"Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity."**

RUSSIA: IN THE WORLD & IN ITS “NEAR ABROAD”

Dr. Theresa Sabonis-Helf¹
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
(Speaker Notes)

In the past I have focused more on Russia’s behavior on its periphery, especially its competition with China. Today, however, I want to speak more broadly about Russia’s role in the world, as well as its periphery.

States function in a world system that serves them differently depending on their power:

Weak States seek help and resources from international patrons and institutions

Middle States pursue collective action which includes them, tend to advocate for multilateral systems


Great Powers seek to shape/reshape the international system to their own benefit

Image 1: States function in a world system that serves them differently depending on their power

The international system serves nations differently depending on their power relative to other states in the system. Weak states, focused on survival, seek help and resources from other states or from multilateral institutions. Middle States tend to be the advocates of multilateral institutions – pursuing collective action which includes them. (We can understand that Canada is correct when it defines supporting key multilateral institutions as a vital national interest). Only Great Powers tend to seek to shape or reshape the international system, bending it to serve their own priorities.

¹ Theresa Sabonis-Helf is the Inaugural Chair of the Science, Technology and International Affairs concentration in the Master’s Degree program at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Prior to joining Georgetown, she was a Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College in Washington DC. She has lived and worked in seven countries of the Former USSR, has assisted two nations with the development of their first National Security Strategies, and has co-edited two volumes on Central Asia’s political and economic transition. She has also published and lectured extensively on energy security, climate change policies, post-Soviet energy and environmental issues, regional water politics, regional trade and transit, and the politics of electricity. She is a frequent advisor to the US Department of State and USAID and is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She holds a PhD in Political Science from Emory University, and an MPA in International Affairs from Princeton University.

What does it look like if you have Great Power ambitions?




Russia became the dominant power in Syria in 2019

Russia hosted 54 African leaders for the first Russia-Africa Summit in 2019

Russia engaged in state of the art cyberattacks on government systems and critical infrastructure

What does it look like if you have Great Power ambitions?



Russia leads the world in nuclear power construction and financing

Russia has provided Maduro of Venezuela with arms, credit and body guards

Image 2: What does it look like if you have Great Power ambitions?

Not all states seek to behave as Great Powers, even if they otherwise have the attributes (think of India or Japan in the 1970s), but how can you recognize a state that has great power ambitions? It is relatively easy to recognize a state with great power ambitions. They tell you... Many of you are familiar with the controversial US National Security Strategy of 2017, which announces Great Power Competition. You might not be aware that this strategy is (arguably) a response to the Russian National Security Strategy of 2015.

Great Power Strategy

Russian Long-Term National Interests

- Defense of the country and its territorial and constitutional integrity
- Strengthening national consensus and stability
- Improving quality of life
- Preservation and development of culture
- Increasing competitiveness of the national economy
- “Consolidation of its status as one of the leading world powers for the Russian Federation, whose activities are aimed at maintaining strategic stability and mutually beneficial partnership relations in a polycentric world”

Section III: National interests and strategic national priorities, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, Approved December 31, 2015

Image 3: Russian Long Term National Interests

In the Russian NSS, Russia clearly presents its great power ambitions. The strategy describes Russia as a rising state which has overcome domestic challenges and international sanction and is engaging a world where the competition is intense, and the role of force is “not diminishing.”




Image 4: Russia in the Modern World

Russia recognizes the emergence of a “polycentric world” as a successor to American hegemony and the strategy clearly notes the grievances Russia has with the existing world system.

- Russia's Great Power Endowments**
- **The Nukes:** With an estimated 6,800 nuclear weapons, Russia has the largest stockpile in the world. (The US is estimated to have 6,185)
 - **The Location:** Proximity to Europe enables Russia to support or disrupt success of key Western allies and economies (Germany, the UK, and France economies ranked 4th, 5th and 7th in 2020). To the East, Russia borders on China (2nd rank)
 - **The Veto:** As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia can endorse or block collective action
 - **Natural Resource Endowments:** 2019, Russia was the 5th largest producer (and second largest exporter) of oil, and the second largest producer (and largest exporter) of natural gas.
- Nuclear weapons estimate from the Federation of American Scientists, size of economies from Business Insider, natural resource endowments from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2020,

Image 5: Russia’s Great Power Endowments

So what resources does Russia have? How does Russia pursue its interests in this complex strategic environment? It was said back in the 1990s that Russia would always matter in world affairs because they had “the nukes, the location and the veto.” It was said in the first decade of this millennium that Russia was an “energy superpower,” with the wealth and power that comes from possessing these resources. Each

of these provide Russia with some advantages, as you can see. Russia is not without instruments of power it can use.

Russia's Power Advantage:

- The nukes
- The location
- The veto
- Natural Resources Endowments

Russia's Power Disadvantages:

- Modest economy (11th in the world, further hampered by sanctions)
- Declining population (9th in the world currently)
- Hostile neighbors
- High dependence on natural resources (oil and gas comprise 70% of exports and 50% of federal budget revenues)

As we know, Russia has a lot of power disadvantages as well...

Definition of Polity:

"I would like to make it clear to all: our country will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means."

"I am referring to those people who consider themselves part of the broad Russian community; they may not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they consider themselves Russian people."

- Vladimir Putin

Disruptive Approaches:

- **Role of Information:** Military-Political Directorate restored in the Ministry of Defense ("to inform is to influence")
- **Dual Use Infrastructure**
 - Nord Stream 2
 - The Kerch Strait Bridge
- **"Implausible Deniability"**
 - Private military companies
 - Hacker groups associated with the GRU

Image 6: Disruptive Approaches

The cultural ambition of Russia leads it to define the interests of Russian people (not necessarily citizens) as its polity. The combination of ambition and limited resources lead Russia to a strategy of disruptive and asymmetric approaches. Three such approaches are much in evidence: the weaponization of information, the construction of dual use infrastructure, and the advancing of what has been termed "implausible deniability." Let me address each of these in turn:

Role of information

Soviet era leadership placed a high priority on propaganda (a word which does not have a negative connotation in the Russian language). Significantly, the Ministry of Defense of Russia created the Main Military-Political Directorate in 2018. Although Russian Defense Minister Shoigu stated in interviews that the directorate was not a throwback to the Soviet era's "Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy," the parallels are difficult to ignore. The Directorate's motto "to inform is to influence" reflects the Kremlin's conviction that Russian management of the message is a key aspect of military preparedness.

Dual Use Infrastructure (Kerch Strait Bridges)

A striking example of dual use infrastructure is the Kerch Strait Bridge. When Crimea conducted the controversial status referendum on joining the Russian Federation in March 2014, Ukraine stopped supplying water through the North Crimean Canal, and on November 2014, the power lines supplying most of Crimea's electricity were destroyed. Russia responded to Crimea's isolation by beginning the construction of both an undersea electricity connection and the Kerch Strait Bridge to provide rail and road links. This 19 km, \$3.7 billion bridge, begun in 2016 and completed in May 2018, is the longest bridge in Europe, and constitutes Russia's only direct road connection to Crimea. The bridge also makes it possible for Russia to constrain commercial shipping in the Azov Sea, increasing the average amount of time needed to transit the Azov Sea from 7 hours in June 2018 to more than 5 days in November 2018. In addition, the height of the bridge prevents larger ships from passing through the area at all.

Critics of Nord Stream 2, the pipeline under construction that will link Russian natural gas supply directly to Germany, allege it is a similar project that, although economically defensible, has strategic implications. Russia is likely to increase its naval presence on the Baltic Sea as it constructs (and then secures) the pipeline. Critics of Russian development of the Arctic see a similar pattern, in which Russia appears to pursue economic interests, but in actuality seeks a position of military dominance in a region where peaceful cooperation had historically been the norm

Implausible Deniability

Russia has also used a group of semi-covert tools that some scholars describe as providing Russia "implausible deniability," meaning that Russia's hand in an activity is clear... but attribution cannot be decisively proven and the Russian state can distance itself from outcomes. The private military companies Russia has employed in proxy conflicts from Ukraine to Syria are one example. Curiously, such companies are actually illegal under Russian law in spite of their frequent use by the Kremlin. In a similar way, Russia uses hackers and cyber aggression.



Eurasian Economic Union:
Est. 1 January 2015
The EAEU now includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia.

It is an integrated single market of over 180 million people. Members of the EAEU have been allowed to honor pre-existing trade agreements.



Shanghai Cooperation Organization : Est. 2001

The SCO now includes 8 member states (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan) and 4 observers (Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia)

It is a mutual security organization

Image 7: Russian Institutions

Russia is not only finding ways to undermine other states cheaply. In its pursuit of great power status, it has also created new institutions designed to project its power. Some institutions, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, mimics European institutions, but with very different purpose. It is a limited customs union, which has abolished internal customs borders, and transfers decision making about tariffs to the Union level. Others, such as the SCO, makes an effort to engage China in its dealings with the region. Institutions (EAEU)



Image 8: Challenges in Russia's Backyard

Continued challenges in Russia’s region have posed a particular challenge to Russian interests in 2020. Although Russia approaches its “near abroad” as an area of special strategic interest, incidents of unrest have proven quite challenging to the Kremlin.



Image 9: Challenges in Energy Markets – Oil Demand and Covid-19

For many years Russian production of oil and gas (but especially oil) expanded on the assumption that global demand would continue to rise... and it did until Covid-19. The collapse in demand was exacerbated by policy miscalculations... and poses a great problem for the Russian economy.

OPEC Plus (OPEC +)

- Also known as the “Vienna Group”
- Formalized in Nov 2016 with the ‘Declaration of Cooperation’
- 24-member group
- Includes all 14 OPEC members plus: Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, South Sudan and Sudan
- Only 4 members have significant swing capacity: Russia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE

- **OPEC Controls**
 35% of global supply
 82% of global reserves
- **OPEC+ Controls**
 55% of global supply
 90% of global reserves
- **OPEC + has cut**
 Production cuts of 5.2 mil. bbl/day were agreed 2016-2019. In that time, shale production added 7.7 mil bbl/day.

Image 10: OPEC Plus structure

Russia tried to play a role in creating new and powerful institutions in energy as well. The organization, however, was unsuccessful in limiting US production increases.

- **6 March 2020:** Russia and Saudi Arabia failed to agree on cutting production. Saudi announced it would raise output by 2 mil. bbl/day
- **12 April 2020:** OPEC+ reconvened and agreed to cuts of 9.7 mil. bbl/day starting in May.
- **McKinsey expected oil price to recover to a \$50-\$60 per bbl by 2022 (2024 at latest)**
- **OPEC+ production cut compliance falls to 75% in Jan 2021**

The Oil Price War



At the G20 summit in June 2019

Price on 29 Feb 2020: \$53.35
Price on 20 April 2020: \$16.94
Price on 25 Oct 2020: \$41.40
Price on 12 Jan 2021: \$56.53

Oil price based on Brent Crude as reported by oilprice.com

Image 11: OPEC-Price War

When the price of oil fell into the low \$50s, Russia and Saudi Arabia met but were unable to agree on cutting production. Saudi's decision to raise production led to a collapse in world prices and a global oil storage problem. Rising demand in a post-Covid China has finally caused the price to begin rebounding.



- Paul Collier's 4 Development Traps:**
- * **Landlocked with Bad Neighbors**
 - * **Bad Governance in a Small Country**
 - * **Natural Resources Trap**
 - * **Conflict Trap**

Map from Stratfor

Image 12: Collier's 4 Development Traps

For many years, Russia's ability to manage its own near abroad was tied to much of that region's isolation. These traps could have ensured that the region did not develop... but the resources were attractive enough that Central Asia was able (in a longer term) to attract other interested parties...



CAREC: Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program

Members: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, People's Republic of China, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Inner Mongolia are also members

Base of Operations: CAREC Institute is located in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, PRC.

Origins: CAREC was established in 2001, founded by the Asian Development Bank, the EBRD, the IMF, the Islamic Development Bank, UNDP, and World Bank. China took over the leadership role of the CAREC Institute in 2015. As of Dec 2018 they had 196 projects completed or underway

Current Status: It was registered as an International Organization in August 2017.

Image 13: CAREC Structures

A relatively weak ADB structure began to take on significance when China began investing in it.



CAREC: Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program

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
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Image 14: CAREC Map

From the Chinese perspective, CAREC begins to address its own problem of being landlocked with bad neighbors. Note that two provinces of China are members (in addition to China's membership).



The UN identified and developed pre-feasibility studies for 42 projects in Central Asia as part of its Euro-Asian Transport Linkages Project (2002)

Of these proposed projects, 30 are currently funded and/or underway... a 74% funding ratio.

(the funding rate for the overall EATL portfolio is 36%)

China's investment in Central Asia is focused on key well-chosen projects

Financial Times, 9 May 2016, "Map: Connecting Central Asia" access at: <https://www.ft.com/content/ee5cf40a15e5-11e6-9d98-00386a18e39d>

Image 15: China investment in infrastructure

BRI is well known. In this region, it has taken up well-designed projects in many instances.



Dushanbe-2 Coal Fired Power Plant was largely financed by the Chinese Eximbank and constructed by a Chinese firm. It cost approx. \$349 million and was completed in 2014

China funded projects that Central Asian states believed were key to their energy security, but that could not find Western supporters



The Datka-Khamin Power Transmission Line enabled Kyrgyzstan to move their own power across the country without transiting Uzbekistan. It was funded and constructed by a Chinese company. It cost approx. \$390 million, and was completed in 2015

Image 16: China investment in Electricity

Although China is still most interested in the corridors of supply and export (and in the resources themselves), they have managed to invest in the region in ways that strengthen it.

These kinds of investments show how Russia is increasingly having to share what used to be its exclusive zone with other players... and that is something we see in the security arena as well:

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 2020

- Russia historically armed both sides of the conflict, but has a defensive pact with Armenia.
- Russia brokered the ceasefire and will have peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh
- Turkey engaged in military exercises before the conflict, armed Azerbaijan during the conflict and will join Russia in peacekeeping




Image 17: Slide 24: Nagorno Karabakh Conflict

Although Russia led the ceasefire negotiations in November 2020 and now maintains peacekeeping troops in NK, the real winner of the conflict was Turkey, whose training and weapons made the difference for its ally Azerbaijan. Turkey also has been given a role in peacekeeping... a sign of Azerbaijan's lack of trust in Russia.

ACTUALIDAD DE LA SEGURIDAD MARÍTIMA MUNDIAL

Valm (R) Edmundo Deville del Campo¹
Speaker Notes
Presidente Encargado del Consejo de la
Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI)

Introducción

Es un placer para mí poder estar una vez más y dirigiéndome, en este caso, a la clase 60 del Colegio Interamericano de Defensa. Al inicio, como corresponde, indicarles que yo lo hago a título personal, las opiniones no reflejan la posición de ninguna entidad específica y los gráficos son para eventos didácticos y no representan ni intentan representar ninguna posición sobre límites en el país. Siempre empiezo la conferencia con una frase de Charles de Gaulle “Los Estados no tienen amigos, solo intereses”. Aunque algunos dicen que no la dijo o que no lo dijo específicamente en este sentido, pero refleja que nuestros Estados lo que tienen son intereses. Son esos intereses los que nosotros, como miembros o ex miembros de fuerzas armadas o funcionarios de nuestro Gobierno, tenemos que proteger y ellos, a su vez, son los que van a guiar el actuar de nuestro Gobierno. La forma en que nosotros podamos manejar la posibilidad de que los intereses

¹ El Vicealmirante de la Marina de Guerra del Perú en situación de retiro Edmundo Luis Enrique Deville del Campo nació el 17 de mayo de 1959, ingresando a la Escuela Naval del Perú en 1976, donde se graduó como Alférez de Fragata. Es calificado en Guerra de Superficie, Electrónica y Comunicaciones. Ha seguido el Curso de Comando y Estado Mayor en la Armada Argentina y el Curso de Guerra Naval en la Escuela Superior de Guerra Naval. Asimismo, ostenta los grados de Magíster en Administración de la Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola y el de Magister en Política y Estrategia por la Escuela de Guerra Naval. Durante su servicio operativo ha ejercido el comando de unidades navales tipo Corbetas y Fragatas Misileras, habiendo ejercido el cargo de Comandante de la Fuerza de Superficie, Comandante General de Operaciones del Pacífico y el de Comandante de la Fuerza de Tarea del Pacífico en el Ejercicio PANAMAX cuyo fin es brindar la seguridad marítima del Canal de Panamá como tarea de protección hemisférica. En años posteriores desempeñó el cargo de Director General de Capitanías y Guardacostas (Autoridad Marítima del Perú) teniendo como función principal la seguridad marítima del espacio acuático nacional. Entre otros importantes cargos, ha sido Jefe del Departamento de Personal Superior de la Dirección de Administración de Personal; Agregado Naval a la Embajada del Perú en Brasil; Comandante de la Quinta Zona Naval; Director de Salud de la Marina; Director de Administración de Personal y Director General del Personal de la Marina. Desde enero del 2015 a diciembre del 2016 ejerció el cargo de Comandante General de la Marina de Guerra del Perú y pasó a la situación militar de retiro con más de 41 años de servicios. En el año 2017 fue nombrado Representante permanente alterno del Perú ante la Organización Marítima Internacional (órgano especializado de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas), que es el foro de mayor nivel que regula aspectos fundamentales como desarrollo, conservación, comercio y seguridad marítima, cargo que ejerció hasta diciembre 2019. En julio 2018, fue electo por aclamación como Vicepresidente del Consejo de la Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI) con sede en Londres para el periodo 2018-2019, habiendo sido reelecto para el periodo 2020-2021 en diciembre 2019. En noviembre 2019 asumió como Presidente encargado del Consejo de la OMI, cargo que ejercerá hasta Diciembre del presente año. Es también miembro de la Junta de Gobernadores de la Universidad Marítima Internacional (WMU). El Vicealmirante Deville ha brindado ponencias en diferentes Escuelas Superiores militares, Universidades y foros nacionales e internacionales sobre temas de seguridad nacional y seguridad marítima.

de nuestros Estados sean compatibles con aquellos con los que estamos interactuando es lo que va a darnos el éxito o no de nuestra labor.

La secuencia que vamos a seguir es básicamente una pequeña introducción, ¿quiénes son los que están involucrados en el mar y los aspectos relacionados con la seguridad del medio marítimo?; ¿cómo se emplea el medio marítimo dentro de los aspectos de diferentes ámbitos que tenemos?; algunos casos de disputas por límites marítimos y luego las conclusiones de estos casos.

El mar es una vía de comunicación, siempre decimos que une a los pueblos, no los separa. Nos permite una serie de interacciones y además es una fuente de riquezas, no solamente sus aguas, también su suelo y subsuelo. Nos permiten dar acceso a una serie de recursos, sean renovables o no, y en ese caso el tema de la protección, la protección del medio ambiente y la forma más adecuada para las explotaciones tienen que ser discutidos en un ámbito internacional. Por otra parte, también hay una característica muy especial que lo diferencia respecto a la tierra firme y es que la mayor parte de este mar son aguas internacionales que no están bajo la jurisdicción específica de un estado y este es un punto que se usaba mucho, o se trata de utilizar mucho, para desarrollar actividades ilícitas.

Como parte de esta introducción, también quería hacer notar los objetivos del milenio porque es lo que nuestros países han acordado desarrollar. En realidad, muchos dicen que Naciones Unidas establece los objetivos; Naciones Unidas solamente es un ámbito en el cual los países llegan a un acuerdo, lo que provee Naciones Unidas es un espacio en el cual los países puedan desarrollar algunas actividades para lograr fomentar reglas internacionales y, dentro de eso, nuestros países acordaron desarrollar los objetivos del milenio. En lo que se refiere específicamente al mar se busca utilizarlo de forma sostenible. Adoptar medidas urgentes para combatir el cambio climático y sus efectos. Para que tengan una idea del transporte marítimo mundial se estima que mueve más del 80% del comercio, emite gases de efecto invernadero y contribuye alrededor del 6% a la producción de gases de efecto invernadero a nivel mundial. Otro objetivo es lograr la igualdad de géneros. Es un interés de la comunidad marítima mundial tratar de introducir mucho más al género femenino dentro de las actividades marítimas, porque en ese momento sólo el 2% de los tripulantes, incluyendo a la gente que trabaja en oficinas navieras, es de género femenino. También se busca promover el crecimiento económico sostenido y sostenible, el empleo pleno y productivo y el trabajo decente para todos. Otro de los objetivos es el fomentar

la innovación, cómo se está moviendo hacia el futuro el ámbito marítimo lo cual va a tener sus propias condiciones que pueden afectar la salud.

Actores

Dicho esto, veamos ¿quiénes son los actores? Tenemos a los Estados y a los organismos y agencias internacionales:

- Organización de las Naciones Unidas, así como sus integrantes Comisión de Límites de la Plataforma Continental, el Tribunal Internacional de Derecho del Mar y la Corte Internacional de Justicia (que tiene relación con los que son disputas en caso de límites marítimos),
- Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI)
- Organización Hidrográfica Internacional (OHI)
- Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones (UIT)
- Organización de UN para la alimentación y Agricultura (FAO)
- Autoridad Internacional de Fondos Marítimos (ISA)
- Comité Internacional para la Protección de Cables (ICPC)

Organismos y Agencia Internacionales

En esta sección no se mencionarán todas, aunque si las más importantes.

Naciones Unidas

Las Naciones Unidas porque, luego de muchas discusiones, en el año 1982 logró emitirse el acuerdo sobre las Naciones Unidas para el derecho del mar que entró en vigor el 16 de noviembre 1994 al ser ratificada por 160 países, en este momento ha sido ratificada por 166 países, aunque no todos han ratificado la totalidad de las declaraciones en la Convención ya que los países pueden emitir declaraciones en las cuales se reservan el cumplimiento de algunos de los aspectos. El 28 de julio de 1996 entró en vigor la parte XI, ratificada por 145 países, haciendo referencia a lo relacionado con la autoridad de los fondos oceánicos. En 1995 también entró en vigor el acuerdo sobre las poblaciones de peces. Este específicamente busca proteger aquellas especies altamente migratorias y que van de una zona económica exclusiva a otra y/o aquellas que se encuentran solamente en alta mar.




Ilustración 1: Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar
 Fuente: United Nations Slideshare Net

El gráfico anterior indica, en verde oscuro, los países que han ratificado la convención; en verde claro aquellos que la han firmado, pero no ratificado, y en gris aquellos países que aún no han firmado la Convención. En el caso del Perú si ha reconocido ante foros internacionales que, si bien no ha sido ratificada, el país se rige y sigue exactamente todos los principios de la Convención de los derechos del mar. Hay otros países que tampoco lo han hecho, pero tienen posiciones bastante similares.




Ilustración 2: Zonas del mar
 Fuente: Elaboración propias

Para aquellos que no están muy relacionado con el medio marítimo, solamente voy a hacer una pequeña demostración sobre que es, más o menos, lo que indica la convención del derecho del mar en cuanto a lo que los Estados pueden reclamar y básicamente lo que hace la Convención. Primero establece las formas en las cuales se puede establecer una línea base, como ustedes saben, las costas son bastante irregulares y para evitar estar llevando las líneas en forma directa se permite establecer una línea base que permite unas líneas rectas y de esa forma fácilmente proyectar lo que son el mar territorial, que son 12 millas, la zona contigua otras 12 millas y luego una zona contigua en la cual los países pueden manejar toda la parte de explotación de los recursos de esa zona hasta 200 millas.

Esta zona económica exclusiva puede ser ampliada en el caso de que los levantamientos demuestren que la plataforma continental, es decir las profundidades menores a 200 metros, se vayan más allá de las 200 millas. Hay levantamientos efectuados por Argentina y por Brazil que les han permitido tener zonas económicas exclusivas que van más allá de las 200 millas. Pongo 2 países como ejemplo, pero hay otros países más que están en desarrollo.



Ilustración 3: Límites marítimos
Fuente: Marine Regions

La imagen presenta cuáles son los límites marítimos en esa zona está incluyendo básicamente las zonas económicas exclusivas de todos los países que han levantado esa información. Estas áreas que obviamente no son aguas internacionales.

Organización Marítima Internacional (OMI)

La OMI donde yo ahora soy el presidente encargado del Consejo es la organización marítima internacional. Sí les ha llegado un televisor de Corea o el auto no es de producción local, entonces vino en un buque cuya construcción paso por regulación de la Organización Marítima Internacional. La forma como ese auto fue embarcado paso por regulaciones de la Organización marítima internacional.

Todo aquello que se mueve con el comercio internacional, todos los buques pasan por la Organización Marítima Internacional. Es decir, la OMI lo que hace es regular todo lo que tiene que ver con el transporte marítimo a nivel internacional. En este momento está integrada por 174 países y 3 Estados asociados, Cuenta con acuerdo de cooperación con 64 organizaciones intergubernamentales y 81 ONG tienen estatus consultivo. Los objetivos de la OMI son “proveer un sistema de cooperación entre los Estados en el campo de la reglamentación y de las practicas gubernamentales relativas a cuestiones técnicas de toda índole concernientes a la navegación comercial internacional; alentar y facilitar la adopción general de estándares tan elevados como resulte factible en cuestiones relacionadas con la seguridad marítima, la eficiencia de la navegación y la prevención y mitigación de la contaminación del mar ocasionadas por los buques”. Salvo algunos países mediterráneos, todo el resto de los países del mundo son miembros




Ilustración 4: Estados miembros y asociados
Fuente: OMI

La OMI se encarga de: establecer los estándares para la seguridad de las naves; proteger el medio ambiente del efecto de las navieras; ha establecido las previsiones globales para búsqueda y rescate; asegura que todas las tripulaciones sean competentes y adecuadamente entrenada; permite que las compensaciones estén disponibles cuando ocurren accidentes.

La primera vez que se hace un acuerdo de seguridad de las naves es cuando se hunde el Titanic momento en que se crea el primer código para la protección de la seguridad de la vida humana en el mar. Luego, se llega al segundo acuerdo grande relacionado con la mitigación de los efectos de la contaminación al medio ambiente. Esto por el desastre del buque de petróleo frente a las costas de gran Bretaña. La OMI ha desarrollado 53 tratados, orientaciones, directivas, códigos, etc. Entre los principales tratados relacionados con seguridad se encuentran:

- SOLAS Seguridad de la Vida Humana en el Mar
- ISPS Protección de Buques e Instalaciones Portuarias
- MARPOL Prevención y Mitigación de la Contaminación
- SUA Supresión de actos ilegales contra la Seguridad de la Navegación
- Codigo Djibuti Codigo de Conducta para Represión de Actos de Piratería y Robo

Autoridad Internacional de los Fondos Marinos

En 1970 la XXV Asamblea General de la ONU aprobó mediante la resolución 2749 (XXV), la Declaración de Principios que Regulan los Fondos Marinos y Oceánicos y su Subsuelo fuera de los Limites de la Jurisdicción Nacional. La Autoridad fue creada por la Convención sobre Derecho del Mar y específicamente por el acuerdo de 1994 sobre la aplicación de la parte XI de la Convención. Cuenta con 168 miembros y a través de ella los Estados organizan y controlan las actividades que se llevan a cabo en los fondos marinos y su subsuelo fuera de sus jurisdicciones (50% de todos los fondos marinos).

Básicamente en este momento el mayor interés son los ejes de la minería. Este interés nace en el siglo 19 entre 1872 y 1876 cuando un buque de la Armada Británica extrae del fondo del mar unos extraños nódulos de forma oval, que básicamente era oxido manganeso, a partir de ahí se descubre la existencia de estos nódulos en el fondo del mar. Los 3 tipos clásicos son: Nódulos polimetálicos, Sulfuros Polimetálicos y Costas Cobálticas.

En este momento hay 30 contratos de exploración en los océanos Pacifico, Índico y Atlántico, que abarcan más de 1,3 millones de km² de fondo oceánico. Son 21 contratistas de todo el mundo que cuentan con contratos de 15 años de vigencia (18 NP, 7 SP y 5 CC). La prioridad

principal de la Autoridad es elaborar un régimen jurídico para la exploración de estos recursos. Esto implica tener en cuenta una serie de cuestiones tecnológicas, financieras y ambientales². La autoridad de los fondos marinos debe llegar luego a un régimen para explotación de esos recursos, porque debe asegurarse que sea en beneficio de todos.





Ilustración 5: Contratos de Explotación – Fractura Clarion-
 Fuente: ISA

² Fuente: ISA

Los Estados

Estos tienen las funciones de:

- Protección de la soberanía e integridad territorial
- Protección de los recursos naturales
- Protección de la vida humana en el mar
- Prevención y mitigación de la contaminación
- Represión de las actividades ilícitas

Los objetivos están asociados siempre a la parte relacionada con la Organización Marítima Internacional



Ilustración 6: Roles de los Estados

Como Estado de Bandera el país es responsable por la seguridad y protección de las naves, debe certificar que las naves que tienen su bandera y las tripulaciones nacionales cumplen con los estándares. Como Estado Rector de Puerto inspecciona todas aquellas naves de otras banderas que llegan a sus puertos y comprueba que cumplen con las regulaciones. Obviamente, como Estado Costero están los aspectos relacionados a soberanía que tienen que ver con la protección del medio ambiente, sus recursos naturales, prestar los servicios de búsqueda y rescate y las comunicaciones.




Ilustración 7: NAVAREAS
Fuente: IHO

El mapa anterior muestra las zonas NAVAREAS. Es básicamente una zona en la cual el estado se compromete a transmitir información relacionada con seguridad y proveer ese tipo de comunicaciones en relación con la seguridad e información meteorológica.




Ilustración 8: Cobertura GMDSS INMARSAT
Fuente: INMARSAT

El mapa anterior muestra la cobertura relacionada a lo que es la búsqueda y rescate. Las coberturas de los satélites relacionados con el sistema mundial de alerta de socorro y desastre.




Imagen: IRIDIUM

Ilustración 9: Cobertura GMDSS IRIDIUM
Fuente: IRIDIUM

El mapa muestra la cobertura antes del GMDSS y ahora la del IRIDIUM que es un nuevo operador.





Ilustración 10: Global Maritime Search and Rescue Areas

La ilustración muestra las áreas de búsqueda y rescate. Cada una de estas áreas va mucho más allá de las fronteras de cada uno de los países y es donde los países tienen la obligación de prestar servicios de búsqueda y rescate en caso de que alguna nave se accidente. Los Estados cumplen con estas obligaciones en las áreas que tienen comprendidas.

Empleo del Mar y Aspectos que afectan la Seguridad

Hay que mencionar que la pandemia ha bloqueado un poco la actualización de esta información y las estadísticas que tenemos son hasta el 2018. Como medio de comercio marítimo más del 80% del comercio mundial es transportado por esta vía. Ello implica más de 11.000 millones de toneladas de carga.



Fuentes: Revista de Transporte Marítimo, diversos números, la división de la carga del 2006 al 2018, tomado de datos de [Clarkson Research](#).

Ilustración 11: Mar como medio de transporte

Fuente: Revista de Transporte Marítimo, diversos números, la división de la carga del 2006 al 2018, tomado de datos de Clarkson Research

En este gráfico se busca presentar una idea de cómo se mueve la carga, por ejemplo, lo que se mueve por contenedores, carga general, lo que son graneles (es decir minerales y otros productos que se cargan no envasados; básicamente es el producto con granos minerales).




Ilustración 12: Comercio marítimo-carga y descarga
Fuente: Fuente: UNCTAD 2020 Handbook of Statistics

Este gráfico muestra donde se carga y se descargan los diferentes bienes, se distribuye en miles de millones de toneladas de carga entre África, Asia, Europa Oceanía, Norte Norteamérica y Sur América.

La flota mundial dedicada al transporte marítimo a finales del 2018 totalizó 93,100 buques con un desplazamiento total de 1.86 billones de toneladas. El número total de tripulantes involucrados en el comercio marítimo es estimado en 1,647,500 de los cuales 774,000 son Oficiales y 873,500 subalternos de diferentes categorías³.

³ Fuentes: UNCTAD, 50 Years of Review of Maritime Transport 1968-2018, International Chamber of Shipping, <http://www.ics-shipping.org>




Ilustración 13: Sistema de transporte mundial
Fuente: Imagen: OMI

Imagen de lo que es el sistema de reporte mundial satelital que los buques deben llevar, se pintan en la pantalla las principales rutas del mundo. El transporte marítimo (lo que es carga) se ha mantenido durante la pandemia, lo que se ha reducido es el transporte de pasajeros. Se marcan los sitios donde se ha generado problemas de seguridad en el transporte marítimo. También menciono, uno de los puntos más importantes de seguridad que es el Canal de Panamá. Desde hace muchos años se desarrolla un ejercicio con el patrocinio del Gobierno Panameño y el Gobierno de EEUU. Esto puede verse en la siguiente imagen.




Ilustración 14: Principales países por flujo de carga
Fuente: Infografía: La prensa Panamá Datos: <https://micanaldepanama.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/10-PrincipalesPaíses.pdf>

Como medio de comercio marítimo que puede afectar o representar riesgo a la seguridad se identifican: la piratería y robo armado; transporte, descargas y/o trasvases ilegales; alteraciones al entorno que afecten la libre navegación; y ciberseguridad.

En relación con la piratería y robo armado⁴ el Artículo 101 de la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar indica que constituye piratería cualquiera de los actos siguientes:

a) Todo acto ilegal de violencia o de detención o todo acto de depredación cometidos con un propósito personal por la tripulación o los pasajeros de un buque privado o de una aeronave privada y dirigidos:

i) Contra un buque o una aeronave en la alta mar o contra personas o bienes a bordo de ellos;

⁴ Referencia Artículos 100 sobre obligación de cooperar e la represión y 105 sobre posibilidad de Apresar un buque pirata por parte de un estado

ii) Contra un buque o una aeronave, personas o bienes que se encuentren en un lugar no sometido a la jurisdicción de ningún Estado;

b) Todo acto de participación voluntaria en la utilización de un buque o de una aeronave, cuando el que lo realice tenga conocimiento de hechos que den a dicho buque o aeronave el carácter de buque o aeronave pirata;

c) Todo acto que tenga por objeto incitar a los actos definidos en los apartados a) o en el apartado b) o facilitarlos intencionalmente

La Resolución A.1025(26) (Anexo, párrafo 2.2) de la OMI, Código de prácticas para la investigación de los delitos de piratería y robos a mano armada perpetrados contra los buques, define como robos a mano armada perpetrados contra los buques cualquiera de los actos siguientes:

a) Todo acto ilícito de violencia o de detención, o cualquier acto de depredación o de amenaza de depredación, que no sean actos de piratería, cometidos con un propósito personal y dirigidos contra un buque o contra personas o bienes a bordo de éste, dentro de las aguas interiores, aguas archipelágicas y mar territorial de un Estado.

b) Todo acto que tenga por objeto incitar a los actos definidos anteriormente o facilitarlos intencionalmente.

Esfuerzos Internacionales

La situación de los piratas somalíes llevó a una serie de acuerdos internacionales como las resoluciones del Consejo de Seguridad de Naciones Unidas, el código de conducta de Judith y una serie de operaciones en curso, pero lo más importante fue, y esto es lo más interesante, que es la primera vez que los 5 países miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas lograron desplegar fuerzas con un propósito similar. Obviamente en otros casos, todos han desplegado fuerzas del Estado en lados opuestos, pero esta es la primera ocasión en que ambos han empujado hacia el mismo lado.




Ilustración 15: Efecto de la Piratería en Somalia sobre rutas de navegación
 Fuente: Marine Policy 59, Set 2015

Lo que se ve en las imágenes de la ilustración anterior, empezando de la parte superior izquierda a la parte inferior derecha, es como se empezaron a afectar las líneas de comunicaciones marítimas en la zona del Cuerno de África a raíz de la piratería en Somalia. Si ven desde la parte superior izquierda como la piratería hizo que las líneas de comunicación se alejaran violentamente de las costas somalíes y luego, a raíz de los esfuerzos internacionales, fueron retomando a casi la normalidad como se ve en la última pantalla.

Cambios en la Industria

Esa situación llevó a una serie de cambios en la industria. Esta se empezó a adaptar para tratar de combatir la piratería con elementos de descarga de agua, cañones de agua, colocar alambre de púas en los buques y llevar guardias armados. Esto es un tema que continúa en discusión porque, de acuerdo con las normas internacionales, estos buques no pueden llevar armas. Sin embargo, algunos decidieron combatir el fuego con el fuego para tratar de evitar ser abordados por piratas.




Ilustración 16: Cambios en la industria

La cooperación internacional ha llevado a que esa situación se reduzca. Entre el 2008 hasta el 2011-12 ya casi la piratería había sido eliminada, hay algunos reportes que habría intentado presentar este año, pero lamentablemente la estadística no ha sido publicada todavía. La siguiente gráfica muestra dicha disminución.




Ilustración 17: Ataques e intentos de ataque por piratas somalíes. Incluye: Golfo de Adén, Océano Indico, Mar Rojo, Golfo de Omán, Somalia y Omán
Fuente: OMI, cuadro elaboración propia

En la imagen siguiente se presenta cual era la zona de seguridad, esta zona habría sido establecida por la industria. Obviamente se presentan una serie de áreas, como las Maldivias, que se vieron afectadas al decir que estaban en una zona de posible piratería. Ya en noviembre y diciembre del año 2018, la industria redujo el área a solamente la zona del Cuerno de África.





Ilustración 18: Anti-piracy planning Chart-Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea

Datos piratería y robo armado

Las gráficas a continuación (Ilustraciones 19 y 20) muestran donde han ocurrido la mayoría de los incidentes. Algunos de ellos se producen tanto estando anclados como amarrados al muelle, es decir, esto sería básicamente robo armado. El 38 por ciento son actos relacionados con la piratería que se han producido navegando mientras 55% han sido anclados. Los tipos de incidentes han sido abordaje, intento de abordaje, secuestro y disparos.

Incidentes de Piratería o Robo Armado						
Region	Año					
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Sud Este Asia	141	157	68	76	63	31
Este Asia	8	27	16	4	8	45
Sub Cont India	34	24	17	15	25	18
Americas	5	8	27	24	30	26
Africa	55	35	62	57	92	67
Resto del Mundo	2	1	1	4	5	3
Total Anual	245	252	191	180	223	190



2017 menor numero de incidentes en 22 años

Fuente: OMI, ICC, Cuadros elaboración propia

Ilustración 19: Incidentes de Piratería o de Robo Armado

Fuente: OMI, ICC, Cuadros elaboración propia




Ilustración 20: Incidentes en 2019

Fuente: OMI, ICC, Cuadros elaboración propia

Esfuerzos Internacionales

Entre los esfuerzos internacionales tenemos el Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) de noviembre de 2009. El mismo comprende 15 países: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Camboya, Corea, China, Estados Unidos de América, Gran Bretaña, Holanda, Japon, Laos, Myanmar, Singapur, Sri Lanka y Tailandia. Tiene establecido un Centro de Intercambio de Información en Singapur y su

misión es: Incrementar la cooperación regional a través del intercambio de información, incremento de capacidades y acuerdos de cooperación relativos al combate a la piratería y robo armado contra buques.

Como parte de los esfuerzos internacionales la OMI promovió la elaboración y firma del Código de Conducta relativo a la represión de los actos de piratería, los robos a mano armada contra buques y la actividad marítima ilícita en África Occidental y Central, formalmente adoptados en Yaoundé, en junio de 2013. Está firmado por 25 Estados que también se comprometen con la implantación del MoU desarrollado por la OMI y la Organización Marítima de África Occidental y Central (OMAOC). Además, se aprobaron las resoluciones 2018 (2011) y 2039 (2012) del Consejo de Seguridad de las Naciones Unidas y las estrategias marítimas de la Unión Africana, la Comunidad Económica de los Estados Centrales Africanos (CEEAC), la Comunidad económica de los Estados de África Central (CEDEAO) y la Comisión del Golfo de Guinea (CGG).

Otro esfuerzo internacional es lograr el objetivo de que los Estados Miembros en África Occidental y Central adopten una legislación nacional que criminalice la piratería, los ataques perpetrados contra buques y otras actividades marítimas ilícitas; que coordinen estructuras y procedimientos, y que dispongan de personal bien formado operacional, técnica y logísticamente para cumplir, de forma efectiva, sus responsabilidades y obligaciones en todos los aspectos de la protección y seguridad marítima y la protección del medio marino, fortaleciendo de ese modo el comercio regional por mar. Esto en estrecha colaboración con UNODOC, FAO, ACNUR y las oficinas regionales de UNOCA y UNOWA, así como Interpol.

Transporte, Trasvases y descargas Ilegales

También hay transportes y trasvases ilegales como medio para evadir sanciones o transportar cargas ilegales. Durante MSC 100, se discutió sobre medidas receptoras empleadas por la RPDC, que incluían trasvases ilegales, falsificación de documentos, alteración de identificación y desactivación de medios de identificación electrónica



Ilustración 21: Buque descargando hacia un pesquero
 Fuente: Departamento de Estado EEUU, publicadas 26 Oct 2018

Como puede verse en la foto anterior, tomada en 2018, es un buque que esta está descargando combustible legal hacia un pesquero de Corea del Norte, pero esto estaba siendo prohibido por el embargo que había establecido Naciones Unidas.




Ilustración 22: Contaminación
 Fuente: Marinha do Brasil

La foto muestra una contaminación que apareció y afectó a más de 3.600km de la costa en Brasil a finales del 2019. Luego de un análisis se presentaron una serie de hipótesis dentro de las cuales se quedaron con tres posibles casos donde una fue el lavado de un tanque (considerada menos probable por la magnitud y el volumen de la mancha) otra es un derrame por una transferencia no autorizada entre buque y buque, y otra posibilidad planteada fue eco-terrorismo donde descargaron crudo al mar de manera intensional. Sin embargo, no se pudo determinar si la situación fue creada por un acto intensional.

Ciberseguridad

En temas de ciberseguridad ya se han hecho demostraciones con un ferry realizando una travesía de forma autónoma y de regreso ser controlado a distancia. Esto ya es una posibilidad, es algo que se está trabajando y que se está estudiando, aunque plantea una serie de temas relacionados a que no haya tripulación a bordo. En temas de seguridad tenemos el ejemplo de MAERSK quienes recibieron un ataque el 27 de junio de 2017 en el que pierden de inmediato control sobre 4.000 servidores y 45.000 Pc's y Laptops en una compañía que tiene 574 oficinas en 130 países y controla 76 puertos con alrededor de 800 buques. Las pérdidas fueron alrededor de US\$ 300 millones. Todo comenzó con un software de contabilidad instalado en la oficina de Odessa en Ucrania.

De igual manera, sucedieron incidentes en mayo del 2018 con ataques en el estrecho de Ormuz, esto en el ámbito de una serie de explosiones y presiones políticas entre algunos países del Golfo Pérsico y algunas potencias mundiales que llevaron a la captura, digámoslo así, de buques en diferentes partes del mundo. Se llegaron a afectar algunos países, pero en realidad el problema es que por esta zona se transporta diariamente el 20 % del petróleo.

También el mar es causa para otro tipo de flujos ya que muchas de las drogas se mueven en cargamentos por vía marítima (tanto cocaína como heroína). Hay otro tipo de casos que son las alteraciones en el entorno. Por ejemplo, un puente construido por la Federación Rusa sobre el Estrecho de Carson. Los rusos indican que el tamaño permite pasar los buques, pero los ucranianos dicen que es una alteración específica al entorno y les limita la comunicación.

El mar como fuente de alimentos

La producción mundial de productos acuáticos en el medio marítimo en 2016 representó 90,9 millones de toneladas de capturas, 32 millones de tn de productos de acuicultura y 31,2 millones de toneladas de plantas acuáticas. El 88% se destina al consumo humano directo, el otro 12% es mayoritariamente para productos de consumo humano indirecto. Esta actividad involucra a 59,6 millones de personas que la realizan en 4,6 millones de embarcaciones de las cuales el 75% se encuentran en Asia. Del total, 2,8 millones de embarcaciones cuentan con motor y de estas, el 86% (2,4m) son menores a 12 metros, solo el 2% (56 mil) son mayores de 24 metros. Esta producción representa 142,000 millones de dólares en exportaciones⁵.

Los elementos que pueden afectar y/o representan riesgo a la seguridad del mar como fuente de alimentos son: a) la pesca ilegal no reportada y/o no controlada y b) las disputas de límites marítimos. La *pesca ilegal* tiene como características que: es realizada en aguas bajo la jurisdicción de un Estado, sin el permiso de éste o contraviniendo su legislación; se realiza por buques de Estados que son partes de una organización regional, pero faenan contraviniendo las medidas de conservación y ordenación adoptadas. Este tipo de pesca está en violación de las leyes nacionales u obligaciones internacionales⁶.

Por su parte *la pesca no declarada* es aquella que no se declara o se hace de modo inexacto ante la autoridad nacional competente. Otra característica es que se lleva a cabo en la zona de competencia de una organización regional que no ha sido declarada o ha sido declarada de modo inexacto, en contravención de los procedimientos de declaración de dicha organización⁷.

Por otra parte, la *pesca no reglamentada* se realiza en la zona de aplicación de una organización regional de ordenación pesquera competente por buques sin nacionalidad, o de un Estado que no es parte de esa organización. La misma se realizada en zonas o en relación con poblaciones de peces respecto de las cuales no existen medidas aplicables de conservación u ordenación y en las que estas actividades pesqueras se llevan a cabo de una manera que no está en concordancia con respecto a la conservación de los recursos marinos vivos en virtud del derecho internacional. La FAO estima que esta actividad conlleva alrededor de los 26 millones de toneladas, lo que representa 23,000 millones de dólares. Esto es aproximadamente el 20% del total

⁵ Anuario FAO, *Estadísticas de pesca y acuicultura*, 2016 <https://globalfishingwatch.org/map/>

⁶ FAO

⁷ FAO

del pescado capturado. De igual manera, esta practica afecta la seguridad por su relación con otros delitos, en especial con el lavado de dinero⁸.

En octubre de 1995, se aprobó el Código de Conducta para la Pesca Responsable de la FAO. Otra regulación aprobada es el Acuerdo sobre las medidas del Estado rector del puerto (AMERP), de carácter vinculante centrado específicamente en la pesca INDNR, en vigencia desde junio 2016. Su objetivo es prevenir, desalentar y eliminar la pesca INDNR impidiendo que los buques que la practican utilicen puertos para desembarcar sus capturas.

El mar como fuente de Combustibles, Energía y Minerales

Más del 25% de la producción mundial de petróleo y gas es extraída “offshore”. Las principales áreas de producción están en el Medio Este, Mar del Norte, Brasil, el Golfo de México y el Mar Caspio⁹. La producción de Petróleo se ha mantenido relativamente estable desde el año 2000, la producción de Gas Natural se ha incrementado en más del 50% en el mismo periodo. Mientras tanto, la producción de energía eléctrica, principalmente eólica se ha incrementado notablemente en los últimos años, particularmente en las aguas someras del Mar del Norte. Por otra parte, el mar como fuente de combustible, energía y minerales puede ser afectado por disputas de límites marítimos

El mar como medio de migración

De acuerdo con los indicadores globales de migración, en el mundo hay 258 millones de migrantes, 25.4 millones registrados como refugiados, 50 millones irregulares, 68.5 millones de desplazados por persecuciones conflictos o violencia, 25 millones víctimas de trabajos forzados y 2.5 millones de migrantes fueron traficados a cambio de dinero (\$7 BN)¹⁰. Las pautas de migración a nivel mundial son complejas, muchos itinerarios migratorios se forman y transforman constantemente. Sin embargo, se pueden señalar cinco importantes rutas migratorias que acogen un flujo migratorio significativo a nivel mundial: las rutas del Mediterráneo y Mediterráneo Oriental; la ruta Centroamericana; la ruta de Asia Sudoriental; y la ruta Sudafricana

⁸ FAO

⁹ Fuente: Offshore Energy Outlook, Mayo, International Energy Agency

¹⁰ Fuente: Indicadores globales de migración 2018, IOM Global Migration Data Analysis Centre

Los datos reflejan que la Ruta del Mediterráneo es la más notoria por la crisis humanitaria reportando: 3685 muertos y desaparecidos en 2016; 1890 muertos y desaparecidos en 2018; 1377 muertos y desaparecidos en 2019 y 672 muertos y desaparecidos en 2020.




Ilustración 23: Ruta Mediterráneo
Fuente: Missing Migrant Project, International Organization for Migration




Ilustración 24: Algunos números
Fuente: Elaboración propia con datos de la IOM

Esfuerzos Internacionales

Algunos de los esfuerzos internacionales para tratar este tema son: Italia Operación Mare Nostrum; Operaciones de la Agencia de Seguridad Fronteriza de la CE (FRONTEX); Operación Poseidón; Operación Tritón; Operación Indalo; Operaciones de la Fuerza Naval de la CE en el Mediterráneo (EUNAVFOR-MED); Operación Sofía; OTAN Mar Egeo

533 325 lives saved since 2015

Data as of 6 September 2020 | Dead or missing: 13 021 (as of 09/09/2020)



Starting date of each operation

- Operation Sophia: 01/06/2015
- Operation Poseidon: 01/01/2016
- Operation Indalo: 03/05/2017
- Operation Themis: 01/02/2018

**Including figures from former Operation Triton since 1 February 2016.*

***Operation Sophia was terminated as of 31 March 2020. During its operation 44 916 persons were rescued.*

Source: Frontex and IOM



Ilustración 25: Operaciones Internacionales

Fuente: Frontex and IOM

Disputas de límites marítimos:

Algunos ejemplos son: Mar del Sur de China, algunos Casos en África, Mediterráneo, EEUU-Canadá.

China

En lo relacionado al Mar del Sur de China tenemos CIJ (12/7/16): "no existe base legal para que China apele a derechos históricos sobre los recursos dentro de las zonas marítimas que están dentro de la línea de los nueve puntos". China "no acepta y no reconoce" el dictamen del tribunal de La Haya, tras conocer el veredicto de la Corte Permanente de La Haya a favor de Filipinas sobre el Mar Meridional de China. Indican que "El proceso ha sido ilegal y por tanto no se puede reconocer, no lo hemos hecho desde el principio".

Las láminas a continuación muestran diferentes ejemplos así como los posibles focos de tensión a futuro.





Ilustración 26 Islas y arrecifes que están en construcción
Fuente: NY Times



Fuente: Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative

Ilustración 27: Airstrip Comparison in the South China Sea
Fuente: Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative

Mar del Sur de China Reservas Probadas y Probables

Pais	Petróleo and líquidos reservas (billones barriles)	Gas Natural reservas (trillones pies cúbicos)
Brunei	1.5	15
China	1.3	15
Indonesia	0.3	55
Malaysia	5.0	80
Philippines	0.2	4
Taiwan	-	-
Thailand	-	1
Vietnam	3.0	20
Total	11.2	190

Nota: Los totales de reservas no incluyen las reservas de Tailandia en el golfo o terrestres
Fuentes: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Oil & Gas Journal, IHS, CNOOC, PFC Energy.

Ilustración 28: Mar del Sur de China Reservas Probadas y Probables
Fuente: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Oil & Gas Journal, IHS, CNOOC, PFC Energy




Ilustración 29: Otro caso en Asia
Fuente: Interfax

África





Ilustración 30: Casos en África
Fuente: Imagen: AFP / DW




- Ghana-Costa de Marfil
- Set 2017 ITLOS definió la nueva frontera, dándole la razón a Ghana.

Imagen: http://ressourcesafricaines.blog.lemonde.fr/files/2015/05/Carre_Tullow_Oil_Ghana1.jpg.

Ilustración 31: Ghana-Costa de Marfil

Fuente: Imagen - http://ressourcesafricaines.blog.lemonde.fr/files/2015/05/Carre_Tullow_Oil_Ghana1.jpg



- Angola-DRC

Imagen: Africa Confidential, Vol 55, Nro 11, Mayo 2014

Ilustración 32: Angola-DRC

Fuente: Imagen: Africa Confidential, Vol 55, Nro 11, Mayo 2014




Ilustración 33: Eastern Mediterranean gas fields
Fuente: Imagen - Crystol Energy




Ilustración 34: Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbon reserves: overlapping claims
Fuente: Imagen- IHS Markit




Ilustración 35: Mediterranean Sea
Fuente: Interfax

Posibles focos de tensión a futuro



Ilustración 36: Posible foco de tensión a futuro
Fuente: Imagen: Geology.com




Fuente: USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, Fact Sheet 2008-3049

Ilustración 37: Undiscovered gas

Fuente: USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, Fact Sheet 2008-3049

Posible foco de tensión a futuro?



Fuente: USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, Fact Sheet 2008-3049

Ilustración 38: Undiscovered oil

Fuente: USGS, Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, Fact Sheet 2008-3049



Ilustración 39: Posible foco de tensión a futuro

Fuente: Imagen: Word Press

Conclusión

- El Mar continuará siendo un escenario fundamental para la interacción y desarrollo de la humanidad.
- La cooperación sea regional, multi-regional o global es fundamental para un uso adecuado y armonioso de los espacios marítimos.
- La armonía necesaria, sólo será posible si se logra acordar/solucionar las diferentes disputas sobre límites marítimos.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Guy Ziv, Ph.D.¹¹
American University
(Speaker Notes)

I. U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Middle East

A. Traditional U.S. Interests

1. Securing Oil
2. Containing/Competing with the Soviet Union
3. Protecting Israel

B. More Recent U.S. Interests

1. Control of Proliferation of WMDs
2. Democracy Promotion (under Bush 43rd)
3. Combating Terrorism
4. Brokering the Arab-Israeli/Israeli-Palestinian conflicts

II. Continuity vs. Change A. A Question We Ask Re Any Incoming Administration B. Of Even Greater Relevance Today

1. Whenever Party Controlling the WH Changes
2. The Trump Years – unprecedented in the modern era in terms of shattering norms of traditional diplomacy and upending longstanding U.S. policy

III. Leadership Styles

¹¹ Dr. Guy Ziv is an assistant professor at American University's School of International Service (SIS), where he teaches courses on U.S. foreign policy, international negotiations, U.S.-Israel relations, and Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. He is the recipient of the SIS Outstanding Teaching Award in 2014 and the William Cromwell Award for Outstanding Teaching in 2019. Dr. Ziv's first book, *Why Hawks Become Doves: Shimon Peres and Foreign Policy Change in Israel*, was published by SUNY Press in 2014, with an updated paperback version published in 2015. His current research project focuses on civil-military relations in Israel. Dr. Ziv has a background in policy, having worked on Capitol Hill and for Israel Policy Forum, a not-for-profit, nonpartisan organization that promotes American efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. His articles have been published in peer-reviewed academic journals, blogs, and leading newspapers, including *The Baltimore Sun*, *CNN.com*, *Haaretz*, *The Hill*, *The Jerusalem Post*, *New York Daily News*, *Newsday*, *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, and *USA Today*. He also appears regularly as a commentator in major media outlets including Al Jazeera, BBC, Bloomberg TV, China Global Television Network (CGTN), CNN, CTV, i24 News, Sky News, and Voice of America.

A. Trump

- 1.** Transactional Approach (Businessman)
- 2.** Advisers: loyalists, family members
- 3.** Erratic, Twitter-Centric Decision-Making Style
- 4.** Populist-Nationalist, Nativist and Isolationist Appeals (“America First”)
- 5.** Norms Set Aside

B. Biden

- 1.** A Compromiser; a man of the Senate
- 2.** Advisers: Consults experts; his picks have been experienced Washington technocrats, many from the Obama era
 - a.** Not a “team of rivals” (Lincoln, Obama)
 - b.** Biden prizes relationships (Ron Klain, his Chief of Staff, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Bill Burns, etc.)
- 3.** A return to norms & multilateralism
- 4.** Liberal Internationalism will replace Populist Nationalism
 - a.** Less reluctant than Trump to get involved in world affairs; Blinken has criticized Trump for pulling U.S. troops out of Syria.
 - b.** Most likely, a greater emphasis on human rights (e.g., China)

IV. Foreign Policy Priorities

A. Climate Change – A Return to the Paris Agreement

B. Facing the Challenges of U.S.-China Relations

- 1.** Work with allies to confront China’s trade practices and authoritarian policies
- 2.** Address China’s relations with its neighbors
 - a.** South China Sea
 - b.** Hong Kong
 - c.** Taiwan
- 3.** Speak out on China’s human rights violations of the Uighur Muslim minority

C. Tensions with Russia

- 1.** Biden to Putin: “I don’t think you have a soul.”
- 2.** Conflicting Foreign Policy Agenda
 - a.** Syria
 - b.** Ukraine
- 3.** Renewing the New START Treaty (expires Feb. 5) – it can be extended for 5 years
- 4.** Putin’s interference in U.S. domestic politics (2016 Presidential Elections)
- 5.** The recent hacking of U.S. government computer systems

D. Reassuring our Allies

- 1.** Repairing the Transatlantic Alliance
- 2.** Renewing our Commitment to Preserve NATO

E. With Competing Priorities, How Much Attention to the Middle East? Will it Rank High?

V. Biden’s Middle East Policy: What Can We Expect?

A. Re-Entering Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA)

- 1.** Ensuring that Iran complies with the 2015 nuclear deal
 - a.** Trump pulled out of it.
 - b.** Biden can restore it via an executive order; it’s not a treaty.
 - c.** A return to the JCPOA will be difficult; unclear as to whether Iranians will do so.
- 2.** “Follow-on negotiation” over Iran’s missile capabilities
 - a.** Iran refused to consider any limitations on their ballistic missile development or testing in JCPOA.
 - b.** National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan has suggested this can be an area of cooperation with Russia.
- 3.** Key indicators that the Iranian nuclear program will be a priority for the incoming administration are two of his top national security picks who were instrumental in negotiating the JCPOA.

- a. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan
- b. CIA Director Bill Burns

B. Building on the Momentum of the Abraham Accords

1. The Trump Administration's Signature Foreign Policy Achievement

- a. Capitalized on years of cooperation between Israel and large parts of the Sunni world (Egypt, Morocco, the Gulf States) given their common enemy: Iran.
- b. The result: A series of normalization agreements
 - (1) UAE
 - (2) Bahrain
 - (3) Sudan
 - (4) Morocco
- c. An expensive price for the U.S.
 - (1) F-35 fighter jets to UAE (\$23 billion sale)
 - (2) Removal of Sudan from list of state sponsors of terrorism
 - (3) Recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara

2. Biden may choose to reverse one or more of these agreements.

- a. Congress can reject them as well; many members are not pleased with the high price tag Trump was willing to pay with little benefit to the U.S.
- b. Should any of these agreements be reversed, those normalization agreements with Israel would also suffer the consequences.

3. Regardless, Biden will want to build on the momentum of the Abraham accords by expanding the bloc of Arab states normalizing relations with Israel

- a. Oman
- b. Tunisia
- c. Saudi Arabia – the ultimate prize

4. Bringing in the Palestinians, who have been set aside in the Trump/Netanyahu calculus.

C. Renewing America's Role as an Honest Broker

- 1.** Long tradition of "Honest Broker" role in Arab-Israeli peacemaking
 - a.** No neutrality; no even-handedness
 - b.** However, greater leverage/ability to pressure Israel, in particular
- 2.** Key Milestones
 - a.** Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy following '73 Yom Kippur War → Disengagement Agreements of '74-'75
 - b.** Carter and Camp David ('78) → Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty ('79)
 - c.** Clinton and Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty ('94)
 - d.** Years of failed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, from Bush 41st through Obama (1991-2014)
- 3.** The U.S. stopped being an honest broker in the Trump Era
 - a.** Recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital
 - b.** Relocating U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem
 - c.** Merging the U.S. Consulate and Embassy
 - (1)** The consulate in Jerusalem has, since 1844, served as America's venue for communication with the Palestinians.
 - d.** Recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights
 - e.** No public criticism of settlement construction in the West Bank
 - f.** The Trump Peace Plan favors the Israeli right
 - (1)** Israel would control a unified Jerusalem.
 - (2)** Israel wouldn't be required to uproot settlements.
 - (3)** Israel could annex approximately 30% of the land.
 - g.** Eliminating \$200 million in aid to the West Bank and Gaza ('18)
 - h.** Stopping all funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides assistance to

Palestinian refugees

- i.** Shutting down PLO office in Washington **4.** What will Biden reverse?
 - a.** He will likely *not* reverse the decision to relocate the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem.
 - b.** Many of Trump’s other decisions are likely to be at least partially reversed.

- (1)** Biden might make specific reference to East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state.

- (2)** He’ll likely restore aid to the Palestinians, enable the PLO office to reopen in D.C., and reopen the U.S. consulate in East Jerusalem.

- (3)** Scrap or revise Trump’s peace plan and take a harder line on settlements (the traditional U.S. policy opposing them)

- 4.** The larger goal of restoring America’s role as an honest broker is to preserve the possibility of the two-state solution.

- a.** The two-state solution has long been the paradigm for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

- (1)** It has its roots in the partition plans of 1937 (British) and 1947 (UN).

- (2)** The Clinton Parameters of December 2000, Bush’s Road Map for Middle East Peace, the Obama-era policies – all were based on this premise.

- b.** Alternatives to the two-state solution:

- (1)** A confederation (see Dahlia Scheindlin)

- i.** A loose association of two states, based on freedom of movement, porous borders, residency rights and a shared Jerusalem

- ii.** National self-determination for both peoples

- iii.** Contributes to economic development for Palestinians

- (2)** A “One-State” Solution

(3) Status Quo → A de facto binational state/Apartheid

It's in America's interest to stabilize the Middle East; resolving this longstanding conflict would be one important step in doing so.

D. Other Middle East Priorities

- 1.** Ending “forever wars”; i.e., Afghanistan and Iraq
- 2.** A greater emphasis on human rights (e.g., Saudi Arabia)

VI. The Future of U.S. Influence in the Middle East

A. Middle East Pullback by Recent Administrations

- 1.** A response to military overreach
- 2.** Other foreign policy priorities around the world

B. Dwindling Influence?

- 1.** Fear of abandonment from our allies
 - a.** Israel
 - b.** The Gulf States
 - c.** The Kurds
 - (1)** Trump had decided to remove U.S. troops from northern Syria
 - (2)** Biden: “Trump sold them out” **2.** Will our adversaries feel emboldened?
 - a.** Iran?
 - b.** ISIS?
 - c.** Russia and other state actors?

Perspectives for the use of Space

Maj Gen José Vagner Vital¹
Brazilian Air Force

Abstract

Space is a new world of opportunities with increasing presence in daily life of common people worldwide. This theme brings some strategic aspects related to defense, security, diplomacy, economic development, including opportunities to regional and multiregional cooperation. Some space applications already used in many different areas will be explored to introduce the topic and prepare to the comments presented about the space economy, space market, trends, and the space industry. Military perspective in the space combat domain will be also discussed, and the increasing military presence in space will be presented. At the end, this work will infer opportunities for international space cooperation.

Keywords: Space Domain. Defense systems. Brazilian Space Program. Brazilian Strategic Space Systems (PESE). Satellites. Space applications. Space economy. Space market. Extra-terrestrial Industry.

Introduction

Space is a new area for the major numbers of American countries, and it is important to consider that we must learn a lot about what means this new world integrated with the increasing presence of use of space in daily life of common people.

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These notes intend to explore some strategic aspects related to defense, security, diplomacy, economic development, including opportunities to regional and multiregional cooperation.

The first chapter presents some space applications already used in many different areas. The second chapter will bring comments about the space economy and space market, tendencies, industries. The third chapter will discuss the military perspective in the space domain, the use of space environment and the last chapter will infer opportunities for international space cooperation. This work will focus on the recent principles about space in this 21st century and will not explore the initial principles of the Space Treaty signed in 1967, when the main purpose of the space exploration was only for the good of humanity. In the beginning, the economic aspects were considered only as spinoff of space activities. The new economic and commercial dimensions, summed with the defense dimension of the use of space have becoming greater since the last decade up to now.

1-Space applications

The space world brings many different possibilities nowadays, which include common applications for Space-to-Earth services like:

- Remote sensing.
- Communications.
- Positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), etc.




Figure 1 – Space-to-Earth services based on remote sensing satellites. (Source ITA Space Center – CEI, <https://www.cei.ita.br/>)

The Figure 1 summarizes the different services one can achieve by taken the advantage of remote sensing satellites. These kinds of satellites can be based on active or passive sensors onboard in orbital spacecraft for multiple purposes on Earth surface. Usually, they fly in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), usually bellow 1,000 km of altitude from the average sea level surface, with many different inclinations related to the Equator plane. The projection of the satellite's trajectory changes according to the plane inclination of its orbit. The Figure 2 gives example of trajectory projections on Earth surface for different orbital plane inclinations.




Figure 2 – Example of trajectories projected on the Earth surface from satellites flying in low inclined plane (a) and high inclined plane (b) (Source: Space Commission (CCISE) presentation).

The use of satellites for communications is usually based on geostationary satellites (GEO) for many purposes such as for broadcasting TV signal in big areas, data and voice transmission, internet services, etc. The GEO satellites fly at approximately 36,000 km of altitude from the average sea level surface, with zero inclination related to the Equator plane. The Figure 3 presents the Brazilian Defense and Strategic Communications Satellite (SGDC-1) as an example. This satellite belongs to the CALIDRIS satellite fleet of the Strategic Program for Space Systems (PESE) from Brazil. The SGDC1 have 50 Ka-Band transponders for broadband Internet governmental services and 5 X-Band transponders for military communications, therefore, this satellite provides dual-use services, for the military and civilian users in Brazil since 2017. The footprint for X-Band and Ka Band communications is also shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3 – CALIDRIS – SGDC-1, Geostationary Communication Satellite (Source: Space Commission (CCISE) presentation).

Another example of communication satellite application is the use of LEO satellites for voice and data communication, data collection in remote areas, etc. The Figure 4 presents the Brazilian concept of a small constellation with 4 LEO satellites for voice and data communications and data collection, according to the principles stated in the PESE.



Figure 4 – ATTICORA – LEO satellite constellation for communication (Source: Space Commission (CCISE) presentation).



Figure 5 – A 3D representation of the constellation of GPS satellites (Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration - NOAA)

The Global Positioning System (GPS) is the best example of using satellite constellations for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing systems (Figure 5). The space segment of the GPS is composed of 24 to 32 satellites flying in medium Earth orbit (MEO) about 20,200 km of altitude in six orbital planes.

All the above satellite systems can be used together with radar, optical or signal exploitation satellites, for mitigating deregulated urbanization, dump and dam monitoring, identification of outbreaks of forest fires, maritime traffic surveillance, maritime environmental monitoring, mining support, agriculture support, preservation of architectural and cultural collections (cultural heritage), and many other applications (Figure 6).




Figure 6 - Satellite applications (Source: Space Commission (CCISE) presentation).

2-Space market

Nowadays, it does no longer makes sense to refer to space only as a technology or a strategic sector. Space is a new world, with its new economy, a new frontier that is changing the way of life in the Earth, just as the discoveries of 1,500 did it at that time. Those countries who had not crossed the Atlantic in the beginning had difficulty reaching out those who crossed first. Even in the United States, where space activities have always been very important, deep structural changes are taking place to keep pace with competitors and to react quickly to the new energy and economic paradigm shifts that are taking place with the space economy. See the creation of the US Space Forces and the growing interest of the Department of Commerce (DoC) in space activities. As Sidney Nakahodo² predicts, there are space economic activities that cannot be ignored in the next 3 to 5 years, and can be grouped into two large sets:

² Sidney Nakahodo is the Founder and General Partner of Seldor Capital and cofounder of the New York Space Alliance. He presented this point of view in the podcast that can be reached at

- Space-to-Earth economy; and
- Space-to-Space economy.

These activities are those pushing to trillions of dollars the market size of the space economy, this is called the “Space Age 2.0”³.

The Bank of America Merrill Lynch sees the size of the space industry eight times larger over the next 30 years, to at least \$2.7 trillion (Figure 7).




Figure 7 – Space 2.0 (Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch)

Estimates for the actual size of the space market in 2019 are between \$366 billion and \$424 billion (Figure 8). Morgan Stanley also expects the global space market growing from at around \$350 billion in 2017 to a \$1.1 trillion market by 2040. If we also consider the **emerging extra-terrestrial industry**, Space 2.0 is no longer only about "using" space activities to increase efficiency and reduce cost on Earth. Space is now a wealth-generating environment that can change the value benchmarks of the global economy.

https://open.spotify.com/episode/6n2SE6UaWYxKXcM3waj4m?go=1&utm_source=embed_v3&si=yIC8s4ucSH6iWv3pzm6Dnw&t=0&nd=1 . Assessed on June 5th, 2021.

³ <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/31/the-space-industry-will-be-worth-nearly-3-trillion-in-30-years-bank-of-america-predicts.html> . Assessed on June 5th, 2021.

Estimates of Space Economic Activity			
2019 Space Economic Activity	Satellite Industry Association ¹	Euroconsult ²	Space Foundation ³
Commercial Space Spending	\$271 Billion	\$290 Billion	\$337 Billion
Government Space Spending	\$95 Billion	\$83 Billion	\$87 Billion
Total Space-Related Spending	\$366 Billion	\$373 Billion	\$424 Billion

1. "2020 State of the Satellite Industry", Satellite Industry Association, July 2020
 2. "The Space Economy Report 2020" and "Government Space Programs 2020", Euroconsult, November and December 2020
 3. "The Space Report", The Space Foundation, July 2020

Figure 8 – Estimated space market size according to Satellite Industry Association, Euroconsult and Space Foundation (Source: David W. Thompson Lecture Notes)

Northern Sky Research's infographic (Figure 9) shows the increasing level of investment in the space industry since the year 2000, due to lower barriers to entry, governments-led privatizations, and a healthy supporting ecosystem.



Figure 9 – Investment in emerging space companies (Source: Northern SKY Research)

The United States of America (USA) and China are by far the countries with the largest number of satellites in orbit (Figure 10), and considering all satellites in orbit in April 2020, more than 50% were commercial ones.




Figure 10 – Number of satellites per countries in April 2020 (Source: www.statista.com)
 According to Euroconsult, by 2028, around 1,000 satellites will be launched per year, which reinforces the growth trend of the space industry (Figure 11).




Figure 11 – 2019-2028 Trends for satellite industry (Source: Euroconsult)

Advances in technology have enabled a reduction in the size of satellites, allowing small satellites to carry out missions that were previously only possible with the use of large spacecraft. The reduction in dimensions and weight allowed the use of small satellite constellations at reasonable costs. This fact is enabling the emergence of new businesses and services that would previously be prohibitive for the private sector.

The small satellites today can be classified according to their mass, from 500 kg to tenths of Kg. The last State-of-the-Art Small Spacecraft Technology report⁴ from the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) brought the 2020 status for these spacecrafts and presents a classification scale for smallsats (Figure 12).




Figure 12 – Smallsat classification (Source: NASA/TP—2020–5008734)

Examples of microsatellites and nanosatellites can be found in Figure 13 and Figure 14. These figures bring a list of spacecrafts extracted from the 2020 State-of-the-Art Small Spacecraft Technology report from NASA. The Brazilian satellites in different stages of development were included by the author.



Figure 13 – Microsatellites examples (Source: based on NASA/TP—2020–5008734)

⁴ NASA/TP—2020–5008734, State-of-the-Art Small Spacecraft Technology. Can be reached at <https://www.nasa.gov/smallsat-institute/sst-soa>. Assessed on June 5th, 2021.

Nanosatellites (1 – 10 kg)

ITASAT 1 (BRAZIL)	6U
FloripaSat -1	1U
AAC ClydeSpace (Sweden)	1U, 3U
Blue Canyon Technologies (USA)	XB3
EnduroSat (Bulgaria)	1U, 3U
GomSpace (Denmark)	1U, 3U
Gumush (Turkey)	n-Art, n-Art Extreme
IMT (Italy)	1U, 3U
ISIS (The Netherlands)	1U
MSS (USA)	Altair 1
NanoAvionics (Lithuania)	M3P (3U)
Open Cosmos (United Kingdom)	3U
SkyLabs	NANOSky 1 3U
Spire Global (USA)	LEMUR 3U
Sputnix (Russia)	SXC1 1U, SXC3 3U
UTIAS SFL (Canada)	THUNDE R 3U



Figure 14 – Nanosatellites examples (Source: based on NASA/TP—2020–5008734)

Examples of picosatellites can be found in Figure 15, where we can also find a picture of Alba P3, a very interesting spacecraft with less than 1 kg of mass that can take pictures in LEO orbits with 15 m of ground resolution.

Picosatellites (0.1 – 1 kg)

Alba Orbital	Unicorn-12P, Unicorn-2 3P
Delft University of Technology	Delfi=PG
Picosat Systems	OzQube-1
Budapest University of Technology and Economics	SMOG=P, 1P & 3P



Figure 15 – Picosatellites examples (Source: based on NASA/TP—2020–5008734)

The launchers industry is also improving day by day, literally. The innovation in this segment runs in three directions:

- Heavy and Super Heavy Launchers, with very low cost per kg for big payloads or large smallsat constellations.
- Small Launchers, with good precision and low costs for smallsats and small constellations.
- Space Tugs for in-space transportation, that can operate stand alone or in combination with the above-mentioned launchers.

The heavy and super heavy launchers are the big ones, which intend to drop dramatically the cost per kg for payload launch to the Earth orbit or to deep space missions (Figure 16).

Heavy & Super Heavy Launchers (payload > 45 Ton, LEO)



Figure 16 – Example of Heavy and Super Heavy Launchers (Source: CCISE)

Small launchers may have bigger price per kg when compared to the heavy or super heavy launchers, but they bring as an advantage, the possibility to have a customized launch service, not so expensive costs and a rapid deployment for missions based in smallsats (Figure 17).

Small Launchers (payload ~ 500, LEO)




Figure 17 – Example of Small Launchers (Source: CCISE)

The space tugs are maneuverable spacecraft that can be filled with smallsats or any other kind of payload and, after launched by a small, heavy, or super heavy launcher, starts its mission delivering the payload at the desired orbit (Figure 18). This combination may provide good price

with customized orbits for smallsats but cannot provide responsivity when rapid deployment is needed.

The space tugs may also stay in orbit indefinitely, attending many missions after refueling. This feature can drop the price for cis-lunar missions, in-orbit services missions, and others.




Figure 18 – Example of Space Tugs (Source: Momentus⁵)




Figure 19 – Example rockets scheduled to launch in 2021 (Source: @DAILYSPACE00)

⁵ <https://www.facebook.com/momentusspace/photos/>. Assessed in June, 5th 2021.

The Figure 19 presents a survey with different launchers and service costs, and it is possible to see the very low price for launch that is planned for the Starship, from the SpaceX.



Figure 20 – Example of companies working in space industry (Source: SERAPHIN SPACETECH MAP 2020 - SERAPHIM Capital)

There are already many companies worldwide working in space business, covering beyond Earth, upstream and downstream missions, and services. The industry ecosystem in 2020 mapped by Seraphim Capital, shown in Figure 20, identify companies in areas such as:

- Upstream Segment
 - Build and Manufacturing: Space Hardware, Materials & Energy, Software & Engineering, Electronics & Robotics
 - Launch: Launcher Operators, Launch Services, Flight & Delivery
 - Data: Satellites (Earth Observation, Telecommunications, Internet of Things - IoT), Drones & UAV
- Downstream Segment

- Downlink: Communications, Ground Terminals, Security & Storage
- Analyze: Satellites, Drones & UAV
- Product: Data Platforms, Location & Tracking, Mapping & Monitoring
- Beyond Earth Segment
 - Space Exploration & Resources
 - Space Infrastructure
 - Space Research




Figure 21 – Space Mining Companies (Source: Planetary Resources, ispace, Arkyd and NASA) A big promise of profitable business in long term seems to be space mining (Figure 21). A company called Planetary Resources estimates that “...a single 30-m asteroid may contain 30 billion dollars in platinum alone and a 500m rock could contain half the entire world resources of PGM⁶”.

The space business today has companies from many different countries created to provide services in different Earth orbits (Figure 22), such as:

- Monitoring-Tracking in-orbit objects
- Active Debris Removal
- Support Deep Space Missions
- In-Space Transportation
- Relocation/Orbit Adjustment
- In/On-Orbit Servicing such as: Refueling, Life-Extension, End-of-Life, In-Space Assembly and Manufacturing

⁶ <https://africanews.space/the-effect-of-asteroid-mining-on-mining-activities-in-africa/>

Space Tourism



Figure 23 – Space Tourism (Source: Space Adventures, Virgin Galactic, SpaceX, Space Perspective)

3- Military perspective

The world today has new challenges and military interests in outer space, where more and more countries understand the necessary use of this environment for self-defense.

Military activities in outer space, or through it, is consistent with the United Nations Charter which admit the State's right to self-defense, which is guaranteed by the military presence. It is also aligned with the Space Treaty of 1967⁷ in times of peace or war, due to the interpretation of the term “peaceful purposes”, contained in that Treaty in its Article IV and in the preamble in a more profound way, as equate to the term "not aggressive." In this context, offensive measures can take place if it is necessary for self-defense. Other treaties that can be invoked in conflict situations under international humanitarian law (IHL).

The Space Control and Defense actions are those that really distinguish the military use of Space Power from the mere use of civilian services. They are used in space combat domain to ensure control and freedom of action in space, within a level of sustainable resilience. At this point cybersecurity plays a major role to ensure the services to be provided also in contested environments. These missions may be carried out, alone or operating jointly with the other branches of the Armed Forces in the other Combat Domains, which are Maritime, Land, Air and Cyber (Figure 24), and serve as a deterrent to the actions of possible opponents, contrary to national interests. Space is a key combat domain to obtain high level interoperability through multi-domain

⁷ José Vagner Vital and Maria Helena Fonseca de Souza Rolim, “Expressão Militar do Setor Estratégico Espacial: Evolução e o Direito. Caso Brasileiro: Quarta Geração da Força Aérea Brasileira”, De LEGIBUS. Revista de Direito, Lisboa, 2020, 151-174, 168.

operations. The military use of space can be made even more effective through space coalitions with allied countries.

Brazil – strengthening defensive capabilities in the multiple warfare domains




Figure 24 – Multi-domain concept of operations (Source: CCISE)

The year of emergence of new and growing military capabilities in outer space for different countries can be seen in Figure 25 and summarizes a sequence of recent facts that attest to the emergence of new military characteristics in countries, as follows:

- China: demonstrated the ability to destroy and hijack satellites
- Russia: demonstrated the ability to destroy and hack satellites
- Spain: 2015 Master Plan already has a Joint Command and a Spatial and Cyber Operational Command within the Defense Staff
- India: demonstrated the ability to destroy satellites and preparations to establish the Space Defense Agency
- France: created the Air and Space Force
- OTAM: has established a doctrine for the protection of space assets and denial of freedom of action in space to its opponents
- USA: created the United States Space Force (USSF)
- Canada: created a new exclusive position at the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), the Director-General for Space (a four stars General)
- Italy: started preparations to establish a Space Force
- Japan: started reparations to establish Space Force creating a Space Squadron

Current Scenario: Increasing Military Capabilities in Outer Space




Figure 25 – Increasing Military Capabilities in Outer Space

The USA established the Space Development Agency to build the space capabilities needed to support Space Forces operations. In early 2019, SDA issued an Information Request to Industries to achieve the capabilities envisioned in its Notional Architecture (Figure 26).

Notional Architecture – Space Development Agency (SDA)

"agile, responsive next-generation space architecture."

1. Space Transport Layer
2. Tracking Layer
3. Custody Layer
4. Deterrence Layer
5. Navigation Layer
6. Battle Management Layer
7. Support Layer



Figure 26 – SDA's Notional Architecture Space

The layers in the SDA's Notional Architecture have the following planned characteristics:

1. Space Transport Layer: Global, persistent, low-latency data and communications proliferated "mesh" network to provide 24x7 global communications.
2. Tracking Layer: Indications, warning, targeting, and tracking of advanced missile threats.
3. Custody Layer: 24x7, all-weather custody of all identified time-critical targets.
4. Deterrence Layer: Space Situational Awareness (SSA) of, and rapid access to, the cislunar volume.
5. Navigation Layer: Alternate Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) for GPS-denied environments.

6. Battle Management Layer: Distributed, artificial intelligence-enabled Battle Management Command, Control and Communications (BMC3), to include self-tasking, self-prioritization (for collection), on-board processing, and dissemination, supporting delivery of perishable space sensor-derived data products directly to tactical users.
7. Support Layer: Mass-producible ground command and control capabilities, user terminals, and rapid-response launch services (small- to medium-class).

This RFI requested information from industry related to satellite bus, payload, applications, and launch concepts that can contribute to an agile, responsive next-generation space architecture.⁸ The suite of the desired capabilities includes multiple constellations (or “layers”) addressing, at least, the capabilities to:

- Detect advanced missile threats and defend against them.
- Deploy an alternate position, navigation, and timing capability to mitigate the growing threat to GPS.
- Deploy a consolidated highly autonomous battle management system to allow for rapid response to a variety of threats by all fielded forces, and by anyone who subscribes to the network.
- Utilize the advances in artificial intelligence to maintain constant custody of critical military targets worldwide, essentially creating “the internet of military things.”
- Extend situational awareness from the Earth up to lunar orbit while developing the means to efficiently and critically maneuver in that volume and dissuade adversaries from attempting to deny or degrade the space-based capabilities.
- Enable this new architecture by encouraging companies to build rapid response, small- and medium-launch vehicles.

The notional architecture of the SDA is based on the availability of a ubiquitous data transport and communications layer and assumes the use of small, mass-produced satellites (50-500 kg) and associated payload hardware and software. SDA is considered to use spacecraft from the transport layer as substrates for other layers, allowing the integration of appropriate payloads based on the needs of each layer.

⁸ <http://www.parabolicarc.com/2019/07/07/space-development-agency-issues-rfi/>

Another example of military presence in space domain is the Brazilian Space Systems Strategic Program (PESE), which deploys the space systems for military and civilian use, keeping a dual use philosophy. The military side of PESE provides services to enable all military branches to take part in the Space Combat Domain with resilience and freedom of action, while reducing the freedom of action of their opponents in an efficient and resilient way.

PESE consists of six classes of products to provide services that cover needs of communications, Earth observation, information mapping, positioning, spatial monitoring. The Space Operation Center (COPE) controls the fleets of LEO satellites called Carponis, Lessonia and Atticora, providing Earth observation, information mapping and communications services. Calidris fleet of geostationary satellites, may provide, in addition to the previous services, communications, positioning, navigation and timing. The combination of each PESE's product can be applied in many different operational scenarios (Figure 27).




Figure 27 – Possible operational scenarios with combined PESE's products

The Alcântara Space Center (CEA) is part of PESE and has many advantages for responsive launch operations (Figure 28) due to the climatologic regularity and its azimuth span which allows, from the same place, reach the same orbital planes as the ones reached from Kodiak, Vandenberg, Wallops, Cape Canaveral, among others (Figure 29).




Figure 28 – Responsive launch from Alcântara Space Center (CEA - Brazil)




Figure 29 – Alcântara Space Center (CEA - Brazil)

4- Opportunities for international cooperation

The increasing interest in the space world have created many opportunities for international cooperation, which can be seen in the number of exercises, conferences and many other meetings and academic missions occurred since 2012 with the countries of the hemisphere (Figure 30)

Brazilian Air Force Space related activities involving American Nations




Figure 30 – Space related activities involving American Nations since 2012

The US National Space Policy issued on December 9th, 2020, considers some subjects as possible areas for partnership with US allies:

- Outer Space Situational Awareness (SSA).
- Research on areas of common interest and self-defense.
- Supply of space items and services (items not yet manufactured in the US, raw materials, etc.).

The countries of the hemisphere can strength the cooperation in space affairs, taking the advantage of the long history of friendship and good relationship, which bring the possibility for planning responsive launches missions for crisis.

Research is always a good alternative for international cooperation, allowing the nations to build together a useful knowledge base for space systems development, space weather, including SSA activities.

The operation field is also a good alternative for international cooperation, including bi-lateral or multi-lateral operators exchange and space military exercises.

applications have experienced a growth in the market. This growth is to become higher as soon as the Space-to-Space services start to be offered as a usual product in some years ahead.

The increasing military presence in space was also mentioned, with the focus on multi-domain operations, and it was considered almost only the services the Space-to-Earth services for improving the operational level of all the military branches, due to the available ground observation data, telecommunications, and other satellite services, contributing directly to improve the national defense, to the monitoring of the territory and to the control of air and sea traffic.

Furthermore, some opportunities for international cooperation in space were highlighted considering defense areas of interest and research topics with well-known benefits for all possible interested nations.

Closing the work, it is important to say that the space domain is becoming more and more relevant as a combat domain and as a new economic frontier, crucial for the progress of the humanity.

CLOSING REMARKS

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Em tempos de grandes mudanças e desafios, o Colégio Interamericano de Defesa reflete sobre a situação mundial em um seminário realizado em Washington, DC, de 12 a 14 de janeiro de 2021. Os objetivos desta conferência visam compreender a atual situação mundial, com base em regiões globais, para permitir a avaliação das características geopolíticas globais. Da mesma forma, busca analisar as tendências que influenciarão regiões e nações individualmente, projetando seu impacto sobre os planos e a implementação das políticas de defesa, segurança e desenvolvimento do Hemisfério Ocidental nos próximos 10 anos.

A Conferência sobre a Situação Mundial (WSC) reuniu 15 palestrantes de diferentes nacionalidades que abordaram questões relevantes para a geopolítica global. O Dr. James J. Przystup analisou os esforços dos Estados Unidos, seus parceiros aliados e governos da região do Pacífico Índico para responder aos desafios colocados e vinculados à ascensão da China, para definir, moldar e estruturar uma ordem baseada em regras para toda a região. Em sua apresentação, ele apresenta a visão adquirida pelos Estados Unidos durante a presidência de Trump, bem como algumas conclusões e recomendações para o atual governo.

As questões relacionadas com a Europa foram discutidas pelo Sr. Pierre Morcos, que reflete sobre a dificuldade de definir geograficamente a Europa, não só por suas fronteiras imprecisas e variáveis, mas também por sua diversidade cultural, lingüística, religiosa e variedade de sistemas políticos. No entanto, desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, a Europa tem avançado como um projeto político comum. Neste sentido, a análise reviu os principais desafios que têm enfrentado, incluindo o COVID-19, concluindo que o projeto europeu continua sólido e se espera que a chegada do Presidente Biden permita avançar nas questões relacionadas com o clima e os direitos humanos.

Por sua vez, a Dra. Theresa Sabonis-Helf apresentou o papel da Rússia tanto globalmente quanto em sua periferia. Para isso, ele apresentou os interesses nacionais de longo prazo da Rússia, bem como as ambições daquele país. Indica-se que é uma potência que tem conseguido superar os

desafios internos e as sanções internacionais em seu processo de se consolidar como uma poderosa liderança em nível mundial.

Da mesma forma, Valm (R) Edmundo Deville del Campo fomentou o debate em torno da situação da segurança marítima em todo o mundo. Foram apresentadas diversas agências internacionais e seus respectivos esforços em prol da segurança marítima. Os diferentes projetos e regulamentos criados para atender às diferentes necessidades que afetam essa segurança, tais como: problemas de segurança cibernética, pirataria, downloads ilegais, ecoterrorismo, entre outros.

A questão da política externa dos EUA com o Oriente Médio foi discutida pelo Dr. Guy Ziv. Em seu discurso, ele apresentou quais são os interesses tradicionais dos Estados Unidos nesta área, bem como as prioridades mais recentes. Como parte de sua apresentação, ele indicou a posição do presidente Trump e o que se pode esperar da perspectiva do presidente Biden para a região.

Em termos gerais, os conhecimentos apresentados nesta conferência foram fundamentais para que os alunos desenvolvessem uma análise aprofundada nas áreas: política, econômica, defesa, segurança, ciência, tecnologia, impacto das principais nações, actores estatais, alianças ou iniciativas governamentais e de organizações não governamentais internacionais. Certamente, o Comitê de Situação Mundial (WSC) atingiu o objetivo de permitir que os alunos da Classe 60 desenvolvam um melhor entendimento da situação mundial atual, de acordo com as regiões do mundo, e avaliem as características geopolíticas globais.

Una vez concluidos los tres días de presentaciones se solicitó a los ponentes que resumieran sus comentarios para esta publicación. El IADC no se hace responsable de las opiniones vertidas en los artículos publicados. Las opiniones, conclusiones y recomendaciones expresadas o que queden implicadas en sus distintos artículos son las de sus autores y no reflejan necesariamente la política o posición oficial ni del Colegio Interamericano de Defensa, ni de la Junta Interamericana de Defensa, ni de la Organización de Estados Americanas, ni la del país u organización representada por el autor.

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