



# **Inter-American Defense College**

**WSO**



**WORLD SITUATION CONFERENCE**

**Fort Lesley J. McNair  
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# Conferencia de la Situación Mundial

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**Los puntos de vista emitidos en este trabajo son de los autores y no reflejan la política o posición oficial del Colegio Interamericano de Defensa, la Junta Interamericana de Defensa, la Organización de Estados Americanos, Ministerio o País de los autores.**

# ABOUT THE CONFERENCE

## 1. Overview

The World Situation Conference is a four-day series of lectures covering regions and special aspects of the actuality. The Inter-American Defense College (IADC) organized the event as part of the World Situation Committee, one of the short courses of its curricula.

This year, renowned speakers talked about their expertise in regions and their influence on the Western Hemisphere. The lectures were registered in the following Proceedings, either by articles or by speaker's notes.

## 2. Course Description

The World Situation Committee (WSC) provides students with a global and subregional geopolitical understanding. This knowledge is foundational for the subsequent Committee I, during which students will analyze subregions of the world, using a Strategic Planning method. Committee I strategically examines the following areas in-depth: political, socio-cultural, economic, defense, security, science, technology, the impact of key nations, state actors, regional alliances or initiatives, and governmental or international nongovernmental organizations. This analysis forecasts national and sub-regional trends for the following ten years that are considered influential on security, defense, and development, as well as policies and strategies over the same period.

## 3. Course Objectives

- Have a better understanding of the current world situation, based on world regions, and assess global geopolitical characteristics.
- Analyze the trends that influence the regions and individual nations and consider their impact on the design and implementation of defense, security, and development policies in the Western Hemisphere over the next ten years.
- Implement the working group methodology used at the IADC.

## 4 Course Learning Outcomes

By the end of this course, students will be able to:

- Identify the predominant geopolitical characteristics today and in the medium to long-term.
- Develop a comprehensive diagnostic assessment of the world situation at the regional level, based on content learned during the WSC in the following areas: political, sociocultural, economic, defense, security, science, and technology.
- Develop conclusions and considerations related to the international geopolitical trends, as well as their potential impacts on the formulation of future policies (focused on threats and opportunities) in the context of defense, security, and development in the assigned country.

# Haciendo las Cosas Correctas<sup>i</sup>

## Seguridad y Defensa del Estado Moderno

Alessandro Visacro<sup>ii</sup>.

*“La Brigada de Caballería de Pomorska, aparentemente ignorando el material del que se hicieron nuestros coches [blindados], se lanzó contra ellos con sus espadas y lanzas, sufriendo tremendas pérdidas.”<sup>1</sup>*

– General Heinz Guderian

Grandes cambios son inherentes a la historia humana. El dominio del fuego, la Revolución Neolítica, el advenimiento de la escritura y la rueda, el surgimiento de la metalurgia del bronce, los avances desenfrenados de la ciencia y la creación de instituciones políticas y sociales sofisticadas demuestran que el mundo siempre ha estado en constante transformación. Desde las leyes de Hammurabi, codificadas en la antigua Mesopotamia en el siglo XVIII a.C., hasta la Declaración de los Derechos del Hombre y del Ciudadano, escrita por los revolucionarios franceses en el siglo XVIII, la humanidad nunca ha permanecido completamente estancada.

Sin embargo, hace unos 200 años, con el inicio de la Revolución Industrial, comenzamos a experimentar cambios a un ritmo cuya intensidad, velocidad, amplitud y profundidad que han desafiado la capacidad de adaptación de incluso las agrupaciones humanas más elaboradas. No por casualidad, el epicentro de estos cambios, Europa, casi encontró su propia destrucción en la primera mitad del siglo XX, con dos guerras mundiales, caos político, desintegración de imperios, revoluciones, conflictos nacionalistas, tensiones étnicas agudas, la propagación de ideologías radicales, el surgimiento de regímenes totalitarios, genocidio, crisis económica prolongada, epidemia y hambre<sup>2</sup>.

Como advirtió Michael Phillips, “nuestro mayor peligro no es el entorno mundial cambiante sino nuestra relación con él”<sup>3</sup>. Después de todo, incurrimos en conceptos erróneos naturales (muchas veces desastrosos) al interpretar las transformaciones que afectan los principios básicos que rigen la organización y el funcionamiento de la sociedad, que a veces requieren demasiado tiempo para adaptarse a nuevos contextos.

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<sup>i</sup> La presentación del autor en la Conferencia de Situación Mundial se basa en su artículo publicado anteriormente y transcrito aquí. Para referencia: VISACRO, Alessandro. **Fazendo as coisas certas: segurança e defesa do Estado moderno**. Cadernos de estudos estratégicos. Escola Superior de Guerra (Rio de Janeiro), n.1/2019, p. 49-80.

<sup>ii</sup> Alessandro Visacro es coronel del Ejército Brasileño. Se graduó como oficial aspirante del Arma de Infantería por la clase de 1991 de la *Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras*. Prestó servicios como oficial subalterno en el 29 ° Batallón de Infantería Blindada y el 26 ° Batallón de Infantería Paracaidista. Fue comandante de la 3ra Compañía de Fuerzas Especiales y el 1er Batallón de Fuerzas Especiales. Se desempeñó como oficial de operaciones del 2º Batallón de Infantería de la Fuerza de Paz del 17º contingente brasileño en Haití y Jefe de Estado Mayor del Comando de Operaciones Especiales. Actualmente, el coronel Visacro labora como oficial de enlace del Ejército Brasileño en el Centro de Armas Combinadas del Ejército de los Estados Unidos en Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Al postular que el conocimiento se convirtió en el principal factor de producción en el siglo XXI, superando con creces la disponibilidad de tierra, capital, mano de obra, energía y materias primas, el profesor Marcos Cavalcanti de la Universidad Federal de Río de Janeiro aseguró que "No vivimos hoy una era de cambio [...] Por el contrario, estamos experimentando un auténtico cambio de era, que es algo completamente diferente"<sup>4</sup>. De hecho, el uso del término "era de cambio" sugiere un *continuum* de transformaciones sobre las cuales podemos ejercer cierto grado de control. Por otro lado, la expresión "cambio de era" presupone una ruptura paradigmática que se centra en los fundamentos de la sociedad, haciendo obsoletos los modelos y patrones consagrados en el tiempo.

Según el escritor venezolano Moisés Naím:

[Si] llama la atención el poco consenso que existe sobre la dirección del cambio en nuestro mundo y las amenazas que se deben anticipar debido a estos cambios, sin mencionar la escasez de ideas realistas sobre cómo lidiar con ellas. A pesar de la avalancha de datos y opiniones disponibles en la actualidad, no tenemos una brújula confiable, un marco claro para ayudar a dar sentido a las transformaciones que están teniendo lugar en todos estos dominios cada vez más interconectados.<sup>5</sup>

En el campo de la seguridad y la defensa, muchos de los desafíos que plantea la posmodernidad no son más que viejas amenazas bajo una nueva dinámica. Algunas formas de conflicto no tienen precedentes, pero otros tienen antecedentes muy remotos. Aun así, los patrones tradicionales de respuesta estatal han sido anacrónicos y completamente ineficaces. Los marcos conceptuales disponibles continúan guiando los procesos cognitivos apoyados por heurísticas y sesgos, que difieren significativamente de la realidad. Es decir, los escenarios actuales se han interpretado de acuerdo con preceptos rígidos y arcaicos, como si los nuevos problemas tuvieran que ser subordinados a soluciones preexistentes y no al revés.

Los más ortodoxos y conservadores refutan categóricamente una nueva lectura de los problemas de seguridad y defensa, abogando por la atemporalidad de sus principios fundamentales. Sin embargo, los peligros reales y potenciales para la sociedad crecen inexorablemente sin que nosotros tengamos las herramientas y los mecanismos adecuados para abordarlos. Es por eso que, en las últimas décadas, el uso arriesgado y costoso de la guerra convencional ha resultado tan poco gratificante. Por mero pragmatismo y prudencia, por lo tanto, debemos cuestionar nuestros supuestos.

Albert Einstein declaró que "si tuviera una hora para resolver un problema y mi vida dependiera de esa solución, pasaría 55 minutos pensando el problema y 5 minutos pensando en la solución"<sup>6</sup>. Casi nunca actuamos de esta manera. Como discípulos inconscientes de Frederick Taylor y Henry Ford<sup>7</sup>, somos más propensos a la aplicación inmediata de los procesos rígidos para los cuales hemos sido entrenados "mecánicamente", en lugar de un estudio crítico más amplio del problema. Como resultado, en un mundo globalizado profundamente afectado por la revolución digital, estadistas, soldados, jueces, académicos, analistas de inteligencia, policías, periodistas y representantes de la sociedad civil, cada uno dentro de su propio nicho, tienen enormes dificultades para estructurar problemas complejos relacionados con la violencia armada, y no son capaces de implementar soluciones coherentes, efectivas y duraderas.

El quid de la cuestión radica en el apego incondicional a los modelos teóricos, con los que pretendemos interpretar y justificar el conjunto de circunstancias que nos rodean – independientemente de si sus características están total o parcialmente desactualizadas. Según

el economista británico John Maynard Keynes, “la dificultad no está en adoptar nuevas ideas, sino en deshacerse de las viejas”<sup>8</sup>.

La creencia errónea de que satisfacer las demandas del siglo XXI se limita solo a la mera adquisición de tecnología moderna puede conducir al desperdicio de grandes inversiones y a la frustración de estadistas y soldados obsesionados con los sistemas autónomos de armas, inteligencia artificial y guerras centradas en redes informáticas<sup>9</sup>. De hecho, la mera incorporación de innovaciones tecnológicas, además de ser notable, es inevitable. Lo que no parece tan claro son los riesgos de emplear una lógica anticuada para administrar nuevos recursos y gobernar nuevas dinámicas, como el choque incontrolable de intereses que culminó en el estallido de la Gran Guerra en julio de 1914. Los líderes mundiales, en particular, deben tener esto en cuenta en todo momento para evitar que una sucesión innecesaria de malentendidos establezca nuevamente el curso de la historia.

Por lo tanto, la entrada de la humanidad en una nueva era requiere que los supuestos básicos que tradicionalmente han guiado al Estado en la promoción de la seguridad y la defensa se sometan a un análisis libre de prejuicios, vicios y pasiones. Para contribuir a este debate ofreciendo un enfoque epistemológico al tema, este documento describirá brevemente el desarrollo del marco conceptual disponible de la Paz de Westfalia en 1648 hasta la actualidad.

## **El advenimiento del Estado moderno, el orden de Westfalia y el concepto de seguridad nacional**

En la Edad Media, el Estado representaba una entidad casi imaginaria, subordinándose a las instituciones supraestatales, especialmente a la Iglesia. Además, su autoridad interna estaba fragmentada a manos de señores feudales y tiranos semiautónomos que, de hecho, tenían el poder político, social, económico y militar a nivel local. Esta realidad duraría hasta la primera mitad del siglo XVII, ya en la era moderna, cuando, al final de la Guerra de los Treinta Años, se instituyó la Paz de Westfalia.

En 1648, la lucha entre católicos y protestantes en Europa llegó a su fin. Tres décadas de guerras religiosas ilimitadas habían dejado un continente devastado por la lucha, el saqueo, el hambre y las enfermedades. El punto muerto que surgió del agotamiento y el fracaso para lograr una victoria decisiva, demostró que ninguno de los diversos reinos involucrados en el conflicto estaba en condiciones de anular a los demás, estableciendo la unidad política y religiosa necesaria para la consolidación de un imperio. Así, cuando los responsables de las negociaciones de paz se reunieron en las ciudades de Münster y Osnabrück en la región de Westfalia (en la actual Alemania), se vieron obligados a tomar como punto de partida el reconocimiento de la fragmentación política de Europa<sup>10</sup>. En términos prácticos, se supuso que una nueva dinámica entre los poderes existentes allí debería basarse en la autoridad soberana de cada Estado sobre su propio territorio y sobre el contingente de población que lo habitaba. Así, Henry Kissinger señaló, "el Estado (no el imperio, la dinastía o la confesión religiosa) fue consagrado como la piedra angular del orden europeo"<sup>11</sup>.

La paz de Westfalia se convirtió así en responsable del advenimiento del Estado-Nación moderno, antítesis del Estado medieval. De acuerdo con Russell Handy *et al*:

Los términos [de los tratados de Münster y Osnabrück] reconocieron el derecho soberano de cada Estado sobre su territorio, pueblo y política exterior en igualdad de condiciones. Además, los tratados "formalizaron" el recurso de la


guerra como herramienta política a disposición de líderes políticos reconocidos internacionalmente, haciéndolos responsables de acciones militares inaceptables. Por lo tanto, la soberanía ha otorgado a los líderes políticos formalmente reconocidos el dominio exclusivo sobre el territorio y el pueblo dentro de sus fronteras, sin interferencia de otros gobernantes.<sup>12</sup>

El Estado moderno consta de tres elementos esenciales, a saber: pueblo, territorio y soberanía. Para muchos juristas y adoctrinadores, el propósito (o valor social) incorporado en la tarea primaria del Estado de promover el bien común representa un cuarto componente fundamental. El pueblo y el territorio constituyen los elementos materiales sobre los cuales la soberanía refleja el poder formal del Estado. Para ser efectiva, la soberanía debe ser absoluta, perpetua, inalienable, única, indivisible, indispensable y, por supuesto, prerrogativa exclusiva del Estado. – que goza de legitimidad en la medida en que el ejercicio de esa soberanía es de valor social, con el bien común como propósito<sup>13</sup>.

Con el orden internacional generado por la Paz de Westfalia totalmente respaldado por el protagonismo del Estado, la política exterior comenzó a regirse por la primacía absoluta del interés nacional. La *raison d'État* y el obstinado ejercicio de la *realpolitik* se convirtieron en los cimientos de una diplomacia excesivamente pragmática, cuyos cimientos doctrinales fueron consagrados siglos después bajo los auspicios de la escuela realista de Hans Morgenthau.

En este contexto, no es sorprendente que el principal destino del instrumento militar se haya convertido en la defensa de la soberanía estatal y sus intereses vitales frente a las amenazas de otros Estados nacionales. Así surge, por lo tanto, el concepto de "seguridad nacional" según una concepción eminentemente estatocéntrica y militarista.

Durante los tres siglos transcurridos entre el final de la Guerra de los Treinta Años y el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial en 1945, la seguridad nacional fue el verdadero equilibrio de la guerra y la paz. Fue, sobre todo, en su nombre que estallaron las conflagraciones entre los pueblos. Como regla general, la salvaguardia del poder soberano del Estado sobre sus elementos materiales, especialmente su integridad territorial, fue la razón principal *jus ad bellum*, es decir, el derecho a hacer la guerra entendido como justo (figura 1)<sup>14</sup>.




**Figura 1** – Elementos esenciales del Estado moderno. (Fuente: el autor)

Según Mariana Moreira e Silva, “tradicionalmente, la defensa de un país está (o estuvo) directa y exclusivamente relacionada con el concepto de seguridad externa, es decir, enfocada solo en el caso de una aparente confrontación entre dos Estados”<sup>15</sup>. Aunque a menudo se requería que los ejércitos suprimieran los levantamientos internos y contrarrestaran las insurrecciones, casi siempre usaban la misma lógica que guiaba la guerra interestatal, recurriendo así a expediciones punitivas y represalias brutales que invariablemente atacaban indiscriminadamente a civiles inocentes<sup>16</sup>.

Por supuesto, el Estado también era responsable de mantener la ley nacional y el orden público, así como de proteger los derechos y garantías individuales a nivel comunitario. Pero esta asignación se restringió al alcance de la "seguridad pública". Esto estableció la distinción básica entre el soldado y el policía. Si bien el Estado otorga a los primeros la responsabilidad del uso de la fuerza coercitiva legítima contra personas ajenas a su colectividad, les asigna a los últimos la misma responsabilidad sobre las personas que pertenecen a su propio grupo social.

Sin embargo, esta segregación de roles no siempre es tan clara. Las fuerzas irregulares nativas que ponen en peligro la existencia del Estado, como los grupos insurgentes y las organizaciones terroristas, por ejemplo, a menudo exigen una respuesta militar, ampliando el alcance de la seguridad nacional y también incorporando una dimensión interna. Pero la *seguridad nacional*, al menos en teoría, no debe confundirse con la *seguridad pública*, en razón de que la seguridad nacional permanece estrictamente orientada a la defensa del Estado, no del individuo (figura 2).



**Figura 2** – Tipos de seguridad.

(Fuente: Julio Ángel Sabines Chesterking, “La Seguridad Nacional, sus dimensiones y las actuales amenazas al Estado Mexicano”, 29 mayo 2019)


Este hecho explica por qué la rebelión campesina brasileña en Canudos (1896-1897), por ejemplo, se consideró un problema de seguridad nacional, mientras que el fenómeno del *cangaço*, que duró en la misma región entre 1879 y 1940, fue tratado como un mero bandidaje y, por lo tanto, restringido al ámbito de la seguridad pública (Tabla 1)<sup>17</sup>.



<b>Seguridad Interna</b>	<b>Seguridad Pública</b>
Seguridad brindada al propio Estado, frente a amenazas internas, para garantizar el pleno funcionamiento de sus instituciones políticas y sociales.	Seguridad brindada por el Estado para las personas, incluidos sus bienes y derechos, de conformidad con las normas legales establecidas.
Amenaza a la estructura política y social actual.	Las amenazas a la seguridad pública no atacan directamente la estructura política y social actual.
Es competencia, también, de las fuerzas Armadas.	Es competencia esencial de las fuerzas policiales de seguridad pública.

**Tabla 1** – Principales distinciones entre los conceptos de seguridad nacional y seguridad pública (Fuente: Visacro, 2009)

Según Anatole Rapoport, “la personificación del Estado como una entidad de voluntad única era un concepto natural de la era de la monarquía absoluta, cuando los intereses de las unidades políticas se identificaban con los apetitos de sus príncipes”<sup>18</sup>. Cabe señalar que el orden internacional creado en la Europa del siglo XVII se fundó sobre bases pragmáticas, es decir, un equilibrio tangible de poder entre diferentes países. Pero siglos después, cuando el sistema de Westfalia se expandió para abarcar a las naciones que surgieron del desmantelamiento de los imperios coloniales europeos, el reconocimiento de la soberanía de los Estados en igualdad de condiciones evidentemente se basó en un ideal y ya no en una realidad irrefutable. Además, “la diplomacia europea no se basaba en la naturaleza pacífica de los Estados, sino en su propensión a la guerra, que era necesario desalentar o equilibrar. Las alianzas se formaron en la búsqueda de objetivos definibles y específicos, no en defensa de la paz en términos abstractos”<sup>19</sup>.



**1648 - 1945**

**Figura 3** – Relación entre la seguridad nacional y la seguridad pública, desarrollada durante el período comprendido entre el final de la Guerra de los Treinta Años y el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. (Fuente: el autor)

Durante trescientos años, fue posible hacer una distinción clara entre la *seguridad nacional* y la *seguridad pública*, teniendo la primera, en virtud de varios factores, primacía sobre la segunda. La figura 3 ilustra el enfoque cartesiano de ambos conceptos. Esta visión anacrónica aún prevalece en círculos especializados y domina a toda la sociedad en general.


## El impacto de la Revolución Francesa y la Revolución Industrial

En la Europa absolutista, la corona no se prestaba únicamente como el núcleo radiante de los instrumentos de poder, sino que la figura real personificaba, sobre todo, el elemento vinculante alrededor del cual se formaba la noción de Estado. Desafortunadamente, no fueron los valores de "libertad, igualdad y fraternidad" propugnados por los revolucionarios franceses los que reemplazaron el ser del rey como una amalgama del Estado. A finales del siglo XVIII, esta idea seguía siendo mera abstracción y, por lo tanto, tenía poca aplicación práctica. Con el rápido avance del pensamiento de la Ilustración y el declive de las monarquías absolutas, fue la *identidad nacional con base nacional* que efectivamente cumplió ese propósito.

Según el consenso emergente del siglo XIX, la lealtad a un Estado nacional era incompatible con el pluralismo de las culturas, como señaló el historiador Howard Sachar<sup>20</sup>. Además, parafraseando a Henry Kissinger, el nacionalismo sin democracia se vuelve chovinista<sup>21</sup>. No por casualidad, una ola de jactancia xenófoba trajo consecuencias catastróficas para Europa y el resto del mundo en la primera mitad del siglo XX.

Sin embargo, en contraste con la perspectiva eminentemente nacionalista derivada de la Revolución Francesa, una visión materialista vino de la Revolución Industrial. La creciente demanda de mano de obra industrial ha dado lugar a una nueva clase social, el proletariado. Sus condiciones degradantes de subsistencia condujeron al surgimiento de diferentes corrientes socialistas, entre las cuales el anarquismo y el marxismo proporcionaron nuevos fundamentos ideológicos para la guerra revolucionaria<sup>22</sup>.

Según Karl Marx y Friedrich Engels, "la historia de todas las sociedades que existieron es la historia de la lucha de clases"<sup>23</sup>. Es decir, según la perspectiva nacionalista, la raza humana se divide en secciones verticales, que separan a los diferentes pueblos. La interpretación marxista, por el contrario, presupone la existencia de cortes horizontales, cuya naturaleza se superpone a las fronteras nacionales, segregando a la humanidad en diferentes clases sociales (figura 4). En ambos casos, la relación entre pueblos o clases sociales estaba gobernada eminentemente por una confrontación ininterrumpida.




**Figura 4** – Perspectivas nacionalistas y marxistas de la humanidad. (Fuente: el autor)

Si bien el pensamiento socialista ha hecho contribuciones innegables, la opaca fidelidad al materialismo histórico - el dogma del socialismo científico - representa uno de los mayores obstáculos para la comprensión adecuada de los problemas de seguridad y defensa en el siglo XXI. Es un precepto anacrónico, todavía profundamente arraigado gracias a la intransigencia

ideológica o la indolencia intelectual, y que, con su reduccionismo intrínseco, es insuficiente para abordar los complejos problemas relacionados con la violencia armada en la sociedad posmoderna, lo que hace que sea difícil especialmente la formulación de soluciones objetivas.

En términos estrictamente militares, la Revolución Francesa propició un regreso a la "guerra total", de la cual Napoleón fue su mayor artesano y Clausewitz su mayor ideólogo. Cuando la guerra total incorporó tecnología de la Revolución Industrial, se forjó el "paradigma de la guerra industrial entre Estados"<sup>24</sup>, que alcanzó su apogeo en la primera mitad del siglo XX con las dos confrontaciones mundiales. La concepción minimalista representada por la figura 5 todavía ejerce una enorme influencia y fascinación en la cosmovisión de los soldados.



**Figura 5** – El modelo de guerra industrial entre estados. (Fuente: el autor)


## La Guerra Fría

Durante la Guerra Fría, el punto muerto generado por el equilibrio de los arsenales atómicos soviéticos y estadounidenses, por oscuro que fuera, evitó el choque directo entre las dos superpotencias que surgieron de los escombros de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Los riesgos inaceptables de una hecatombe nuclear, postulado según la teoría de "Destrucción Mutua Asegurada" (MAD, por su sigla en inglés), descartó la opción de una confrontación abierta en Europa entre las fuerzas de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte y el Pacto de Varsovia. Así, el conflicto pasó a la ruta indirecta del Tercer Mundo, y desde 1945 en adelante la humanidad fue testigo de una marcada reducción en la guerra interestatal, mientras que hubo una proliferación interminable de "conflictos de baja intensidad"<sup>25</sup>. Según Eric Hobsbawn, "el número de guerras internacionales ha disminuido constantemente desde mediados de la década de 1960, cuando los conflictos internos se volvieron más comunes que las guerras entre países"<sup>26</sup>.

Además de las guerras de liberación nacional derivadas del proceso de descolonización, las luchas internas por el poder provocaron una gran cantidad de guerras civiles en Estados frágiles sin tradición democrática cuyos gobiernos no pudieron fortalecer la cohesión interna y

superar el desafío del desarrollo económico a corto plazo. Muchos conflictos combinaron disensión étnica, ideología revolucionaria y la interferencia velada de gobiernos extranjeros, especialmente Washington y Moscú. Por lo tanto, algunas guerras han "desbordado" las fronteras políticas de sus respectivos países y se han internacionalizado, causando impacto regional y reflejos globales significativos<sup>27</sup>.

La dinámica de los conflictos internos, orientada hacia la represión de los movimientos revolucionarios y la erradicación de las organizaciones de lucha armada, impuso una nueva relación entre los conceptos de *seguridad nacional* y *seguridad pública*. Después de todo, la lucha contra los grupos guerrilleros y las células terroristas requería una mayor integración y complementariedad entre las fuerzas militares y policiales, para asegurar el logro de los objetivos definidos dentro del alcance de la *seguridad interna*. Por supuesto, la seguridad nacional, incluso superaba la seguridad pública (figura 6).



**1945 - 1991**

**Figura 6** – Relación entre seguridad nacional y seguridad pública durante el período de la Guerra Fría. (Fuente: el autor)


En Brasil, por ejemplo, la eliminación de Carlos Marighella, líder de la Acción de Liberación Nacional, en calle *Casa Branca* el 4 de noviembre de 1969, fue realizada por el Departamento de Orden Público y Social de la Secretaría de Seguridad Pública de *São Paulo*<sup>28</sup>. Por otro lado, la neutralización del enfoque guerrillero instalado en las selvas del sur del estado de *Pará* por el Partido Comunista de Brasil, entre 1972 y 1974, recayó en las fuerzas armadas<sup>29</sup>.

Es de destacar que durante el mismo período, frente a la intensa proliferación de guerras de liberación nacional y guerras civiles en todo el planeta, el 8 de junio de 1977 se adoptó el Protocolo adicional II a los Convenios de Ginebra de 1949<sup>30</sup>. Los cuatro Convenios de Ginebra y el Protocolo I (también de 1977) representan los diplomas legales en línea con el paradigma arraigado de la guerra industrial entre los Estados. El Protocolo II surgió en ese momento como una respuesta a los desafíos planteados por los "conflictos de baja intensidad". El tratado, aún vigente, tiene como objetivo instrumentalizar la aplicación de los principios que rigen el Derecho Internacional Humanitario en caso de "conflicto armado no internacional"<sup>31</sup>.

Los responsables de formular este instrumento normativo se basaron sobre todo en el perfil de las guerras de descolonización que, en términos prácticos, terminaron en 1975. En cierto sentido, por lo tanto, el Protocolo II surgió de antemano con contornos obsoletos, y existen otros obstáculos importantes para su implementación efectiva en contextos que involucran violencia armada no estatal. Además, como advierte el coronel del Ejército Brasileño Carlos Frederico Cinelli: “El problema es que un supuesto anacronismo de la norma siempre es un pretexto para su no aplicabilidad, especialmente en el derecho internacional, donde no existe un instrumento coercitivo supranacional”<sup>32</sup>.

### La escuela de Copenhague y el concepto de seguridad humana<sup>33</sup>

Incluso después del final de la Guerra Fría en 1991, el número de conflictos que involucraban a actores armados no estatales se mantuvo alto y, por lo tanto, al margen del orden internacional idealizado según el modelo de Westfalia (figura 7).



**Figura 7** – Naturaleza del conflicto armado (1946-2017). (Fuente: Petersson, Terese; Eck, Kristine, 2018. Organized violence, 1989-2017. *Journal of Peace Research*. 55(4): 535-547 / Uppsala Conflict Data Program / Adaptado por *Military Review* 1º Trim, 2019, p. 24; traducción del autor)

Ya en la década de 1980, muchos académicos comenzaron a postular una redefinición del concepto de seguridad desde un enfoque más amplio. Para ellos, la idea de seguridad nacional, *strictu sensu*, era incapaz de proporcionar un marco lógico para la gran cantidad de conflictos intraestatales, y era un obstáculo para cualquier otra forma de relaciones internacionales que no se regían fundamentalmente por la competencia entre Estados.

En 1985, en la capital danesa, se creó el *Peace Research Institute*, más conocido como la Escuela de Copenhague. El instituto se convirtió en un importante centro de pensamiento crítico, abogando por que los análisis de seguridad no pudieran someterse únicamente a un enfoque puramente militar. Por el contrario, también deberían incorporar consideraciones económicas, sociales, políticas y ambientales más amplias. Sus ideas se convirtieron en un contrapunto al realismo tradicional.

Entre los principales intelectuales de la Escuela de Copenhague, Barry Buzan ha tenido una notable influencia en los debates sobre la expansión de la agenda de seguridad internacional. Con un enfoque holístico bien estructurado, finalmente introdujo una nueva perspectiva de paz que no se limitó a la ausencia de guerras convencionales entre Estados soberanos.

En 1994, el informe del Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD) sobre desarrollo humano incluyó el concepto de "*seguridad humana*" en la agenda mundial posterior a la Guerra Fría. La idea de la seguridad humana demostró ser bastante innovadora, ya que contrastaba con la doctrina establecida de la seguridad nacional, cuyo enfoque sigue siendo la defensa y protección del propio Estado como institución y entidad legal. La Tabla 2 presenta una síntesis comparativa entre el concepto tradicional de seguridad nacional y la propuesta presentada en la década de 1990 por el Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo:

Factores de comparación	<b>SEGURIDAD NACIONAL</b>	<b>SEGURIDAD HUMANA</b>
1. Core	Concepto centrado en la seguridad del Estado.	Concepto centrado en la seguridad de la persona humana.
2. Concepción	Estatocéntrico y militarista	Concepción multidisciplinaria
3. Marco doctrinal	Escuela realista (Hans Morgenthau)	Escuela de Copenhague (Barry Buzan) Informe de Desarrollo Humano del PNUD, 1994
4. ¿Para quién es la seguridad?	El objeto de seguridad es el Estado (El Estado es el propósito)	El objeto de seguridad es el individuo. (El Estado es el medio)
5. Seguridad	Defensa y protección del territorio nacional.	Protección de las garantías individuales básicas.
6. ¿Qué valor debe protegerse? (enfoque sobre los elementos constitutivos del Estado moderno)	La soberanía del Estado sobre sus elementos materiales, especialmente la integridad territorial.	El propósito o valor social: la tarea principal de promover el bien común, materializada en la promoción y salvaguarda de los derechos humanos.

Factores de comparación	<b>SEGURIDAD NACIONAL</b>	<b>SEGURIDAD HUMANA</b>
7. Amenazas de seguridad	Otros Estados	Violencia intra e interestatal Amenazas transnacionales (terrorismo, crimen organizado, etc.) Endémicas Desastres naturales Heridas sociales y económicas (violencia estructural: atraso económico, inequidad, miseria, etc.)
8. Enfoque	Prevención de conflictos mediante disuasión militar. En la resolución de conflictos a través de la intervención militar.	En la prevención de conflictos por medios no militares
9. Medios	Militares	Prevalencia de medios no militares
10. Obtención y mantenimiento de la paz	Hegemonía de un poder o equilibrio de poder ("la conquista de la paz")	Condiciones favorables de desarrollo socioeconómico. Promoción y protección de los derechos humanos. ("Construcción de la paz")
11. Supuestos	Las relaciones internacionales se rigen únicamente por los intereses de los Estados	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Los Estados no son los únicos actores importantes.</li> <li>- La fuerza no es el único instrumento significativo.</li> <li>- La seguridad internacional va más allá de los asuntos militares.</li> <li>- La seguridad internacional es transnacional, global e interdependiente.</li> <li>- El concepto de seguridad internacional centrado en el poder militar convencional es insuficiente para explicar (y resolver) todos los problemas de seguridad.</li> </ul>

Factores de comparación	SEGURIDAD NACIONAL	SEGURIDAD HUMANA
12. Actores	Estados	Estados, organizaciones internacionales, ONG, actores no estatales responsables de amenazas a la sociedad y al individuo (organizaciones terroristas, grupos insurgentes, facciones criminales, etc.)
13. Dimensiones interdependientes	Diplomático (basado en el poder de guerra convencional)  Militar	<u>Freedom from Wants</u> (dignidad de la persona humana) 1. Seguridad económica; 2. Seguridad alimentaria; 3. Seguridad sanitaria; 4. Seguridad ambiental;  <u>Freedom from Fear</u> (seguridad física) 5. Seguridad personal; 6. Seguridad de la comunidad; y 7. Seguridad política.
14. Relación predominante entre Estados	Competencia	Cooperación
15. Seguridad proporcionada	Por la capacidad militar	Por el desarrollo humano, a pesar de que el Estado tiene el monopolio sobre la aplicación de la fuerza coercitiva legítima para salvaguardar los derechos individuales y colectivos.

**Tabla 2** – Tabla comparativa de Seguridad Nacional *versus* Seguridad Humana (Fuente: Visacro, 2018)


Aunque el término presentado por el PNUD hace poco más de 20 años se ha convertido en un tema común en las relaciones internacionales, hasta ahora, ningún Estado, de suma relevancia en el concierto de naciones, lo incorporó verdaderamente como un dogma fundamental en la formulación de su política de defensa. Los partidarios de la escuela realista aún conservan su hegemonía.

En verdad, el concepto de seguridad humana se llena de ambigüedad e incongruencia ante los múltiples desafíos inherentes a su aplicación. Sin embargo, su contenido puede entenderse como un punto de partida para una interpretación holística, multidisciplinaria y multidimensional de los problemas que rodean la guerra y la paz. Así, desde mediados de la



década de 1990, se estableció una dicotomía entre la seguridad humana como innovación doctrinal y la perspectiva binaria consagrada "seguridad nacional / seguridad pública" (figura 8).

## La Posguerra Fría (Escuela de Copenhagen)



**Figura 8** – Nuevas concepciones de seguridad en el mundo posterior a la Guerra Fría. La idea de seguridad humana contrasta con la dicotomía consagrada de seguridad nacional y seguridad pública. (Fuente: el autor)

### Convergencia e Hibridación


Los desafíos inherentes al siglo XXI no se limitan al impacto de las tecnologías derivadas de la revolución digital. La humanidad hoy se enfrenta a un flujo sin precedentes de personas, ideas, servicios, bienes y capital. Además, los cambios en los patrones de migración, las presiones demográficas, la urbanización sin control y la degradación ambiental se suman a los cambios políticos, las transformaciones económicas globales y, sobre todo, los cambios profundos en las expectativas, valores y normas sociales. Según Moisés Naím: “Negar el papel crucial de las tecnologías de la información, especialmente las redes sociales, en los cambios que estamos viendo, sería tan engañoso como explicar estos cambios solo como resultado de la adopción generalizada de estas tecnologías”<sup>34</sup>.

En términos prácticos, la posmodernidad impuso una redefinición de lo que entendemos como *tiempo*, *distancia* y *poder*. En una era de comunicaciones instantáneas, donde las personas se conectan automáticamente a cualquier parte del planeta, no es difícil admitir la virtual abolición del tiempo y la distancia<sup>35</sup>. Sin embargo, la descomposición del poder resultante del surgimiento de pequeños actores en todos los campos de la actividad humana puede no ser tan evidente. Volviendo una vez más al escritor venezolano:

Lo que está cambiando el mundo hoy tiene menos que ver con la rivalidad de mega-actores que con el surgimiento de *micropoderes* y tu habilidad para desafiar exitosamente los *mega-actores*. [...] ya no es el poder masivo, abrumador y a menudo coercitivo de las grandes organizaciones ricas en recursos con una larga historia, sino el poder de vetar, contrarrestar, combatir y limitar el margen de

maniobra de los grandes actores. Es negar a los grandes el espacio eterno para la acción y la influencia que siempre se ha dado por sentado. Es un poder que nace de la innovación y la iniciativa, sin duda, pero también del hecho de que cada vez hay más espacio para que los micropoderes empleen técnicas como el veto, la interferencia, la desviación de la atención, el aplazamiento de las decisiones o la sorpresa. Las tácticas clásicas de los rebeldes en tiempos de guerra ahora están disponibles y muestran efectividad en muchos otros campos.<sup>36</sup>

Es dentro de este contexto de degradación del "tiempo, distancia y poder" que se da el fenómeno de la *convergencia*, es decir, interactividad e *hibridación* de varias redes ilícitas a escala mundial<sup>37</sup>. Los grupos insurgentes, las organizaciones terroristas, las facciones criminales y, a menudo, los Estados poco comprometidos con los valores democráticos y los preceptos humanitarios, comparten intereses, métodos y objetivos, estableciendo dinámicas de cooperación respaldadas por actividades legales, ilegales e informales (figura 9).



**Figura 9** – Convergencia e hibridación. (Fuente: el autor)

Con conectividad ilimitada, surgen "networks de networks" caracterizado por un enorme alcance, capilaridad, multiplicidad, velocidad y redundancia. Es decir, la convergencia forma los *sistemas adaptativos complejos* que no pueden interpretarse de acuerdo con la ortodoxia que rige los preceptos tradicionales de seguridad y defensa. Por lo tanto, los procesos cognitivos basados exclusivamente en la lógica cartesiana habitual son ineficaces y sus soluciones son inocuas, especialmente porque estas estructuras son extremadamente resistentes y tienen una notable capacidad regenerativa (compárense las figuras 5 y 9).

De acuerdo con André Luís Woloszyn:

El final de la Guerra Fría y el comienzo del proceso de globalización económica pueden considerarse los hitos en los que surgieron grandes cantidades

de organizaciones paraestatales, que vieron la posibilidad de obtener ganancias en mercados en expansión y fronteras recién abiertas, lo que condujo a múltiples instalaciones comerciales y transporte de diversos materiales de actividades ilícitas [...] Las diversas formas de violencia se desarrollan principalmente debido a la interconexión global y la facilidad de acceso a las redes informales de comercio ilegal (drogas ilegales, armas, explosivos y tecnología), recreando un entorno de guerrilla urbana más sofisticado que el practicado en los años 1960 y 1970.<sup>38</sup>

Según Hilary Matfess y Michael Miklaucic, “el alcance y la dinámica de la convergencia ilícita de las redes indican que este fenómeno está penetrando nuevos dominios y mercados, adquiriendo nuevas características, un proceso de mutación constante y una velocidad muy difícil de seguir<sup>39</sup>.

Gracias a la convergencia y la hibridación, las conexiones entre actividades dispersas territorialmente se vuelven más fluidas, ignorando deliberadamente las fronteras erigidas entre Estados soberanos. Los lazos flexibles de interdependencia, respaldados por la vocación natural de distintos espacios geográficos, impregnan una densa red que interconecta (1) regiones remotas productoras de drogas; (2) rutas de tráfico, contrabando e infiltración de delincuentes, terroristas y *foreign fighters*; (3) los mercados de consumo, especialmente en las grandes ciudades; (4) centros industriales y financieros; (5) fortalezas para el ocultamiento, recaudación de fondos, lavado de dinero, proselitismo, propaganda y reclutamiento; (6) áreas conflagradas y zonas de conflicto; (7) enclaves no gobernados y "santuarios" de fuerzas irregulares; y (8) paraísos fiscales. Por esta razón, la violencia en el siglo XXI, en particular la violencia armada no estatal, ya no se puede entender de manera segmentada a través de enfoques reduccionistas. Por el contrario, requiere un análisis sistémico complejo – algo que apenas se hace.

El fenómeno de la convergencia, por lo tanto, representa un gran desafío para el orden vestfaliano. Después de todo, la coexistencia de insurgencias nacionalistas, insurgencias yihadistas e insurgencias criminales relacionadas, a través de *networks* de alcance global, las frenéticas actividades ilícitas transnacionales, la delincuencia rampante a nivel local y el oscuro ejercicio de la *realpolitik* exponen la fragilidad del sistema de Westfalia y, sobre todo, la creciente vulnerabilidad del Estado moderno. Con buena razón, André Luís Woloszyn advierte: “El avance de las organizaciones criminales es un tema estratégico de seguridad internacional”<sup>40</sup>.

El coronel Eduardo de Oliveira Fernandes de la policía brasileña explicó el fenómeno de convergencia a través de un "diseño asimétrico posmoderno"<sup>41</sup>, que destaca la intersección entre la guerra irregular, el terrorismo doméstico y el crimen organizado (figura 10).



**Figura 10** – Diseño asimétrico posmoderno.  
(Fuente: Eduardo de Oliveira Fernandes, 2012, p: 125)

Liddell Hart, uno de los más grandes pensadores militares del siglo XX, calificó al general William Sherman, héroe de la Guerra de Secesión de los Estados Unidos (1861-1865), como el primer general de la era industrial<sup>42</sup>. Quizás el general Stanley Allen McChrystal pueda ser considerado, con el mismo rigor, el primer gran general de la era de la información. Como comandante de la Fuerza de Tarea 714, fue el principal responsable de la destrucción de al-Qaeda en Irak, incluida la eliminación de su líder, el terrorista jordano Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, el 7 de junio de 2006<sup>43</sup>. Según el general McChrystal:

Tanto en Irak como en Afganistán, las fuerzas de la coalición [liderada por Estados Unidos] luchaban contra oponentes no estatales resistentes, altamente adaptables y totalmente comprometidos, operando sin las restricciones impuestas a las campañas militares tradicionales de los gobiernos nacionales. Al-Qaeda, los talibanes y el Estado Islámico reflejan un nuevo tipo de conflicto que muchos conservadores aún no reconocen como guerra. Estas organizaciones desafían las caracterizaciones elementales como terroristas, insurgentes o criminales.<sup>44</sup>

### **Estado versus Estado: guerra híbrida y zona gris<sup>45</sup>**

Los Estados nacionales, como entidades políticas, todavía compiten ferozmente entre sí, guiados por el *raison d'état* y por los preceptos realistas de la escuela de Hans Morgenthau. Sin embargo, han diversificado sus formas de confrontación y han tratado de reducir la visibilidad de sus acciones estratégicas ante una opinión pública cada vez más intolerante e impaciente, y menos dispuestos a asumir los costos de una guerra total. La guerra cibernética, guerra de información, guerra psicológica, guerra no convencional y las operaciones clandestinas (*“black Ops”*) son solo algunos de los recursos ampliamente utilizados junto con alternativas no militares para complementar, apoyar, expandir y, sobre todo, evitar confrontaciones formales.

Especialmente, Rusia, China e Irán han estado desarrollando estrategias menos ortodoxas para contrarrestar la hegemonía militar estadounidense. Espectadores de la asombrosa demostración de poder militar durante la Guerra del Golfo de 1991, estos países se convencieron de que Estados Unidos se había vuelto prácticamente invencible en un campo de batalla convencional. Ninguna otra fuerza armada en el planeta podría enfrentarlos al aventurarse en una lucha campal directa, realizada de acuerdo con el paradigma de la guerra industrial entre Estados.

Años más tarde, en febrero de 1999, dos oficiales de la Fuerza Aérea china, Qiao Liang y Wang Xiangsui, publicaron un libro titulado "Guerra más allá de los límites". El trabajo propuso acciones y procedimientos que trascendieron las tácticas militares habituales destinadas a compensar la inferioridad militar de los países emergentes, como China en particular, en caso de un conflicto que involucra medios de alta tecnología<sup>46</sup>. Según los autores:

La guerra como la conocíamos, descrita en términos gloriosos y dominantes, hasta el final del conflicto reciente, que marca un punto culminante en la historia militar, ya no se considera uno de los eventos más importantes en el escenario mundial, y se hizo importante como actor secundario. [...] El punto es que las fuerzas multinacionales lideradas por Estados Unidos que operaron en la región desértica de Kuwait marcaron el final de un período, lo que marca el comienzo de una nueva era. [...] Todo esto aún es indeterminado. La única conclusión segura es que a partir de ahora la guerra ya no será como siempre. [...] La guerra, que ha sufrido cambios en la tecnología moderna y el sistema de mercado, se desatará de formas aún más atípicas. En otras palabras, mientras estamos presenciando una reducción relativa en la violencia militar, definitivamente estamos mostrando un aumento en la violencia política, económica y tecnológica.<sup>47</sup>

El actual Jefe de Estado Mayor de Rusia, el general Valery Gerasimov, también mencionó la adopción de estrategias más eclécticas, no basadas únicamente en el uso del instrumento militar:

El énfasis en el contenido de los métodos de afrontamiento está cambiando hacia el uso generalizado de medidas políticas, económicas, diplomáticas, informativas y no militares implementadas con la participación del potencial de protesta de una población. Las formas no militares y los medios de lucha han sido objeto de un desarrollo sin precedentes, adquiriendo un carácter peligroso y a veces violento.<sup>48</sup>

Además, el grupo de participantes en un conflicto militar se está expandiendo. Junto con las fuerzas regulares, se ha utilizado el potencial de protesta interna de una población, así como los grupos terroristas y las organizaciones extremistas [...] Hay un cambio de operaciones secuenciadas y concentradas a operaciones dispersas realizadas simultáneamente en todas las esferas de confrontación y enfrentamiento en remotos teatros de guerra.<sup>49</sup>

Análisis recientes muestran que la conducta de Rusia, China e Irán parece estar claramente subordinada a tres premisas:

I. Una colisión directa con el ejército estadounidense sería extremadamente desventajosa y arriesgada, por lo que debe evitarse;

II. Deben emplearse otros medios, que las alternativas militares tradicionales, para lograr los objetivos nacionales; esto significa poner mayor énfasis en las acciones políticas, diplomáticas, geoeconómicas<sup>50</sup> y de información, en detrimento de la acción militar, así como el desarrollo de otros métodos indirectos de participación, como la guerra no convencional, las operaciones de información y la guerra cibernética; y

III. Tener un poder militar convencional que, aunque no sea suficiente para asegurar una victoria militar definitiva sobre los Estados Unidos, les permite alterar la relación costo-efectividad de cualquier intervención de los Estados Unidos, haciéndola desventajosa y creando así un punto muerto del que puedan beneficiarse explotando las ambigüedades y contradicciones del sistema internacional.

Por lo tanto, las opciones políticas y estratégicas descritas por los gobiernos de Moscú, Beijing y Teherán se desarrollan ampliamente de acuerdo con la siguiente secuencia lógica:

1º) **El uso "agresivo" de medios no militares, apoyados por alternativas militares no cinéticas (no letales), especialmente guerra de información y operaciones cibernéticas.** Esto les permite dar forma al medio ambiente a su favor, reduciendo progresivamente la influencia e interferencia de los Estados Unidos, en un área geográfica determinada, al mismo tiempo que garantiza que expandan su propia presencia regional. Las iniciativas geoeconómicas emprendidas por los chinos en África y América Latina se prestan como ejemplo, así como las acciones de Irán con las fuerzas políticas chiitas de Afganistán, Irak, Siria y Líbano.

2º) **El uso de medios militares para lograr objetivos estratégicos sin desencadenar la intervención de Estados Unidos.** Esto significa permitir una escalada violenta del conflicto hasta un límite que precede a la acción decisiva del gobierno de Washington. En esta fase, es posible observar el uso limitado de las fuerzas convencionales, combinado con el uso hábil de herramientas diplomáticas e informativas, además de las prácticas de guerra no convencionales, especialmente el uso intenso de *proxies* o terceros, como lo han hecho los rusos al apoyar a los separatistas en el este de Ucrania y a través de las milicias chiitas y *Wagner Group*, una compañía militar privada al servicio del Kremlin en la Guerra Civil Siria<sup>51</sup>; así como a Irán a través del *Hezbollah* y de *Janud al-Madhi*, por ejemplo.

3º) **Posible uso de "anti acceso y negación de área"** (A2-AD, del acrónimo en inglés), utilizando sofisticados recursos de defensa aérea, naval y de misiles, incluidas armas anti satélite, respaldados por operaciones de inteligencia, guerra cibernética y guerra electrónica para restringir que las fuerzas estadounidenses entren en el teatro de operaciones.

El hecho de que Rusia, China e Irán desafíen la hegemonía estadounidense retrata una dinámica multipolar muy cercana al escenario predicho por Samuel Huntington en su controvertido libro "El choque de civilizaciones y la recomposición del orden mundial"<sup>52</sup>. Sin embargo, estos tres países no son los únicos que han confiado en métodos poco ortodoxos para lograr sus objetivos nacionales.

Muchos gobiernos, para defender sus intereses vitales, han establecido vínculos perniciosos con actividades clandestinas, especialmente el terrorismo y la delincuencia organizada transnacional. Esto crea relaciones oscuras, dentro de las cuales es difícil distinguir cuánto explota el Estado las prácticas ilícitas o, en qué medida, las redes criminales utilizan la burocracia gubernamental. Este es el caso, por ejemplo, con los narco-Estados y los países que patrocinan el terrorismo. Según los investigadores colombianos Vicente Torrijos y Luis Fernando Sarmiento, "varios Estados están utilizando el fenómeno de los actores irregulares para promover sus intereses y alcanzar objetivos estratégicos, políticos, económicos o ideológicos, creando

lógicas de convergencia"<sup>53</sup>. Por lo tanto, algunos gobiernos incorporaron deliberadamente a su "arsenal diplomático": corrupción; lavado de dinero; tráfico de drogas y armas de fuego; contrabando; la captura de propiedad intelectual; piratería; la fabricación y el comercio de productos falsificados, etc.

Como señaló el general Gerasimov, el potencial de movilización y protesta de un pueblo también se convierte en un componente fundamental en la nueva dinámica geopolítica, como sucedió con la llamada Revolución del Color – Revolución Rosa en Georgia (2003), Revolución Naranja en Ucrania (2004), la Revolución del Cedro en el Líbano (2005) y la Revolución de los Tulipanes en Kirguistán (2005). La Primavera Árabe comenzó en 2010 con manifestaciones en Túnez y se extendió por Egipto, Libia, Bahrein, Yemen y Siria. Los disturbios también desestabilizaron a los gobiernos de Marruecos, Jordania y Líbano, cambiando el panorama político de Medio Oriente y África del Norte<sup>54</sup>. A pesar de la espontaneidad de algunos movimientos de masas, la erupción de disturbios internos y la participación de "activistas digitales" pueden canalizarse hacia la degradación del poder de los Estados antagónicos. Según el general Marshall Webb, ex comandante de operaciones especiales de los Estados Unidos en el continente europeo:

Las condiciones de 2014 son diferentes de las de 1944, y las herramientas, con las que, hoy en día, se libra una guerra no convencional son muy diferentes. Debemos dejar la visión nostálgica de las bases guerrilleras remotas en territorios inaccesibles y adaptarnos a un mundo de comunicaciones instantáneas, transferencia de datos, resistencia no violenta, guerra cibernética y económica, y manipulación del derecho internacional para socavar la soberanía nacional. [...] En nuestra era, es más probable que la guerra no convencional tome la forma de un movimiento de resistencia civil, muchos de ellos manipulados por potencias extranjeras, para provocar una respuesta violenta de las autoridades, con el propósito de destruir la legitimidad del gobierno a los ojos de la comunidad internacional. Empezar y enfrentar esta nueva forma de guerra no convencional requiere gran sofisticación y agilidad.<sup>55</sup>

Los regímenes dictatoriales en el Magreb y el Medio Oriente experimentaron la amenaza de las "tribus urbanas" de los jóvenes no conformes, desafiando el *establishment* y su monopolio tradicional sobre el uso de la fuerza. El compromiso extra regional de ciberactivistas como el grupo *Anonymous*, por ejemplo, moldeó lo que Peter Fein llamó "*guerrilla information warfare*"<sup>56</sup>. Los *hackers* desempeñaron un papel decisivo en frustrar los intentos del gobierno de censurar y controlar los medios de comunicación, mejorando y ampliando las manifestaciones callejeras que de otro modo podrían haberse disipado fácilmente. En 1998, un grupo de investigadores, incluido John Arquilla, ya había llamado la atención sobre un fenómeno llamado "*social netwar*":

La revolución de la información está favoreciendo y fortaleciendo las formas de organización en las redes, al mismo tiempo que dificulta las cosas para las estructuras jerárquicas verticales tradicionales. El crecimiento de *networks* – especialmente *networks* abiertas donde cada nodo está conectado directamente a todos los demás nodos, significa que el poder está cambiando a manos de actores no estatales, que pueden adaptarse, dentro de redes dispersas de múltiples organizaciones, de manera más rápida que los actores estatales tradicionales y jerárquicos. Esto significa que más y más conflictos serán combatidos por *networks*, en detrimento de las "jerarquías". Por lo tanto, quien domine estas formas de redes tendrá la mayor ventaja sobre sus oponentes.<sup>57</sup>

Este escenario ambiguo y difuso ha resaltado los conceptos de *guerra híbrida* y *zona gris*. Según el coronel del ejército brasileño Paulo César Leal, la guerra híbrida emplea una amplia gama de recursos, combinando herramientas de guerras convencionales y no convencionales, a saber: fuerzas regulares e irregulares, fuerzas especiales, apoyo para manifestaciones locales, guerra de información, diplomacia, ciberataques y guerra económica<sup>58</sup>. Según Hal Brands, "el conflicto de la zona gris es una actividad coercitiva y agresiva por naturaleza, pero a la vez deliberadamente diseñada para permanecer por debajo de los límites de un conflicto militar convencional"<sup>59</sup>. En otras palabras, "la zona gris se caracteriza por una intensa competencia política, económica, informativa y militar más feroz que la diplomacia tradicional, pero inferior a la guerra convencional"<sup>60</sup>. El propio general Gerasimov admite que "hoy, la falta de definición de la distinción entre estado de guerra y paz es obvia"<sup>61</sup>.

Además de los Estados nacionales que recurren a estrategias basadas en el concepto de guerra híbrida, Torrijos y Sarmiento llaman la atención sobre aquellos actores no estatales que se han convertido en "*amenazas híbridas*":

Las diferencias entre conflictos convencionales e irregulares se están volviendo cada vez más borrosas, lo que permite a los actores no estatales incorporar las capacidades de ambas clases de conflictos. [...] Los actores híbridos pueden recurrir a tácticas de ejércitos regulares mientras participan en actividades delictivas, ataques terroristas y emplean los últimos avances tecnológicos para su beneficio. [...] Los actores irregulares que emplean la guerra híbrida pueden aprovechar el potencial de protesta de la población civil para utilizar movimientos sociales y fuerzas políticas transversales a la sociedad [...] Se puede decir que el nuevo centro de gravedad de esta clase de conflictos es la sociedad civil, que los actores híbridos buscan polarizar a su favor. [...] Según [general] Gerasimov, el uso de medios no militares de naturaleza política, económica, social, humanitaria e informativa aumenta la efectividad de los actores híbridos para lograr sus objetivos políticos y estratégicos. [...] Los actores que recurren a esta forma de hacer la guerra no buscan la eliminación de su oponente, sino su fractura interna, que puede tomar la forma de desestabilización interna, desintegración, disturbios masivos y terror, volatilidad económica y aislamiento diplomático.<sup>62</sup>

Según John Troxell, "La guerra de información, la guerra cibernética y la competencia económica internacional no son necesariamente enfoques o métodos nuevos para que los Estados persigan objetivos de seguridad nacional, pero el contexto en el que se están aplicando y la importancia que han asumido es algo significativamente nuevo"<sup>63</sup>. Lo que tenemos, de hecho, es el ejercicio tradicional de *realpolitik* con una cartera de medios más diversa y quizás con menos ataduras morales. Los Estados no solo son parte de esta dinámica. Después de todo, ante el vigoroso aumento de los actores no estatales (armados o desarmados) y el advenimiento de la sociedad posmoderna, el orden internacional se ha vuelto notablemente más complejo, hasta el punto de cuestionar la efectividad del sistema de Westfalia (figura 10).





Figura 10 – Guerra Híbrida y Conflicto en la Zona Gris (Fuente: el autor)

Las disputas geopolíticas entre Estados soberanos siempre se han comparado con un juego de ajedrez. Sin embargo, parece haber nuevas reglas en un mundo globalizado profundamente afectado por la revolución digital, en el que las distancias y el tiempo se han abolido virtualmente y el poder se ha degradado drásticamente. Es como imaginar, entonces, un tablero que tiene más de dos oponentes al mismo tiempo. Algunas piezas son autónomas, tienen su propia voluntad, se mueven de forma independiente. El perfil del juego de las piezas cambia a lo largo del juego: la torre se mueve diagonalmente como un alfil, ¡y un peón patea varias casillas! Los jugadores son libres de moverse sin respetar el tiempo asignado a otros oponentes... Posiblemente, esta analogía retrata los complejos desafíos del siglo XXI de manera más apropiada.

Sin embargo, debe recordarse que el juego de estrategia chino es el “Go” (o *Wei-Chi*) y no ajedrez – de origen persa. Esta sutil diferencia puede ocultar conceptos estratégicos bastante distintos entre el oeste de Clausewitz y el este de Sun Tzu. Según Jamie Schwandt:

En el ajedrez, la filosofía subyacente es ganar con una victoria decisiva con el claro objetivo de capturar al rey enemigo y destruir las fuerzas enemigas. El ajedrez es un juego lineal con un simple centro de gravedad: el rey. Comenzamos el juego con todas las piezas en el tablero, buscando avanzar linealmente en una guerra de desgaste.<sup>64</sup>

El “Go”, por otro lado, sugiere una dinámica compleja, en la que la hábil combinación de los instrumentos del poder nacional adquiere un carácter constructivo, mientras que el desarrollo de un juego de ajedrez reproduce un proceso estratégico-militar eminentemente destructivo<sup>65</sup>.

## **Insurgencia criminal**

En el siglo XX, la dinámica de los conflictos irregulares se agrupaba en torno a causas nacionalistas y/o marxistas. Es decir, los perfiles de estas guerras permanecieron casi invariablemente subordinados a propósitos emancipadores o revolucionarios, destinados a alcanzar objetivos eminentemente políticos. Pero desde la erosión de la antigua Unión Soviética y el final de la Guerra Fría, las cosas ya no son tan simples.

La etnicidad, la demografía, la urbanización, la búsqueda de identidades alternativas, la globalización económica, la revolución digital, los flujos migratorios, la anomia, la convergencia y la hibridación de redes ilícitas, entre otros factores relacionados, han promovido una fragmentación significativa de la violencia, incluida la proliferación de *micro insurgencias* disociadas de una agenda política tangible.

De hecho, a pesar del eventual resurgimiento de disputas entre Estados soberanos, el advenimiento de la sociedad posmoderna ha puesto de manifiesto un tipo de violencia, en particular: armada, organizada, no estatal, endémica e hiperdifusa. En este contexto, la *insurgencia criminal*, al igual que la *insurgencia yihadista*, ha adquirido una importancia creciente debido a su capacidad para corromper, degradar e incluso usurpar el poder soberano del Estado sobre sus elementos materiales.

Según John Sullivan, la criminalidad de alta intensidad que surge de la disputa por el control de la economía ilegal promueve conflictos sobre territorios y rutas de ilícitos, cuyos objetivos están asociados con la búsqueda de la plena autonomía económica y territorial, libre

de influencia estatal<sup>66</sup>. Existe una confrontación, desprovista de cualquier matiz político-ideológico, en la cual el poder central es desafiado por organizaciones no estatales o “*criminal netwarriors*”, quienes recurren a la barbarie y la violencia abyecta, impregnadas de acciones informativas con diversos grados de sofisticación, para arrebatarse la iniciativa y encubrir sus prácticas criminales con un falso atractivo de “bandidaje social”, buscando ganar legitimidad para ellos y sus esfuerzos<sup>67</sup>.

Las insurgencias criminales difieren del terrorismo clásico y la insurgencia tradicional, cuyos objetivos conducen a la toma del poder. La insurgencia criminal no tiene como objetivo capturar al Estado. Pero precipita un proceso que puede conducir a la erosión total o parcial de las instituciones nacionales y, en consecuencia, al colapso y la bancarrota de la gobernanza estatal, o al menos a una “renegociación” de los términos de su existencia. Esto se realiza a través de los siguientes elementos:

- confrontación continua con aparato de seguridad y protección del Estado, con diferentes niveles de intensidad, lo que resulta en el agotamiento de la capacidad de represión policial y la sobrecarga del sistema legal;

- impugnando la legitimidad del Estado, especialmente en regiones que sufren corrupción endémica, fragilidad democrática e ineptitud gubernamental para satisfacer las demandas básicas de la población local;

- dominio sobre áreas no gobernadas;

- expansión de empresas ilícitas y control de la microeconomía informal por coerción y/o cooptación; y

- corrupción, intimidación, desertión, incitación e infiltración de instituciones públicas y organizaciones no gubernamentales<sup>68</sup>

Según José Rita Martins Lara, “hoy, el crimen organizado evade el estándar de las antiguas estructuras jerárquicas de la mafia, con su rígido código de honor, y se convierte en redes difusas que penetran en los sistemas estatales, buscando dar apariencia legal a sus actos ilegales.”<sup>69</sup>. En términos generales, el crimen de alta intensidad puede manifestarse como una insurgencia de diferentes maneras, a saber:

**Insurgencia local.** Pandillas, *maras* y facciones criminales actúan a nivel comunitario a través de la hegemonía local para establecer el control político, económico y social sobre la población. En esta etapa, se crean los mecanismos necesarios, muchos de ellos de forma empírica, para el ejercicio del poder en áreas no gobernadas.

**Lucha por el Estado paralelo.** Las organizaciones criminales luchan entre sí por el control de áreas no gobernadas y empresas ilícitas. El aumento de la violencia afecta a la sociedad en su conjunto y, por lo tanto, impulsa al Estado a la acción. Sin embargo, el alcance del compromiso contra las fuerzas gubernamentales sigue siendo limitado.

**Lucha contra el Estado.** En esta etapa, la organización criminal desata campañas agresivas, convirtiéndose en un activo beligerante contra el Estado para preservar su autonomía y libertad de acción.

**Implosión Estatal.** El Estado pierde su capacidad de respuesta frente a una espiral ascendente incontrolable de violencia. La corrupción endémica y la infiltración de organizaciones

criminales en las instituciones públicas socavan la legitimidad del poder central y lo hacen cómplice de empresas ilícitas. La sociedad civil ahora acepta formas alternativas de gobierno, en detrimento del poder soberano del Estado sobre sus elementos materiales. Esto acomoda a las organizaciones criminales a estructuras formales de poder.<sup>70</sup>

La insurgencia criminal ha sido un fenómeno recurrente, especialmente en las Américas. Como cualquier otra forma de conflicto, las insurgencias criminales comparten características y elementos comunes entre sí. Sin embargo, se ajustan a las idiosincrasias locales y a contextos específicos de tiempo y espacio, que los hacen únicos y autóctonos. Países como México, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Colombia, Perú y Brasil, por ejemplo, han sufrido los efectos nocivos de esta categoría peculiar de violencia (armada, organizada, no estatal, endémica e hiperdifusa), que se ha prolongado durante décadas de manera inconclusa y siniestra.

Sin embargo, las amenazas intrínsecas a las insurgencias criminales se han malinterpretado ya que están sujetas a un enfoque ortodoxo, a menudo restringido al alcance de la seguridad pública, aunque paradójicamente el uso de los militares se ha vuelto recurrente (figura 2). El concepto de insurgencia criminal está estrechamente asociado con la idea de “*áreas no gobernadas dentro del estado*”. Quizás la magnitud del desafío que representan puede evaluarse mejor a través de un análisis basado en los supuestos que rigen la *teoría general del estado* y la *teoría de control competitivo* de David Kilcullen<sup>71</sup>.

Bartosz Hieronim Stanislawski acuñó el término “*black spot*” (punto negro) para designar áreas alrededor del mundo que se encuentran fuera del control de gobierno efectivo, y son capaces de generar y propagar inseguridad, aunque manteniéndose excluidas de la agenda internacional. El enfoque de Stanislawski cubre tanto los grupos terroristas como las organizaciones criminales transnacionales, como “males globales” capaces de afectar la seguridad y la estabilidad internacional<sup>72</sup>. Según la maestra Marília Carolina Barbosa de Souza:

*Black spots* son áreas dentro de un Estado sobre las cuales el gobierno formal no ejerce ningún tipo de control. El tipo de orden vigente en estos territorios es casi siempre desconocido tanto para las autoridades gubernamentales como para la comunidad internacional. Como resultado, las agencias de seguridad nacional tienen poca supervisión sobre los puntos negros, que son motivos propicios para que los grupos terroristas y criminales realicen libremente sus actividades ilegales. México es un ejemplo de un país que tiene *black spots*, dado que hay regiones donde el poder estatal no se aplica, como Ciudad Juárez, donde los grupos de narcotraficantes imponen sus propias reglas de convivencia.

[...] Esta es la violencia urbana, prevalente en las grandes ciudades de los países emergentes. El fracaso de las autoridades del gobierno central para generar gobernanza crea estos pequeños *black spots* que, casi siempre, se encuentran en las afueras, donde las fuerzas policiales no llegan y, como resultado, las normas sociales son paralelas a las formales. En estos *black spots* las pandillas y los narcotraficantes a menudo operan, buscando expandir su influencia en regiones estratégicas y sacar provecho de sus actividades ilícitas. Para este fin, la violencia se usa constantemente.<sup>73</sup>

En 2004, la Agencia Central de Inteligencia de los Estados Unidos (CIA) ya había identificado 50 regiones en todo el mundo sobre las cuales los gobiernos nacionales tenían poco

o ningún control. De hecho, los países que no tienen "focos de ilegalidad" conectados a redes globales más amplias son raros<sup>74</sup>.

Dentro de los *black spots*, todos los elementos esenciales que dan forma al Estado de Westfalia (es decir, pueblo, territorio, soberanía y propósito) son profundamente subvertidos por grupos anárquicos que usurpan, esencialmente a través de la violencia armada, las prerrogativas que anteriormente tenían las autoridades públicas. El problema se vuelve exponencialmente más grave cuando el fenómeno ocurre dentro de las megaciudades. Porque en estas áreas no gobernadas, degradadas y densamente pobladas, grupos de delincuentes, pandillas armadas y otros *spoilers* tienen la capacidad de redefinir la dinámica de la interacción social e imponer reglas informales de convivencia. Ellos ejercen influencia directa e indirecta sobre los valores culturales (*narcocultura*), los patrones de comportamiento y las normas de conducta de la población local, sometiendo a cientos de miles de personas a su control efectivo.

De acuerdo con la *teoría de control competitivo*, "quien hace cumplir el sistema normativo tiene el control efectivo"<sup>75</sup>. Así, la territorialización de los nichos urbanos se puede observar a través de la apropiación del espacio de manera concreta y abstracta<sup>76</sup>, en detrimento del poder hegemónico del Estado. En ese sentido, la capacidad del gobierno para realizar redadas ocasionales u ocupaciones temporales con las fuerzas militares y policiales no significa que estos enclaves criminales estén bajo el control del gobierno.

Mientras que la incidencia de *black spots* se debe, entre otros factores, a la incapacidad del gobierno para satisfacer las crecientes demandas y aspiraciones de la población local, la presión demográfica, *apartheid* social, bajos niveles de desarrollo humano, deudas históricas no pagadas, escasez de recursos y preservación de las deformidades en la estructura social, su aparición evidencia que el Estado no ha promovido el bien común (por eso fue concebido) y por consiguiente lo encuentra desprovisto de propósito. Parafraseando al profesor Dalmo de Abreu Dallari, es una señal de que el propio Estado está mal organizado y lejos de los objetivos que justifican su existencia.

Además, dentro de las áreas no gobernadas, el poder soberano del Estado sobre sus elementos materiales (personas y territorio) no es más absoluto, perpetuo, inalienable, único, indivisible, indispensable y exclusivo (figura 1). Es decir, la soberanía simplemente deja de existir en el momento en que los actores armados no estatales ejercen una fuerza coercitiva de manera ilegítima y arbitraria, sin relación con las instituciones públicas y en una clara divergencia de los principios que rigen el Estado democrático de Derecho<sup>77</sup>. Según Alice Castelani de Oliveira:

Cuando el Estado deja de ejercer su soberanía, incluso en un espacio limitado de su territorio, ausente de practicar una gobernanza efectiva en respuesta a las demandas sociales de la población, pierde legitimidad en relación con la sociedad y crea vacíos de poder.

[...] Las transformaciones que el mundo globalizado impone hoy muestran que los actores paraestatales han alcanzado el puesto de amenaza real para el Estado. Las autoridades públicas hoy enfrentan nuevos desafíos planteados por una 'sociedad global' en la cual las interacciones humanas son fluidas e instantáneas. Los nuevos desafíos presentados, como el narcotráfico y el terrorismo transnacional, son actividades que van más allá de los límites formales del Estado, mientras que el Estado todavía está vinculado a las concepciones clásicas.

El surgimiento de áreas no gobernadas es una agresión explícita contra todos los elementos que constituyen el Estado, ya que presentan el potencial para el desarrollo de grupos que ahora ejercen control sobre el territorio y la población dentro de los límites de un Estado nacional.

[...] La formación de áreas no gobernadas dentro del territorio nacional de un Estado puede dar lugar a la aparición de grupos que se harán pasar por verdaderos enemigos del Estado, convirtiéndose en una amenaza para el principio básico del estado, la soberanía.<sup>78</sup>

Las áreas no gobernadas no son problemas restringidos a Estados fallidos o casi fallidos. Muchos países, aunque no se someten a procedimientos de quiebra claros e inexorables, pueden tener “*gobierno en bancarota*” y así permitir el surgimiento y expansión de *black spots* dentro de su territorio. Por lo tanto, existe una paradoja que ataca el orden tradicional de Westfalia, porque, si bien es cierto que, dentro al concierto de naciones, estos Estados mantienen intacta la prerrogativa del poder soberano sobre sus elementos materiales, pero al mismo tiempo, enfrentan un creciente déficit de soberanía interna. Lo que se podría llamar “*soberanía fragmentada*”<sup>79</sup>. Al abordar la crisis de gobernanza global, Phil Williams señaló que “la idea de soberanía sigue siendo válida como *status* formal y legal, según el cual el Estado no reconoce ninguna otra autoridad por encima de sí mismo y no permite que otros gobiernos intervengan en sus asuntos internos. Sin embargo, la soberanía como dominio territorial completo y exclusivo y como control sobre los ciudadanos dentro de sus límites jurisdiccionales es cada vez más ilusoria”<sup>80</sup>. Nuevamente, el marco conceptual disponible demuestra ser incapaz de lidiar con este tipo de ambigüedad. De acuerdo con Vanda Felbab-Brown:

Grandes contingentes de población en todo el mundo, en áreas con presencia estatal mínima, alta pobreza y marginación social y política, dependen de economías ilícitas, incluido el tráfico de drogas, para su supervivencia económica y la satisfacción de otras necesidades socioeconómicas. Por lo tanto, es importante dejar de pensar en el crimen solo como una actividad social anómala que necesita ser suprimida, para, en cambio, pensar el crimen como un competidor que amenaza al propio Estado.<sup>81</sup>

El problema se vuelve aún más delicado cuando algunos de los sectores de la sociedad civil llegan a abogar por modelos alternativos de gobernanza ante la incapacidad explícita del Estado para restablecer el control absoluto sobre estos enclaves. Lo que se origina como un mecanismo informal de supervivencia de la población a nivel comunitario, en ausencia del poder público, se convierte en una “gobernanza criminal” profundamente arraigada, lo que lleva a una renegociación de los términos de la soberanía estatal. Según Gabriel Rocha:

En un contexto de rearticulación de las fuerzas políticas ubicadas en el cuadrante de la izquierda, el esfuerzo por conformar las organizaciones de base e incluso el llamado autonomismo ganan mayor prominencia y las comunidades necesitadas son vistas como espacios de umbral, donde es posible construir alternativas políticas y sociales al llamado Estado y sociedad convencionales.<sup>82</sup>

La perspectiva de la soberanía dual ha llevado a muchos analistas a preocuparse por los riesgos del advenimiento de un orden *neofeudal*. Es decir, un acuerdo político que obliga al Estado, sacudido en su poder, prerrogativas y atribuciones, a compartir el control sobre parte de su territorio y su población con los grupos locales, señores de la guerra, jefes tribales,

narcotraficantes, mareros, líderes de organizaciones terroristas, etc. El hecho de que, a pesar de los repetidos esfuerzos, muchos países no puedan contener y erradicar espacios anárquicos y enclaves de micro soberanía, justifica este tipo de miedo, que también se ve corroborado por la tendencia a fortalecer los organismos e instituciones supranacionales.

A pesar de la existencia de *black spots* en regiones remotas, como las áreas tribales de Asia Central, los estudios demográficos actuales sugieren una incidencia cada vez mayor de áreas no gobernadas que proliferan en las megaciudades costeras de países pobres o en desarrollo, un pronóstico sombrío para el siglo XXI<sup>83</sup>. Según Mike Davis, en su aclamado *Planet of Slums*, "la urbanización de la pobreza mundial ha producido la urbanización de la insurgencia"<sup>84</sup>.

Sin embargo, el fenómeno de la insurgencia criminal no se limita a los desafíos de la territorialidad. La búsqueda permanente de autonomía, libertad de acción y la expansión de empresas ilícitas transnacionales ha promovido diferentes formas de confrontación, algunas de ellas disociadas de disputas sobre *black spots*. En Brasil, por ejemplo, acciones terroristas emprendidas por el crimen organizado en 2006 y 2012 en Sao Paulo; 2012, 2013, 2014 y 2017 en Santa Catarina<sup>85</sup>; y 2019 en Ceará se desataron selectivamente contra agentes de seguridad del Estado, vehículos de transporte público y estructuras críticas como el suministro de agua, electricidad y obras viales, pero sin reclamar el dominio territorial<sup>86</sup>.

Debido a que es una amenaza amorfa, los insurgentes criminales explotan magistralmente el "vacío legal" que existe entre el sistema legal nacional y el Derecho Internacional Humanitario. Esto no solo les proporciona mayor libertad de acción, sino que también impone numerosos dilemas legales al Estado. Por lo tanto, las alternativas de afrontamiento viables están severamente limitadas por ambigüedades éticas y legales. En otras palabras, la insurgencia criminal es capaz de combinar *guerra legal* y *guerra de información* con el propósito de llegar a sus objetivos estratégicos, así como, limitar el uso de los medios coercitivos estatales. En este sentido, se recomienda profundizar la discusión en torno al llamado "Derecho Penal del Enemigo" que significa la suspensión de ciertas garantías legales por la necesidad de proteger a la sociedad o al Estado contra ciertos peligros muy graves<sup>87</sup>.

Finalmente, es necesario resaltar el enorme poder de atracción y cooptación que las insurgencias criminales ejercen sobre los jóvenes, niños y adolescentes, especialmente en los espacios segregados de las megaciudades. Este es un porcentaje significativo de la población que no logra satisfacer sus aspiraciones crecientes en el cuerpo tradicional de creencias y valores de su propia cultura, sintiéndose destruido por las estructuras políticas y sociales fosilizadas. De hecho, no es difícil ver la relación entre la búsqueda de "*identidades alternativas*" y sumisión a formas de "*gobierno alternativo*", estableciendo una asociación entre antropología cultural, seguridad y defensa.

En un artículo publicado en 1995, Geoffrey Demarest advirtió que "los niños de barrios marginales son el arma secreta de las fuerzas antiestatales"<sup>88</sup>. Ellos representan un suministro aparentemente inagotable de recursos humanos, así como, la reserva movilizable de las insurgencias criminales. Con notable acierto, Demarest concluyó que "la violencia híbrida no necesita ser una sola entidad subordinada al liderazgo coordinado. Solo puede ser el resultado de la convergencia de muchas formas de violencia anti-estatal que se alimentan de la capacidad disruptiva de cada una de ellas y del miedo que ellas producen."<sup>89</sup>.

## Seguridad multidimensional

Como se ha tratado de demostrar sucintamente, el advenimiento de un orden postindustrial ha dado forma a entornos operacionales caracterizados por una extrema fluidez, volatilidad, incertidumbre y complejidad. Por lo tanto, la adopción de un enfoque sistémico es necesaria. Sin embargo, su instrumentalización a menudo se ha descuidado. Quizás porque el marco conceptual que ha guiado tradicionalmente al Estado en la promoción de la seguridad y la defensa no se presta efectivamente para inducir enfoques eclécticos y soluciones multidisciplinarias.

La Figura 11 permite identificar gráficamente cuán limitadas se vuelven las acciones puramente militares emprendidas en la dimensión física si se disocian del espectro completo del conflicto. Debe adoptarse un enfoque menos ortodoxo, teniendo en cuenta las amenazas híbridas de los actores estatales y no estatales en múltiples dominios, así como comprender la interdependencia y complementariedad entre medios militares y no militares para tener éxito político, estratégico, operacional e incluso táctico, en las dimensiones física, humana e informativa.





Figura 11 - Concepto de modelado de intensidad de conflicto (Fuente: Visacro & Doktorczyk)



Por lo tanto, el concepto de “*seguridad multidimensional*” emerge como una mejor herramienta para nuevos conjuntos de amenazas a la sociedad y su dinámica no lineal. Como fundamento doctrinal, permite una interpretación más asertiva de los peligros que plantean los complejos sistemas adaptativos y guía la formulación de respuestas coherentes, convergentes e integradas en todas las expresiones del poder nacional, porque se basa en la relación de marcada interdependencia que se creó entre *Seguridad Nacional*, *Seguridad Pública*, *Seguridad Humana* y *Seguridad Común* (concepto basado en la cooperación interestatal ante la aparición de intereses de seguridad comunes, que trascienden la responsabilidad de cada Estado de forma aislada, ya que también implica organizaciones internacionales y no gubernamentales<sup>90</sup>) – compare las figuras 3, 6, 8 y 12.



**Figura 12** – Seguridad multidimensional. (Fuente: el autor)

La adquisición de un nuevo marco multidisciplinario como punto de partida para la interpretación de los temas de seguridad y defensa y la formulación de políticas públicas no debe entenderse como un mero ejercicio de tautología. De hecho, esta aparente fusión conceptual impone una perspectiva holística más profunda que la relación compartimentada habitual entre los campos de poder (político, económico, psicosocial, militar y científico-tecnológico). Por lo tanto, el modelo político y estratégico de protección del Estado y la sociedad adquiere una concepción sistémica desde su origen, sin limitarse a algo que, en algún momento del proceso de resolución de problemas, experimente una interfaz efímera con temas relacionados.

Confinados en nuestros propios nichos de especialización, nos acostumbramos a buscar respuestas mutuamente excluyentes en una especie de "juego de suma cero". En particular, la voluble opinión pública, susceptible de resultados inmediatos pero insatisfactorios, se inclina recurrentemente a ser seducida por la panacea. Sin embargo, la idea de seguridad multidimensional aboga por una visión compartida de todo el problema, que invariablemente

dependerá de soluciones complementarias e interdependientes como parte de una respuesta sistémica respaldada por una estrategia de múltiples componentes.

Así, el concepto de seguridad multidimensional induce objetivamente: (1) la articulación entre los poderes constituidos; (2) gestión ejecutiva respaldada por mecanismos regulatorios formales capaces de fomentar la dinámica del entorno cooperativo interinstitucional en todos los niveles de la administración pública; (3) la integración, coordinación, sincronización y evaluación de acciones y campañas emprendidas en todos los campos del poder nacional; (4) el desarrollo de culturas organizacionales que favorecen la dinámica de las relaciones horizontales y transversales, así como las funciones tradicionales jerárquicas verticalmente; (5) compromiso de la sociedad civil; y (6) cooperación internacional.

Desafortunadamente, a menudo, muchos de los expertos han reducido las posibles innovaciones conceptuales a un mero atractivo semántico, haciendo uso de términos y expresiones que enriquecen su vocabulario, solo para dar una connotación futurista a las conferencias doctrinales y documentos oficiales. Esto es debido a que el centro de su racionalidad persiste incondicionalmente apegado a valores, reglas y preceptos inherentes a la dinámica de las sociedades industriales con su lógica cartesiana y mecanicista<sup>91</sup>.

## **Conclusión**

El episodio que involucra a la intrépida caballería polaca en septiembre de 1939, descrito en el epígrafe de este texto, se presta como una advertencia contundente de los peligros intrínsecos a la obsolescencia. En el choque entre las fuerzas de dos mundos, agrícola e industrial, prevaleció el poder del acero y el motor de combustión. La tragedia inconmensurable que azotó a Polonia, cuyo Estado no pudo evitar el sacrificio de su pueblo y la mutilación de su territorio, debería inspirarnos a cuestionar nuestras suposiciones ante el advenimiento de una nueva era en la historia humana.

Inicialmente, la sociedad en general debería ser menos escéptica cuando se enfrenta a un posible replanteamiento de los problemas de seguridad y defensa. Sobre todo, debemos renunciar al deseo de adaptar nuevos problemas a soluciones preexistentes. Esto no significa renunciar a todos los conocimientos y experiencias adquiridas a lo largo de la historia, ni tampoco, la adhesión incondicional a enfoques minimalistas. Solo significa la aceptación de que no siempre los dogmas, por los que fuimos criados, y los procesos a los que hemos sido rígidamente condicionados, proporcionarán la respuesta más adecuada a la protección y salvaguarda de los intereses vitales de la nación. Cuando la fidelidad a nuestras propias creencias es mayor que nuestra capacidad de percibir la realidad que nos rodea, inadvertidamente permitimos que los medios monopolicen el fin, creando un serio obstáculo para alcanzar las metas y objetivos de la sociedad.

El general Stanley McChrystal, en su obstinada búsqueda de Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, concluyó que no era suficiente para él “hacer las cosas correctamente”. Sobre todo, era necesario “hacer las cosas correctas”<sup>92</sup>. Es decir, si la habilidad extrema en la ejecución de procesos y el dominio en la aplicación de preceptos consagrados no proporcionan resultados decisivos, debemos cuestionar nuestras suposiciones en busca de lo que efectivamente nos llevará al éxito. Esta postura debe prevalecer entre estadistas y líderes militares, pero también

debe estar presente en auditorios universitarios, oficinas de periódicos, oficinas de magistrados y foros de la sociedad civil. En este sentido, el breve análisis que termina aquí nos lleva a:

- repensar el paradigma de la guerra industrial interestatal en la forma que fue consagrado en los campos de batalla de la primera mitad del siglo XX para que seamos coherentes con la nueva era;

- rechazar la interpretación estrictamente materialista de la historia, reconociendo que la violencia armada se deriva de la interacción de un conjunto complejo de factores y no solo de la estratificación social o de los modos de producción, que en muchos casos ni siquiera serán las principales causas de conflicto; y

- reevaluar la rígida dicotomía entre seguridad nacional y seguridad pública a favor de un enfoque multidimensional expandido que se oponga a la convergencia de amenazas híbridas de actores estatales y no estatales.

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# Russia and Central Asia

Lecture delivered by Theresa Sabonis-Helf<sup>i</sup>.  
(Notes of the presentation)

## Russia in the World

States function in a world system that serves them differently depending on how powerful they are. As a state accumulates more power, it tends to define its national interests more broadly. Weak states seek help from international patrons and institutions. Middle states pursue collective action which includes them. Only great powers seek to shape the international system to their own benefit.

But not all states aspire to Great Power status. The US National Security Strategy of 2017 announces an era of Great Power Competition, but this American strategy is (arguably) actually a response to the Russian National Security Strategy of 2015. In this document, Russia clearly presents itself as a nation with great power ambitions. The strategy portrays a rising Russia which has overcome domestic challenges and international sanction and is engaging a world where the competition is intense and the role of force is “not diminishing.”<sup>1</sup>

### **National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (December 2015):**

*“At the present time, a stable basis has been created for further building up the economic, political, military and spiritual potential of the Russian Federation, enhancing its role in the emerging polycentric world”*

*“The position of the West aimed at counteracting integration processes and creating hotbeds of tension in the Eurasian region has a negative impact on the realization of Russian national interests... The practice of overthrowing legitimate political regimes, provoking intra-state instability and conflicts is becoming more widespread.”*

*“In the struggle for influence in the international arena, the whole spectrum of... instruments is involved... the role of the force factor is not diminishing.”*

*-- Section II*

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In that dangerous world, what are Russia's interests? As expressed in its 2015 NSS, many of the interests are typical – security, prosperity, values, but also “Consolidation of Russia's status as one of the leading powers, whose interest lies in maintaining strategic stability in a polycentric world.”<sup>2</sup> In this, Russia is clearly signaling its intentions for the world order. It is a bold strategy, and one that galvanized a US response.

How does Russia pursue its interests in this complex strategic environment? It was said of Russia, back in the 1990s, that they would always matter in world affairs because they had ‘the nukes, the location and the veto.’ Each of these is an attribute of a great power, but because Russia finds itself in the modern world with modest means, a declining population and what it perceives as a hostile Europe, Russia has become a master of disruptive, asymmetric approaches to securing its interests. Three such approaches are much in evidence: the weaponization of information, the construction of dual use infrastructure, and the advancing of what has been termed “implausible deniability.”<sup>3</sup> Let me address each of these in turn.<sup>4</sup>

That Russia has been more attuned than the free world to the use of information as a weapon is not surprising. Soviet era leadership placed a high priority on propaganda (which does not have a negative connotation in the Russian language). Significantly, the Ministry of Defense of Russia created the Main Military-Political Directorate in 2018. Although Russian Defense Minister Shoigu stated in interviews that the directorate was not a throwback to the Soviet era's “Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy,” the parallels are difficult to ignore.<sup>5</sup> The Directorate's motto “to inform is to influence” reflects the Kremlin's conviction that Russian management of the message is a key aspect of military preparedness.

The construction of what can be understood as dual-use infrastructure is also an approach that Russia has used to its advantage. A striking example is the Kerch Strait Bridge. When Crimea conducted the controversial status referendum on joining the Russian Federation in March 2014, Ukraine stopped supplying water through the North Crimean Canal, and on November 2014, the power lines supplying most of Crimea's electricity were destroyed.<sup>6</sup>

Russia responded to Crimea's isolation by beginning the construction of both an undersea electricity connection and the Kerch Strait Bridge to provide rail and road links. This 19 km, \$3.7 billion bridge, begun in 2016 and completed in May 2018, is the longest bridge in Europe, and constitutes Russia's only direct road connection to Crimea.<sup>7</sup> The bridge also makes it possible for Russia to constrain commercial shipping in the Azov Sea. Less than a year after the opening of the bridge, the *Financial Times* reported that Russia had used points near the bridge (which spans the usual vessel route into the Sea) to delay significantly the movement of vessels entering and exiting the Azov Sea, increasing the average amount of time needed to transit the Azov Sea from 7 hours in June 2018 to more than 5 days in November 2018.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the height of the bridge prevents larger ships from passing through the area at all.<sup>9</sup>

Critics of Nord Stream 2, the pipeline under construction that will link Russian natural gas supply directly to Germany, allege it is a similar project that, although economically defensible, has strategic implications. Russia is likely to increase its naval presence on the Baltic Sea as it constructs (and then secures) the pipeline. Nord Stream 2, which will be wholly owned by Russia's Gazprom Construction, will supply an additional 55 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia to Germany, partially replacing natural gas that previously transited Ukraine and potentially increasing overall flows of Russian gas to Europe. Although US sanctions against

companies helping to lay Nord Stream 2 did cause a Swiss-based company (Allseas) to withdraw from its contract, the US sanctions are not likely to delay completion by more than a year. Russia is preparing its own pipe laying ship and moving it from Vladivostok to the Baltic Sea.<sup>10</sup> Critics of Russian development of the Arctic see a similar pattern, in which Russia appears to pursue economic interests, but in actuality seeks a position of military dominance in a region where peaceful cooperation had historically been the norm.<sup>11</sup>

In addition to its use of information and infrastructure in disruptive ways, Russia has also used a group of semi-covert tools that some scholars describe as providing Russia “implausible deniability,” whereby Russia’s hand in an activity is clear... but attribution cannot be decisively proven and the Russian state can distance itself from outcomes. The private military companies Russia has employed in proxy conflicts from Ukraine to Syria are one example. Curiously, such companies are actually illegal under Russian law in spite of their frequent use by the Kremlin. According to scholar Borshchevskaya, they are not always fully controlled by the state. Borshchevskaya notes that “It is unclear how the illegality of PMCs contributes to plausible deniability for the Kremlin. But the illegality does help the state to maintain power dynamics and ensure loyalty within the rivalries of cronies around Putin.”<sup>12</sup>

In a similar way, Russia uses hackers and cyber aggression. Russia’s cyber-attack of Estonia in 2007, in response to the Estonian government’s removal of a statue, marked the first major attack on a state by such means.<sup>13</sup> This was followed by a cyber attack associated with the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. But Russia has not confined itself to cyber aggression in its own neighborhood. Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted 12 hackers from the Russian military organization within the GRU for interference in the US elections. The hacking team was known as “Fancy Bear,” and was also involved in attacks on Emmanuel Macron leading up to French elections, on NATO, on the German parliament, and on the Republic of Georgia.<sup>14</sup> Although the Justice Department clearly stated that GRU officers acting in their official capacity had committed sustained hacking efforts, the issue has proven difficult to address through typical tools of foreign policy. Cyber expert Andy Greenberg has identified evidence that another Russian GRU hacking group known as Sandworm has been involved in the first-ever blackout triggered by hackers (Ukraine in December 2015), the “NotPetya” cyberattack that inflicted \$10 billion in damages, and the cyberattack on the 2018 Winter Olympics.<sup>15</sup>

The Russian government’s use of such disruptive tools of statecraft is problematic for traditional international relations. So, too, is Russia’s expansive definition of its polity. Putin has asserted that Russia will “...continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means.”<sup>16</sup> The Russian assertion that it will defend the rights of Russians abroad is particularly concerning to the states of the former USSR.

### **Russia’s “Near Abroad”**

Russia has created many institutions that include former Soviet states as members, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which it leads together with China. Russia’s most recent effort to create an international forum of former Soviet states is the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was officially established in January 2015. The organization includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The EAEU is an integrated, single market of over 180 million people, offering some market advantages to smaller states. Members have been allowed to honor pre-existing trade agreements, but even so there is evidence among members of some “buyer’s remorse.” Russia has been under sanction since the EAEU was created, which reduces the trade



advantages of being associated with Russia's common market, and the Russian Federation has faced difficult economic times, due to low oil prices and the sanctions. Some states, such as Kazakhstan, eagerly sought the EAEU. Others, particularly Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (each of which is among the most reliant in the world on remittances), joined the EAEU due to their reliance on Russia. Maintaining access to Russian labor markets became a critical component of regional relations, as Russia began extending preferred guest worker status to members of the Eurasian Economic Union.

Celebrated economist Paul Collier published a book in 2007 called The Bottom Billion.<sup>17</sup> In it, he identified four development traps that can prevent development, potentially forever. Although the focus of the book was Africa, he also devoted significant attention to Central Asia in the volume, since Central Asia was home to all four of the traps he identified.

"Landlocked with bad neighbors" was one trap he examined. High reliance on migrant labor is a frequent challenge faced by landlocked states. Successful landlocked states require, not only that the state effectively manage its infrastructure and rules to enable trade – but also that neighbors cooperate with compatible rules and infrastructure. Russia's promise of the EAEU was to provide such compatibility. The price, however, was feared to be diminished sovereignty.

### **The Curious Case of the Central Asia Power System**

Russia's offer to help overcome the perils of being landlocked was not persuasive to several Central Asian states, most likely because they have been (finally) improving their interconnections with each other without Moscow. One example of the change can be found in the Central Asian Power System, known as CAPS. The CAPS system, a Soviet-era electricity grid, made it possible to move electricity around among the five states of Central Asia. Because the states were thought of as an integrated whole, the system was by design highly integrated. With independence, the use of it steadily declined and then collapsed in 2008. The surprising news is that the CAPS system is now being restored. After 10 years of inactivity, Tajikistan resumed sales of electricity to Uzbekistan in April 2018,<sup>18</sup> Uzbekistan resumed sales in February 2019, and now all Central Asian states are rushing to rehabilitate their portion of the Central Asia Power System – with even Turkmenistan improving its grid in preparation for trading more electricity with Central Asia.<sup>19</sup>

There are many reasons for this transformation, and different countries and actors in the region prefer one explanation over another. Each explanation offers new insight into what has changed in Central Asia, so let's examine them in turn. The first explanation is that holding fast in the face of adversity, President of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, was able to put facts on the ground that compelled Uzbekistan to resume its long-abandoned role as manager of the CAPS grid. Uzbekistan had engaged in economic warfare to try to prevent Tajikistan from building a large upstream dam that would have sufficient height to impound the Vakhsh River, threatening Uzbek agriculture. Rahmon's government persisted in construction, and the first turbine of the feared Roghun Power Plant came online in July 2018. The full facility is scheduled for completion in 2028. Once a large dam is underway, downstream states have an urgent need to engage regarding the rate of fill of that dam. Once it is full, water will continue downstream after it is used to generate power, but while a large reservoir is being filled, downstream countries can be cut off entirely from water supply.<sup>20</sup>

So, indeed, one explanation is the persistence of Tajikistan in building infrastructure that it was persuaded was essential to the prosperity of the state. Another explanation is the politics

of leadership. The architect of Uzbekistan's aggressive efforts to prevent the construction of Roghun had been President Islam Karimov, who died in 2016. His successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, tried to set a new tone for the region. When President Mirziyoyev traveled to Dushanbe in March 2018, it was the first official visit by an Uzbek leader to Tajikistan in 18 years.<sup>21</sup> President Rahmon reciprocated a few months later, making the first Tajik State visit to Uzbekistan since independence.<sup>22</sup> Relations continued to improve in the region, making possible the Caspian Summit in 2018, which partially resolved the long-standing dispute over the status of the Caspian Sea. Transition of leadership is an important matter, especially in authoritarian states. Policies based on longstanding personal enmities can be more easily put aside when a new leader takes his place.

A third explanation for the resurrection of the CAPS system focuses on longstanding World Bank, USAID and ADB efforts. These agencies focused for over a decade on trying to create infrastructure that would link Afghanistan to energy resources, increasing the possibility of getting the lights on in Kabul. Although the ambitious CASA-1000 (World Bank) project to bring power from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan is not yet complete, it has made significant progress and is expected to be complete in 2020. The even more ambitious TUTAP (ADB) project to build a coherent grid for Afghanistan and connect it to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan will not be complete until after 2030, but it is making progress and some aspects are already improving delivery of electricity to Afghanistan. As new infrastructure offered new prospects for export to participating countries, Uzbekistan began to see the advantages of participation. In fact, Uzbekistan had increasing fear of missing out, with its former role as integrator of the grid lost, and hence chose to change policy in order to retain a place in an integrated system.

A fourth explanation gives credit to China. Part of the regional tension regarding electricity was about vulnerability. At the time of independence, Kyrgyzstan was dependent on Uzbekistan not only to bring its seasonal hydropower to the regional market, but also to transport its own electricity from the provinces to the capital city, since existing power lines ran across Uzbekistan's territory.<sup>23</sup> Turkmenistan had isolated itself from the grid in 2002, alleging that Uzbekistan was dumping power into their grid and then charging for it. The Central Asian grid came under a particularly severe strain during a cold snap in the winter of 2008-2009, with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan all drawing more power than they had negotiated. The grid became unstable as a result, giving Uzbekistan the excuse to bring it down. In the years since the take-down of the grid, China proved willing to invest in Central Asian projects that would enhance the energy security of states – projects that had been unable to find Western supporters. With Chinese-sponsored completion of the Dushanbe-2 Coal Fired Power plant in 2014,<sup>24</sup> and of the Datka-Khamin Power transmission Line in 2015,<sup>25</sup> critical vulnerabilities in the system had been addressed. Integration of a system in which the individual states were more energy-secure was a more attractive proposition than sharing vulnerability in a system in which the individual states had significant grid problems.

The re-establishment of the CAPS grid is just one example of the many changes in Central Asia, but each explanation for this change is suggestive of a slightly different path towards the future. It may be that stronger states can impose their will in ways that make neighbors treat them more seriously (as in Rahmon and Roghun). It may be that the new generation of leaders is more interested in cooperation and better poised to achieve it (as in Mirzoyoyev's initiatives). It may be that new infrastructure – regardless of its original sponsor – makes trade more possible and more

desirable. But what we can see clearly is that all the states of Central Asia are more interested in trade, and in each other, than they had been before.

Among the World Bank's "Doing Business" indicators, at least one state in the region has been among the top 10 every year since 2014.<sup>26</sup> Uzbekistan has been a consistent high performer, and was designated Economist Magazine's "County of the Year" for its improvements in 2019. For 2020, World Bank Doing Business ranks Tajikistan 5<sup>th</sup> among the top 10 most-improved economies. This desire – and improved ability – to trade is closely connected with China, which has emerged as a critical trade partner for all the countries in the region. But it leads us back to the question of Russia.

In the West, Russia is facing neighbors embracing ideology it considers hostile to its own. In the East, Russia is facing neighbors dramatically increasing their engagement with each other and with China. The former is the threat to which Russia has addressed most of its energy so far, but in the longer term, Russia is likely to perceive threats to its interests on both fronts.

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<sup>1</sup> Section II, Russia in the Modern World, "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation," Approved December 31, 2015

<sup>2</sup> Section III: National Interests and Strategic National Priorities, "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation," Approved December 31, 2015.

<sup>3</sup> See Rory Cormac and Richard J. Aldrich, "Grey is the new black: covert action and implausible deniability," Chatham House, 4 May 2018, Vol. 94 No.3.

<sup>4</sup> Thanks to my colleague, Lena Kovalova, who first introduced me to this framing of Russian behavior.

<sup>5</sup> Interview with Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu, first published in *Moskovskij Komosomolets* on September 22, 2019, under the title "Russian Minister of Defense Shoigu: Russia Returned to Her Senses in 1999 to Thwart Western Designs to Destroy and Enslave Her; Thanks to Russia, Today's World Is Multipolar," The interview was excerpted and translated on October 4, 2019, by the Middle East Medial Research Institute, Special Dispatch No. 8303. Access at: <https://www.memri.org/reports/russian-minister-defense-shoigu-russia-returned-her-senses-1999-thwart-western-designs>

<sup>6</sup> Tass, "Crimea will be able to export electricity, first time ever," Tass 22 November 2019, access at: <https://tass.com/economy/1091929>

<sup>7</sup> Andrew Roth, "Putin opens 12-mile bridge between Crimea and Russian mainland," *The Guardian*, 15 May 2018, access at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/15/putin-opens-bridge-between-crimea-and-russian-mainland>

<sup>8</sup> David Bond, Roman Olearchuyk and Max Seddon, "Russia bridge to Crimea strangles Ukraine ports," *Financial Times*, May 16, 2019, access at: <https://www.ft.com/content/f5c68dd4-765c-11e9-be7d-6d846537acab>

<sup>9</sup> Bond, Olearchuyk and Seddon

<sup>10</sup> Stuart Elliott, "So close: Nord Stream 2 gas link completion trips at last hurdle," S&P Global Platts Insight, January 7, 2020, <https://blogs.platts.com/2020/01/07/nord-stream-2-gas-pipeline-trips-at-last-hurdle/>

<sup>11</sup> Ivo Daadler, "Responding to Russia's Resurgence: Not Quiet on the Eastern Front," *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 2017.

<sup>12</sup> Anna Borshchevskaya, "Russian Private Military Companies: Continuity and Evolution of the Model," *Foreign Policy Research Institute, Russia Foreign Policy Papers*, December 2019, page 6.

<sup>13</sup> Damien McGuinness, "How a cyber attack transformed Estonia," *BBC News*, 27 April 2017, access at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415>

<sup>14</sup> Garrett M Graff, "Indicting 12 Russian Hackers Could Be Mueller's Biggest Move Yet," *Wired Magazine*, 13 July 2018, access at: <https://www.wired.com/story/mueller-indictment-dnc-hack-russia-fancy-bear/>

<sup>15</sup> Andy Greenberg, "Here's the Evidence that Links Russia's Most Brazen Cyberattacks," *Wired Magazine*, 15 November 2019, access at: <https://www.wired.com/story/sandworm-russia-cyberattack-links/>

<sup>16</sup> Quoted by Ivo Daadler in "Responding to Russia's Resurgence: Not Quiet on the Eastern Front," *Foreign Affairs*, Nov/Dec 2017.

<sup>17</sup> Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion* Oxford University Press, 2007

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<sup>18</sup> Abdul Kerimkhanov, "Tajikistan exports 1.5 billion kWh of electricity to Uzbekistan, AzerNews, November 27, 2018. Accessed via Lexis-Nexis.

<sup>19</sup> Huseyn Hassanov, "ADB Issues loan to increase export of Turkmen electricity," Trend News Agency, Baku, November 16, 2018. Accessed via Lexis-Nexis.

<sup>20</sup> For a detailed discussion of the politics and engineering of Roghun, see Theresa Sabonis-Helf, "" Chapter 18 in Central Asia in the Era of Sovereignty, Edited by Dan Burghart and Theresa Sabonis-Helf, Lexington Press, 2018.

<sup>21</sup> The Economist, "Mirziyoyev makes historic visit to Dushanbe," The Economist, March 12, 2018

<sup>22</sup> Farkhod Tolipov, "Uzbekistan-Tajikistan Relations: The Long Way to Strategic Partnership," CACI Analyst, 18 September 2018, access at: <https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13533-uzbekistan-tajikistan-relations-the-long-way-to-strategic-partnership.html>

<sup>23</sup> "Kyrgyzstan has gained energy independence – President Atambayev about launch of Datka-Kemin power transmission line" Central Asian News Service, August 28, 2015, accessed via Lexis-Nexis

<sup>24</sup> Natalia Idrisova, "A second coal fired power plant for the Tajik capital," CEE Bankwatch Network, 17 January 2018, access at: <https://bankwatch.org/blog/a-second-coal-fired-power-plant-for-the-tajik-capital>

<sup>25</sup> "Kyrgyzstan has gained energy independence – President Atambayev about launch of Datka-Kemin power transmission line" Central Asian News Service, August 28, 2015, accessed via Lexis-Nexis

<sup>26</sup> See World Bank, "Doing Business" website.

# Europe

Lecture delivered by Michelle Egan<sup>i</sup>.  
(Notes of the presentation)

I am delighted to be at the IADC World Situation Conference as both an academic and policy analyst focusing on Europe.

Europe faces a multiplicity of challenges and crises, some of which are internal to their own domestic political system, in terms of challenges to judicial independence, surge of anti-establishment populist movements, and pressures of economic austerity. Others are external driven by geopolitical challenges, by state and non-state actors, as well as the surge in great power competition.

The bedrock of relationship, the transatlantic relationship, has been difficult. Trump administration's emphasis on national sovereignty and its dislike of multilateralism and concern over the US "transactionalist" approach which means national sovereignty reciprocity in trade, burden-sharing in defense, and "new partnerships" for specific crises. Few, in Europe or elsewhere, would disagree with the Trump administration about the nature of the regimes and issues in North Korea, Iran, or Venezuela.

Though the EU is not Europe – much of what has come to determine European responses involves the European Union - grapple with four almost simultaneous crises: over the Eurozone, Ukraine, refugees and the Schengen Area of free movement and internal mobility, and 'Brexit.'

The few years have been very rough for the European Union and its citizens. The referendum vote taken on 23 June 2016 by the United Kingdom over membership in the EU represents a startling departure from the EU's attractiveness for prospective states seeking to join. The waves of Middle Eastern refugees washing up on the beaches of Italy and Greece have produced a humanitarian crisis that has only somewhat diminished. Meanwhile, tensions within the eurozone continue, with cutbacks and austerity programs resulting in a grinding recession in Greece and much of Southern Europe. Russian leader Putin remains a divisive shadow over Europe. Finally, the EU has seen the rise of autocratic regimes within its own borders, as backsliding by Hungary and Poland seem to be eroding democratic consolidation in the former Soviet sphere, creating a fundamental challenge to the EU as a liberal, democratic order.

In thinking about these challenges, they are also dealt with at different levels of collective action and engagement, stemming from regional and multilateral engagement in different institutions, such as the European Union and NATO, to bilateral efforts through diplomatic strategies and actions that reflect specific national foreign policy orientations and interests.

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The reawakening of great power competition and the limitations of the current, rules-based international order are a challenge to Europe's role and influence in the world.

**Europe regional power** – challenges are Mid East/Balkans/Russia-as a regional power, less focus on the Western Hemisphere beyond strategic partnerships and dialogue. Even the recent Mercosur agreement (after twenty years) requires implementation and will take time to be put in place.

The EU goals are centered around a strategy of “principled pragmatism,” stemming from European Global Strategy, but took a ‘whole of EU’ approach, also looking at trade, development, migration, energy, climate, and much more.

A lack of unanimity among member states on specific foreign policy issues makes a coherent foreign policy difficult. Some observations for upcoming strategic orientation in Europe:

A) Europeans finally began to believe that the US would leave the Middle East. For decades, Europeans have outsourced their Middle East policy to the US, even though they have far greater interests in the region.

B) Battle over China policy; the European Union was often one of the inadvertent beneficiaries of China-US tensions; China (a “systemic rival”) will go into this year's trade and investment talks with the EU, with potential US deal and less focused on issues that are still at the top of Brussels' own negotiating agenda such as subsidies and values. EU establishing: an ambitious industrial strategy and set of connectivity plans; a harder-edged approach to trade enforcement. Trade war spreads to other geopolitically significant sectors, particularly information technology and financial services.

C) Standards have become the key battleground of a new era of geo-economic competition. China, the EU, Russia, and the US have all sought to use their ability to establish global standards in areas such as health, privacy, and safety.

D) Balkans - Resolving bilateral problems, including border disputes, is especially crucial in the Western Balkans, where they are numerous; suspension of accession negotiations; EU's slackening commitment to further enlargement.

## **Challenges and crises across Europe**

### A) Economic challenges and developments.

- Eurozone crisis and economic recovery; a decade of austerity measures; the division between creditors and debtors in Europe due to pressures on Southern Europe to reduce public debt and cut welfare programs.

- Structural reforms are incomplete.

- The Eurozone crisis has ended, provisionally at least, in closer political integration, as manifested, among other things, in the creation of a bailout fund, the ESM (European Stability Mechanism), and the adoption of a (partial) banking union and a new surveillance regime, including a ‘Fiscal Compact’ and the regulations, to discipline member states' fiscal and macro-economic policies.

- States such as Greece – and Ireland, Portugal, and Cyprus - accept the draconian conditions for financial aid imposed on it by other member states, led by Germany, and the ‘troika’ of the ECB (European Central Bank), the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the European Commission.

- Struggling member states had to agree to fiscal and economic reform conditions as *sine qua non* for financial assistance.

- Both discipline and solidarity remain limited in the post-crisis Eurozone.

- Worked hard to impose German ideas and solutions - defending German taxpayers-safeguard against excessive spending by Southern European states.

- The Eurozone crisis was arguably the first “real crisis” of the European integration process-led to massive integration.

- The member states that do not require any financial assistance are left almost completely free to decide on their economic policies.

- The broader issue of growing income inequality: long-run wage stagnation for lower-wage workers — and rising inequality across Europe.

- Youth unemployment - intergenerational pressures – and unemployment levels.

- Proposed green deal - the climate-policy debate will deepen geographic and socioeconomic divisions within Europe, prompting an anti-environmental populist backlash. As many Eastern European countries still depend heavily on coal for energy generation, they fear that the push for carbon neutrality is an underhanded form of protectionism.

#### B) The backsliding of democracy and illiberalism.

- Concerns about the region’s “illiberal” democracies, a brand of governance coined by Orbán that has shrunk the space for civil society, free media, and opposition parties in both countries. This has dominated discussions in the CEE region.

- Orbán’s conservative, populist, and anti-European Union approach, has led to increased nativist, anti-immigration sentiment, coupled with continued acceptance of European funds for infrastructure and development.

#### C) The surge of populist right-wing. Pressures in Poland, Hungary, and Balkans.

- While Fidesz and PiS will continue to be the dominant parties in their respective countries, protests over the suppression of the rule of law.

- Greater domestic acceptances that a unified opposition is a necessary precursor to loosen the grip of right-wing nationalism in Central Europe.

- Impotence of the EU in responding to democratic backsliding by one of its members. That said, there is a surge of populism on the left and right in Europe.

- We also need to figure in the effects on the political stability of the increased party fragmentation across Europe.

- An uptick in support for far-right parties but also surge for green parties both domestically as well as at the EU level.

- Social democratic parties lose mostly to center-right, and also Green parties (in Western Europe), not the radical right.

- Populist radical right parties had only had a limited impact in elections, and warned they were receiving “disproportionate” attention – times have changed the radical right and right-wing populist parties, which, once marginal, have grown their support and can now often act as agenda setters in national politics. Such parties are part of governing coalitions, as has been the case in Denmark, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria. In contrast to Western Europe, in Hungary and Poland, mainstream right parties have transformed themselves into radical right populist parties.

- Different ideological orientations: Hungary, where, among the far-right, the dominant notion centers on defending Europe’s traditional conservative. Germany and Spain, the third largest parties in their respective parliaments – the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Vox – are now far right.

- Across Europe, such parties have been inciting nationalist, anti-immigrant anger in elections and securing more votes, more seats in parliament, and more ministerial posts as part of coalition governments than at any time since the second world war.

- EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: was the evidence of a new pluralism emerging in EU politics, including a Green and liberal surge.

#### D) Limitations of the European asylum/immigration regime.

- Stabilized since the surge in 2015-2016. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers to the land and maritime borders of the EU in 2015 engendered a humanitarian crisis and revealed flaws in two key institutions of the EU border regime: the Schengen area and the Dublin Convention. The Schengen Area is an area without internal borders, and the Dublin Convention governs the process by which asylum seekers should be registered upon entering EU territory.

- Both of these agreements originated as intergovernmental cooperation. Member states were then eager to protect their sovereign prerogatives while enabling greater mobility of people across EU borders.

- Originally under Schengen and Dublin, states retained the right to monitor their borders and to unilaterally re-introduce border controls right to return asylum seekers to the first country of entry — to prevent potential influxes of migrants and asylum seekers from external border states such as Italy and Greece.

- More than 3,400 people died at sea in 2015 and 2016 while trying to cross to the EU. Italy first sent some rescue patrols (Operation Mare Nostrum) before being supplemented by the EU through Frontex (Operations Sophia and Themis).

- Overwhelmed system. Germany hosted more than 745,000 asylum seekers in 2016, more than any other EU country. Other countries such as those of the Visegrad Group and Italy over the past year proved to be hostile to the idea of hosting more immigrants.

- The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) both found that, in these conditions, sending immigrants back to Greece was



tantamount to inhumane and degrading treatment (ECHR, 21 January 2011, *MSS v. Belgium and Greece*; CJEU, 21 December 2011, *NS v. Secretary of State for the Home Department*).

- Cooperation with third countries. Agreement with Turkey in 2015. Cooperation and Support for Libyan coastguard (15,000 rescued in 2018; trained 400). EU assists migration and returns through the IOM nonprofit to return to the home country.

#### E. Brexit and challenges facing UK foreign policy.

- Unsurprisingly, Brexit was at the heart of recent elections in the United Kingdom, as it has dominated domestic politics since the June 2016 referendum. Prime Minister Boris Johnson campaigned relentlessly on the promise to “get Brexit done.”

- The EU would lose its third-most populous member state, its second-biggest economy, and, along with France, the only other member state with nuclear weapons, a significant military power projection capacity, and a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Also of note, the UK currently contributes to 7 out of 16 CSDP missions and significant strategic command.

- Pressure in the UK to sign trade agreement with the US and EU quickly- too ambitious.

- But the constant focus on Brexit during the campaign has obscured equally important foreign policy challenges that will require close attention. Once out of the European Union, the United Kingdom might gain some autonomy of action. But it will also have to navigate a more uncertain international context marked by renewed great power competition.

- It determines the future terms of the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, especially over trade. And domestically issues concerning Northern Ireland and Scotland the “union.” The surge of violence and rising tensions in Northern Ireland take concerns about the fragility of peace.

- Challenges in pursuing simultaneous trade deals with EU and US as different rules on agriculture, finance, trade and services – different demands and cross-pressures on the UK.

- London will have to make a similar choice, gravitating more toward Washington or Brussels, when it comes to Iran. The US and EU have been increasingly at odds over Iran following the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018. The United Kingdom has sought to preserve the Iran nuclear deal, along with France, Germany and the other signatories. But, facing the United States’ continued campaign of “maximum pressure” and tightening sanctions, Iran has already taken several steps to stop complying with parts of the JCPOA. If the Iran nuclear deal continues to whittle away, this would create a greater dilemma for the Johnson government.

#### F. Defense and security.

- The latest Eurobarometer survey shows that 75% of EU citizens are ‘for’ a common defense and security policy among the EU Member States.

- The 2008 global economic crisis, which precipitated a fall in defence budgets across Europe and requisite cuts to military capabilities across the board.

- The main focus has been transatlantic relations.

- The bifurcated European response to Trump's policy — praising the substance and decrying the rhetoric—has, if anything, grown clearer. The substance of U.S. engagement with NATO remained strong. Trump administration accelerated funding requests for the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) that began under the Obama administration.

- The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) – Menendez Bill on Russian sanctions –led to some complications in terms of fall out for EU member states and companies. The US Congress, especially Senate Foreign Relations and Banking Committees, did try to work with EU partners to minimize damage to European interests, but since the EU economic relationship with Russia is larger than the US – some collateral damage is inevitable.

- Distrust of European “strategic autonomy” - European visions of “strategic autonomy” are designed to pushback against the US. So far, goals do not match the reality of Macron's “Europe has the capacity to defend itself” as defense spending is imploding and military capabilities deteriorating. But even such tentative proposals fuel skepticism, if not outright opposition, in Washington.

- Iran divisions.

- Europeans have a bad habit of talking too much and acting too little on the Iran nuclear deal. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the agreement remains on life support.
- According to Natalia Tocci, the re-imposition of all nuclear-related sanctions, as well as the threat of applying this extra-territorially to all (read: European) companies wishing to engage in lawful trade with Iran, has been progressively stepping back on its commitments under the deal.
- With Iran heading toward a parliamentary election in February, neither announced an uptick in its levels of enrichment nor a restriction of international inspections.
- Iran may yet exit the JCPOA, but for reasons intrinsic to the agreement and non-compliance by other signatories: the EU, the U.S., Russia, China and the “E3” — France, Germany and the U.K.
- Europeans have been busy establishing the Instrument in Support of Trades Exchanges (INSTEX) — to circumvent US sanctions and allows for lawful trade in humanitarian goods between Europe and Iran. So far, no concrete transaction has actually taken place under the program. INSTEX is a “paper tiger.”

- Europeans are currently present in Iraq through a civilian mission advising Iraqi security sector reform but withdraw, given recent events likely. The cautious silence of other countries in the region, including Iran's rivals Israel and Saudi Arabia, suggest there is an appetite for de-escalation, precisely what European leaders have called for. Europeans are simply not taken seriously by anyone in the region or elsewhere, because of limited leverage.

- EU countries are likely to be less — rather than more — willing to boost their presence as tensions rise or the U.S. is forced to leave, thus eliminating their ultimate security guarantee. Europeans are far more divided on other foreign policy matters than the Middle East.

- So what is Europe doing in terms of defense and security given the intrinsic weakness in this area?

- There is a political appetite for progress in European defense, focused on increased cooperation between the EU and NATO, e.g., countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation, cybersecurity.
- Developing the EU battlegroups so that they are more usable and effective; no EU battlegroup has ever been deployed on operations. It will lose the British battlegroup post-Brexit.
- Enhancing and coordinating oversight of all EU missions, including the establishment of a new permanent operational planning and conduct capability - to improve the EU's crisis management structures by providing greater coherence and coordination between the EU's civilian crisis management operations and military missions operating within the same regions.
- Enhancing partnerships with the UN, NATO, the African Union, and OSCE.
- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). 25 EU Member States have joined PESCO, except for Denmark, Malta, and the UK. The 'strategic' projects on the list are a medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned drone, an upgrade to the Tiger attack helicopter, and a high-altitude Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability. It also includes a European Medical Command, military mobility, 34 maritime surveillance, and armoured vehicles. There is an expressed skepticism over the ability of PESCO to deliver the EU's objective of strategic autonomy.

#### G) Trade.

- Coercive economic measures are a longstanding tool of the U.S. policy in the pursuit of diplomatic and security goals. The number of sanctions programs increased.

- Trump administration's critique of the EU is not just steel, automobiles, or trade imbalances. Trade, but the regulation of a huge market for goods as well as data, is the one aspect in which a united EU wields a power comparable to the US.

- A bill sanctioning European companies involved in Nord Stream 2, the pipeline project to export gas from Russia to Europe and conflict between the United States and China over Huawei has captured more than a quarter of the smartphone market in Europe and has been campaigning aggressively (and to some degree successfully) to supply the continent's new 5G mobile telephone network generated internal divisions in Europe.

- Europe has also pursued its strategic interests in response to the US and China.

- Europe has taken advantage of US withdrawal in trade to accelerate its FTA. Europe agreement with Mexico, Canada, and Mercosur, Korea, Singapore; and also initiating with Australia and New Zealand. The European Union has signed a free trade agreement with Japan in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

- Europeans allies share many of Washington's concerns about China gaming the system, its defiance of global trade rules, and its aggressive economic practices.

- Europe is also focused on new areas in the digital single market to improve innovation. It continued the consolidation of Euro, leading globally on multilateral trade, and as the alternative to WTO gridlock new dispute settlement system with other allies including Canada and Japan.

- Europe is also tackling the issue of monopolies, unfair advantages of digital platforms, US technology giants, and has the prospect of US action (Section 301 used outside of China against the US - security concerns) for the digital tax imposed by France.

# Sub-Saharan Africa

Lecture delivered by Alix Boucher.<sup>i</sup>  
(Notes of the presentation)

Ms. Boucher started her lecture showing the Africa continent at a glance. She exposed relevant figures: 54 countries, the largest hot desert in the world (Sahara – the size of the U.S.), the world's newest country (South Sudan), the longest river in the world, estimation of 2 billion people by 2050, 75% of the population living on less than \$2 a day, and a large number of mineral resources. The importance of the colonial legacies was also stressed at the beginning, where it left strong marks on languages, legal traditions, trade relationships, and military interventions.

The students received an overview of crises and conflicts in Africa as it follows:

- Algeria: the “Hirak” movement that led President Bouteflika to resign, and elections to be held in December, continues, now in its 47th week (as by Jan 15<sup>th</sup>, 2020). Abdelaziz Tebboune, former PM, was “elected.”

- Tunisia: Transition continues after the death of President Essebsi and the election of President Kais Said, but with no parliamentary majority. So, there is no government yet (need a coalition).

- The conflict continues in Libya.

- It is a very interesting time in Sudan. In August 2019, the Transitional Military Council and an alliance of opposition members signed an agreement to form a three-year Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC). The council, headed by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has 11 members. An opposition member, economist Abdalla Hamdok, serves as prime minister. The council is made up of five military officers and six opposition coalition members. The agreement provides for a 300-member transitional legislative assembly and a cabinet staffed by technocrats.

- In South Sudan, peace remains elusive.

- In Ethiopia, the situation is of continuing violence. The conflict in some of the states has led to an internal displacement crisis. The PM Abiy just won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work opening relations with Eritrea, but a severe internal displacement crisis threatens progress there, the result of long-simmering intercommunal tensions.

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<sup>i</sup> As an Assistant Research Fellow, Alix Boucher focuses on good governance, peace operations, and transnational threats. Her areas of expertise include peace operations in Africa, building the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict states, security sector reform, and UN sanctions. Before joining the Africa Center, Ms. Boucher served as an expert adviser for the High Level Review on United Nations Sanctions. She was also a member of the Targeted Sanctions Research Consortium. She previously worked at the Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program, the National Defense University's Center for Complex Operations, and the Global Center on Cooperative Security. She received a B.A. in international relations from Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts, and an M.A. in international relations and international economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC.

- In Zimbabwe, the election of President Mnangagwa has not ended the unrest, as security forces respond with violence to economic protests/requests for more openness.

- In Cameroon, separatist conflict in the Western Provinces, which are Anglophone, has led to the displacement of more than 500,000 Cameroonians from western Cameroon, in addition to 35,000 who have sought asylum in Nigeria. Moreover, the violence has killed 200 members of the security forces and 3,000 civilians. Both separatists and government forces are accused of widespread human rights violations and extrajudicial killings.

The long history of countries from the Western Hemisphere contributing large contingents to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa has decreased quite significantly. Today, the largest Troops Contributor Countries (TCC) from the Western Hemisphere is Uruguay, which deploys 1,131 personnel to UN missions, almost all of them to MONUSCO in DRC, then Peru contributes 231 personnel mostly to MINUSCA and Guatemala also contributes 174 personnel, mostly to MONUSCO. Other countries contribute to other missions (like Brazil 262 mostly to UNIFIL). This fact is important to note in a context where more than 100,000 military personnel are deployed to 7 UN missions, 4 regional missions (AMISOM, FC G5 S, MNJTF, and ECOMIG in the Gambia), including more than 77,000 troops from Africa. Uruguay is the 18th largest TCC for UN missions.

Ms. Boucher showed the term limits of the African leaders because of all the very important elections upcoming: Tunisia, Algeria, South Africa earlier in the year, Togo Presidential in February (described as a sham), Burundi in May (President Nkurunziza claims he will not run again despite 2015), and Ethiopia Parliamentary in October. More elections will occur in the Fall in West Africa, amid a context of growing Militant Islamist Groups (MIG) presence, with some presidents saying they want a third term. The countries are Guinea in October, Cote D'Ivoire in November, Ghana, and Niger (See [africacenter.org/spotlight/highlights-africa-2020-elections/](http://africacenter.org/spotlight/highlights-africa-2020-elections/)).

About migration, the most recent figure of 25 million people displaced is a 500-percent increase from 2005. While much attention focuses on economic migrants who are trying to cross into Europe, 95 percent of displaced remain on the continent. Two-thirds are displaced within their home countries. In short, the reality faced is more accurately characterized as an African displacement, rather than a European migrant crisis.

#### Conflict and repressive governance - two main drivers of displacement in Africa.

- The 13 African countries facing armed conflict account for almost 90 percent of the 25 million people displaced. The regional concentration of these conflicts means that those seeking refuge in neighboring countries face other dangers. Even though the conflict in South Sudan has displaced more than 4.1 million people, the country still hosts nearly 300,000 refugees fleeing neighboring countries.
- Of the 10 African countries with the greatest number of people displaced, nine have authoritarian-leaning governments. Seventy-five percent of African countries facing armed conflict, similarly, have repressive governments. The lack of political space and the inequitable enforcement of the rule of law, therefore, are at the heart of much of Africa's population movements.

#### Displacement crises direct implications on security.

- The growing numbers of economic migrants and forcibly displaced have created a lucrative market for human smuggling — estimated to be worth \$765 million annually

along the Trans-Sahara route. A significant share of this flows to violent extremist and criminal groups, who use the funds to undermine and destabilize governments.

- Communities that host displaced populations face enormous economic, environmental, and social strains. Northern Uganda, home to 1.9 million people, absorbed more than 1 million South Sudanese refugees in 2018. As resources are stretched, the risk of instability in Uganda, which has its own history of strife, increases.

The drivers of this crisis, not just the symptoms, need to be addressed if the trend is to be reversed.

There is a minor but perhaps growing route through South/Central America to the United States, but it is complicated because it requires documentation/flying, at least to the initial Western Hemisphere destination. Therefore, this ends up being just a few thousand people, according to estimates.

Clandestine migration in Africa has created a lucrative market for human smuggling — estimated to be worth \$765 million annually along the Trans-Sahara route alone. A significant share of it flows to criminal and violent extremist groups, who use the funds to undermine and destabilize governments (See [africacenter.org/publication/shifting-borders-africas-displacement-crisis-and-its-security-implications/](http://africacenter.org/publication/shifting-borders-africas-displacement-crisis-and-its-security-implications/)).

Ms. Boucher showed the evolution of MIG violence since 2012. In that year, the violence concentrated in Northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, and Somalia. With some incidents in Mali and North Africa. It keeps the pattern in 2013 and 2014. In 2015, the violence increased in Mali and seems to have moved to the center of the country. In 2016, there was an increase in violence in Burkina Faso and Niger. In 2018, the violence increased significantly in the Sahel, but there is also a new theater in Northern Mozambique (See [africacenter.org/spotlight/threat-from-african-militant-islamist-groups-expanding-diversifying/](http://africacenter.org/spotlight/threat-from-african-militant-islamist-groups-expanding-diversifying/)).

The Sahel has experienced the most rapid increase in a militant Islamist group activity of any region in Africa in recent years. Violent events involving extremist groups in the region have doubled every year since 2015. In 2019, there have been more than 700 such violent episodes. Fatalities linked to these events have increased from 225 to 2,000 during the same period. This surge in violence has uprooted more than 900,000 people, including 500,000 in Burkina Faso in 2019 alone (See [africacenter.org/publication/responding-rise-violent-extremism-sahel/](http://africacenter.org/publication/responding-rise-violent-extremism-sahel/)).

About drug trafficking, and according to the UNODC World Drug Report, one of the main links between South America and Sub-Saharan Africa is cocaine trafficking. In May 2018, Algerian authorities seized 701kg of cocaine hidden in a shipment of meat from Brazil. In February 2019, Cape Verde seized almost 10 tons of cocaine from a Russian flagged vessel going from S. America to Morocco. In May 2019, Guinea-Bissau seized 800kg in a fish truck going to Mali. In October 2019, Senegal seized more than 1 ton of cocaine in Dakar in a car shipment (all these are from news stories).

The speaker finished inviting the class to read the publications of Africa Center available at [africacenter.org](http://africacenter.org). They are available in English, French, and Portuguese.

# South – Southeast Asia

Lecture delivered by Michael Shipler.<sup>i</sup>  
(Notes of the presentation)

The speaker started describing the organization he participates. Search for Common Ground (SFCG - [www.sfcg.org](http://www.sfcg.org)) is the world's largest peacebuilding NGO with offices in 30 countries around the world. The SFCG takes a whole-of-society approach when tackling conflict systems, using an array of tools from media programming to change narratives to work with government and non-government institutions.

In this presentation, Mr. Shipler focused on five key trends driving conflict in South and Southeast Asia and three opportunities for building peace.

## Driving Conflict Trends

**1. Strategic competition is having a devastating effect in communities, exacerbating local divisions, and escalating violence.** The region is rife with major geopolitical rivalries that define the continent's landscape. China is remaking the world's trade routes with the most ambitious infrastructure development program ever through the Belt and Road Initiative; India and Pakistan's rivalry and military standoff fuels the war in Afghanistan, making it into a proxy war; Russia, the US, and regional rivals compete over influence in most of the region's less powerful and poorer countries. The populations of these societies are devastated by the international intervention – political progress is stunted, corruption is fueled, and weapons flow into conflict, turning localized disputes into full-scale and high impact clashes.

**2. The rise of ethnic and religious nationalist movements has become a key hallmark of politics.** While some extremist movements explicitly challenge state authority (ISIS, the Taliban), mainstream political parties and states are utilizing nationalist sentiments and advancing nationalist agendas. In Myanmar and Sri Lanka, Buddhist nationalism and the vicious anti-Muslim sentiment is a key feature of the political landscape, leading to communal violence and state-sponsored atrocities. In India, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) - led Hindu Nationalist movement (which is behind the Bharatiya Janata Party - BJP) is the dominant political actor in the country and is advancing a vision of a Hindu India (to the exclusion of the 200 million or so Muslims living there).

**3. The progress of democracy has seen a major regression with some notable exceptions.** Three years ago, people were speaking about gains made in advancing democracy, but there has been significant regression in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and elsewhere. The exceptions are Pakistan and Uzbekistan, both of which have seen some reform efforts take hold,

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<sup>i</sup> Michael Shipler has served as Search for Common Ground's Associate Vice President, Strategy and Program Quality since July 2018. In this role, he leads strategic planning for Search's multi-country conflict geographies and supports field teams in implementation of high quality programming. He first joined Search in 2002, where he became Director of Children and Youth Programs, Director of Programs in Nepal, and Asia Regional Director, overseeing programming in eleven countries and supervised offices in Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Timor Leste. He founded Search's Children and Youth Division, which has gone on to play a significant role in creating Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security. He has worked in over 20 countries across Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, including some of the most conflict-affected parts of the world. He is a former board member of the Alliance for Peacebuilding and the author of *The Dancing Country and Other Stories*. Mr. Shipler holds his MA from Kings College in London.



and civic space somewhat increased. This scenario chafes against increasing public expectations of their leaders. Poor and exclusive governance privileges some groups over others, leading to broad and legitimate grievances.

**4. The role of women and gender roles, in general, are ideological wedge issues.**

The question about the future role of women in an Afghanistan where the Taliban is part of the government dominates discussions about the possibilities for peace in the country. There are competing views about gender roles, which are manifesting not only political debates but fuel armed violence in the region. That links what happens in households to what happens in national and regional level politics.

**5. There are increasing stressors on systems that governments and communities are ill-equipped to handle.** That includes climate change – Central and South Asia have significant water stress, which promises to increase as temperatures rise. Populations will become more restive as they watch inaction from their leaders and struggle to meet their basic needs. There are migration patterns putting pressure on systems as well – major urban centers are microcosms of the countries they are in and often lack the resources to resolve disputes or meet their population’s needs. There are other stressors as well – social media accelerates the movement of ideas (including hate speech).

There are some forces for progress worth seeking to harness (opportunities for building peace).

**1. There is momentum to end the war in Afghanistan** triggered by the US talks with the Taliban. From the chamber of commerce to local women’s associations, Afghans are organizing to see how they can support such a process. This moment should be capitalized on.

**2. There are public expectations of participation.** Citizens groups now expect to be included in decision making and resource management and are demanding their place at the table. There are largely civically engaged populations across the region, generating force for positive good.

**3. There is a generation of highly connected, visionary young leaders** who are organizing to cause change, to utilize technology and innovation to create constructive solutions to their problems and hold their leaders to account.

# Lessons for Latin America from the Strategic Context of the Middle East and North Africa

Lecture delivered by Samuel Greene<sup>i</sup>  
(Notes of the presentation)

The strategic context of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are shaped by a number of political, social, and economic dynamics. First, many states in the region suffer from weak institutions, both in the context of institutional performance (performing basic state functions) and equity (issues of corruption, equality before the law, etc.).<sup>1</sup>

According to data from the World Bank, regional averages for government effectiveness, control of corruption, and the rule of law are at roughly half of the level of high-income OECD countries.<sup>2</sup> State weakness, including the limited ability of many states to perform basic tasks and popular frustration with high levels of corruption, shapes the strategic environment in much of the region.<sup>3</sup>

Second, much of the region is characterized by deficits in human security and human development. Except for the wealthy Gulf States and a small number of other outliers, many states suffer from issues such as access to affordable food, water, medicine, and education.<sup>4</sup> This is exacerbated by high levels of inequality.<sup>5</sup>

This context leaves potential gaps for malign actors to exploit. While *Daesh's* (the so-called Islamic State) exploitation of state weakness in Iraq and Syria is the most prominent example, Libya and Yemen also remain extraordinarily fragile, while Hezbollah has carved out independent space in Lebanon. In the cases above, state weakness allows non-state actors to compete with governing authorities over the provision of services and security (small Gulf States such as the UAE are important exceptions in the region).<sup>6</sup>

State weakness and insecurity have also lead to refugee flows, particularly from Syria (into Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon) and Libya (into Tunisia), which has led to significant strain on destination countries.

The failure of many democratizing or democratic states in the region to overcome such gaps has contributed to skepticism about democracy. The results of the Arab Spring transitions, including a civil war in Syria and Yemen and the removal of the Morsi government in Egypt, following the abysmal and divisive performance, have also played a role in diminishing confidence in democracy. 42% of respondents in a recent poll to agree that “my society is unprepared for

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<sup>i</sup> Dr. Samuel Greene is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Global Studies at Shepherd University. Prior to coming to Shepherd, he worked at the National Defense College in the United Arab Emirates, the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, and Howard Payne University in Texas. Dr. Greene holds a doctorate in Politics from the Catholic University of America, a master's degree in International Relations from the University of Cambridge, and a bachelor's degree in History and Political Science from George Fox University. His first book, *Pathological Counterinsurgency*, a critique of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, was published by Lexington Books in 2018.

democracy.”<sup>7</sup> In this context, polarization is also important, including increased references to Sunni/Shia tension but also to divisions between secularists and Islamists. The latter division has played a major role in the dispute between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt with Qatar, as Qatar has repeatedly sided with Islamist actors in a number of regional crises, including Syria and Libya.<sup>8</sup>

Perceptions of an ambiguous US policy toward to region and questions about the continuity of policy from administration to administration has also led to significant uncertainty. For example, during the Qatar crisis, President Trump expressed support for the Saudi-led actions against Qatar as opposing extremism, while then-Secretary of State Tillerson objected to the decision, arguing that it undermined US strategic partnerships against Iran.<sup>9</sup> Iran’s role in the region as a revisionist state, which seeks to challenge the status quo order in the region, particularly via proxy actors, further complicates the regional dynamics.

Readers from Latin America may be interested in parallels between the MENA region and Latin America. Given that many of the above dynamics, in particular state weakness and deficits in development and human security, are present in much of Latin America, the context of the Middle East has important lessons for Latin America.

First, commitments to institutions at the state and the regional level are essential. For example, the relative success in the Tunisian democratic experience can, in part, be explained by commitments of key actors across the ideological spectrum to accept the country’s new democratic institutions.<sup>10</sup> Regional organizations such as the OAS can also play an important role in encouraging national actors to respect democratic institutions as well as support for increasing institutional quality.

Second, the professional role of security forces is paramount. States in the MENA region with professional militaries and security forces that remain apolitical and avoid deep entanglement in their state’s economic affairs have been the best performers during a crisis and, in cases like Tunisia, helped secure a peaceful transition to democracy.

Increasing confidence in democracy is also an important task in Latin America, given that it is also facing decreased public satisfaction in democracy. In all of these areas, but particularly in the area of confidence in democracy, regional organizations like the OAS can play a vital role, including both through technical means such as election monitoring but also public pressure on member states to respect democratic norms. That Latin America has an effective non-partisan regional organization may prove to be an important advantage over the Middle East if the OAS successfully engages in these areas.

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<sup>1</sup> For more on this, see Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2004); Samuel Greene (forthcoming, contact author)

<sup>2</sup> See <https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>

<sup>3</sup> See articles in Lorenzo Kamel ed. *The Frailty of Authority. Borders, Non-State Actors and Power Vacuums in a Changing Middle East* <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/frailty-authority>

<sup>4</sup> See <http://www.arab-hdr.org/>

<sup>5</sup> Facundo Alvaredo, Lydia Assouad, and Thomas Piketty, “Inequality in the Middle East” <https://voxeu.org/article/inequality-middle-east> <https://voxeu.org/article/inequality-middle-east>

<sup>6</sup> See articles in Kamel, particularly ch 3 and 4.

<sup>7</sup> <http://arabcenterdc.org/survey/2017-2018-arab-opinion-index-executive-summary/>. This is also in an issue in Latin America. See <http://www.latinobarometro.org/latNewsShowMore.jsp?evYEAR=2018&evMONTH=-1>

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<sup>8</sup> Cenap Çakmak, "The Arab Spring and the Shiite Crescent" *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 13 (2015): 52-63; David Roberts, "Competing Visions for the Arab Future" <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/competing-visions-for-the-arab-future>

<sup>9</sup> Daniel Larison, "The Qatar Crisis and the Incoherent U.S. Response" <https://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/the-qatar-crisis-and-the-incoherent-u-s-response/>

<sup>10</sup> Samuel Greene and Jennifer Jefferis, "Overcoming Transition Mode: An Examination of Egypt and Tunisia" *International Journal on World Peace* 33 (Dec 2016): 7-37.

# Tackling the Technology Competition with China

Lecture delivered by Martjin Rasser<sup>1</sup>  
(Notes of the presentation)

In technology competition, there are many areas in which China is on par with or has an advantage over the United States. Specific sectors include genomics, quantum science, and artificial intelligence (AI). With regard to research spending, China is poised to overtake the U.S. as the largest spender on R&D as early as 2019. There is a strategic emphasis on China's leadership coming from the top-down, with strong government support for achieving scientific and technological milestones.

However, there are a number of ways in which China is also the laggard of technological competition. They are still highly dependent on foreign technology, such as with jet engines and semiconductors. They are impaired by innovation shortfalls that range from a lack of world-class universities and research institutes to the proliferation of high-quantity, low-quality patents. Furthermore, as a result of being a closed authoritarian system, China lags in innovation because scientists and technologists tend to flourish more in open societies.

China is actively making AI a strategic priority, sensing that it is critical to the future of global military and economic power competition. Beijing is pursuing the military uses of AI at an aggressive rate, as demonstrated by growing exports of armed autonomous platforms and surveillance technology (sold to countries like Venezuela and Ecuador). Under the benefits of "leapfrog" effects, Beijing believes that China is better positioned to adopt military AI than the U.S. and its allies. However, China still faces a number of vulnerable dependencies. For example, the country still relies on imports of international technology in order to fulfill quotas it is unable to meet domestically. Additionally, China faces a lack of homegrown talent to further develop vital technologies. As a result, China is seeking to overcome its limitations and strengthen its foothold on the global stage.

China's influence can already be felt throughout the Americas. Numerous projects in a variety of countries are underway to build up the infrastructure ranging from 5G, cloud computing, surveillance technology, and seabed cables. China is actively investing in and providing loans to developing countries that have high supplies of raw materials. Although Beijing is providing much-needed infrastructure improvements, these advancements come at the cost of sound fiscal, social, and environmental decisions. To combat China's rising influence, the U.S. can employ a

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number of strategies, namely by promoting American innovation, protecting key areas of competitive advantage, and partnering with other democratic technology leaders.

With regard to promoting American innovation, there are a number of strategies the U.S. could employ. First and foremost, the U.S. should increase R&D spending. This can be done by boosting yearly U.S. government funding of AI R&D to \$25 billion by 2025, incentivizing private-sector AI R&D with tax credits, easing access to government datasets, and promoting international R&D collaboration. In addition, the U.S. should increase science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education and training to promote human talent and remain competitive. To fulfill critical shortages in necessary occupations, the U.S. should attract foreign STEM talent (H1 visas, the U.S. does not have enough people to fill the gap it has) and rely on temporary high-skilled workers. Finally, it is imperative to secure vulnerable supply chains through public-private partnerships that will ensure the U.S.'s lead in AI hardware. Through the promotion of American innovation, it will be more challenging for China to unfairly compete.

The second prong in U.S.-China Tech relationship strategies is for the U.S. to protect key areas of competitive advantage. Export controls should be widely used in this area, specifically regarding semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME), end-use based cases in China, and entities funded by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Furthermore, sufficient resources for counter-espionage investigations should be provided to prevent illicit technology transfer. There should be better collaboration with universities to counter-espionage threats. Visa screening should have enhanced criteria to identify espionage risks and request additional authorities from Congress. These criteria should go beyond pending legislation that pertains to specific research or PLA-linked individuals. Finally, there should be a new sanctions authority created to target Chinese firms that steal U.S. technology. The Treasury Department should cut off foreign firms that engage in intellectual property theft. Through these measures, the U.S. could better protect key areas of competitive advantage.

The final strategy to recalibrate the U.S.-China tech relationship is to partner with other democratic technology leaders. The U.S. should be at the forefront of a new international regime for technology policy. Multilateral cooperation is needed to maximize effectiveness in R&D, supply chain security, standards-setting, export controls, and countering illiberal uses of technology. Additionally, the U.S. should engage more proactively in international technology standards-setting. This could be accomplished through the Office of Science and Technology Policy establishing an interagency working group on international technology standards. Finally, the U.S. should lead internationally on norms and principles for the use of emerging technologies by working with allies and partners to codify and export these norms to other countries. Through partnering with other democratic technology leaders, the U.S. can more effectively shape how the world adopts emerging technologies.

Building off of these strategies, the importance of designing a new international alliance for technology policy becomes clear. A new organization should be developed to achieve broad-based, proactive and long-term multilateral cooperation. The core members would be leading liberal-democratic technology powers such as the U.S., Japan, U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Besides this foundational group, there would be mechanisms to involve other countries and expand membership. The formulation of an organization like this is a necessity because no single country can easily prevail in technology competition with China. If China achieves dominance in critical technologies like AI, 5G, and quantum capabilities, they would become the primary beneficiaries of substantial economic,

military, and political advantages. Therefore, it is imperative to regain the initiative in the realm of global technology competition. A technology policy alliance would protect and preserve key areas of competitive technological advantage and promote collective norms and values around the use of emerging technologies. An international technology policy group could influence a number of areas for cooperation including R&D, supply chain diversity and security, standards-setting, multilateral export controls, and countering the illiberal use of advanced technology. Other proposed areas for cooperation and collaboration include the mining, processing, and recycling of rare earth elements; the creation of a semiconductor consortium to establish new fabs; enforcing export controls by restricting the sale of semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China; and encouraging 5G open architecture to stimulate the transition to network virtualization.

# China, America Latina y el Caribe

Lecture delivered by R. Evan Ellis<sup>1</sup>  
(Notes of the presentation)

This presentation analyzed China's evolving relationship with the states of Latin America and the Caribbean.

It began with an examination of some salient dimensions of China itself. These included:

China's economic engagement with both the United States and with the Region has multiple direct and indirect impacts on the region. The trade war with the United States, for example, creates expanded export opportunities for countries such as Brazil to substitute their agricultural exports for those of the United States, while the settlement of the trade war, if it occurs, will also have its impacts.

While the Chinese economy has grown impressively, that growth is currently slowing to 6%, and perhaps less according to many analyses. The future of China's engagement will depend in part on its ability to turn to a development model more based on internal demand, which will not be easy. On the other hand, while China has significant problems such as a large debt overhang, or difficulties with its health and education system, or environment, the anticipation of its collapse is probably overstated. In part, some of that staying power comes from China's accumulated resources, but also from the Chinese political culture, whose ingrained deference to authority gives its political system some ability to weather crises that would more severely challenge some other systems.

China's current president Xi Jinping has presided over an unprecedented consolidation of power, seen in the October 2017 19<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, and the absence of a clear replacement for him there.

Accompanying the impressive expansion of China's economy during the past 40 years has been an accompanying growth of its military capabilities, first focused primarily on asymmetric capabilities designed to deny potentially opposing powers such as the United States from projecting capabilities into Asia against it, but more recently, expanding to numerically significant and modern capability with global operations paralleling its growing global economic and commercial reach.

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Chinese defense expenditures have risen loosely in parallel to its GDP, approximately 10% per year 200-2016, and 7.5% in 2019, yet because China's defense budget does not include some key items included in its US counterpart, and because of questions regarding the pricing of the production and maintenance of defense goods, as well as salaries and costs for operations and maintenance to the force, the amount purchased by China's defense budget is arguably far more significant than that by the US equivalent.

From a US perspective, Chinese anti-access capabilities including hypersonic missiles such as the DF-21D, or the YJ-12 anti-ship missile, or the DF-17 Hypersonic Glide vehicles, new generations of attack submarines such as the Type 093G Shang, and the ability to project power from bases in the artificial islands it has created in the South and East China Seas raise question about the ability of the US to project force against China in theater, certainly in the mind of some allies. Other key capabilities with the expansion of the force include new generations of stealth fighters such as the J-20 and J-31, or the new Y-20 heavy transport, although China continues to have difficulties with its own engines. New generations of surface combatants such as the T-052 destroyer, or the Type - 055, or the recent production of the second of at least four aircraft carriers in the works, are also notable.

China is increasingly developing a capability to project power, including far seas operations, including the establishment in August 2017 of a military base in Djibouti, as well as the development of commercial ports and relationships in places like Gwadar, Pakistan, that would give it options to escape dependence on maritime routes through the Malacca straits.

Also of note, China is developing an expeditionary capability for projecting force, causing some concern to others in the region, particularly Taiwan, which sees itself as the primary objective of possible PRC power projection. By 2030, China expects to have a force of 6-8 amphibious ships, and as many as 100,000 marines.

Other capabilities of note, to combat the US and others, in possibly asymmetric ways, include advances in cyberwarfare, anti-satellite capabilities, and a significant concentration on unmanned aerial vehicles, including armed variants such as the CH-7, and experimental cargo vehicles such as the AT-200.

While part of such forces appears oriented toward combatting China's likely adversary, the United States, or taking over Taiwan, part also appears oriented to global engagement to accompany China's increasingly global stakes in commercial operations and supply chains. These increasing global stakes are highlighted by the extension of the Belt and Road Initiative to Panama and the Western Hemisphere beginning in 2018. The Chinese Defense Strategy White Paper of 2015 emphasizes the importance of global engagement, including institution-to-institution contacts with Latin America and other parts of the world.

It is also important to mention Taiwan in China's security panorama. China's heavy-handed treatment of protests in Hong Kong helped to ensure the reelection of the relatively hawkish Democratic People's Party (DPP) over the more China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) in the 2020 Chinese elections. With this move, the struggle by the PRC to strip Taiwan of its remaining democratic allies is likely to continue, possibly returning to focus on Central America and the Caribbean, where a number of states are vulnerable to switching, particularly if their governments change.

In this struggle, Taiwan is increasingly at a disadvantage in competing in both economic and military terms. While it has invested in an array of modern arms such as the HF-3; “Aegis” destroyer, the Tuo Jiang corvette, a new diesel submarine, and F-35s, its core strategy in a military confrontation with the PRC remains a decentralized defense, the imposition of high costs on the invaders, and attempting to hold out until a US-led coalition can presumably intervene.

In looking at Chinese strategic goals, its objectives today are remarkably consistent at the strategic level with that during the majority of its 3000+ year history: the unity, security, and prosperity of the Chinese people. In ancient times, that meant politically unifying the Han people, whereas today it includes the importance of concepts regarding the incorporation of Taiwan and Tibet. In ancient times, security involved substantial, long-term efforts, such as the 100-year project to build the Great Wall defense, ultimately unsuccessfully, against the Mongol invaders. Today, it involves developing an asymmetric strategy against those, such as the US, whom it presumes will resist China’s rise. With respect to prosperity, in ancient times, the Chinese saw themselves at the center of the universe and sought an ordered system in which benefits would flow from the external “barbarian” kingdoms to the imperial center. Concepts such as the silk road, and Zheng He’s treasure fleet, were manifestations of this concept. In today’s interdependent world system, the continuation of that concept can be seen in the resurrection of the fundamentally mercantilist concept of the “belt and road initiative.” China fundamentally seeks to leverage its comparative advantages in cheap labor, its ability to price capital under the state’s control, and coordination between the government and various economic sectors, too rise up the value-added chain to have a diverse developed economy in which it acquires factor inputs at the lowest possible price point, has security of supply through ownership by its corporations of operations for obtaining and transporting those factor inputs including both food and other commodities needed for production, capital formation, urbanization, and feeding the Chinese people. Reciprocally, it seeks to realize the value-added of production, and associated decisions, in China, or by Chinese people to the extent possible, and have secure access for its markets for selling those high value-added goods and services to the rest of the world. Its concept can be understood, ironically, in the writings of many Latin American authors such as Immanuel Wallerstein or Raul Prebisch, who saw Western capitalists doing something similar, thus condemning Latin America and other parts of the world to extended sub development.

With respect to means, China is achieving these goals leveraging the size of its market, financial resources, and coordination of the state, using its products and technologies through investment, incremental learning, and forced collaboration in China (and sometimes elsewhere) with companies having advanced to desired technology and capabilities), to include systematic theft of intellectual property. China is thus accumulating capital with increasingly sophisticated commercial entities capable of increasingly sophisticated global operations. It is also using strategic partnerships, including 10 in Latin America, which include ministerial-level committees that meet periodically to help China and its partners work through commercial and other issues obstructing the progress of their projects, the commercial relationship, and sometimes political affairs. As noted as well, it is also using the fundamentally mercantilist concept of “belt and road” to advance these aims. The concept attracts Latin American partners to cooperate, seeking to “plug into” the opportunities perceived to be afforded by China, while reciprocally, facilitating Chinese access to Latin American markets and supply sources, through a physically oriented concept involving the construction and operation of ports and other infrastructure (including electricity and telecom), and associated extractive operations (petroleum and mining for example), production facilities, etc.

As a corollary, China is also seeking to establish a “world safe for the rise of China” using its influence and money to adjust, or at least avoid excess criticism in international institutions in which it is part, including the World Bank, UN organizations such as ECLAC, and special multilateral vehicles such as CELAC, the BRICS, and the AIIB, with which it works to its benefit.

China's engagement with Latin America can be understood in phases. Although China's global engagement dates back to Deng Xiaoping's opening to the world in 1978, its engagement with Latin America truly began to grow exponentially in the trade area in 2001 when it was accepted into the World Trade Organization. It was not until approximately 2010, however, that China began not simply to buy commodities from Latin America and sell its products, but also to invest in the region, giving it for the first time profound stakes in the conditions of the region, including security, and decisions of leaders as those affected Chinese companies, their suppliers and competitors. Since approximately 2016, following a steep fall in commodity prices and the slowing of Chinese economic growth, with an associated slowing in Chinese loans and some cases investment in the region, China has arguably entered a new phase in which the relationship is more “realistic”; China is no longer seen so much, as in the early days, as either a “dragon” which will nefariously devour Latin America nor as a friendly “panda” which will rescue it from its ills and develop the region out of its benevolence. Rather, today, China is increasingly seen as one important partner, with its combination of unique difficulties and opportunities, which must be dealt with in a different form than other more traditional partners such as the US and Europe.

Five tendencies for China in Latin America are worth noting: The physical presence and associated operations of Chinese companies are increasingly more sophisticated and diversified. The Chinese “Belt and Road” since 2018 has arrived in Latin America, starting in Panama, but now with 19 countries in the region having “signed on” to the initiative; China also gives much emphasis to plans and planning. It has been remarkably consistent, at least at a general level, following the general lines of what it declares it will do. China's policy statements, including the 2008 White Paper toward Latin America, and the 2016 update to that paper, China's 2014 1+3+6 framework; and the 2015-2019 and 2019-2021 China CELAC plans, were relatively accurate as indicators of where and how China would engage with the region, although the details, and perhaps motives, have not always been well understood. China is also advancing significantly, with strategic implications in telecommunications including not only the participation of Huawei in 5G, but also substantial contributions to 3G and 4G architectures for state agencies and private telecom companies across the region, as well as other infrastructure such as the fiberoptic interconnection between Venezuela, Jamaica, and Cuba, or the proposed Transpacific cable linking Chile to Asia possibly through Hong Kong.

China has considerable soft power in Latin America, although it is based principally on interest in benefits, more than cultural affinity. This includes politicians with expectations of benefits for their countries from China, including investment, trade, and loans, as well as possible side benefits from corrupt deals. It also includes business people who both dream of exporting to the Chinese market or being the local partner to Chinese firms coming to the country. It also includes the impact of people to people diplomacy, with 6,000 Latin Americans anticipated to be hosted by the Chinese government cultural organization Hanban, in a combination of student scholarships, and special programs for politicians, reporters, prominent analysts, and consulting firms. While such trips may not motivate consultants or reporters to write pro-Chinese propaganda, the combination of gratitude and hopes for continuing access often leads many to avoid saying things that overtly challenge the known Chinese government orthodoxy.

Chinese military engagement with Latin America is modest but growing, blessed in China's 2015 Defense Strategy White Paper as part of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) global engagement. This includes military sales, training, and professional military exchanges, and presence. Sales have transitioned from basic goods such as clothing and non-lethal gear, to increasingly sophisticated end items, such as armored personnel carriers (sold to the Venezuelan naval infantry, Ecuadoran and Bolivian armed forces, among others), military fighters and transports (Venezuela), helicopters (Bolivia), offshore patrol vessels (Trinidad and Tobago), and Multiple Launch Rocket System vehicles (Peru), among others. Professional Military Education (PME) and training has expanded from the sending of Latin American officers to short course in Beijing, to participation in longer courses, such as year-long Command and Staff courses in Nanjing, the PLA 5-year military academy program, and the sending of PLA officials to select Latin American training courses, such as the Colombian special forces "Lancers" school in Tolemaida, and the Brazilian Jungle Warfare school in Manaus. Growing PLA presence also includes activities in the region, such as participation in the MINUSTAH peacekeeping force in Haiti from 2004 through 2012, three trips to the region by the Chinese hospital ship "Peace Arc" and combat exercises between the PLA Navy and Chile in 2013.

In telecommunications and space, Chinese advances include significant presence by the telecom companies Huawei and ZTE as device and network providers to Latin American governments and commercial integrators, as well as cables (e.g., Venezuela to Jamaica and Cuba fiberoptic interconnect), a possible Chilean transpacific cable connecting to Hong Kong, and likely Chinese participation in numerous 5G efforts. Chinese firms also participate in security systems, many in the framework of "smart cities" initiatives, popular in Latin America where insecurity is high. Notable examples include ECU-911 in Ecuador, BOL-110 in Bolivia, surveillance for the port of Colon, in Panama, the Uruguayan border, Jujuy, Argentina, and a range of cities in northern Brazil, among others. The risk is not the Chinese cameras, so much as architectures which allow remote storage and processing of the collected data outside the region, including in China, potentially giving the Chinese state access to sensitive information not only about the movement of specific Latin American officials but also associated data regarding their financial and other affairs, that could be used to compromise them or infer information about activities of the target government or corporations in the region.

In Space, China has developed and launched satellites for Brazil, Venezuela (3), Bolivia, and Ecuador. It has also built space monitoring facilities in both Argentina and Chile, among others, and maintains ties with the ancient Peruvian space program through its participation in the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). Because China has physically built much of the satellites in question, launched them, trained the country's space personnel (especially in Bolivia and Venezuela), and installed its tracking systems, it has significant ability to obtain the sensor and communication data passed through those space assets, including some with orbits involving US territory.

Finally, with licit activity, expanding business connections between China and Latin America, and expanding trade and financial infrastructure, permit the expansion of illicit activities. These include human trafficking and smuggling involving Chinese communities in Latin America and the Caribbean, the importation of precursor chemicals for drugs, such as fentanyl, trade-based money laundering, and arms smuggling, to name a few. Since few Latin American police forces have persons who speak fluent Mandarin, let alone dialects spoken by Chinese in the region (such as Cantonese or Hakka), or have good contacts in China to follow up on activities of criminals found in their midst, the activities of Chinese criminal gangs in the region, such as

the “triads” and their connection with Latin American criminal organizations will likely continue to expand and evolve.

# El acuerdo entre EE.UU. y China constituye la estructura básica del poder mundial en el siglo XXI

Jorge Castro<sup>1</sup>.

## Sociedad global creada por la revolución de la técnica.

Ha surgido una sociedad global creada por la revolución de la técnica, cuya infraestructura básica es el hecho de que el número de usuarios de Internet (3.800 millones) es más de ½ de la población del planeta (7.800 millones de personas en 2019), de las cuales casi 80% dispone de Internet móvil inteligente (*smartphones*); y el resultado de este fenómeno central de la época es que el criterio decisivo del sistema es la **instantaneidad**.

Dentro de esta sociedad global instantánea se despliega con enorme fuerza una nueva revolución industrial, que es **la 4ta en la historia del capitalismo, y se funda**, en el conocimiento, antes que en el capital y el trabajo.

## Nueva revolución industrial

El núcleo de la 4ta. revolución industrial no es una tecnología determinada, sino su condición de **sistema global de interconectividad**, fundada en el procesamiento instantáneo de inmensas masas de información (Big Data) que se realiza a escala mundial y en tiempo presente.

La tecnología decisiva de este sistema virtual absolutamente integrado es la “**Inteligencia artificial**”, que multiplica e intensifica la capacidad para coleccionar, utilizar y analizar montos y gigantescos de información acerca de cualquier actividad, lo que aumenta exponencialmente las oportunidades de negocios.

Es un salto cualitativo el que experimenta la economía global en los próximos 20 años. Cambia la naturaleza de la economía capitalista del siglo XXI; y, sin embargo, esto es nada más que el comienzo, un tímido esbozo de lo que viene.

Como la 4ta. revolución industrial es un sistema superintensivo de conectividad, y no una tecnología determinada destinada a profundizar el dominio de la naturaleza por el hombre, establece con ella una relación distinta, en la que en vez de “explotarla” –destruirla- como hicieron las 3 anteriores, asume su lógica y se rige por las “leyes de la vida”, con un criterio

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sustentable y circular, donde la vida transforma a la vida, y la enriquece, contribuyendo al esfuerzo global de creación.

Esto hace que la materia creada por la nueva revolución industrial, que resulta de **fusionar lo real con lo virtual**, tenga una dimensión biológica inexcusable.

Es un sistema cada vez más liviano, cuyo insumo básico es profundamente intangible: el conocimiento. Lo que crea valor en el nuevo sistema es esta explosión de flujos de información: y esto ocurre cuando esa Data es interpretada y procesada, convertida en Inteligencia digital, para luego ser monetizada a través de sus innumerables usos comerciales.

Por eso es que la capacidad de creación de valor de la nueva revolución industrial es cualitativamente superior a la de las 3 anteriores; y se realiza a través de un número prácticamente infinito de oportunidades.

Hay que agregar que el sistema actúa al mismo tiempo como un poderoso instrumento de reestructuración (disrupción) de todas las actividades existentes, en un asombroso proceso de **“destrucción creadora”**, el más excepcional y abarcante de la historia de la humanidad.

La “destrucción creadora” es el núcleo de la acumulación capitalista, que “destruye” (reestructura) en un proceso incesante todo lo preexistente, mientras que “crea” lo nuevo sistemáticamente a partir de lo actual.

EE.UU y China, las 2 superpotencias de la época, tienen en sus manos prácticamente la totalidad de la nueva revolución industrial: disponen de 75% de la “nube” (cloud computing), 50% de la Internet de las Cosas (IoT), y más de 90% de la capitalización de mercado de las 70 principales plataformas digitales.

## **EE.UU.**

EE.UU es la mayor economía del mundo (U\$S 21.9 billones / 25% del PBI global), y es también la principal potencia del sistema mundial en todas las dimensiones del poder.

La economía norteamericana crece sostenidamente por encima de su capacidad potencial (2.5% anual) por 12 trimestres consecutivos; y esto sucede con un nivel de inflación de 1.6% por año, sin signo alguno de sobrecalentamiento.

Es una economía **“hiperintensiva”** con plena utilización de los recursos de capital y trabajo; y esto hay que sumarle el pleno despliegue de una nueva revolución industrial que ha ocurrido en estos últimos 3 años centrada en el conocimiento y el “capital humano”.

La productividad estadounidense se agotó en 2004, y cayó a +1.5% por año, o menos, para virtualmente desaparecer en 2008 (crisis financiera internacional/ Lehman Bross.), y transformarse en nula o negativa en los 8 años posteriores (+0.6% anual en 2015).

Ha vuelto a crecer notablemente en los últimos 3 años, hasta superar el promedio histórico de +2.5% anual (+3.5% en los primeros 3 meses de 2019). Significa que en EE.UU no hay determinismo tecnológico en el alza de la productividad; y que el último y excepcional despliegue de eficacia en la utilización de recursos ha ocurrido en condiciones de pleno empleo y expansión récord.

La productividad en EE.UU es un fenómeno por el lado de la demanda y no de la oferta; y esto ocurre cuando es imperativo aumentar la producción para satisfacer una creciente y gigantesca demanda, y no hay límites en la utilización del capital y de la fuerza de trabajo.

Más de 60% de la inversión norteamericana se realiza en “**capital intangible**” (marcas, patentes, propiedad intelectual), en conocimiento, y no en “capital fijo” o “hundido” (aunque sean bienes de capital de última generación tecnológica).

EE.UU ha recibido más de U\$S 12 billones de inversiones del mundo entero en los últimos 3 años (2017/2018/2019), incluyendo la repatriación de U\$S 1.4 billones de capitales que las trasnacionales *high tech* tenían en el exterior (Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google, Facebook, entre otras).

También se ha producido el retorno de una parte significativa –quizás 30% / 40% - de los U\$S 4 billones/U\$S 5 billones que las compañías estadounidenses acumulaban fuera del país para evitar el pago de 35% en el impuesto a las ganancias corporativas, que fue reducido a 21% por decisión de Donald Trump y el Congreso Republicano. Esto ha implicado una disminución del costo del capital de 30%, o más con una mejora similar de la tasa de retorno.

**EE.UU experimenta la expansión más larga de su historia (11 años consecutivos);** y la tasa de inversión aumentó 16% anual en el 3er. trimestre de 2019, igual nivel de alza que en 2017 y 2018. El alza de la inversión en EE.UU está en relación inversa a la declinación de sus inversiones en el exterior. Hoy, por 1ra. vez en la historia desde la 2da. Guerra Mundial, las trasnacionales norteamericanas invierten más en EE.UU que en el exterior. Se han sumado a la tendencia mundial que es invertir en la 1ra economía del mundo.

La economía de EE.UU muestra los siguientes rasgos: el total de la inversión en investigación y desarrollo científico y tecnológico (R&D), tanto pública como privada, alcanzó a U\$S 496.000 millones en 2017, y es la 1ra del mundo, el doble que la de China (U\$S 260.000 millones).

La inversión en R&D es un fenómeno esencialmente privado. Era de U\$S 70.000 millones en 1980, y trepó a U\$S 300.000 millones en 2016 (un alza de 340% en 35 años); y la inversión de las 5 principales empresas high tech (Apple, Google, Microsoft, Amazon y Facebook) en este rubro decisivo superó U\$S 200.000 millones el año pasado, 5 veces más que las 3 mayores chinas (Alibaba, Tencent, Baidú).

Los “venture capital” (VC) norteamericanos –fondos que financian start ups high tech- gastaban U\$S 14.500 millones en 1980, y prepararon a U\$S 131.000 millones en 2018.

Todo esto ocurre cuando las trasnacionales estadounidenses son 44% del total global, y venden en el exterior 4 veces más de lo que exportan desde EE.UU (las chinas son 25% del total mundial).

EE.UU creó 266.000 puestos de trabajo en noviembre, en tanto que el mercado había previsto 180.000, y produjo en octubre 128.000 empleos.

El resultado fue que la desocupación cayó a 3.5%, el menor nivel desde 1969; y con este ritmo de creación de puestos de trabajo, el desempleo se derrumbaría a 3.2%, o 3%, al finalizar 2020. Sería el menor nivel de desocupación de la historia norteamericana desde la guerra de Corea (1950-1953).



EE.UU está más allá del pleno empleo. Y se crea el doble de puestos de trabajo que personal existe en condiciones de ocuparlos. Es la 1ra. vez que algo semejante sucede en la historia del capitalismo avanzado.

El gasto de los consumidores (70% del PBI) aumentó 2.9% anual en el 3er. trimestre,+ 0.3% más que en los 4 trimestres previos; y esto ha ocurrido en ese periodo empujado por un alza de los ingresos reales de los trabajadores de +3.2% anual, acompañado por un auge de la productividad de +2.5% por año que se proyectaría a 3% anual en 2020.

EE.UU experimenta hoy un boom económico sólo comparable por su magnitud e intensidad con el formidable logro de la 2da. Guerra Mundial. En ese periodo (1940-1945), EE.UU creció 8% por año, y la industria manufacturera, que armó y avitualló a 12.5 millones de combatientes contra el Eje y Japón, se expandió 11% anual una tasa semejante a la de China entre 2001 y 2010.

## **China.**

### *Boom de consumo*

China es la 2da economía del mundo (U\$S 13.6 billones, medida en dólares constantes/15% del PBI global), pero es responsable de 35% del crecimiento mundial en los últimos 10 años (EE.UU del 15%).

Ahora experimenta un boom de consumo (U\$S 7.6 billones en 2019), que se fundamenta en una “economía digital” que cubre 40% del PBI en 2020, en la que tramita la nueva revolución industrial.

Hace 15 trimestres consecutivos que el PBI de la República Popular crece entre +6.2% y +6.5% anual, una economía excepcionalmente estable; y esto ocurre mientras se acentúa el denominado “conflicto comercial” con EE.UU.

Esto sucede cuando 98% del alza del PBI chino en 2019 ha sido obra de la demanda doméstica y del consumo individual. China no depende más de las exportaciones al mercado mundial como contribución al alza del producto; y este fenómeno se produce cuando es total su integración al capitalismo del siglo XXI: la relación comercio internacional/PBI es más de 90%.

El dato crucial es el siguiente: los ingresos “disponibles” de la población china de 1440 millones de habitantes, tras haber cubierto las necesidades “básicas” de alimentación, vivienda y salud, aumentaron 8.8% anual en los primeros 6 meses de 2019. Pero los ingresos “disponibles” de la nueva clase media de 440 millones de personas con niveles de ingresos comparables a los norteamericanos (U\$S 35.000/U\$S 45.000 anuales) se duplicaron (crecieron +15% anual).

De ahí que se haya intensificado el boom de consumo, y se oriente cada vez más hacia los bienes “culturales” (educación, viajes, servicios sofisticados). Fueron 150 millones los turistas chinos que viajaron al exterior en 2019, y la mitad lo hizo a EE.UU y Europa (gastaron U\$S 8.700 por viaje y cabeza, más que los turistas alemanes y norteamericanos); y provocaron un déficit en la cuenta corriente (servicios) de U\$S 240.000 millones.

Las ventas por Internet (e-commerce) aumentaron +9.8%, en junio, más de 1 punto por encima del récord registrado en el mes anterior (+8.6%), mientras que los servicios se elevaron +7% anual, el mismo nivel de los últimos 5 años.

La economía digital, en que la manufactura y los servicios están completamente informatizados, ascendió a 38% del PBI en 2019, y treparía a 40% en 2020, con una manufactura high tech que crece 9% anual, frente a la expansión de +6% en la restante industria. La producción de automóviles eléctricos aumentó +34.6% entre enero y julio; y representaría + de 40% del parque automotor (290 millones de unidades) en los próximos 5 años.

El boom de consumo en 2020 se sustenta en una situación de pleno empleo (+4.6% de desocupación urbana), y una tasa de inflación prácticamente inexistente (+1.6% anual).

El fenómeno de fondo de China es que es un mercado nacional de 1.440 millones de personas absolutamente unificado en reglas, moneda, idioma e infraestructura (la red de ferrocarriles super-rápidos supera 30.000 kilómetros/+60% del total mundial), con un poder de compra que se aproxima a los niveles norteamericanos, ejercido ahora por una clase media de 440 millones de personas, que serán 780 millones en 2025 (+8.1% anual), y treparía a 1.000 millones en 2030.

La totalidad de los pueblos y ciudades de la República Popular están conectados vía ferroviaria en 2019, y más de 90% se comunican vía banda ancha categoría 4-G; y Huawei coloca a la venta el primer Smartphone 5-G, previendo disminuir sus costos en + de 50% al concluir 2020.

De ahí que en China los nuevos productos adquieran de inmediato “**economía de escala**”, con una extraordinaria disminución de los costos de producción (40% / 50% en los primeros 12 meses); y al mismo tiempo el riesgo de producirlos se desvanece, mientras el costo del crédito (tasas de interés) se derrumba.

En este gigantesco mercado, completamente integrado, el número de empresas es cada vez mayor: superan los 100 millones las entidades empresarias, con 40 millones de firmas creadas en los últimos 5 años; y más de 15% son start ups de alta tecnología.

Lo que está ocurriendo en China - éste es su significado histórico – es la sustitución de la fuerza de trabajo de 900 millones de operarios por un universo de emprendedores, que serían 300 millones en una década al ritmo actual (+9% anual).

### **Economía digital**

La Big Data china crece 30% anual y tendría una magnitud superior a la de EE.UU, Unión Europea, y el “Resto del mundo” sumados en 2022.

Este es el principal instrumento de expansión de la economía digital en la República Popular, que aumenta 12.2% por año, el doble que el PBI nominal (+6.2% anual).

Hay 70 grandes plataformas digitales en el sistema global de 2020; y de ellas, 68% son norteamericanas y 22% chinas. El conjunto constituye el sector de avanzada del capitalismo en el siglo XXI.

Implica que tramita en ellas lo esencial de la nueva revolución industrial (+ de 70%), que es el proceso de informatización de la manufactura y los servicios, que transforma las estructuras binarias en digitales.

De esas 70, 7 son las principales y decisivas; y 5 de las primeras son estadounidenses (Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Apple y Facebook), y las otras 2 de la República Popular (Alibaba y Tencent). **Aquí está lo esencial del presente, el futuro del mundo.**

La novedad de esta vanguardia del capitalismo es que era un monopolio absoluto de EE.UU hace sólo 15 años, debido a que la potencia norteamericana había encabezado la 2da y la 3ra revolución industrial (1865/1973 y 1973/2004, respectivamente); y de pronto, en la **4ta revolución industrial** (2004 y ss), surgió el desafío chino, el mayor enfrentado por EE.UU en toda su historia.

A partir de 2008, China se ha volcado al **consumo doméstico**, que responde por 98% de su expansión en 2019 (+6.4% anual en los 1eros 6 meses del año) **y a la economía digital** (40% del PBI en 2020); y lo ha hecho encabezada por sus 2 grandes plataformas digitales – Alibaba y Tencent -, a las que hay que sumarles la principal empresa industrial de alta tecnología del mundo, que es Huawei.

Este complejo *high tech* de la República Popular ha desatado una verdadera explosión de crecimiento e innovación en la tecnología decisiva del siglo XXI, absolutamente crucial en la nueva revolución industrial, que es la Inteligencia artificial (AI). Sumada a la Internet de las Cosas (IoT) y a la robotización, la AI constituye el núcleo del poder en el mundo en esta parte de la historia.

La contrapartida de éstas 70 grandes plataformas digitales son los 3.800 millones de usuarios de Internet que existen hoy en el mundo (51.2% de la población mundial). De ese total, los chinos son 810 millones, más del doble de la población de EE.UU; y todos ellos utilizan equipos de Internet inteligente (*smartphones*) en la categoría 4-G, que sería 5-G, prácticamente sin excepciones, en 2027.

Lo decisivo de la economía digital china es que su extraordinaria creatividad tecnológica y científica se desarrolla en los últimos 7 años en forma independiente de EE.UU. Esta **es una diferencia cualitativa, una novedad histórica absoluta**, respecto a lo que ocurría entre 1978 – vuelco del sistema al capitalismo por decisión de Deng Xiaoping – y 2008, cuando la crisis financiera internacional cambió en sus raíces la forma de acumulación de la República Popular.

En este periodo histórico 1978/2008, más de 40% del desarrollo tecnológico y el incremento de la productividad de China, se logró utilizando **tecnología estadounidense**, ya sea a través de transferencias pactadas o *joint ventures* (UNCTAD/2017 – Organización de Naciones Unidas para el Comercio y el Desarrollo).

Lo históricamente novedoso del liderazgo del presidente Xi Jinping iniciado en 2012 es que China enfrenta ahora la 4ta revolución industrial con un proceso de innovación científica y tecnológica independiente; y esto ocurre por primera vez en su historia moderna, iniciada el 1 de octubre de 1949 cuando Mao Tse Tung proclamó la República Popular.

Esto es lo que ha convertido a China en una superpotencia capaz de disputar con EE.UU la primacía por el poder mundial.

La fórmula china es nítida: **innovación independiente + 4ta revolución industrial = China superpotencia**, capaz de disputar la primacía con EE.UU, el mayor país del mundo, U\$S 21.9 billones/ 25% del PBI global.

El flujo de información por Internet ascendía a 100 gigabytes diarios en 1992, y ha trepado ahora a 45.000 gigabytes por segundo; y esto es sólo el comienzo. El tráfico por Internet alcanzaría a 150.700 gigabytes por segundo en 2020; y hay una relación directa entre el auge del flujo de informaciones y el desarrollo de las grandes plataformas por Internet.

Más de 40% de las 20 principales compañías transnacionales en términos de capitalización de mercado son negocios fundados a partir de plataformas digitales; y las 7 superplataformas representan más de 2/3 del total del valor de las 70 mayores (U\$S 7.3 billones en 2017/ +67% de alza respecto a 2015).

### **“Guerra comercial” entre EE.UU y China: puja por el poder mundial.**

El punto de partida de éste conflicto entre las 2 superpotencias, eufemísticamente denominado “comercial”, es la caracterización de China realizada por EE.UU como su “...**principal competidora estratégica en el siglo XXI**”, cuya política de desarrollo y fomento de las industrias del futuro y de las tecnologías de avanzada que las sustentan (“*Made in China 2025*”) constituye una “**amenaza existencial**” para los “**intereses vitales**” norteamericanos, según señala la “Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional de EE.UU” de diciembre de 2017.

La apreciación de la República Popular como “**amenaza existencial**” para EE.UU es lo que transforma a ésta “**competencia estratégica**” en un conflicto que contiene virtualmente la posibilidad de un **choque bélico directo** entre los 2 grandes centros de poder mundial del siglo XXI.

La “Inteligencia artificial” es la tecnología decisiva del siglo XXI; y el dominio de ella decide el poder mundial en los próximos 20/30 años; y la Internet móvil 5-G es la principal forma de canalización de la “Inteligencia artificial”.

La República Popular tiene ya en funcionamiento 350.000 estaciones 5-G; y Huawei, la mayor empresa 5-G de China y el mundo, afirma que construirá más de 200.000 usinas 5-G en los próximos 3 años.

La absorción de la 5-G por la economía digital china acelera (intensifica) en más de 40% sus niveles actuales en los próximos 10 años; y el ritmo con que se produce este salto extraordinario de productividad depende sólo de la velocidad de su generalización.

La interconexión Big Data/5-G se constituye en el núcleo de la nueva revolución industrial en los próximos 10 años, que es el proceso de digitalización e integración forzada de la manufactura y los servicios: la conversión de todo lo binario en digital. Más de 50% de la Big Data global residiría en “la nube” o “*cloud computing*” en 2025, y sería 80% en 2030.

El PBI de la República Popular es 66.5% del norteamericano (medido en dólares constantes), en tanto que era menos del 10% en 1978: ha crecido 35 veces en los últimos 40 años; y el PBI per cápita (U\$S 10.000 anuales en 2018) es 1/6 del estadounidense (U\$S 67.517 anuales). Esto implica que el ingreso por habitante de China puede aumentar 6 veces más en relación a los niveles actuales en los próximos 15 años.

La comparación entre las 2 superpotencias hay que colocarla dentro del siguiente contexto histórico: el PBI chino era 1.8% del PBI global en 1978, cuando Deng Xiaoping abrió la economía y la volcó al capitalismo; y ahora es 15% del total (EE.UU es 25% del PBI global).

**La diferencia a favor de EE.UU, y ésta es la raíz de su supremacía estratégica, está en la fuerza de sus instituciones, en el “capital humano” acumulado en los últimos 200 años, y en el vigor sin límite de su impulso capitalista.**

Pero China, con sus 5.000 años de historia estatal ininterrumpida, se acerca y converge aceleradamente con el primer país capitalista del sistema global, que es EE.UU, expresión del “Nuevo Mundo”, con sólo 300 años de historia.

### **Pensamiento estratégico**

Ha surgido una sociedad global creada por la revolución de la técnica que se rige por el criterio de la instantaneidad que se combina con una nueva revolución industrial, en este momento histórico.

La consecuencia es que el **statu quo** está en quiebra en todas partes al mismo tiempo.

Por eso, la estrategia como **teoría del conflicto**, sustentada en la búsqueda de la peor hipótesis, ha dejado lugar a **la teoría de la crisis**. Esto es, a la súbita irrupción de lo nuevo (instantaneidad), que ha adquirido un carácter permanente.

Se ha ampliado cualitativamente **el marco de lo posible**, y el futuro se ha colocado al alcance de la mano, en un sentido no metafórico, sino estricto, inmediatamente operativo.

El reclamo general es por la igualdad convertida en exigencia de incorporación a lo más avanzado de la época, y en la búsqueda de la educación de alta calidad, único capital verdaderamente decisivo en una sociedad excepcionalmente competitiva y fundada excluyentemente en el conocimiento como es la actual.

Las clases sociales en el mundo de hoy no están vinculadas a la inserción en la estructura productiva, sino al nivel de calificación técnico y cultural, al dominio de la inteligencia sistémica.

Lo que está en marcha es una **revolución propia del siglo XXI**, protagonizada por la clase media, arrastrada por expectativas de alcance global y un impulso extraordinariamente igualitario de participación plena en el mundo virtual, técnico y cultural de la sociedad planetaria.

### **Acuerdo EE.UU/China, basado en la premisa de la supremacía estratégica norteamericana.**

El acuerdo entre el presidente Donald Trump y el mandatario chino Xi Jinping reafirma la supremacía estratégica norteamericana, reconocida por la República Popular; y de esta manera cierra el conflicto en que se decide el poder en el mundo en el siglo XXI, centrado en el dominio de las tecnologías de avanzada de la nueva revolución industrial, ante todo la “Inteligencia artificial”.

Es un acontecimiento que trae al sistema una tremenda certidumbre, y clausura el ciclo contractivo/recesivo de la economía global de los últimos 20 meses.

EE.UU y China se aprestan a cerrar en Washington primero y en Beijing después un acuerdo fundamental entre las 2 superpotencias que compiten y cooperan entre sí a través de

un mecanismo de negociación permanente, en el que se distribuyen el poder en el siglo XXI, convertido en sinónimo de dominio de las tecnologías de avanzada.

Lo que está en juego de la 4ta revolución industrial, en sus aspectos económicos, tecnológicos y políticos, la más disruptiva y revolucionaria de la historia del capitalismo.

El acuerdo entre EE.UU y China incluye 2 fases: a) en la 1era se acordó todo lo referido a la agricultura, el sistema financiero, y la mayor parte de la garantía de la “propiedad intelectual” de las compañías transnacionales norteamericanas en la República Popular.

La 2da fase, que es la decisiva, incorpora los mecanismos de ejecución y garantía de cumplimiento de lo pactado y refleja tanto la supremacía estratégica de EE.UU como la afirmación de la soberanía de la República Popular, que son los términos de la ecuación de poder establecida entre las dos superpotencias.

Lo que se ha acordado es la modificación en la relación de fuerzas entre las 2 superpotencias, donde la admisión por parte de China de la supremacía estadounidense le quita a la “**competencia estratégica**” el carácter de “**amenaza existencial**” para los “**intereses vitales**” norteamericanos; y de esa manera desarma la “Trampa de Tucídides”.

El acuerdo de **competencia, cooperación y negociación permanente** entre EE.UU y China se convierte en la estructura **básica del poder mundial en el siglo XXI**, y marca el rumbo, y fija el sentido, de los acontecimientos globales en los próximos 30/50 años.

La regla de esa relación es la siguiente: a medida que aumenta la complejidad y densidad del desarrollo científico-tecnológico, la cooperación entre China y EE.UU se torna cada vez más necesaria, en especial respecto a la tecnología crucial de la nueva revolución industrial, que es la “Inteligencia artificial” (AI).

Por eso, a mayor complejidad, mayor competencia, y esto obliga, forzosamente, a una mayor y creciente cooperación.

Over a decade after the last major financial crisis, the world economy is facing a number of headwinds that put further economic expansion at risk. Economies around the world are facing a number of problems that threaten their health and strength. Given those headwinds, there is a very real possibility that many economies that are not already in recession will face recessions in 2020 or, at the latest, 2021.

# Three Major Global Trends Affecting World Economies

Paul-Martin Foss<sup>i</sup>

There are three primary factors that are affecting world economies and that bode ill for the future. Those are rising debt levels, declines in manufacturing and production, and a return to monetary easing.

Rising debt is a problem in countries around the world, from major industrialized nations such as the US and Japan to smaller countries on every continent. Levels of overall debt continue to rise in most countries, while levels of debt to gross domestic product (GDP) are reaching levels last seen during the financial crisis.

Manufacturing declines aren't necessarily a problem in and of themselves, as long as they are isolated to a certain area or a certain industry. However, the decline in manufacturing is a worldwide phenomenon, affecting China, the United States, Europe, and many other nations whose economic productivity relies on strong industrial output. That's a sign that consumer and business demand is dropping, and that business conditions will likely deteriorate further in 2020. And whenever the major industrial engines of the world catch a cold, the rest of the world very often soon gets sick.

Finally, the return to loose monetary policy is a worrying indicator that central banks are worried about a weakening economy and seeking to counteract economic weakness by injecting new money and credit into the financial system in an attempt to keep economic growth alive. But because the recovery from the financial crisis was largely the result of monetary easing and artificially low-interest rates, and because those low-interest rates have resulted in the usual malinvestments and misallocated resources that we've seen in previous economic bubbles, the current return to loose monetary policy is likely both too little, too late, as well as adding fuel to the fire of what will likely be another economic downturn.

## 1. Debts Levels Are High and Growing

Debt has always been a factor that weighs heavily on individuals, companies, and governments. Buoyed by low-interest rates over the past decade, levels of debt have skyrocketed

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around the world. Levels of household debt, corporate debt, and government debt remain elevated, and in fact, have surpassed levels last seen before the 2008 financial crisis.




Image Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>1</sup>

US household debt is now 10% higher than it was at its peak in 2008, rising from \$14.5 trillion in 2008 to \$16 trillion in the third quarter of 2019. That’s a clear sign that many households have forgotten the lessons of 2008 and believe that the past is behind them. While the rate of growth since 2008 is slower than it was from 1990 onward, there’s no reason to believe that it won’t pick up, barring another economic downturn.

Low-interest rates incentivize borrowing, and especially borrowing for long-term, capital-intensive projects. Projects that might be unprofitable at an 8% interest rate may be highly profitable at a 3% interest rate. With interest rates having been so low for so long, many corporations have been incentivized to take on debt.




Image Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>2</sup>

1 “Households and nonprofit organizations; debt securities and loans; liability, Level (CMDEBT).” *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CMDEBT>

2 “Nonfinancial corporate business; debt securities and loans; liability, Level (BCNSDODNS).” *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BCNSDODNS>



US corporate debt levels have risen over 50% from their last peak in 2008, accelerating even faster than they did pre-2008. Current corporate debt outstanding is over \$10 trillion, a more than 50% increase from its \$6.6 trillion peak in 2008.




Image Source: Zero Hedge<sup>3</sup>

Much of the concern over the level of corporate debt relates to its relationship to GDP. Over the past several business cycles, a corporate debt to GDP ratio of over 40% generally precedes a severe recession. During the burst of the dotcom bubble and the financial crisis, corporate debt to GDP ratios rose to around 45%. Currently, US corporate debt to GDP ratios are at about 47%, or even beyond the levels one would expect to see precede a major financial crisis, hence the fear that a corporate debt crisis may be the precipitating factor in the next financial crisis.

With respect to corporate debt vs. private domestic product (GDP minus government expenditures), that ratio is also above levels last seen during the financial crisis. That ratio rose to around 56% when the dotcom bubble burst, around 60% during the financial crisis, and is now at over 60.5%.

3 Image source: [https://www.zerohedge.com/s3/files/inline-images/2019-12-02\\_6-31-56.jpg](https://www.zerohedge.com/s3/files/inline-images/2019-12-02_6-31-56.jpg) Accessed January 14, 2020.




Image Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>4</sup>

US government debt has also grown significantly, and like corporate debt has grown faster since the financial crisis than before. At over \$23 trillion and growing, it is more than 2.5 times its 2008 levels. There is no sign of federal government debt growing smaller anytime soon, nor is there any chance of the federal government balancing its budget anytime soon either.




Image Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps more ominous is the ratio of US government debt to GDP. It spiked from around 65% before the financial crisis to over 100% today.

In absolute terms, the US' debt to GDP ratio is not the highest in the world, but it isn't exactly keeping good company. Japan has the world's highest debt to GDP ratio, at over 236%. That's followed by Greece at 182%, with Lebanon, Yemen, and Barbados rounding out the top five. The US is in 14<sup>th</sup> place, but most of the top 20 include smaller countries such as Sudan and Mozambique and poorly-run European countries such as Italy and Portugal. That's not exactly the good company to keep.

4 "Federal Debt: Total Public Debt (GFDEBTN)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEBTN>

5 "Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as Percent of Gross Domestic Product (GFDEGDQ188S)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEGDQ188S>

One might argue that if Japan can survive with a 236% debt to GDP ratio, then the US still has a long way to go before it needs to tighten its belt. That ignores, however, the fact that Japan has long had a significantly higher savings rate than the US, with the savings rate at one point over 23%. Japanese debt, in other words, has normally been purchased by its citizens, who rely on it for retirement savings.

In the US, on the other hand, the savings rate has never been as high as Japan's. And foreigners own significant amounts of US Treasury securities, which is a liability as far as the Treasury is concerned.

### Debt Quality Is Decreasing




Image Source: *economist.com*<sup>6</sup>

A worrying aspect of the growing corporate debt bubble is the fact that the quality of the debt being issued today continues to decrease. As the above image shows, the median corporate debt rating today is BBB-, which is one step above junk grade.

### BBB bonds represent over 50% of investment grade debt

BBB share of global investment grade corporate market



Source: Barclays Indices, based on the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Corporate Bond Index, as of 9/17/2019.

Image source: *s3.amazonaws.com*<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> [https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/20180505\\_FNC392.png](https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/20180505_FNC392.png) Accessed January 14, 2020.

<sup>7</sup> <https://s3.amazonaws.com/blackrockblog.com/content/uploads/2019/09/BBB-bond-share-of-corporate-market.jpg> Accessed January 14, 2020.

In fact, bonds in the BBB range now comprise over 50% of investment-grade debt issued today.

**The size of corporate debt one rung above junk has never been greater**




Image source: [zerohedge.com](http://zerohedge.com) <sup>8</sup>

**Chart 2**  
**U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Bonds by Rating, 2008–18**




Image source: [dallasfed.org](http://dallasfed.org) <sup>9</sup>

BBB-rated debt constitutes a large and growing proportion of corporate debt. That does not give corporations much room to maneuver, as any downgrade is likely to push them close to, if not directly into, junk grade.

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.zerohedge.com/s3/files/inline-images/Corporate-bonds-almost-junk-Feb-19.jpg> Accessed January 14, 2020.

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.dallasfed.org/research/economics/2019/~/-/media/Images/research/economics/2019/0305/0305c2.png> Accessed January 14, 2020.

## What Effect Does Debt Have on the Western Hemisphere?

The effects of all this debt on the Western hemisphere are manifold. It is very likely that the next financial crisis will occur as a result of the massive amounts of corporate debt that companies have been taking on. Nearly two-thirds of corporate debt in existence today is BBB-rated debt, which is one step above junk grade. And more and lower graded debt continues to be piled on top of the existing amounts of low-quality debt. The corporate debt bubble could be burst in one of two ways.

The first way is if securities of existing BBB-rated corporations are downgraded into junk status. Companies issuing BBB-rated debt include corporate behemoths such as General Motors, Ford, AT&T, Verizon, General Electric, CVS, and Anheuser-Busch InBev. The effects of downgrading BBB-rated debt into junk status would mean that financial institutions, pension funds, and others that are required to hold investment-grade bonds would have to immediately divest themselves of those downgraded securities. That would set off a massive chain reaction within bond markets, likely freezing markets in a manner similar to what we saw in 2008.

Because rating agencies realize that is a possibility, there is an incentive for the agencies not to downgrade those bonds, or at least to wait as long as possible to downgrade them. No one wants to be known as the credit rating agency that broke the bond market.

The problem with that is that markets will eventually discover whether those bond ratings are accurate and react accordingly. This is how the second way the corporate debt bubble could be burst would occur.

One of the characteristics we saw in 2008 was the fact that mortgage-backed securities that had been rated AAA were subsequently found to be nearly worthless. Many were comprised of subprime mortgages that were packaged together, securitized, and sold to investors who trusted the AAA ratings. Rating agencies in many cases knew that the securities shouldn't have been rated AAA, but they went with the flow rather than risk upsetting the apple cart.

The result was that once investors realized that these supposed AAA-rated securities weren't performing, it threw the trust in any credit ratings right out the window. Now investors couldn't trust any security, so they held back from lending to any borrowers. That froze credit markets, prompting intervention by the Federal Reserve.

A similar situation could occur today if rating agencies continue to maintain BBB ratings on many of these large corporations despite a deterioration in their business. If those corporations begin to have difficulty servicing their debts, markets may get jittery, stop trusting rating agency ratings and wonder what other debt securities are similarly overrated or improperly rated, and markets would freeze up until things settle down.

## **2. Decline in Manufacturing and Production**

Throughout the world, manufacturing activity is slowing. This is reflected in declines in manufacturing indices across numerous different countries. Particularly hard hit has been the automotive industry, which is seeing declines across the board in numerous different countries.




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>10</sup>

The US and Europe are seeing minor declines, but China is being particularly hard hit, as sales decreased over 8% in 2019 after a decline in 2018.<sup>11</sup> And sales in China are expected to decline again in 2020.

**China's Big Boom in Auto Sales (is over)**  
Light New-Vehicle Sales in millions




Image source: wolfstreet.com<sup>12</sup>

China is now the world's largest auto market, nearly double the size of the US market, so slowdowns there will now have major effects worldwide, particularly as major automakers such as Ford, GM, Volkswagen, etc. have significant sales and operations in China. Ford, for instance, saw its sales decrease 26% in China last year.

It isn't just cars that aren't selling either. In the US, orders for heavy trucks have fallen precipitously. That's an indicator that trucking companies are seeing less business and therefore

<sup>10</sup> "Total Vehicle Sales (TOTALSA)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTALSA>

<sup>11</sup> Sun, Yilei and Brenda Goh. "Auto industry cautious as China starts 2020 with forecast of a 2% sales decline." *Yahoo!Finance*. Published January 12, 2020. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://finance.yahoo.com/news/global-automakers-cautious-chinas-market-235337548.html>

<sup>12</sup> <https://wolfstreet.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/China-auto-sales-2018.png> Accessed January 14, 2020.

don't have the need for more trucks. That, in turn, results from reduced shipments of goods, an indicator of a slowing economy.




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis <sup>13</sup>

Looking at the past several business cycles, large drops in orders for heavyweight trucks generally presage a recession. While the current drop in trucking sales isn't yet on the order of magnitude that one might expect before a recession, the trend is certainly steeply negative. It's hard to imagine a turnaround this year.

Indices of US production aren't rosy either, with most showing slowdowns or declines.




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis <sup>14</sup>

13 "Motor Vehicle Retail Sales: Heavy Weight Trucks (HTRUCKSSAAR)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HTRUCKSSAAR>

14 "Manufacturers' New Orders: Nondefense Capital Goods Excluding Aircraft (NEWORDER)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NEWORDER>




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>15</sup>




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>16</sup>

15 "Industrial Production: Manufacturing (NAICS) (IPMAN)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/IPMAN>

16 "Manufacturing Sector: Real Output (OUTMS)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/OUTMS>






Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>17</sup>

In countries around the world, indices of industrial production are stagnant or falling. In China, for instance, total industrial production has been falling steadily for the past decade.



Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>18</sup>

With the continued trade war between the US and China and the threat that is always there for the imposition of new tariffs, it is hard to imagine these figures getting any better. One might wonder why industrial production is falling in China despite the claims of continuing GDP growth. That is because these figures exclude construction, and as many now know, the Chinese government is good at building roads, infrastructure, and ghost cities, much of which factor into GDP but doesn't actually add anything to real economic output.

17 "Industrial Production Index (INDPRO)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/INDPRO>

18 "Total Industry Production Excluding Construction for China (PRINTO01CNQ663N)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PRINTO01CNQ663N>



Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>19</sup>

German industrial production is likewise decreasing, with a downward trend evident for the first time since the financial crisis. While the country avoided a technical recession in 2019, the outlook for industrial growth in 2020 is bleak, leading to concerns that the industrial engine of Europe will fail to power EU growth, which itself is beginning to falter.




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>20</sup>

Data on South American countries is fragmented and largely difficult to come by, but even here the data available indicates that many South and Central American countries are seeing slowdowns of their own. And as production slows in the major industrialized countries, that doesn't bode well for the Americas.

When looking at the major South and Central American economies – Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile – the US, Germany, and China are often the top three trading partners, or at least in the top five. So when those economies slow, so will South American

19 "Production of Total Industry in Germany (DEUPROINDMISMEI)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DEUPROINDMISMEI>

20 "Total Industry Production Excluding Construction for the Euro Area (PRINTO01EZQ661S)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PRINTO01EZQ661S>

economies. Slowing major economies also means fewer opportunities for South American companies to export, as export markets are contracting as well.

### 3. Return to Easy Monetary Policy

The third major global trend is the return to easy monetary policy, particularly in the case of the US Federal Reserve System. While other central banks such as the Bank of Japan and European Central Bank never really stopped their monetary easing, the Fed had at least made a show of attempting to tighten monetary policy. Interest rates had been raised from near-zero to 2.5%, and the Fed's balance sheet was gradually drawn down by over \$700 billion.

Now that the Fed has begun loosening monetary policy again, its balance sheet has exploded by nearly \$400 billion since the beginning of September. If that rate were to be annualized, the Fed would break its previous record-high balance sheet by mid-year.

In addition to once again adding to its balance sheet, the Fed has also pushed interest rates down nearly 100 basis points from where they were before it began its new easing. That makes it much more difficult for the Fed to respond to a future financial crisis, as it maintains historically low-interest rates and has a bloated balance sheet. It also puts pressure on other central banks around the world to ease, which will further incentivize debt issuance.

#### What Are Markets Doing?

Markets, not surprisingly, have reacted positively to this injection of new money and credit into the financial system. From the NASDAQ to the S&P 500 to the Dow Jones Industrial Average, stocks have seen major increases and set new record highs ever since the Fed announced that it would restart its monetary easing.



Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> "NASDAQ Composite Index (NASDAQCOM)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NASDAQCOM>



Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>22</sup>



Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>23</sup>

Looking at the correlation of the Dow Jones to the M2 money supply, the broadest measure of the money supply available today, we see that since 2008 there is a 97.5% correlation between money supply growth and the growth of the Dow. When comparing the Dow to the Fed's balance sheet, we see that there is only a 77% correlation over that same period.

<sup>22</sup> "S&P 500 (SP500)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SP500>

<sup>23</sup> "Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DJIA>

M2 vs. DJIA




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>24</sup>

But when comparing correlations since the Fed announced its new easing program in October 2019, the correlation is now 92.3% between the Fed's balance sheet and the Dow, versus 91.9% between M2 and the Dow. So market performance over the past several months has been almost directly correlated to the growth in the Fed's balance sheet.

Dow vs. Fed's Balance Sheet




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>25</sup>

In fact, the graph below makes it clear that increases in the Fed's balance sheet result in rising stock markets, while declines in the Fed's balance sheet lead to losses.

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24 "Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DJIA>; "M2 Money Stock (M2)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/M2>

25 "Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DJIA>; "Assets: Total Assets: Total Assets (Less Eliminations From Consolidation): Wednesday Level (WALCL)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL>




Image source: zerohedge.com<sup>26</sup>

### Weakness in Bond and Repo Markets

While stock markets have been making great gains, bond markets have been seeing signs of weakness. That's particularly the case in repo markets. Repo is market slang for repurchase. In a repo contract, borrowers offer US Treasury securities or other high-quality securities as collateral so that they can borrow cash, often overnight, in order to finance their business or trading activities. The next morning they repay their loans along with some interest and take back their collateral. In other words, they repurchase their collateral.

Interest rates on overnight repos generally stay right around the federal funds rate, which is currently 1.50% to 1.75%. But in September 2019, those rates spiked, with some rising to as high as 10%. The Fed had to immediately step in and provide liquidity to repo markets, allowing those markets to continue functioning.

<sup>26</sup> Image source: <https://www.zerohedge.com/s3/files/inline-images/Fed vs market 12.13.jpg>. Accessed January 14, 2020.




Image source: *The Economist* <sup>27</sup>

### Repo Reprise

Federal Reserve funding of repurchase agreements, weekly




Image: *Federal Reserve* <sup>28</sup>

The amount of assistance the Fed was offering each day exceeded the amount that the Fed was injecting into repo markets in late September 2008, at the height of the financial crisis. In September 2008, we were being told by the Treasury Secretary and the Fed Chairman that the economy was on the verge of collapse and that unless Congress passed the \$700 billion bank bailout the entire financial system would come crashing down.

<sup>27</sup> [https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/20191221\\_FNC777.png](https://www.economist.com/sites/default/files/20191221_FNC777.png) Accessed January 14, 2020.

<sup>28</sup> [https://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/OG-DG585\\_REPOfu\\_4U\\_20191004175646.png](https://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/OG-DG585_REPOfu_4U_20191004175646.png) Accessed January 14, 2020.

In September 2019, the Fed was pushing more money each day into the repo markets than in 2008, indicating that markets were actually in worse shape than they were in September 2008. Yet that fact garnered almost no notice, even in financial media. And the Fed continues to remain active in repo markets today, promising to wind down its intervention eventually but offering no concrete timelines.

### Yield Curve Inversion

A further indicator of weakness in markets is yield curve inversion. Every US recession for the past 30 years has been preceded by a yield curve inversion.

Normally interest rates are higher on bonds of larger maturities, due to the increased default risk over longer periods of time. A normal yield curve, therefore, is upward sloping, like this curve showing the yield curve on January 14, 2020.




Image source: US Department of Treasury<sup>29</sup>

If investors begin to fear about the future health of the economy, they start to buy bonds with longer maturities. That's because they believe that interest rates will fall in the short- to medium-term, therefore they want to lock in higher interest rates by buying longer-dated bonds. That increased demand drives prices for longer-dated bonds up which, because price and yield are inverted, drives yields on those bonds down. And because investors are selling or at least not buying short-term debt, yields on those bonds either rise or remain stable while yields on longer-term debt fall.

When yields on longer-term bonds fall below those of short-term debt, the yield curve is said to invert. An example of an inverted yield curve is this one, from August 15, 2019, in which yields on short-term debt were higher than long-term debt. Even 30-year Treasury securities were yielding less than one-month Treasuries.

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29 "Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates." US Department of the Treasury. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?data=yield>






Image source: US Department of Treasury<sup>30</sup>

Recessions normally follow within months of a yield curve inversion, sometimes occurring within as little as seven months, but always within 24 months.

The two charts that most investors like to look at when yield curves invert are the yield spreads between 10-year Treasuries and 2-year Treasuries, and the spread between 10-year Treasuries and 3-month Treasuries. Those two curves give a strong indicator of the direction of interest rates in the short, medium, and long terms.




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> "10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 2-Year Treasury Constant Maturity (T10Y2Y)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y2Y>




Image source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis<sup>32</sup>

As you can see from these charts, the areas in which the spread turned negative are the points at which the yield on the shorter-term Treasuries exceeded those on the longer-term Treasuries. The yield curve inversion has already occurred, now it's just a matter of waiting until the all but inevitable recession occurs.

### What Does World Trade Look Like?

It's worth taking a look at world trade figures too, as industrial production and trade largely correspond to each other. With slowing production in the US, China, and Germany, world industrial production is seeing a reduced growth rate. While it hasn't gone negative yet, world import growth has, which is a worrying sign for the future.



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With the threat of potential tariffs against France and other EU countries, plus the possibility that the United States' Phase One trade deal with China may collapse, the possibility of a further trade war will weigh heavily on the world economy.

<sup>32</sup> "10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus 3-Month Treasury Constant Maturity (T10Y3M)." *FRED Economic Data*, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed January 14, 2020. <https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/T10Y3M>

<sup>33</sup> Image source: [https://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2019/3/27/47769140-1553660367891\\_origin.png](https://static.seekingalpha.com/uploads/2019/3/27/47769140-1553660367891_origin.png) Accessed January 14, 2020.

## Wild Cards

While these three major factors are the largest ones weighing on the world economy, there are a number of wild cards that could affect both the world economy and the Western hemisphere. Anyone of them could blow up at any moment, unforeseen and unexpected.

### A. Venezuela

The Venezuelan regime maintains a tenuous grip on power, aided and abetted by Russia and China. Despite years of monetary mismanagement and hyperinflation, and an economy close to destruction, President Maduro maintains a tight grasp on the military and police forces. Were his regime to collapse, however, it would have tremendous ramifications not only regionally, but also worldwide.

The crisis of refugees fleeing Venezuela is already weighing on the country's neighbors, but a regime collapse and potential armed conflict to choose a successor government would likely see a surge in refugees leaving Venezuela. And given the interest China, Russia, and the United States have in Venezuela's oil reserves, a regime collapse could bring those three countries to the brink of conflict among themselves in the ensuing power struggle.

### B. Iran

While conflict with Iran seems to be less of a possibility after the assassination of General Soleimani and Iran's subsequent retaliation, there's no telling when hostilities with Iran might flare up again. If you had told someone a year ago that Iran would be launching missiles at US bases in Iraq, most people would have thought you were crazy. But it has happened, and it could happen again at any time.

### C. Oil Markets

Oil markets have been in turmoil for the past several years, as the importance and dominance of OPEC has been diminishing. With the United States now taking its place as the world's largest oil producer, Saudi Arabia and Russia increasingly cooperating on production limits, and Iran and Venezuela largely removed from world oil markets, the old order is no more.

Despite uncertainty about the future, oil prices are still far lower than many would have expected, especially with Iranian and Venezuelan input to world oil markets now largely negligible. With decreased demand from China, there is the potential for oil to continue falling. But if a conflict with Iran were to rear its head, and Iran were to manage to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, through which an estimated 30-35% of world oil travels, oil prices could surge, causing price shocks throughout the world economy.

### D. New Tariffs

While the US and China signed their Phase One trade deal, it remains to be seen just whether China will stick to the terms of the deal. If China doesn't, or more importantly if President Trump thinks that China hasn't stuck to the terms of the deal, then there's a high risk that the trade war with China will intensify once again. In other words, we're not out of the woods yet.

With the threat of tariffs against EU countries as a result of WTO rulings against Airbus and potential retaliation against France for its digital services tax that has been viewed as an attack on US tech companies, entire new trade war fronts could be opened.

#### E. Disease

The big unknown is the extent to which the Chinese coronavirus will affect world economies. Expectations for Chinese economic output for the first quarter are poor, with most people expecting slow economic growth and best, and a contraction at worst. There is still too much that is unknown about the disease, how long it will take to run its course, whether statistics from the Chinese government are accurate, and how it may spread outside China.

China will undoubtedly be affected negatively. But if the disease becomes pandemic outside China, then it will have an even more outsized negative impact on the world economy. That will weigh not only on stock markets but also on overall industrial production and world trade.

### Takeaways

All indicators point to a recession on the way. But the \$64,000 question is: when will that recession occur? Will it be this year or next? With the recovery from the 2008 crisis being the slowest and longest in history, it almost seems as though the current slide into recession could be the longest we'll ever see.

Many investors have seen the recession on the horizon and attempted to profit from it, shorting stocks or shorting overall markets. And time and time again, those shorts have been squeezed due to stock markets continuing to reach new record highs. As the saying goes: markets can stay irrational longer than investors can stay solvent. Everyone can see the crash coming, it just seems to take forever to actually occur.

No one knows what the trigger for the next crisis will be, the pin that bursts the bubble. With so much focus on the corporate debt bubble, other potential flashpoint areas are being ignored, so the crisis could start from somewhere else. Or the next crisis could result from a foreign policy trigger, a pandemic disease, or even from an accidental policy action on the part of the US or some other government.

Central banks will react to the next crisis and attempt to nip it in the bud, but as we have seen from the data, their ability to do so will be far more constrained than in 2008. With little to no room to cut interest rates and balance sheets that are already overinflated, there's no guarantee that quantitative easing will have any positive effect at mitigating the next crisis or its effects on the economy.

Interest rates can only go so low, with Europe and Japan already pushing negative short-term interest rates. Pushing them too low will stimulate an exodus of capital from the banking system, bringing the fractional reserve system to its knees. No one knows exactly where that lower bound is, and no one wants to find out either. But central banks are walking a very tight line, and their response to the oncoming recession could determine whether the world economy will escape a day of reckoning again as in 2008, or whether the entire financial system will come crashing down.

# Likewar

Lecture delivered by Peter Warren Singer<sup>1</sup>.  
(Notes of the presentation)

Concluding the World Situation Conference, Mr. Singer spoke about the power of communication by social media. Here are his thoughts.

Two big ongoing changes made it so powerful, one given the technological means, and the other related to new trends of behavior. Regarding the technological change, 2019 marked the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the internet. It has not been just a broad implementation of software easily available to all, but a tremendous improvement in the hardware. Nowadays, the average of cellphones gets 25 sensors or more.

The second big ongoing change happens on a personal level but reaching everybody. All people can share their individual experiences in a scale, linking people at a distance. Web 2.0 made all content creators and distributors. It doesn't mean just more information available than ever before, but each of us as individuals having the power to broadcasting out, in both one on one like a telegraph, but mass broadcasting like a newspaper or TV.

Mr. Singer stressed the reason why people love this social media. He gave examples of personalities like the US President Donald Trump, the basket player LeBron James, or the hacker Junaid Hussein, and how each one of them uses it as their own newspaper.

The result, though, is that while social media started a space for fun, then profit, it became now like a warzone. That is the first way to think about Likewar, the exploitation of communication between people, and the anger and conflict generated by events.

But also a second meaning. The speaker spent five years tracking how social media was being used around the world, from wars to news to politics. He blended everything from big data mapping of Russian troll networks to interviews with tech company executives, extremist group recruiters, even generals turned convicted felons and found that not just a space of conflict but an actual mode of it.

If cyberwar is hacking of network, then Likewar is hacking of people on it. And like any mode of war, there were rules and tactics that people would follow — a strange world where ISIS top. But not only terrorist groups, as described by the speaker, also when drug cartels in Latin America connect gangs in big cities, or when Russia target soldiers in the Ukraine conflict, as well as people and elections (e.g., Hungary, BREXIT, or even the USA). Russian politicians are doing the same as celebrities.

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<sup>1</sup> Peter Warren Singer is Strategist at New America. His latest book is LikeWar (Oct 2018, HMH), which explores how social media has changed war and politics, and war and politics has changed social media. It was named an Amazon book of the year, a NY Times "new and notable," and reviewed by Booklist as "LikeWar should be required reading for everyone living in a democracy and all who aspire to." His past work include serving at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Harvard University, an editor at Popular Science magazine, and as the founding director of the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence at Brookings, where he was the youngest person named senior fellow in its 100 year history.

Likewar is hacking people! Whether somebody hacks a bank, it is because he wants money. When someone else hacks people, it is to make them think as wanted.

There are rules of likewar:

- All secrets now have a half-life. The average millennial take 26,000 selfies, including in the scariest circumstances. In the same way, 'combat selfies' shared out deliberated information. Every future president will have this kind of shared info. Strava was tracking and sharing the exercises at a secret CIA location in East Africa. It is possible to locate ships. A Japanese stalker found the place his 'loved' pop star lived based on the image or her pupils in photos she shared on social media, and the Google Street View, and showed up.

- The truth can be buried underneath a sea of lies. This is, in essence, what played out in the 2016 election, where saw hacking, sockpuppet accounts posing as someone else, bots were driving online trends. For example, Russian hackers created a fake Tennessee GOP<sup>2</sup> account. On election day, it was the 7<sup>th</sup> most read on all of Twitter, more than the Tennessee real GOP. The effect can be measured by the average of journalists that choose their subject using social media – 90% of them. But don't just think of this LIkeWar as US election issue. Hit every democracy, in some cases with history-altering effects. One-third of online conversation around Brexit was inauthentic accounts. It also drove the Brazilian campaign.

- We're in the world that the 'Virality Trumps Veracity.' Not just in the battles online, but effecting our real-world actions, even our beliefs, including of the truth itself.

- What is notable is that it found consistency in what drove things viral, and it is provoking real changes in happenings.

The speaker stated that every one of us knows somebody that is sharing toxic content online. The result of this is the creation of new winners, who understand these rules, in realms that range from politics to war to business. But the new powers and responsibilities for the firms that run this battlespace make them uneasy to keep their position. The attacks on Facebook in Myanmar are examples of this.

The threats will grow for two core reasons: (1) Only half the world is online. Half the world is still to enter this fight. And they will be doing so without five decades of experience at the internet and over two centuries of experience at democracy and free media (as in the US). It has been tough enough for us, how about for them? (2) The tech is also changing. Artificial intelligence, again available to all actors, is set to massively compound this problem with the creation of what is known as "deep fakes." Neural networks can study a database of images, words, and sounds to learn to mimic a human speaker's face and voice almost perfectly. An early example of the potential political impact of this came in the creation of an eerily accurate, entirely fake conversation between Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Donald Trump. Like everything else, it will be marketized.

In conclusion, a variety of things need to happen. The key is to recognize that just like cybersecurity writ large, there is no simple solution or victory. It is an issue to be managed for as long as there is the internet, and that role has to be played by government, business, and individual user.

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<sup>2</sup> GOP – Great Old Party – The Republican Party.

For the government, reorganize, having the model done after the Estonia case. It needs a strategy; building new Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), new laws (regulating bots) to campaign ad not the same as skywriting; and restore old – active measures working group.

For the business that runs the networks, new responsibility is necessary. The companies have to exercise the same kind of denial –stages of grief. Using Red Teams could help to prevent the live stream video in New Zealand. The business has to focus on superspreaders. It could also educate users, implementing proactive popups.

The whole of society needs digital literacy. The experience lived in Estonia, and how that country got out of a Russia active denial needs to be discussed. Individuals are both targets and participants. It is not just of recognizing fake news, but how the very networks they use work. Like in regular cybersecurity, threats go after the vulnerable but can harm the whole.

Mr. Singer left a final lesson: you are what you share, but through what you share, you reveal who you truly are.

# Conclusão

A Conferência sobre a Situação Mundial (WSC, abreviatura em inglês para World Situation Conference) do Programa de Mestrado em Segurança e Defesa Interamericana da Classe 59, conduzido pelo Colégio Interamericano de Defesa (CID), proporcionou 4 dias intensos de reflexões e debates sobre a geopolítica mundial e sub-regional. Os 58 estudantes assistiram 16 palestras que abordaram assuntos relevantes de áreas geográficas mundiais importantes, bem como temas globais atuais como economia, meio ambiente, ciência e tecnologia, segurança e defesa, relações internacionais e política. A alta qualidade dos conhecimentos e experiências compartilhadas pelos palestrantes durante a Conferência foi complementada com 50 artigos e relatórios disponibilizados aos alunos para leituras.

A semana de apresentações evidenciou o alto nível dos profissionais que frequentam o Programa de Mestrado do CID. As perguntas pertinentes e os debates muito bem fundamentados enriqueceram as palestras e contribuíram para um ambiente de aprendizado com variáveis pontos de vistas. Alguns temas específicos destacaram-se nas exposições e discussões.

O Cel Alessandro Visacro, do Exército Brasileiro, autor de “A Guerra na Era da Informação”, abordou o tema “Defesa e Segurança no Estado Moderno”. Ele apresentou importantes considerações sobre a ameaça à concepção do Estado Moderno, em que povo, território, soberania e finalidade perdem o equilíbrio com a perda de soberania. Esta perda é fruto da incapacidade do Estado e de suas forças de segurança fazerem frente às novas ameaças. Com este enfoque, o palestrante abordou conceitos de segurança e defesa, black spot, zona cinza, guerra irregular, teoria da convergência e hibridização, segurança humana, terrorismo, crime organizado transnacional, insurgência criminal, teoria do controle competitivo, etc.

Benjamin Jensen, autor de “Military Strategy in the 21st Century – People, Connectivity, and Competition”, apresentou sua visão da tecnologia disruptiva e o quanto ela tem alterado o modo de abordar os conflitos e as estratégias militares. O mundo está inteiramente conectado, compartilhando problemas comuns e criando um ambiente altamente competitivo entre si. Assim, a tecnologia diminuiu os espaços e aumentou as influências entre Estados e grupos, com ações específicas em determinada área geográfica ou setor impactando na economia, na segurança e defesa, na política e nas relações sociais de modo global.

Theresa Sabonis-Helf explanou sobre a Ásia Central e a Rússia. Ela apresentou os interesses nacionais russos, sua liderança na construção de um mundo policêntrico, o envolvimento de companhias mercenárias e de hackers em suas estratégias. A Professora também abordou os conflitos energéticos e a carência de recursos hídricos da Ásia Central, sendo fatores que modelam as relações políticas na região, inclusive com interferência chinesa, nas áreas energéticas e de transporte terrestre (restabelecimento da ligação terrestre entre Ásia e Europa). Há destaques econômicos na região, como Uzbequistão e Tajiquistão, e blocos regionais como o Programa de Cooperação Econômica Regional da Ásia Central (CAREC) e a União Econômica Eurasiática (EAEU) que funcionam como ferramentas para expansão econômica e espaço para discussões políticas.



Michelle Egan apresentou sobre a Europa. Os desafios na área econômica, os problemas dos refugiados e dos imigrantes, a crise do BREXIT e da Eurozone, o conflito entre liberalismo e nacionalismo na Europa em um contexto de globalização e as dificuldades na área de segurança. Percebe-se que o Velho Continente está em transformação, com os olhos do mundo observando quais serão os impactos globais na área econômica, política, social e de defesa destas mudanças.

Alix Boucher falou sobre a África Subsariana. A pesquisadora da África Center apresentou os principais conflitos na região, as atuais rotas de migração, a instigante correlação entre países autocráticos e incidência de conflitos e, por fim, a evolução de grupos terroristas na África Subsariana.

À tarde, Michael Shipler compartilhou suas experiências em mediação de conflitos no Sul-Sudeste da Ásia. Ele explanou sobre disputas por recursos hídricos, problemas e dificuldades gerados pela diversidade cultural, áreas de atrito, influência do talibã e interesses chineses na construção de vias terrestres ligando o Sul-Sudeste da Ásia à Europa e Oriente Médio. Desta forma, ele tornou evidente a complexidade e os desafios geopolíticos da região.

Samuel Greene apresentou uma análise bastante peculiar sobre a região do Oriente Médio e Norte da África. Ele correlacionou pontos em comum entre esta região e a América Latina, destacando a debilidade das instituições, o déficit em segurança humana e em desenvolvimento humano, o papel relevante de atores não-estatais violentos, a polarização política, o descrédito na democracia, os fluxos migratórios, etc. Tudo isto contribui para um ambiente favorável à violência e ao descontrole do Estado do Oriente Médio e Norte da África, assim como esses pontos causam os mesmos efeitos nos países da América Latina.

Martijn Rasser compartilhou suas análises sobre tecnologia, especificamente a evolução tecnológica chinesa. Ele detalhou áreas de inovações que a China está à frente e outras que está deficiente. Além disso, abordou o esforço chinês em Pesquisas e Desenvolvimento (P&D), o aumento do investimento em Ciência e Tecnologia (C&T) e os avanços em Inteligência Artificial. O Senior Fellow do Technology and National Security Program da CNAS ressaltou os setores que a tecnologia chinesa está presente nas Américas, as estratégias de relacionamento entre EUA e China na área e as políticas mundiais que afetam a C&T. Por fim, Dr. Rasser apresentou áreas possíveis de cooperação com a China, em detrimento de competir tecnologicamente.

O encerramento do terceiro dia coube a Evan Ellis, professor do US Army War College, com o tema “China, América Latina e Caribe”. Dr. Ellis caracterizou a República Popular da China (RPC), seu imperativo estratégico para o mundo e as ações e tendências estratégicas para América Latina. O aumento de investimentos e a evolução em capacidade militar chinesa destacou-se em sua exposição. Em relação à América Latina, o Professor apresentou os principais produtos de defesa comercializado pela China, as principais atividades militares desenvolvidas e países beneficiários, além de abordar as conexões do Crime Organizado chinês na América Latina. Os investimentos nas áreas espaciais e de telecomunicações aumentaram significativamente a presença chinesa nos países latino americanos.

O Dr. Jorge Castro, Presidente do Instituto de Planejamento Estratégico da Argentina, apresentou uma análise sobre a Estrutura do Poder mundial do Século XXI com seus dois atores principais: Estados Unidos da América (EUA) e República Popular da China (RPC). O Dr. Castro destacou as transformações da sociedade global por meio da Quarta Revolução Industrial, da

interatividade, da conectividade e da inteligência artificial. Ele caracterizou os dois países nesta luta de interesses pelo poder, ressaltando aspectos econômicos, sociais, políticos e científicos tecnológicos.

Dr. Paul-Martin Foss, Presidente do Carl Menger Center, proporcionou ao WSC uma visão sobre a economia mundial. Ele foi enfático que uma crise financeira mundial está a caminho, apenas não sabe quando. Esta análise é devido aos níveis crescentes da dívida interna dos países, a diminuição de manufaturas e da produção industrial, sobretudo da China e da Europa, e o retorno da flexibilização monetária. Dr. Foss analisou cada aspecto deste e seus efeitos na economia do Hemisfério Ocidental.

Por fim, Peter Warren Singer, autor de “Like War - The Weaponization of Social Media”, abordou como as redes sociais têm afetado as culturas, a política, a economia e a guerra. Ele destacou como a internet e, especificamente, as redes sociais está presente na vida cotidiana das pessoas e o quanto somos vulneráveis à guerra de informação, ao ataque cibernético e à manipulação em prol de interesses de grupos, pessoas e Estados.

A complexidade e a conexão dos assuntos ficaram claras durante toda WSC. Assim, torna-se evidente inferir sobre a necessidade de abordar os problemas de maneira integrada e cooperativa - um “mantra” enfatizado pelo CID e provado na Conferência. De posse deste conhecimento, os estudantes foram divididos em seis grupos de trabalho e tiveram 3 dias de discussões internas para aprimorarem suas análises e percepções dos assuntos e das regiões geopolíticas abordadas. O quarto dia foi caracterizado por uma apresentação destas análises e percepções aos demais grupos, possibilitando uma interação de toda classe.

Desta forma, a WSC contribuiu para um melhor entendimento estratégico dos problemas, desafios, ideias e soluções dos mais importantes assuntos globais que afetam as Américas. A consciência situacional aprimorada pela conferência permitirá evolução no planejamento estratégico dos estudantes no prosseguimento do mestrado e em suas vidas profissionais futuras.

Andrelúcio Ricardo Couto, Coronel do Exército Brasileiro

Professor Encarregado