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WSC 2022

PROCEEDINGS OF

THE WORLD SITUATION CONFERENCE

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PREFÁCIO

Cel. Marco Antonio Carnevale Coelho[1]
Coordenador da Conferência

A Conferência de Situação Mundial do ano de 2022 (WSC/2022) constitui-se de uma atividade acadêmica realizada pelo Colégio Interamericano de Defesa e que tem por objetivo ampliar os debates acerca de eventos geopolíticos relevantes da conjuntura mundial com base em regiões globais. Assim, ao se reunir diversos especialistas para tratar do tema, espera-se alavancar as principais tendências que influenciarão as diversas regiões e nações individualmente, projetando seu impacto sobre os planos e a implementação das políticas de defesa, segurança e desenvolvimento do Hemisfério Ocidental nos próximos 10 anos.

A fim de se atingir tal objetivo, em três dias de intensas atividades, o WSC/2022 reuniu 13 palestrantes de diferentes nacionalidades onde foram abordadas diversas questões relevantes entorno da geopolítica mundial. Em seu primeiro dia, foram abordados temas relacionados à Defesa e Segurança Global destacando o poder de capilaridade das novas tecnologias no âmago social e seu impacto na sustentação dos pilares do Estado Moderno. Também foram colocadas em tela questões acerca da

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[1] O Cel Carnevale ingressou na Força Aérea Brasileira no ano de 1988 e graduou-se em Ciências Aeronáuticas na Academia da Força Aérea – Brasil em 1994. Realizou o Curso de Tática Aérea em 1995 e especializou-se na Aviação de Ataque, atuando por 3 anos no 1º/3º Grupo de Aviação onde qualificou-se como Líder de Esquadrilha da Aviação de Ataque. Foi Integrante de Tripulação em Missão de Observadores Militares Equador-Peru. Serviu no Comando Aéreo de Treinamento, atuando como Instrutor de voo da Aviação de Ataque por três anos. Graduou-se em Engenharia de Infraestrutura Aeronáutica no Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica em 2006. Especializou-se Gestão Pública pela Universidade Federal Fluminense no ano de 2007 e obteve o título de Mestre em Ciências em Infraestrutura Aeronáutica em 2013, também no Instituto Tecnológico de Aeronáutica. Foi chefe da Divisão de Projetos, Planejamento e Orçamento de Obras da Comissão de Aeroportos da Região Amazônica e apoiador do Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos atuando como agente de prevenção de acidentes aeronáuticos e como instrutor dos diversos cursos ministrados no âmbito do Sistema de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos. Foi Comandante do Corpo de Alunos do Centro de Preparação de Oficiais da Reserva da Aeronáutica – CPORAER-SJ de 2011 a 2014. Possui especialização Latu Sensu em Ciências Militares Aeroespaciais pela Universidade da Força Aérea (2016). Foi Vice-Diretor do Centro de Lançamento de Alcântara (CLA) de 2017 a 2018 e Diretor do CLA no biênio 2018 e 2020. Concluiu o curso de Mestrado em Ciências no Inter-American Defense College (IADC) no ano de 2021 e, atualmente, integra o corpo docente do IADC atuando como professor assistente

segurança marítima mundial destacando problemas como a pirataria, downloads ilegais, ecoterrorismo, entre outros e, em seguida, discutiu-se as potencialidades do ambiente ciberespacial e seu desenvolvimento de caracterização com a inserção dos diversos Estados. Por fim, analisou-se também os esforços os desafios colocados e vinculados à ascensão da China e os possíveis impactos para a segurança e defesa em toda a Ásia.

No segundo dia de evento e, tendo como pano de fundo, a retomada da economia global, a diversidade cultural, linguística, religiosa e variedade de diversos sistemas políticos em toda a macrorregião, abordou-se o continente Europeu e suas relações transatlânticas e a África Subsaariana, destacando as questões fronteiriças, a crise migratória, energética e inflacionária regional. Neste mesmo contexto, seguiram-se as discussões acerca da região da Ásia Central com destaque para a Rússia e seu contínuo esforço para se consolidar como uma potência global. Com base neste amplo cenário, discutiu-se também os prováveis impactos para a segurança global decorrente da retirada intempestiva dos Estados Unidos do Afeganistão.

Por fim, seguiram-se as apresentações do último dia com as discussões acerca das regiões do Meio Oeste e Norte da África destacando a violência crescente de grupos extremistas e o Sudeste e Leste da Ásia juntamente com a Oceania onde foram evidenciadas o crescente aumento de tensão no Oceano Pacífico e, em particular, na região que cobre o mar da China. E, finalmente, seguiu-se a palestra final onde foram destacados diversos temas relevantes acerca da evolução tecnológica atual e como a facilidade de acesso as estas tecnologias por parte do cidadão comum tem contribuído para a insegurança global.

Desta forma, pode-se afirmar que as diversas apresentações contribuíram de forma contundente na promoção de amplos debates, em que os conhecimentos evidenciados permitiram aos alunos e participantes consolidarem uma análise aprofundada nas áreas: política, económica, defesa, segurança, ciência, tecnologia, impacto das principais nações, atores estatais, alianças ou iniciativas governamentais e de organizações não governamentais internacionais. Certamente, o Comitê de Situação Mundial (WSC/2022) atingiu o objetivo de permitir aos alunos da Classe 61 desenvolvessem um amplo entendimento de como fatores geopolíticos mundial poderão impactar o Hemisfério ocidental nestes próximos dez anos..

CONFERÊNCIA SOBRE SITUAÇÃO MUNDIAL
WELCOME REMARKS

Brigadeiro do Ar Leonardo Chaves Rodrigues[2]
Inter-American Defense College ViceDirector

Bom dia a todos! Eu sou o Brigadeiro Leonardo, da Força Aérea Brasileira, atual Vice-Diretor do Colégio Interamericano de Defesa. Inicialmente, gostaria de dar as boas-vindas a cada um que participa desta Conferência sobre Situação Mundial.

Para o Colégio, é uma imensa honra contar com uma audiência tão qualificada e com palestrantes de alto nível, experts nos temas que serão apresentados, e que nos permitirão avançar nesta importante etapa de nosso curso acadêmico.

Compreender a geopolítica, seja no âmbito regional ou mundial, é algo desafiador, e ao mesmo tempo fundamental para estrategistas, assessores e líderes, pois as decisões que envolvem os mais altos escalões precisam ser bem estudadas e planejadas, para que possam gerar os efeitos desejados.

Se "Nenhum homem é uma ilha", como afirmou o filósofo inglês Thomas Morus, o que dizer então de toda uma sociedade, essa coletividade que habita determinado país, uma sub-região, ou um continente? Os níveis de relacionamentos entre os povos são os mais diversificados e intensos! Muitas vezes, por meio de uma única instituição, uma empresa, por exemplo, um determinado país se relaciona com outro, não é mesmo? Ampliando um pouco mais, e pensando além do exemplo de uma empresa, neste exato

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[2] Brigadeiro do Ar Leonardo Chaves Rodrigues was born in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Joined the Brazilian Air Force in February 1985 and successfully completed his studies graduating as Aeronautical Science Bachelor in the Air Force Academy, in 1991. In his military career, he has served in Staff and Operations Sectors, and as Assistant of Ministry of Defense, Assistant to the Commander-in-Chief of Aeronautical Personnel, Chief of Operations and Commander of the Sixth Air Transport Squadron, Vice-President of the Amazon Region Airports Commission, Head of the Patrimony and Environment Section of the 4th Sub-Section of Brazilian Air Force General Staff, Wing 1 Chief of Staff, and Wing 9 Commander. His academic studies includes Training of Aviation Officers (Air Force Academy), Improvement of Officers (Air Force Officer Training School), Brazilian Air Force Staff Command Training (Air Force Command School and Staff), MBA in Strategic People Management (Getúlio Vargas Foundation) and Maestría en Desarrollo y Defensa Nacional (Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales – CAEN, Lima-Peru). His main operational courses are: Air Tactic Course, Crew Resource Management, Preparation of Flight Instructors, Flight Safety Course and Planning of Composite Air Missions.

instante países estão se relacionando em todo o mundo, seja de maneira bilateral com um determinado parceiro, seja em bloco. Enfim, estão se vinculando de alguma maneira.

Naturalmente que isso gera efeitos. Aprofundando um pouco este pensamento, é evidente então que as nações, representadas por seus mandatários e governantes legalmente constituídos, estão escrevendo a sua própria história e tendo seus destinos traçados a cada dia.

E talvez, senhoras e senhores, isso passe despercebido por bilhões ou milhões de pessoas no mundo inteiro. Talvez, repito, esse público simplesmente ignore as consequências de um ataque cibernético, por exemplo, ou não perceba que os problemas de seus países muitas vezes ultrapassam suas próprias fronteiras. Mas talvez ignorem por terem plena convicção de que há funcionários em seus respectivos países sendo pagos para se dedicarem a essas questões. E quantos são os problemas, não é mesmo? Crimes transnacionais nos testam todos os dias... E aprofundar-se nessa questão é simplesmente fundamental para assessores de alto nível, líderes e tomadores de decisão.

Voltando às relações entre os países, elas são realmente muito amplas no mundo em que vivemos! Quantas vezes uma questão de cunho político acaba pesando de forma desfavorável para se estabelecer um acordo comercial entre dois países ou entre blocos? E aí nos damos conta da complexidade do tema, que envolve outros fatores, sob as perspectivas socioculturais, econômicas, de defesa e segurança, e de ciência e tecnologia. Em meio a tudo isso, apresentam-se diversos atores que são as organizações governamentais e não governamentais, empresas públicas e privadas, indivíduos, dentre outros, que o tempo todo participam ativamente da história e dos destinos do mundo.

Realmente, ninguém informou que seria fácil estar sentado nos bancos escolares do Colégio Interamericano de Defesa. Se a experiência e a capacitação profissional de cada um de vocês lhes conduziram até aqui para este programa de mestrado, temos total convicção de estarmos contribuindo para o aprimoramento que se faz fundamental para os desafios que ainda virão em vossas carreiras.

A Conferência sobre a Situação Mundial será sem dúvida um valioso instrumento para ampliar as reflexões e análise crítica de cada um, permitindo, com o decorrer do

curso, prepará-los a melhor compreenderem a situação mundial atual, e analisarem as tendências que influenciarão as regiões e nações individualmente, projetando, por exemplo, o impacto sobre os planos e a implementação de políticas de defesa, segurança e desenvolvimento nos próximos 10 anos.

O menu oferecido é farto, e engloba Europa, Leste da Ásia, Sul e Sudeste da Ásia, Ásia Central e Rússia, Oriente Médio e Norte da África e África Subsaariana. Teremos a oportunidade de conhecer importantes marcos conceituais, mas principalmente teremos o privilégio de usufruir das visões e experiências dos nossos ilustres conferencistas convidados.

Disfrutemos todos deste evento! Sem dúvida alguma, cada um dos senhores ou senhoras poderá ser um ator decisivo ou um importante elo de uma engrenagem maior, na busca de soluções para desafios complexos, seja a nível nacional, regional, continental ou mundial. Habilidade e atitude serão, sem dúvida, essenciais, mas a diferença poderá estar no conhecimento, ingrediente básico que essa Conferência sobre a Situação Mundial se propõe a oferecer.

Boa sorte e sucesso a todos! Muito obrigado!

CENÁRIOS E DESAFIOS DE SEGURANÇA

> *"Aqueles que estão presos à mentalidade tradicional, provavelmente, não reconhecerão futuros conflitos como guerras até que seja tarde demais."*
> Sean McFate

Col (Ret.) Alessandro Visacro[12]
Exército Brasileiro

1. Características e tendências do ambiente estratégico global

Embora o desenvolvimento científico exerça um papel determinante no curso da história, a pós-modernidade não se restringe, apenas, ao impacto de tecnologias disruptivas. Modificações nos padrões migratórios, pressões demográficas, urbanização incontida e degradação ambiental se somam a mudanças políticas, transformações econômicas globais e, sobretudo, profundas alterações nas expectativas, valores e normas sociais. Além disso, a humanidade se defronta, hoje, com um fluxo sem precedentes de pessoas, ideias, serviços, bens e capital. Hiperconectividade digital

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[2] O presente texto é um extrato da aula proferida pelo Col (Ret.) Alessandro Visacro, do Exército Brasileiro, em 12 de janeiro de 2022, para o Colégio Interamericano de Defesa, durante a *World Situation Conference*. Seu objetivo é oferecer uma breve descrição do ambiente de conflito nos níveis estratégico, operacional e tático. As ideias expressas a seguir são de inteira responsabilidade do autor. Elas não traduzem a posição oficial de nenhum órgão ou instituição da República Federativa do Brasil.

combinada com elevada mobilidade geográfica resultou na virtual abolição do tempo e das distâncias, assim como tem sido responsável por uma sensível degradação das tradicionais formas de poder.

Dentre as principais características e tendências que dão forma ao atual ambiente estratégico, destacam-se:

• **Acirramento da competição estratégica global** – atores estatais e não estatais dispõem de recursos e se mostram propensos a competir de forma mais agressiva, por meio de todos os instrumentos de poder e em todas as dimensões (física, humana e informacional). Os Estados nacionais, como entes políticos, ainda competem acirradamente entre si. Todavia, têm diversificado as formas de enfrentamento e procurado reduzir a visibilidade de suas ações estratégicas, em face de uma opinião pública cada vez mais intolerante e impaciente, e menos disposta a arcar com os custos de uma guerra total. Ainda que o alcance, o ritmo e a amplitude dessa disputa sejam enormes, o emprego sincronizado de alternativas não militares e o largo uso de formas indiretas de engajamento permitem manter tal confrontação abaixo do limiar da guerra total. Observa-se o emprego de meios militares para alcançar objetivos estratégicos específicos, sem, contudo, provocar uma confrontação ostensiva formal de maior envergadura. Admite-se uma escalada violenta do conflito até um ponto que anteceda a ação decisiva do inimigo ou precipite uma resposta em larga escala. Nesse contexto, tem-se o emprego limitado de forças convencionais, combinado com o hábil uso de ferramentas diplomáticas e informacionais, além de práticas de guerra não convencional, sobretudo, o intenso uso de terceiros (*"proxies"*). Ao parafrasear Clausewitz, em mensagem pessoal a este autor datada de 29 de agosto de 2019, o general Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva, do Exército Brasileiro, afirmou que "a paz se tornou a continuação da guerra por outros meios". Recursos militares e não militares estão se tornando interdependentes, complementares e indissociáveis em quaisquer níveis – político, estratégico, operacional e, até mesmo, tático.

Figura 1 - Competição entre Estados.

• **Comprometimento da ordem vestfaliana** – a ordem internacional centrada no protagonismo exclusivo do Estado Nação vê-se confrontada pela ascensão de atores não estatais em todos os níveis (local, nacional, regional e global). Esses atores não estatais, nem sempre, estão vinculados a uma agenda política objetiva, mas, ainda assim, mostram-se aptos a contestar a legitimidade e o poder soberano do Estado sobre seus elementos materiais, isto é, povo e território. Organizações extremistas, facções criminosas, grupos militantes, movimentos reivindicatórios disruptivos, organismos internacionais, corporações multinacionais e, até mesmo, indivíduos superpoderosos desafiam abertamente o exercício da soberania do Estado.

Sistema Vestfaliano	
Características essenciais	**Desafios contemporâneos**
1. Soberania alicerçada no monopólio estatal sobre a aplicação da legítima força coercitiva	• A ascensão de atores armados não estatais resulta na quebra do pretenso monopólio estatal sobre a aplicação da força coercitiva. • A hábil manipulação da opinião pública (*"guerra da informação"*) e do sistema legal (*"guerra jurídica"*) cerceia a liberdade de ação do Estado, impondo-lhe severas restrições quanto ao uso dos seus próprios meios coercitivos.
2. Ordem internacional centrada no protagonismo exclusivo do Estado Nação	• Atores não estatais passam a ter participação direta e relevante na ordem internacional – em muitos casos, exercem influência maior do que Estados frágeis ou de modesta importância.
3. Separação entre política interna e política externa	• A inserção de temas de interesse coletivo na agenda internacional leva a pressões externas e a tentativas de ingerência sobre assuntos domésticos. • Campanhas abrangentes de desinformação e propaganda, concebidas para atingir sub-repticiamente a opinião pública de um Estado alvo, permitem interferir de modo decisivo em questões de natureza interna. • O fenômeno da convergência e hibridização de redes de ilícitos faz com que atores autóctones expandam seus métodos de atuação para além das fronteiras nacionais. Ademais, lhes proporciona vínculos e formas de cooperação com agentes externos, incluindo outros Estados. Portanto, faz-se necessário maior alinhamento, coerência, complementaridade e sinergia entre as políticas interna e externa.
4. Relações internacionais fundamentadas no reconhecimento formal da soberania de cada Estado sobre seus elementos materiais (povo e território)	• A grande assimetria de poder entre Estados produz relações desbalanceadas, sobretudo, em termos econômicos, científico-tecnológicos e militares. • A informação tem relativizado fronteiras, dificultando enquadramentos jurídicos baseados no princípio da jurisdição. • Campanhas persistentes de desinformação e propaganda minam, de forma sistemática, os fundamentos e valores essenciais que dão coesão e sustentação à sociedade oponente. Ou seja, o uso da informação como arma incide, direta e decisivamente, sobre a cognição do povo do Estado antagônico. • A *"finalidade"*, como elemento constitutivo do Estado moderno, se mostra um componente tão crítico quanto povo e território. Afinal, a falha na promoção do bem comum subtrai a credibilidade do Estado perante o concerto das nações, na medida em que evidencia os limites da sua soberania sobre seus elementos materiais, bem como sua manifesta incapacidade de atender às

	expectativas de seus cidadãos segundo valores consagrados dos direitos humanos, levando também à perda de sua legitimidade. Tal quadro, além de agravar as tensões internas, expõe o país ao escrutínio da opinião pública internacional, às pressões externas e, até mesmo, aos riscos de intervenções humanitárias. • O conceito de "responsabilidade de proteger" legitima intervenções humanitárias destinadas a prevenir ou reagir a violações massivas dos direitos humanos (reais ou não), à revelia da soberania do Estado. • Governos e organismos internacionais estabelecem relações, amistosas ou hostis, com entidades não estatais, a despeito da aquiescência dos Estados que as abrigam.
5. Primazia absoluta do interesse nacional na condução da política externa, fazendo com que, nas disputas interestatais, o conceito de segurança adquira uma conotação eminentemente estatocêntrica e militarista	• Grupos de interesses, associados ou não a outros Estados, adotam uma agenda própria, cujas metas, não raro, divergem abertamente dos objetivos nacionais. • O governo central sofre pressões para subordinar os interesses nacionais a uma agenda coletiva, isto é, supra-estatal. • Insuficiência de uma política de segurança e defesa centrada, preponderantemente, no uso do instrumento militar.

Quadro 1 – Desafios à ordem vestfaliana.

• **Crise persistente da democracia representativa** – o desgaste das instituições democráticas, a degradação do discurso coletivo, os efeitos deletérios de massivas campanhas de desinformação e a crescente perda de capital político têm contribuído, sobremaneira, para o descrédito e a fragilização desse sofisticado sistema político-social. Muitos atores se valem das contradições e vulnerabilidades inerentes aos regimes democráticos para capturar o poder ou simplesmente corromper as estruturas do Estado. Democracias em crise são facilmente suscetíveis a campanhas de desinformação e propaganda. A instabilidade política decorrente tem o potencial para gerar ou agravar crises que reverberam no âmbito regional. A coesão nacional é afetada a ponto de

comprometer um eventual esforço de guerra, tornando-se uma vulnerabilidade passível de ser explorada por seus oponentes.

• **Falência governamental endêmica** – muitos Estados têm fracassado na promoção do bem comum, razão pela qual foram concebidos. Constata-se a incidência, cada vez maior, de Estados falidos ou quase falidos, nos quais ocorre o virtual colapso dos governos centrais e/ou uma situação permanente de conflito armado interno. Países, que não estão submetidos a um processo de falência claro e inexorável, têm apresentado um quadro de governança falida e soberania fragmentada, admitindo a proliferação de áreas não governadas no interior de seu território (*"black spots"*). Assim sendo, a debilidade do poder público tem suscitando uma renegociação dos termos da soberania e, por conseguinte, da própria existência do Estado.

• **Convergência e hibridização** – A hiperconectividade global produz sistemas complexos adaptativos, cujos componentes exercem influência, direta e indireta, uns sobre os outros; e cujas múltiplas formas de interação revelam-se extremamente rápidas, quando não, instantâneas. Essas dinâmicas dão origem ao fenômeno denominado "convergência e hibridização", isto é, o surgimento e a expansão de redes de colaboração, que congregam atores estatais e não estatais partícipes em atividades lícitas, ilícitas e informais. Como nos ensina o cientista político colombiano Vicente Torrijos, vários Estados estão se servindo do fenômeno dos atores irregulares para promover seus interesses e alcançar objetivos estratégicos, de ordem política, econômica ou ideológica, criando lógicas de convergência. Grupos terroristas, organizações criminosas, movimentos insurgentes e, não raro, Estados pouco comprometidos com valores democráticos e preceitos humanitários compartilham interesses, métodos e objetivos, estabelecendo dinâmicas de cooperação. Com conectividade ilimitada, surgem "*networks* de *networks*" caracterizadas por enorme alcance, capilaridade, multiplicidade, velocidade, redundância e resiliência. Estruturas de redes apresentam significativa vantagem competitiva quando confrontadas por estruturas verticalmente hierarquizadas.

• **Ordem multipolar ou policêntrica** – o declínio da hegemonia norte-americana tende a gerar uma reacomodação da ordem internacional, especialmente, diante da ascensão da China como potência global. Ademais, certos países se consolidam como potências regionais. Os modelos, normas, regras e valores impostos pelo Ocidente como padrões universais tendem a ser contestados, incluindo o próprio sistema internacional e suas estruturas. Novas instituições e mecanismos de cooperação surgem como alternativas às formas vigentes de relações exteriores.

• **Ordem neofeudal (neomedievalismo)** – democracias em decomposição e Estados débeis, que padecem de fragilidade institucional, têm se mostrado incapazes de sobrepujar atores armados não estatais, tampouco refrear iniciativas agressivas de outros países, nos campos político, econômico e, mesmo, militar. Em muitos países, atores armados não estatais exercem influência direta sobre contingentes populacionais significativos. Eles impõem seus próprios sistemas normativos no nível local, territorializando o espaço geográfico sob seu controle. Vários Estados têm se mostrado incapazes de suprimir o crescente déficit interno de soberania, falhando na erradicação dessas áreas não governadas. Além disso, a debilidade exibida pelo governo central e a fragmentação do seu poder no plano doméstico ocorrem concomitantemente com a fragilização de sua posição no âmbito externo, em face de sua inevitável subordinação a agendas impostas por grandes potências, organismos internacionais, corporações multinacionais etc. A perda gradual do controle e influência do Estado sobre seus elementos materiais (povo e território) promove o empoderamento ilícito de atores armados não estatais, no plano doméstico, enquanto o caráter predatório da competição geopolítica global compromete, ainda mais, a autonomia do governo formalmente constituído. A degradação da soberania leva, por conseguinte, à construção de um arranjo neofeudal de governança. Por esse motivo, muitas áreas estrategicamente importantes ao redor do planeta, incluindo países da América Latina, testemunharão o surgimento de uma ordem pós-vestfaliana.

• **Surgimento de novos espaços contestados** – atores estatais e não estatais competirão pelo acesso, influência, exploração e/ou controle sobre áreas geográficas

consideradas, até então, de importância marginal. Além disso, a disputa na dimensão informacional pela prevalência cultural, ideológica e de narrativas abrange elementos físicos, virtuais e cognitivos. O espaço sideral, o espaço cibernético, o oceano Ártico são exemplos de espaços nos quais as disputas tornar-se-ão mais acirradas.

• **Pressões demográficas** – alterações em perfis demográficos, crescimentos vegetativos discrepantes e/ou fluxos migratórios agravam tensões sociais pré-existentes, colocam em risco contingentes populacionais específicos, acentuam a escassez de recursos, sobrecarregam as infraestruturas disponíveis, contribuem para a degradação ambiental e desafiam a capacidade governamental de atendimento das necessidades coletivas. Sociedades multiétnicas e/ou estratificadas são mais sensíveis às variações demográficas. O envelhecimento da população, em alguns países, traz consequências para o campo da segurança e da defesa. Estados pouco comprometidos com a promoção dos Direitos Humanos podem recorrer a "migrações coercitivas planejadas" como ferramenta de coerção política, a fim de obter vantagens estratégicas de curto e longo prazo.

• **Agravamento de fissuras psicossociais** – contingentes populacionais segregados ou desprovidos de um senso de pertencimento, hoje, têm acesso mais facilmente a novos referenciais críticos. Em decorrência disso, se mostram propensos ao resgate e fortalecimento da cultural ancestral ou, em muitos casos, são suscetíveis à construção de identidades alternativas como "justificativa para a existência do ente coletivo". A lealdade a essas identidades pode transcender fronteiras políticas ou superar o senso de nacionalidade. Religião, etnicidade, reivindicações por autonomia territorial ou a adesão a ideologias radicais podem se converter em sectarismo fratricida. De fato, parcela significativa da população deixa de encontrar o atendimento às suas crescentes aspirações no tradicional corpo de crenças e valores de sua própria cultura. A busca por "identidades alternativas" pode contribuir para a submissão a formas de "governança alternativa", estabelecendo-se um vínculo lógico entre antropologia cultural e questões de segurança e defesa. Ideias radicais e o apelo à violência tendem a exercer enorme

influência sobre jovens, crianças e adolescentes, sobretudo, nos espaços marginalizados das grandes e megacidades.

• **Expectativas e aspirações crescentes**– os anseios da população crescem em um ritmo muito superior à capacidade de produção e distribuição de riqueza. Graças à aquisição de novos referenciais críticos, as causas de insatisfação popular, na atualidade, vão muito além do mero atendimento das demandas básicas. Sobretudo, entre as legiões de jovens que se sentem obliteradas por sistemas socioeconômicos estagnados, a frustração psicológica tornou-se, potencialmente, mais perigosa que as carências materiais. Expectativas não correspondidas e frustrações psicológicas podem ser, eventualmente, exploradas para gerar antagonismos passíveis de manipulação.

•**Pós-verdade** – o ambiente estratégico contemporâneo caracteriza-se pela ascendência da dimensão informacional sobre os tradicionais domínios físico e humano. O poder de construir "verdades", moldar percepções e afetar a cognição de grandes contingentes populacionais faz com que a informação transcenda, em alcance e efetividade, a mera disputa de narrativas. A manipulação de percepções e a farta disponibilidade de "narrativas alternativas", quase sempre associadas a uma campanha de desinformação mais ampla, são capazes de acirrar antagonismos, comprometer a coesão nacional e gerar cisões entre aliados, criando intencionalmente oportunidades passíveis de serem exploradas por atores estatais e não estatais, nos níveis político e estratégico. Como alerta David Beskow, nos dias de hoje, a tecnologia capacita tanto atores estatais quanto não estatais a manipularem o "mercado global de crenças e ideias" à velocidade de algoritmos. A informação orquestrada agrava tensões preexistentes, minando o consenso sobre os valores que dão coesão e sustentação à audiência-alvo, além de enfraquecer a confiança nos líderes e nas instituições nacionais. Os algoritmos ditam, cada vez mais, quais informações cada indivíduo tem acesso. Um mundo mais interconectado está agravando, ao invés de atenuar, as divergências sobre ideias e identidades.

• **Degradação ambiental e escassez de recursos** – o comprometimento das condições de subsistência causa, invariavelmente, o recrudescimento de antagonismos ou promove o surgimento de novos focos de tensão e instabilidade. A escassez de recursos, associada ou não à degradação ambiental, pode ser causa primária de conflitos armados (internos e externos). Quando os recursos naturais são escassos e potencialmente vitais para uma sociedade ou país, eles podem adquirir importância geopolítica e se tornam recursos estratégicos. A posse de recursos estratégicos, o domínio sobre rotas de abastecimento e a capacidade disruptiva sobre cadeias logísticas podem ser utilizados como instrumentos de coerção política e econômica.

• **Impacto tecnológico** – além de fomentar a anomia, colocando em risco os tradicionais corpos de crenças e valores que amalgamam a cultura, o acesso universalizado à tecnologia da informação está produzindo sociedades dependentes da digitalização em cada aspecto da vida cotidiana. Entretanto, o "gap tecnológico" tende a aumentar. Mesmo admitindo o surgimento de novos líderes em termos de inovação científica, a capacidade de produção, distribuição e controle dessa e outras tecnologias permanecerá restrita a um número relativamente pequeno de detentores. Sob o aspecto estritamente militar, o desenvolvimento tecnológico continuará impondo modificações expressivas e exercendo enorme influência sobre o campo de batalha. Como já aconteceu no passado, a introdução de novos sistemas de armas e o aumento de capacidades técnicas não afetarão, apenas, as circunstâncias táticas. Ao contrário, trarão impactos estratégicos relevantes.

• **Economia globalizada** – mercados globais e cadeias produtivas transnacionais subsistirão, a despeito de eventuais retrações decorrentes de disputas comerciais, crises financeiras internacionais e outros fatores. Sistemas econômicos interdependentes induzem algumas economias nacionais a apresentarem um escopo, cada vez mais, limitado, porém com maior grau de especialização. Embora persista a tendência geral de redução da extrema pobreza, grandes focos de iniquidade continuarão existindo como fontes perenes de instabilidade e insegurança. Em todo o mundo, a economia estará sujeita aos resultados práticos da automação, do emprego de inteligência artificial e do

advento de novas tecnologias disruptivas. Mercados interdependentes mostram-se mais vulneráveis à coerção econômica.

• **Efeitos da urbanização** – a urbanização incontida agrava problemas relativos à escassez de recursos, degradação ambiental, esgotamento das infraestruturas existentes, iniquidade social e segregação espacial. Paradoxalmente, algumas megacidades litorâneas estão se tornando mais importantes do que os Estados que as abrigam. Em virtude de sua natureza singular, as megacidades geram novas dinâmicas demográficas, sociais, políticas, econômicas e ecológicas, que se caracterizam pelo elevado grau de complexidade. O inchaço das grandes metrópoles e a conurbação (fusão de áreas urbanas distintas, decorrente do processo contínuo de crescimento) geram desafios de difícil manejo e solução.

• **Crises humanitárias recorrentes** – Desastres naturais, conflitos armados, distúrbios internos, escassez de recursos e pandemias provocarão crises humanitárias recorrentes, passíveis de serem exploradas, na dimensão informacional, por meio de campanhas de propaganda e desinformação, repercutindo de modo relevante nos níveis político e estratégico. Forças militares continuarão sendo imprescindíveis para prover resposta imediata às crises humanitárias.

2. compreensão do ambiente nos níveis operacional e tático

Embora o desenvolvimento técnico-científico influencie diretamente as formas de combate, as transformações na conduta da guerra decorrem das mudanças do ambiente estratégico como um todo e não apenas da incorporação de novas tecnologias. Adquirir novas armas para travar guerras pretéritas certamente não é o melhor caminho para a vitória. Compreender as mudanças dos conflitos armados e ajustar-se adequadamente a elas representam um enorme desafio. A seguir serão apresentadas algumas tendências e características determinantes da guerra nos níveis operacional e tático:

• **Heterogeneidade do campo de batalha** – salvo em casos específicos, o campo de batalha deixou de ser um espaço no qual forças convencionais exercem seu protagonismo exclusivo. Trata-se, na verdade, de um ambiente complexo e heterogêneo, composto por uma grande diversidade de atores, tais como: forças armadas de países aliados; forças de uma coalizão inimiga (eminentemente conjuntas); forças irregulares amigas (movimentos dissidentes de luta armada, movimentos de resistência, forças de segurança locais, grupos de autodefesa *etc.*); forças irregulares hostis (grupos insurgentes, organizações terroristas, facções criminosas *etc.*); companhias militares privadas; população local; e instituições e agências civis (estatais e não estatais/locais e internacionais). Por conseguinte, a batalha também deixou de ser apenas o resultado do choque entre forças convencionais e se tornou o produto da complexa interação de todos esses atores.

• **Automação Ampliada** – o combate vem sendo submetido a um processo contínuo de digitalização e automação. Conflitos travados ao longo das duas últimas décadas demonstraram a importância de sistemas de defesa antimíssil, aeronaves remotamente pilotadas e *"loitering munitions"*, por exemplo. Entretanto, o desenvolvimento e a integração de inteligência artificial, computação quântica e *"big data"* irão elevar drasticamente os níveis de automação das forças armadas. Muitas tarefas realizadas por seres humanos no campo de batalha, incluindo seus respectivos processos de tomada de decisões, em breve, serão executadas integralmente por máquinas. Sob muitos aspectos, o grau de envolvimento e participação humana na dinâmica do combate será sensivelmente reduzido, em decorrência da introdução de sistemas mecatrônicos militares autônomos, incluindo plataformas integradas multipropósitos e sistemas de enxames robóticos. A guerra continuará sendo uma atividade humana. Porém, o uso de sistemas automatizados e de robôs militares será, cada vez mais, comum. Eles desempenharão um papel central no decorrer da batalha e seu emprego será, frequentemente, decisivo. Enxames multirrobóticos desafiarão a capacidade de sobrevivência das unidades convencionais em combate. A automação será inversamente proporcional à expectativa de baixas. Em termos políticos, a perspectiva de um número reduzido de mortos e feridos nas fileiras das forças armadas

tornará a opção pelo uso do instrumento militar mais aceitável. Afinal, o dano ou a destruição de máquinas não produzem as mesmas consequências ou causam o mesmo impacto que a perda de vidas humanas. Dilemas éticos e morais não impedirão o uso de sistemas robóticos para fins militares. A presença do soldado continuará imprescindível nas ações que envolvam a população local, pois a habilidade para estabelecer vínculos de confiança e aprofundar relações interpessoais, ainda, constitui uma faculdade humana insubstituível.

• **Aceleração do combate** – a ampliação do uso de sistemas autônomos e automatizados, combinada com o advento de armas hipersônicas, imprimirá um novo ritmo às operações de combate. A dinâmica de alguns engajamentos será tão célere e intensa que a velocidade do ciclo de comando e controle (ciclo OODA) transcenderá a capacidade humana para geri-lo em momentos críticos. O engajamento de múltiplos alvos em múltiplos domínios, por exemplo, requer que a detecção, identificação, alerta, priorização e neutralização ocorram em prazos bastante exíguos, oferecendo pouca margem de erro. Por conseguinte, máquinas serão introduzidas no ciclo de comando e controle como decisores – podendo ou não, de acordo com as circunstâncias, compartilhar o processo decisório com seres humanos. Os comandantes, em todos os níveis, devem estar preparados para se confrontarem com situações que evoluam com extrema rapidez, nas quais o tempo disponível para a resposta será significativamente reduzido. As consequências imediatas serão a crescente dependência de sistemas integrados, como requer a defesa antiaérea, antimíssil e antidrone, por exemplo; e o emprego descentralizado dos elementos de combate, concedendo-lhes maior autonomia e liberdade de ação, a fim de abreviar os ciclos de comando e controle.

• **Maior letalidade** – o combate será marcado por fogos de maior alcance, precisão e letalidade. A artilharia de mísseis e foguetes será empregada, prioritariamente, para obter efeitos nos níveis operacional e estratégico, em detrimento do seu uso tático. Plataformas remotas e autônomas (aéreas, terrestres e navais) devem se tornar partes indissociáveis do combate de armas combinadas. Isso reduzirá consideravelmente o tempo entre a aquisição de alvos e o seu engajamento,

proporcionando efeitos letais decisivos no nível tático. A sobrevivência em um campo de batalha exponencialmente mais letal dependerá de maior furtividade, maior dispersão e maior descentralização.

A furtividade será decorrente de elevada mobilidade tática e baixa assinatura (acústica, radar, térmica eletromagnética e cibernética). Os potenciais alvos de alto valor deverão ser mantidos ocultos e facilmente realocáveis. A incorporação de plataformas remotas e autônomas permitirá que os elementos de combate sejam compostos por menores efetivos, tornando-os mais fugazes.

O conceito de dispersão está relacionado à distribuição espacial dos elementos de combate no interior da área de operações. O princípio da massa vem sendo progressivamente alterado, com ênfase atribuída a unidades mais dispersas, porém capazes de convergir efeito. Os usuais parâmetros de frente, profundidade e distâncias necessitarão ser revistos.

A ideia de maior descentralização diz respeito à concessão de maior autonomia tática e liberdade de ação aos escalões subordinados, em prol de uma relação de comando mais ágil e fluida, dentro de uma área de operações expandida.

• **Complexidade** – embora seja uma tendência natural, interpretar o combate a partir das ações táticas terrestres empreendidas na dimensão física é um equívoco. Assim como o ambiente estratégico, o campo de batalha constitui, por si só, um sistema complexo adaptativo. Não basta compreender como as operações reverberam no ambiente ou como os aspectos não militares interferem nas operações. É imperativo que os comandantes, em todos os níveis, desenvolvam uma visão sistêmica acurada, até mesmo para priorizar as ações de combate táticas quando elas forem necessárias e oportunas. A fim de compreender e manejar as complexidades típicas de cada ambiente operacional, as estruturas de estado-maior devem permitir a incorporação de novas capacidades e especialidades, incluindo disciplinas não militares como direito, economia, sociologia, antropologia *etc.*

• **Extrapolação** – a guerra não estará mais confinada dentro do campo de batalha. Ações conduzidas fora do teatro de operações poderão afetar diretamente as operações

de combate. Lidar com ameaças que transcendem o teatro de operações constitui um novo tipo de desafio para os planejadores nos níveis estratégico e operacional, por exemplo:

- ativistas digitais, em outros continentes, são capazes de mobilizar o potencial de protesto da população no interior da área de operações, a fim de alterar o equilíbrio de forças e modificar a própria dinâmica do conflito;

- tentativas de intrusão e ataques cibernéticos, lançados de qualquer ponto do planeta, podem ameaçar as redes de comando e controle;

- campanhas de desinformação e propaganda persistentes podem moldar a percepção acerca do conflito no âmbito da comunidade internacional, obstruindo ações e decisões no nível político;

- eventos no espaço sideral, como a neutralização ou a negação de uso de um satélite de comunicações, podem degradar os sistemas de comando e controle, navegação e guiamento de fogos de precisão no interior do campo de batalha;

- o emprego de mísseis balísticos ou de cruzeiro de longo alcance pode comprometer as rotas logísticas que abastecem o teatro de operações;

- plataformas de lançamento situadas fora do teatro de operações podem bombardear alvos no interior do campo de batalha; e

- pilotos em estações remotas, localizadas fora da zona de conflito, podem operar aeronaves destinadas a produzir inteligência e atacar alvos táticos.

• **Urbanização** – as operações militares desenvolver-se-ão, cada vez mais, em áreas urbanas densamente povoadas. Grandes e megacidades poderão abrigar mais de uma área de operações (contíguas ou não). O ingresso no ambiente urbano não representa o fim da manobra, mas ele afeta significativamente os parâmetros segundo os quais a guerra de movimento é regida. Equipes de armas combinadas são requeridas para lutar de forma dinâmica, semi-independente e adaptável. Nos ambientes urbanos, a interdependência entre as dimensões física, humana e informacional é mais intensa. A distinção entre os níveis político, estratégico, operacional e tático é menos óbvia. A farta disponibilidade de recursos e tecnologias digitais habilita um mero evento tático a transcender facilmente o teatro de operações, afetando as narrativas estratégicas. No

nível operacional, o combate urbano requer maior adjudicação de meios. Quanto maior a densidade populacional, maior a relevância do apoio da população. As grandes e megacidades, quase sempre, reúnem as condições adequadas para a proliferação de atores armados não estatais e, por conseguinte, favorecem a irrupção da guerra irregular. O enorme potencial de protesto da população amplia, sobremaneira, as possibilidades de orquestração de distúrbios de rua, demonstrações violentas e campanhas de desobediência civil. A subversão pode ser combinada de forma eficaz com ações típicas de guerrilha urbana. Tudo isso pode ocorrer simultaneamente à condução de operações de combate de larga escala.

• **Primazia da informação** – a informação é, sobretudo, uma arma política e estratégica. Seu uso nos níveis operacional e tático possui importância marginal, ainda que imprescindível. Nos conflitos modernos, a informação tornou-se mais importante que a ação letal para determinar os resultados da campanha militar. Porquanto, a vitória decorre da percepção da opinião pública acerca dos fatos e dos pormenores que os cercam. Logo, a destruição das forças inimigas ou a conquista do terreno passaram a ter importância secundária. Assim sendo, a informação tornou-se o principal ativo no arsenal de um exército moderno. Os exércitos continuarão fazendo uso da força letal, não raro, aplicando enorme capacidade destrutiva. Porém, o farão de acordo com um novo conjunto de propósitos, redefinindo seu foco do "cinético físico" para o "estratégico informacional". Subestimar a importância da aplicação do poderio bélico convencional para a obtenção de resultados decisivos é um grave equívoco. Entretanto, as usuais ações táticas de efeito cinético na dimensão física só terão utilidade na medida em que forem orientadas para a consecução de um objetivo psicológico passível de ser amplamente explorado e potencializado pela propaganda nos níveis político e estratégico, fazendo parte de um contexto informacional mais amplo, ou seja, a manobra tática se subordina à manobra informacional – e não o contrário, como acontecia nos conflitos passados. Dessa forma, torna-se imprescindível agregar valor psicológico às ações de combate, sob pena delas se tornarem contraproducentes e, portanto, desnecessárias. A mensagem embutida na ação cinética nem sempre terá por finalidade influenciar o grande público. Algumas operações de combate terão como objetivo

psicológico afetar, tão somente, uma audiência específica. Operações de baixo perfil e efeito limitado podem atingir um determinado público alvo – como os decisores no nível político nacional, por exemplo – sem repercutir na opinião pública de uma maneira mais ampla. Essa assertiva mostra-se, particularmente, válida quando se busca evitar uma escalada do conflito.

• **Judicialização** – Cada vez mais, as operações militares se tornam passíveis de constrições por ações judiciais. Em particular, os atores armados não estatais exploram com maestria o hiato legal que existe entre o ordenamento interno, o Direito Internacional Humanitário e o Direito Internacional dos Direitos Humanos. Tal fato não só lhes proporciona maior liberdade de ação como também impõe inúmeros dilemas jurídicos ao Estado. Dessa forma, as alternativas viáveis de enfrentamento são seriamente restringidas por ambiguidades éticas e legais. Ou seja, atores armados não estatais são capazes de combinar "guerra jurídica" e "guerra informacional" para alcançar seus objetivos estratégicos e, ao mesmo tempo, cercear o uso dos meios coercitivos estatais. Mesmo as operações de combate convencionais estão sujeitas à judicialização. Ainda que infundadas, denúncias de crimes de guerra, violações dos direitos humanos, sacrifício de não combatentes e crises humanitárias geram pressões no nível político que afetam, em maior ou menor grau, as ações táticas. O uso de tribunais e cortes de arbitragem para tentar restringir as operações militares possui grande apelo junto à opinião pública, permitindo a exploração política e midiática do fato. Quase sempre, essas iniciativas estão vinculadas a campanhas de desinformação e propaganda mais amplas.

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CHINA: IMPACT ON THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT IN ASIA

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Adapted from remarks to the Inter-American Defense College's 2022 World Situation Conference, January 11, 2022

This short essay summarizes the competitive dimensions of U.S.-China relations from three perspectives. First is historical context and the intensification of strategic competition between two major powers in recent years at a global level. Second are competitive dynamics in Asia, including the strategic advantages and liabilities of China and the United States in this ongoing contest for influence. Third is how China is pursuing a "gray zone" strategy of advancing territorial interests while keeping conflict below the level of lethal violence, and U.S. responses.

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[1] This essay represents only the views of the author and not those of the National Defense University, Department of Defense, or U.S. Government

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U.S.-China Strategic Competition

Leaders in both countries perceive an expanding strategic competition with the other side. The Trump administration's core strategic documents emphasized "great power competition," with a specific emphasis on China, while the Biden administration's early *Interim National Security Guidance* highlighted approaches that will "allow us to prevail in strategic competition with China…" while allowing that competition does not "preclude working with China when it is in our national interest to do so."[3] Meanwhile, China's 2019 defense white paper noted that Asia "has become a focus of major country competition, bringing uncertainties to regional security."[4]

In historical context, U.S.-China relations have been increasingly competitive over the last two decades. However, relations have not yet plummeted to the early Cold War atmosphere of open rivalry—a period when the two sides were locked in an intense ideological competition, conducted little trade with each other, and found themselves on opposite sides of the Korean War. Yet they are also not nearly as close as they were towards the end of the Cold War, when Washington and Beijing aligned against Moscow. U.S.-China relations, while acrimonious, are still bounded by trade relations ($615 billion in 2020) and some common global interests. Moreover, neither side has demonstrated itself eager to launch a war to determine the outcome of the rivalry given the massive anticipated costs and risks.

Nevertheless, without a common adversary, divergences between the two sides on core values set the stage for an expanding competition in the coming years. These differences include political systems (liberal democracy versus authoritarian rule), ideologies (individual freedoms versus stability maintenance and collective order), information (free and open exchanges versus state control), and economics (free and open trade versus state subsidies). Contributing to tenser relations are incompatible aims

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[3] *Interim National Security Guidance* (The White House, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.

[4] State Council Information Office, Defense White Paper (2019), https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.

on sensitive regional issues, including Taiwan's political status and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.[5]

The dimensions of the U.S.-China rivalry are similarly expansive. These include a diplomatic contest for influence in Asia and over international rules and norms, such as how "human rights" will be defined and interpreted in the United Nations; an ideological competition over the performance and durability of democracy versus the authoritarian model of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" developed in China; activities in the information domain that highlight the benefits of one's systems and policies while undermining the appeal of the other side; a military competition for conventional superiority in the area of maritime Asia bounded by the First Island Chain; pressures to develop more potent capabilities in the nuclear, space, and cyber domains; and an economic battle in which both sides are seeking superiority in high-technology sectors.

A Struggle for Mastery in Asia

Given conflicting interests on regional issues, U.S.-China competitive dynamics are most intense in Asia. The primary U.S. objective is preserving a "free and open" regional order defined by commitments to peaceful resolution of disputes, free access to the global commons, human rights, and preservation of sovereignty of the region's smaller countries against the backdrop of Chinese intimidation. China advocates a more "inclusive" regional order where U.S. presence, influence, and alliances are greatly reduced.

The competition, however, is not as symmetrical as it was during the Cold War. Rather, the competition is unfolding simultaneously on multiple playing fields, with both sides sharpening competitive asymmetric advantages. The key U.S. advantage lies in its historic network of regional alliances and an expanding set of regional security partnerships. These are often rooted in bilateral agreements, but there is also a regional security architecture emerging based on cooperation between these countries. Important

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[5] For an analysis, see Thomas F. Lynch III, James Przstup, and Phillip C. Saunders, "The Indo-Pacific Competitive Space: China's Vision and the Post-World War II American Order," in Thomas F. Lynch III, *Strategic Assessment 2020: Into a New Era of Great Power Competition* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2020, 185-218.

recent examples take place at the "minilateral" level, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and Australia-UK-US cooperation (AUKUS).

Meanwhile, China's major advantage is its ability to leverage its status as a key economic partner to achieve diplomatic influence. Beijing has historically tolerated large trade deficits with countries such as Australia and has more recently used prodigious lending through the Belt and Road Initiative to lure countries into its strategic orbit, while also achieving economic benefits (such as finding outlets for excess industrial capacity following the 2008 global recession). China has also sharpened its ability to compete on the diplomatic playing field through high-level visits and major regional gatherings hosted in China. China has also increased its military diplomacy, often using this tool to reinforce its regional message (see figure).

Figure: Increases in Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2002-2019[6]

There is also an escalating military competition in Asia, but even in this domain the contest has historically been asymmetrical. The United States has enjoyed advantages in conventional air and maritime capabilities, though China's rapid military modernization

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[6] NDU Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Data.

over the last two decades, including the development of advanced fighters and surface combatants, has eroded some of those strengths. Beijing's focus has been more on asymmetric capabilities, such as longrange precision strike and anti-satellite and cyber weapons, designed to deny the U.S. the ability to successfully intervene on behalf of a regional ally.

Both sides also face significant limitations to their strategies. U.S. influence is reduced by comparative economic disadvantages, including the inability of the U.S. government to match China's large financial outlays. Moreover, while occupying a few small islands in the Pacific, the United States is also primarily an extra-regional power, meaning that it faces a "tyranny of distance" in deploying forces into the theater and must rely on allied countries, which may deny Washington the use of key facilities during a conflict. China's disadvantages include the desire by states not to become overly reliant on Beijing, territorial disputes with many of its neighbors, and human rights abuses and heavy-handed economic policies that reduce China's soft power.

Caught between the two major powers are medium and smaller Asian countries. These states want to avoid an outright U.S.-China conflict in which they might need to choose sides (and thus lose the benefits of cooperation with the other), but are also wary of a U.S.-China "G2" arrangement in which they lose bargaining power. These states find value in a degree of managed friction between Washington and Beijing, hoping that these circumstances will allow them play one side against the other—extracting economic and security concessions from both. Nevertheless, an increase in Chinese intimidation tactics is driving many states towards closer military cooperation with Washington.

China's Model of "Gray Zone" Coercion

A defining feature of China's strategy in Asia is its pursuit of a "gray zone" strategy of expanding its territorial control while avoiding military conflicts that would involve escalation risks that could threaten the regional economy. This approach represents a compromise between Chinese interests in gaining control of disputed borders and land features in areas such as the South China Sea and economic interests that benefit from regional stability. Both interests are central to the Chinese Communist Party's claims for legitimacy at home, and part of the party's agenda.

There are many dimensions to Chinese "gray zone" activities. These can include information operations in third countries, including misinformation and use of "United Front" tactics to engender support from civil society actors; use of legal arguments, or "lawfare," to legitimize Chinese actions and delegitimize other rules and norms, such as China rejecting the conclusion of a 2016 UN tribunal that invalidated Beijing's South China Sea claims; and buying foreign elites through targeted donations or financial assistance.[7]

Use of economic coercion has become a potential, if not always successful, part of China's "gray zone" arsenal. Rather than attracting countries through economic incentives, Beijing has imposed costs on those seeking to pursue national interests at odds with China agenda. One example was China's retaliation against South Korea following Seoul's 2017 decision to authorize a U.S. missile defense battery. Beijing's response included bans on sales of some South Korean products, cancellation of South Korean pop music events and charter flights, closure of most of South Korean firm Lotte's stores in China, and increasing cyberattacks.[8] The case displays the breadth of tools at China's disposal, but also the willingness of the targeted actor to resist—Seoul went ahead with the deployment and China's image in South Korea plummeted.

Greater attention has been paid to China's use of military and paramilitary force below the level of lethal violence. Underwriting these operations is a rapid expansion of Chinese capabilities. The People's Liberation Army operates the region's largest and, by some measures, most capable air and naval forces, enabling more persistent offshore missions. The China Coast Guard, also the region's largest, possesses more than 130 large (1000-plus ton) patrol vessels, while the maritime militia includes hundreds of fishing vessels that can be mobilized for national purposes.

China has used several varieties of armed "gray zone" operations to pursue its territorial agenda. These are represented in the table below. A first variety includes military construction in disputed regions. The most well-known example includes reclamation of more than 3200 acres of territory in the South China Sea, combined with the construction of military outposts on three reclaimed "islands." These activities

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[7] For a discussion of the concept, see Frank G. Hoffman, "Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges," *PRISM* 7:4 (2018), 31-47.

[8] "China's Response to U.S.-South Korean Missile Defense System Deployment and Its Implications," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 26, 2017.

established new "facts on the ground" and enabled greater persistent military presence in the region. On land, China has built new roads and infrastructure in the Himalayas to advance its position vis-a-viz territorial rivals India and Bhutan.

	Military Construction in Disputed Areas	Sovereignty Enforcement and "Near Seas" Development	Challenges to U.S. Operations in the Western Pacific
Purpose	Establish new facts on the ground, extend the range of PLA operations	Bolster narrative of China's rights to disputed territory; economic development	Raise costs for U.S. operations along China's periphery, deter intervention
Activities	Land reclamation, infrastructure construction in disputed areas	PLAN and CCG patrols, "combat air patrols," protection of PRC commercial activities	Shadowing, warning, harassment of USN and USAF assets
Examples	Doklam (2017), SCS island building	ECS/SCS patrols, HY-981 (2014)	EP-3 (2001), *Decatur* (2018)

Table: Varieties of Chinese Military "Gray Zone" Coercion

A second variety includes employment of a mix of military and commercial vessels to enforce territorial claims and pursue unilateral development of resources located in disputed areas. China has, for instance, conducted "combat air patrols" over the South China Sea since 2016, and has increased incursions of Chinese fighters into Taiwan's southwestern Air Defense Identification Zone. In 2014, China gained attention by positioning an oil drilling platform (HY-981) inside Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone and protecting it with layers of civilian and naval vessels. The rig only departed after Vietnam deployed ships in response and protests erupted in Hanoi.

Third has been more regular intercepts of U.S. military aircraft and vessels operating in Asia. A subset of these intercepts, such as a 2018 near-collision with the U.S. navy ship *Decatur*, have been exceptionally dangerous, raising the prospects for a fatal accident involving U.S. and Chinese forces. Beijing's intent appears to have been to raise the costs for U.S. presence, undercutting U.S. resolve to defend a "free and open" regional order and demonstrate support for U.S. allies and partners.

An emphasis of U.S. strategy in the region has been to identify ways to counterbalance China's "gray zone" tactics and thereby preserve key elements of a "free and open" regional order. This includes identifying alternative sources of financing to reduce economic dependency on China; developing new multilateral partnerships, including the Quad and AUKUS; maintaining a strong forward military presence; providing economic or governance aid to expand economic opportunities or strengthen democratic resilience, such as the Lower Mekong Initiative; and providing security assistance to states that have been threatened by Chinese coercion. A challenge for the Biden and future U.S. administrations will be maintaining these commitments in light of other domestic and foreign priorities.

Conclusion

Three conclusions can be inferred from this discussion. First, given lack of a common adversary and incompatible strategic aims, U.S.-China competition will further intensify over the next several years. This will involve competition for diplomatic partners, hostile rhetoric, and military signaling. Since leaders increasingly see relations in zero-sum terms, the possibilities for bilateral cooperation on regional and global issues will also decline. Yet both sides also have incentives to establish sensible "guardrails" so that a robust peacetime competition does not devolve into a military conflict that ultimately harms the national interests of both countries.[9]

Second, while competition will be acute within Asia, it is unlikely that the region will be dominated by either of the major powers. Both sides have certain competitive advantages, but neither is able to defeat the other's main strengths. The United States is unable to match China's financial commitment and China cannot replace the security cooperation afforded through the U.S. alliance system. Moreover, the agency of third parties should not be ignored. Short of a decisive conflict, a contest for influence will

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[9] This was a theme of a recent Biden-Xi meeting. "Readout of President Biden's Virtual Meeting with President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China," The White House, November 16, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/16/readout-of-president-bidens-virtualmeeting-with-president-xi-jinping-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.

persist in which medium and smaller states are in a strong position to play the major powers against each other for maximum gain.

Third, expanding capabilities will allow Beijing to continue use "gray zone" tactics to intimidate rivals and expand its effective control in contested regions. However, China will also face difficult choices about when to de-escalate tensions and whether to cross into the use of lethal force to resolve disputes. On one hand, Beijing prefers not to incur irreparable harm to its relations with neighbors, whose support it needs to diminish U.S. influence in the region. On the other hand, confining China's activities to the "gray zone" mean that other claimants will likely remain in control of territory that China claims. It will be up to Xi Jinping or future Chinese leaders to determine whether the benefits of a wider conflict would outweigh the potential harm to China's economy.

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES FACING
THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Introduction

With much appreciation for the invitation to IADC hosts for the invitation to speak to CLASS 61. My summary builds on the previous speaker Professor Garret Martin who focused primarily on NATO to highlight some political, economic and security challenges facing Europe. Can Europe assert itself? Can European Union meet the challenges in the twenty-first century that reflects a renewed energy and ambition?

While the COVID-19 pandemic has had dramatic effects on both health care and economic systems with disrupted supply chains and shortages of equipment and vaccines, it is one of many challenges that the European continent has faced. The last decade of European integration has arguably been the most challenging one yet. The decade started with a pending Greek default in 2010 then led to the Eurozone crisis where financial contagion and sovereign debt led to internal divisions about supporting crisis hit economies. The resulting austerity measures generated deep divisions between the fiscally conservative North European states and those in South forced to undertake structural reforms as Germany refused to accept mutualized debt. The decade ended with the immense social and emotional toll of the pandemic (COVID) that began in spring 2020. As the EU has limited competence in public health, there was initially national

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[2] Based on lecture January 14, 2022. Updated due to recent events. Submitted January 24, 2022.

responses through travel restrictions across borders and domestic hording of medical equipment followed by cross-border cooperation on vaccine deployment and critical emergency medical support. Over the same decade, the European Union has faced and continuous to deal with renewed Russian aggression on its Eastern borders, a surge of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa that has led to increased border security as disagreements over quotas for refugees and asylum seekers has led the European Union to sign an agreement with Turkey to host migrants, and the UK vote to leave the European Union. There was concern about rising Euroscepticism.[3] The steady rise of populist parties in member states fueled direct challenges to the legal commitments were accompanied by the erosion of democratic principles and often rejection of legal obligations by specific members states, notably Hungary and Poland.

Over the past decade, European ambitions have felt somewhat diminished due to internal divisions over multiple crises. However, the current health crisis has pushed European publics into demanding more from the European Union. And so often when European faces crises, the result is often more integration (economic and fiscal governance, public health cooperation, economic stimulus). This will mean addressing a myriad of issues: a mix of internal pressures so that the European Union can foster economic recovery, address the erosion of democratic values, and respond to changes in the security, technology, and digital domain. It will also need to respond to external pressures including policies towards neighboring countries and regions (e.g., Turkey, the Balkans), as well as EU external relations in trade, energy, climate, defense, and migration.

Transatlantic Relations

For Europeans, there has been a surge of confidence towards the US Administration (see table below) with a staunchly Atlanticist President as well as key players that have extensive orientation and experience towards Europe (Karen Donfried,

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[3] Euroscepticism can be hard (leave the EU as a principle/objective) or soft (anti-European sentiment and fostering gridlock).

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe, Tony Blinken, State, Victoria Nulan, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Amanda Sloat, NSC).

U.S. favorability sees one of its steepest recoveries in years from 2020 to 2021

% who have a favorable view of the U.S.

Note: 2000 trend is from 1999 or 2000 and provided by the U.S. Department of State. 2019-2021 difference shown in Greece.
Source: Spring 2021 Global Attitudes Survey. Q4a.
"America's Image Abroad Rebounds With Transition From Trump to Biden"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Though caught by surprise by Australian nuclear deal that undermined the French delivery of submarines and the abrupt, chaotic but negotiated Afghan withdrawal, the US has responded by engaging in a concerted so there has been diplomatic effort to engage widely with Europe on Russian about the Ukraine crisis. Europeans appreciate the benefits derived from US security guarantees but there remains concern that the strategic priorities of the United States are Pacific rather than Atlantic. From a US perspective, there is an ambivalence about Europe's posture towards China which is considered a key challenge for US policy. Europe has high degrees of trade interdependence with China

and sought a trade and investment agreement (CAI) in December 2020 despite concerns from the incoming Biden administration. CAI is on hold due to Chinese reprisals when condemning Beijing's abysmal record on democratic and minority rights, and then followed by pressure on Lithuania for recognizing Taiwan. Coupled with reluctance to impose sanctions on Russia over the latest threats to Ukraine, the United States is engaged in talks with Britain, France and Germany, over current tensions. Despite the US Administration efforts to provide a coordinated united front with a mix of retaliatory measures, France has signaled that the EU should forge its own plan for security and stability, with concerns among the US and other allies that this undermines unity and solidarity in a bid by President Macron to exercise leadership to try and de-escalate tensions. While Europeans were initially counting on Biden to re-embrace the arms control and proliferation agenda with extension of US-Russia treaty (START) on ceilings for strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, the situation has been upended by recent developments in Ukraine. There does need to be political and strategic renewal on both sides of the Atlantic but there are issues that the United States will need to factor into its decision-making.

- France currently holds the Presidency of the European Union and Macron is up for re-election in 2022.

- German coalition government is new and so we are in a post-Merkel era.

- France is promoting Franco-German leadership and as proposed the Normandy format as an option to address the Ukraine crisis which means he hopes for Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia to have four-way talks. This will not be well-received by Central and East European countries and it also undermines Blinken's efforts at unity in transatlantic and NATO relations.

- Britain has been the one country to assist Ukraine with arms lift and providing anti-tank missile launchers which has not received any coverage.

- The EU is engaged in discussions on a Strategic Compass for Security and Defense which will be the forward thinking for the next five years on these issues (capabilities, threat perception, strategies) so it will be important to have the new EU-US Security and Defense Dialogue take effect and come on-line. This is

especially important as both are engaged in upgrading cyber security, disinformation measures and other non-traditional threats.[4]

A Full-Agenda: European Policies and Constraints

Overall, the EU has taken some steps to strengthen its internal cohesion but has not been as ambitious in its pursuit of greater international autonomy. Europe (as reflected in Macron's agenda) has advocated for "European sovereignty" which loosely refers to a strong, united Europe capable of independently addressing military and economic challenges.[5]

So let me map out some specific issues on the European agenda, focusing first on internal constraints and policies and then external foreign policy challenges and measures before concluding with on-going discussions on the strategic compass – which will be finalized in March 2022.

Public Health

The pandemic has resulted in a renewed sense of cooperation among European member states. While initially the EU struggled to cooperate by closing borders and restricted cross-border export of medical equipment and personal protective equipment (in violation of single market rules), the EU has subsequently removed those restrictions and activated the European civil protection mechanism. By the end of 2020, member states had taken steps to strengthen key policies in health care and public health as labor markets, supply chains, and budgets were too closely bound together. The EU is based on the free movement of labor, goods, and services which means that food safety, health professional regulation, cross-border health care services, or the regulation of pharmaceuticals and medical devices must move freely across borders (with specific

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[4] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/19/fact-sheet-president-biden-signs-national-security-memorandum-to-improve-the-cybersecurity-of-national-security-department-of-defense-and-intelligence-community-systems/

[5] https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/media/13gjadzx/pfue_press_kit.pdf

public health exemptions that have rarely been utilized). The EU determined that this was problematic and made public health a European regulatory goal. The EU is now focused on resilience of supply chains, stockpiling resources relevant to COVID-19, as the EU before the pandemic, the EU was the world's largest vaccine producer, closely followed by India. China is now much further in front in terms the clear leader not only of production but also exports. Within EU, rules for travel for those outside of Europe varies across member states although the EU has created a European-wide covid travel certificate for European citizens to restore freedom of travel within Europe.

The issue of public health is also one of vaccine distribution at the global level where the US and EU have differing positions. Various states including India supported by African and Caribbean states have sought a TRIPS waiver (intellectual property). After some initial supportive comments from the US, there has not been a specific proposal. The EU has an alternative proposal in which the vaccine is made available so that it could be produced locally by scaling up the manufacturing of vaccines or other health products. Waiving certain IP rules in the TRIPS agreement over the next three years could help create diverse regional manufacturing hubs but the EU has a different position on the issue (having also invested significant funds in research on vaccines).

Economic recovery and stimulus

The EU has created a massive €720 billion across the EU to strengthen the recovery from the Covid-19 crisis. The NextGen EU recovery plan does not provide the same kind of firepower as its US counterpart.[6] However. It is an important response to promote economic recovery and solidarity. Europeans have learnt from their experience during the eurozone crisis where a lack of solidarity generated internal divisions between Northern and Southern Europe. This time around a Franco-German agreement led to support for those hit hardest by the current crisis. A key element is the new Recovery and Resilience Facility of €560 billion, which offers financial support in the form of loans and funds for investments and reforms, especially for green and digital transitions which have been prioritized by the European Union.

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[6] https://europa.eu/next-generation-eu/index_en

Democratic backsliding and rule of law

The European Union has faced pressure about upholding its values with the changes in domestic laws in Poland and Hungary. There has been democratic backsliding and erosion of rule of law with challenges to decision from the European Court of Justice. The problem for the EU is that the rule of law has a limited toolbox so that the actions taken so far have not yielded any domestic legal. There is a blatant disregard for the rule of law, media pluralism and other fundamental rights in Poland and Hungary. Judges have been forced out and disciplinary tribunals have been established to exercise government control over the judiciary. The EU's sanctioning mechanism for member governments who violate the union's fundamental norms, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law has not been invoked. However, the European Union is preparing to withhold budget payments for non-compliance with European laws, withholding Poland's request for 36 billion euros from the EU recovery fund regarding rule of law violations. There is a sense that the EU institutions have not been able to exert change and so several nation-states have sought to act - the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Belgium –and bring a case before the courts.

FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES

There are a myriad of foreign policy challenges including trade, migration, climate, nationalism, and border conflicts.

Regional Neighborhood

The situation in Turkey and the Balkans has gotten much less attention despite the worsening conditions. The European Union opened accession negotiations as a step towards membership with six states in the Balkans. There is clear enlargement fatigue as well which hampers the incentives to undertake the necessary reforms. If there appears to be no clear path forward, the efforts to stabilize the region are undermined. There has also been limited European support during the pandemic and so the Balkan states have focused on regional economic cooperation, but it is a relatively small market. The EU can focus on connectivity in transport, railways, energy, and digital

connectivity to foster stronger links to European Union. But with growing economic hardships, social tensions, and unsettled conflicts in the European Neighborhood, the EU has to deal with growing anti-western attitudes. North Macedonia and Albania exposed divisions within Europe as specific states have blocked the opening of membership talks for Albania and North Macedonia.[7] The European vacuum has led to the Balkans becoming the arena for multipolar competition. The rise of authoritarianism, suspension of political liberties, lack of statehood, corruption, and democratic backsliding, has not been met by serious European engagement. Part of the reason is internal divisions in Europe. Thus, Cyprus and Greece concerns about Turkish actions mean that Cyprus links their enlargement concerns to other European reforms. Bulgaria's blockage of North Macedonia's accession path, and Croatia's position on Bosnia and Herzegovina has led to an uncoordinated policy. China, Russia, Turkey, and some Gulf states, have as a result stepped in and are also vying for political, economic, and cultural influence so it has become an area of multipolar competition. The US has become engaged and slapped sanctions on Bosnian Serb nationalist Dodik for destabilizing BiH and the EU should do just the same but again divisions in Europe prevent concerted actions as Viktor Orbán vowed to veto EU sanctions. What we are seeing is an undermining of Bosnian institutions and threatening the country's territorial integrity. While Germany still has a good deal of credibility in the region, there needs to be a stronger political impulse, financial resources, and cooperation with US to engage actively with the Western Balkans.

Trade Issues

European trade policy has shifted direction from one that focused on "Trade for all" with an emphasis on trade agreements to a more geo-economic trade policy. The lack of progress at the multilateral level has shifted the European focus to bilateral trade issues. The European Union has also shifted towards more trade defensive instruments with issues of enforcement, sanctions, dealing with non-market practices, subsidies, and distortions. The lack of progress at the multilateral level has shifted the

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[7] Bulgaria has opposed that of North Macedonia till it acknowledges Bulgarian identity in terms of Macedonian identity and language. Kosovo and Bosnia are not yet candidates and many issues remain unresolved.

European focus to pressure to reform the WTO as well as pursue a variety of other strategies and options. The EU has opted for new investment screening laws over foreign direct investment (driven by surge of Chinese investment in technology and infrastructure in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008) and legislation on dual use technologies in recognition of the need to address technology transfer and other issues (such as 5G). The EU is enhancing its trade enforcement toolbox with export controls, sanctions and data regulations while also focusing on environmental and labor standards in free trade agreements (FTAs) in relation to global supply chains.

The European Union has also focused on the importance of trade and technology.[8] The EU is at the forefront of data privacy rules which have led to difficulties in data flows between the US and EU due to US bulk surveillance. Concerns about how information is used has led to the suspension of the US-EU Data Privacy shield. The EU is also concerned about competition and regulating large data platforms. While this initially appeared to be directed at large US platforms due to their dominance in many areas (eg cloud computing), the European position is gaining traction in the US in terms of monopoly powers. The final element to the digital strategy is the importance of connectivity within the European single market and beyond. The EU has just announced a Global Strategy to counteract the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI-China) to promote infrastructure, connectivity, and standards to its global partners including Asia and Latin America.[9] The technology, trade, and security element is the new Transatlantic Trade and Technology council which kicked off in November 2021 to cooperate on key issues. So far around twelve working groups have been put in place. European lags the US and China in critical digital infrastructure, critical raw materials, and new industries such as artificial intelligence (AI), the control of data flows and storage, semiconductors, 5G mobile equipment.

Also addressing some trade irritants between the US and EU is important. Some of this is deferring conclusion on these issues such as halting retaliatory tariffs,

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[8] Digital Markets Act (DMA) will be a single set of rules for the largest digital platform. Tame big tech platforms and include search engines, operating systems, and online marketplace

[9] Alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-Global Gateway, the new EU strategy-major investment in infrastructure development around the world

providing a grace period on the steel and aluminum tariff issue that was imposed by Trump Administration on grounds of national security (Section 232). Adding efforts to support low-carbon production and reduce overcapacity is also targeted at Chinese manufacturing. The long-standing Boeing-Airbus dispute has generated a deal which was necessary so they can focus on China's subsidies to its own aircraft challengers. Getting a broad coalition to address the subsidies issue will be important to get support from Japan, India, Brazil as well as US and EU. The agreement on digital taxes is another welcome development that defers trouble for the transatlantic relationship for the time being.

Brexit

Britain is now a third country and so treated similarly in diplomatic terms to the United States or others states outside the EU. The UK opted out of strategic foreign policy cooperation. The UK and EU have a major trade agreement (known as TCA)[10] but the implementation has been problematic due to the accord reached on Northern Ireland. The issue is that the Good Friday Peace Agreement requires no border within Ireland and allows for trade between North and South. This is now threatened as N. Ireland as part of UK is outside of EU. It has receded in significance for European member-states, but Britain has sent strong signals it wishes to cancel the negotiations involving Northern Ireland protocol. This is a fundamental breach of international obligations and has generated strong condemnation by Members of Congress and President Biden who value the role of the US in negotiating the Good Friday Agreement that brokered peace in 1998. This has hampered British efforts to negotiate a trade deal in the US as there is considerable strong sentiment that the UK must prioritize peace and stability in N. Ireland.

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[10] https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/relations-non-eu-countries/relations-united-kingdom/eu-uk-trade-and-cooperation-agreement_en

Ukraine-Russia Escalation

With respect to the current crisis with Russia, this has been evolving from cyber security attacks to military buildup on the border with Ukraine.[11] Ukraine is unfinished business for Putin as he believes that absorption of Ukraine into West is a concern for Russian security. He has taken advantage of European divisions involving Russia as Europe has produced strategic outlooks on Indo-Pacific and China but still has divergent threat perceptions on Russia.[12] NATO is not directly involved in this conflict but there are lots of disinformation in Russian media about NATO aggression. Putin has put out demands publicly including new treaties and agreements that are not starting points for discussion. The US and NATO should respond that there is no guarantee that NATO will not take Ukraine as new member and cannot reduce deployment of military assets. There are discussions in NATO-Russia council, and OSCE meetings but these have made limited progress. Sec. of State Blinken has engaged with European allies extensively given their immediate security needs. NATO will not agree to these maximalist demands even though Ukraine is not on a path to membership for the foreseeable future, but NATO will not close the door to any new prospective member. NATO is willing to have constructive dialogue on other issues. However, Russian military posture and troop movements suggest the prospect of a major ground offensive into Ukraine which does not prioritize precision of differentiate combatants from civilians.

The US administration is talking about financial sanctions but there is a reluctance from Germany to impose high sanctions due to fledgling post-covid economic recovery and energy dependence on Russia. Germany is under mounting pressure from European allies as others quickly supply military aid and security assistance. Germany policy is generating confusion to Central and East European allies who have been reliant of US/NATO response as Germany's stance is undermining EU credibility.

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[11] With failed talks between the United States, NATO, and Russia on January 10–13, 2022, the level of concern has deepened in West and the Normandy group has also begun diplomatic engagement as well as efforts to arm Ukraine from various allies in response to Russian military build-up.

[12] https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf

Russia has been preparing financially for the prospect of sanctions and taking funds out of US banks. Europeans have been more focused on cyberattacks and disinformation than the US and providing counter narrative (eg UK across government agencies). France has key role as holds Presidency of EU, Germany the G7, and Poland the OSCE. European Security pact proposed by Macron (French President).

The foreign policy challenges including ongoing destabilization of Ukraine and military threats that are posed against European countries come at a time when France holds the EU Presidency (January-June 2022). While France had an initial preference to re-focus European attention toward the Middle East and Africa, and German reticence to take an assertive posture toward Russia, the context has changed with resurgent Russian actions.[13] Germany has been criticized for its reticence driven by a mix of concerns about the weaponization of energy given their dependence on Russian energy supplies (Nord Stream 2), its refusal to allow the Baltic states to supply military arms to Ukraine, and its undermining of a transatlantic response towards Russia. Berlin, Paris, Warsaw, London and others have made their strategic assessments and need a common position which may emerge out of the Normandy format. French goals were to establish institutions to provide collective security for Europe and achieve strategic autonomy—the capacity to decide and act to protect European territory and its near neighborhood independently of NATO. This goes further than the European Union Global Strategy from 2016 and is reflected in the discussions surrounding the *Strategic Compass* (see below).

European action on defense and security

The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan was a very sobering experience for Europeans. European decision-makers have responded by promising to bolster their own security and defense policy by developing a robust European initial entry force that generated a strongly worded response from the NATO Secretary-General who is concerned about duplication. This is not a new issue as the efforts in the aftermath to create a European Security and Defense policy after the Balkans War when Europe

was unprepared to respond has elicited reactions from both the United States and NATO in the past. Albright famously commented that European efforts should not discriminate, duplicate, or decouple. EU external action has struggled to meet expectations and so the EU in its 2016 Global Strategy outlined a €13.5 billion European Defense Fund, and a €6.5 billion Military Mobility Fund among earmarked expenditures including stronger tech regulations and disinformation efforts that have been cut due to the pandemic.

Part of the problem is often diagnosed as a capacity one when the EU also requires a geopolitical vision and political will to leverage capabilities. To align the different strategic cultures and priorities of European member states and to work towards a mutual understanding of threats and capabilities, the EU is currently developing a *Strategic Compass*, which should be adopted in early 2022. This is important as it is being written in terms of threat perception and strategic outlook in comparison to the negotiations that led to the Global Strategy which did not focus on how to respond to crises. The Strategic Compass focuses on four baskets: crisis management, resilience, capabilities, and partnerships. It is designed to deal with varied threat perceptions including economic coercion, climate change, regional instabilities, and hybrid risks for example. The document will likely reflect a balance between Atlanticists and Europeanistsas os often the case with issues of foreign policy and security. France has been pushing for an ambitious Strategic Compass so that the EU can engage in high-intensity crisis management whereas Poland, has been calling for a more modest level of ambition.[14]

- The EU is set to adopt its first common threat analysis and define its level of military ambition in a **Strategic Compass**

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[14] The costs for such strategic autonomy are enormous and capability requires capacity "including combat clouds with interconnected joint strike fighters and drone swarms, satellite support, land forces with advanced protection and electronic warfare systems, as well as cyber capacities sufficient to attack European critical infrastructure" (Fiott 2017; Donnelley, Forthcoming). Fiott, D. 2017. A revolution too far? US defence innovation, Europe, and NATO's military-technological gap. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 40 (3), 417-437; Donnelley S (2022) Recasting World Order: Power politics, Contestation, and International Institutions in Egan M. et al. (2022) Contestation and Polarization in Global Governance: European Responses (Edward Elgar, 2022 in press).

- EU will take more responsibility for its own security and in the field of defense-deepening defense cooperation
- pursue a strategic course of action and increase its capacity to act autonomously
- Use of entire EU toolbox, including civilian and military policies, tools, and instruments.
- Less on military than on sanctions, institution building, development assistance, regulatory convergence, cybersecurity and fighting disinformation

A few general thoughts as the Strategic Compass takes shape and will provide direction to 2030.

a) What will be a clear division of labor between NATO and EU?
b) What type of strategic partnerships does the EU envisage? How balance strategic autonomy with partnership?
c) Why should EU engage in crisis management?
d) What do they want to achieve with a threat perception analysis that is broad in scope?
e) Should the focus of this document by regional neighborhood and make Africa and Balkans the priority areas?
f) What type of threats will shape a European response?
g) How address strategic fragmentation and the diffusion of responsibilities in security and defense?
h) What does Europe mean by resilience?
i) What critical capabilities need to address (versus political will)?
j) Should EU address existing capability gaps or invest in modernization?
k) With many European missions over the past twenty years being in low intensity conflict environments, such as judicial reform, police training, maritime surveillance, will the EU overcome its focus on crisis management and prevention?
l) To what extent will the Compass focus on classic security challenges versus hybrid ones? And will this lead to a change in the security parameters of the

EU? Will it need more resources and political will to be an effective actionable document?

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Regarding the Western Hemisphere, there is much less attention relative to other regions (China, Indo-Pacific, Africa). There are strategic dialogues and trade negotiations that underpin the relationship. There is less of a coherent strategic picture than a series of distinct bilateral initiatives. On the humanitarian front, the EU is active (eg distribution of Astra Zeneca vaccine to Honduras) or sanctions against specific individuals (eg Nicaragua) in light or worsening human rights conditions and concerns about recent elections). The major trade agreement between Mercosur and the EU is on hold due to continued concerns over environmental guarantees.[15] The sentiment in the region from industrial organizations from Mercosur -Confederação Nacional da Indústria (CNI), Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA), Unión Industrial Paraguaya (UIP) and Cámara de Industrias del Uruguay (CIU) is broad support.[16] Overall, there are a variety of aid and development programs (eg climate change, digital connectivity, gender) but there are overall fissures within the CELAC bloc that make coordination difficult so the EU engages in interregional discussions as well as bilateral, but the focus of Europe seems primarily economic interests.

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[15] Mercosur Association Agreement, which was finalized on June 28, 2019, but not ratified. Concerns by civil society about effects of increased trade will intensify Brazilian deforestation rates and violate indigenous rights.

[16] https://www.tradeexperettes.org/blog/articles/is-it-time-to-get-the-eu-mercosur-deal-across-the-finish-line

AFGHANISTAN AND THE WORLD:
THE REGIONAL AND GLOBAL IMPACT

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(Lecture)

Introduction

The core of this analysis addresses the impact of the U.S. and Afghan central government defeat by the Taliban on the image of the U.S. in the world, its potential global and regional impacts, and its probable impact on regional and global extremism and terrorism. The full version also addresses its probable impact on Afghanistan and some of the key lessons the U.S. and its strategic partners should learn from the war.

It argues that the U.S. defeat is likely to have only a limited strategic impact in most of the world and that global attention already discounted the U.S. defeat once the U.S. announced its withdrawal and the peace negotiations with the Taliban. It also argues that the primary causes of political violence and unrest are the failures of the governments of fragile states, and not the limited threat posed by terrorism and extremism – with civil war and major insurgencies – caused largely by the failures of national governments – driving instability and unrest.

It estimates that China and Russia – along with other regional powers – will attempt to exploit the situation, and that the primary threat of the regional powers around and near Afghanistan is their own internal instability, divisions, and weak governance.

Finally, the full version highlights failures in the U.S. approach to strategic partnership with Afghanistan and the U.S. failure to understand that it faced a major and

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growing insurgency rather than a terrorist and extremist threat, along with the U.S. failure to address the corruption, incompetence, and weakness of the Afghan central government.

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Impact on the United States

I was a civilian assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the point when Vietnam collapse so to some extent this is the second time that I have deal with this kind of situation. Many people during the collapse of Saigon triply overreacted to what they thought the importance of the collapse of Vietnam would be and ignored the problems that actually would occur. Well, my own impression of that it's based on having visited Afghanistan, having been there many occasions with the US command. Haven gone there with General McChrystal, we dealt with the country where the crisis we had in 911 let us to commit ourselves in ways which did not serve in some ways, our strategic interests. I think that from roughly 2014 onwards. It was clear that the Afghan government was in serious trouble; that our efforts to create effective forces only having marginal impact, that we were in a situation where we either had to stay indefinitely or decide to leave. We decided to leave and my guess is that the broader regional and global impact will be very limited even in terms of the US role and prestige in other countries.

Afghanistan under the Taliban is not going to become a major threat of terrorism or Islamic extremism. I think it is likely to remain one more trouble state, in a very troubled region, in a country that has minimal strategic importance, except for its neighbors. It is a country which is suffering these problems in a world where many other countries represent an equal threat of extremism, terrorism and violence. Something like 20 to 25% of the states of the world today have very similar level of instability in a time with COVID, internal crisis, failed governance and economies, and major power competition impacts on. In the case of Vietnam in which in many ways is a state of consider with strategic importance. It was remarkable to see how little real impact the collapse of Vietnam had. And I think that is going to be repeated in this case. But obviously, no one can predict history.

When we talk about Afghanistan we also have to talk about strategic triage. If there is a lesson here, it is to be careful about over committing forces and over committing yourself to a mission of limited value. But in this case in particular, the US had effectively already withdrawn stated it was leaving. It was dealing with an insurgent movement in the form of the Taliban which basically there's no clear option as yet that can produce lasting, meaningful victory or impact heavily on the region and the world. If it is to succeed, it has to establish a functioning government, and it faces its own threats like ISIS. It also has to build a government in a country whose government had already failed as a central government under its previous leaders. My guess is it will have some impacts on its neighbors, but almost all of these neighbors face their own problems. They have different cultures, different political systems, and do not share the values of the Taliban in cultural or religious terms. At the same time, the US will have to find its own ways in very different parts of the world, some of which we were discussing in the previous briefing, and in drafting a new national security strategy or National Defense strategy. The recent *Global Posture* review we've already largely excluded Afghanistan. Focusing on competition with China, Russia, North Korea, Iran and global extremist threats.

Fragile States Index
Source: Adapted from the Fragile States Index Report 2021,
https://fragilestatesindex.org/analytics/fsi-heat-map/.

And this just gives you an idea of the world we now live in. I said that we face roughly the same problems in a good part of the world we do in Afghanistan. This is one map of the level of countries that have their own elements, problems and instability. You can see how different those challenges are.

Impact on the Region

Afghanistan's Strategic Position
Source: Adapted from Research Gate,
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-southwest-Asia_fig1_235967637.

We talk about the impact on the region. We are talking about two different sets, one are the countries immediately around Afghanistan and the others are the major powers that may or may not become involved. Obviously, Afghanistan is landlocked, it has no major communication routes of international importance. It has no meaningful exports other than drugs. Previous government got more than 60% of its income from foreign aid, and was incapable of operating except through outside aid and support.

UN Least
Developed
Country
Status

Adapted from United
Nations, *Least
developed Countries*,
August 2021, p. 3,
https://info.worldbank.or
g/governance/wgi/Home
/Reports.

UN Least Developed Country Status
Source: Adapted from United Nations, Least developed Countries, August 2021, p. 3,
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports.

Afghanistan also was and is one of the least developed countries in the world. There is a great deal of literature about progress being made in Afghan development. Most of it occurred in a handful of cities and affected less than 8% of the population. By and large it remained poor to the point of crisis. The government did not function even in a minimal way, in the areas where it was not sharply opposed by the Taliban that world, or outside the urban areas and many of the major urban areas are under the control outside local power brokers rather than the central government that collapsed in the face of the Taliban invasion.

So what will the impact be on the neighbors? Well, for several days Pakistan saw this at least in some levels as a victory. Now, it is facing the fact that it has a serious border crisis with the Taliban and it is largely sponsored in a quiet level and threw up much over the border. There is a debate over the border, which has gone on since the border was formed. It faces ISIS in other arms. Iraq is seeking stability to find some way to work with the Taliban so they do not have another problem with the Shiite minorities' stability and security in Afghanistan. It would like to limit drug exports. The drug problem

in Iran increased sharply under the Government after the fall of the Taliban. It does face its own problems with extremists in the southeast. Would like to trade aid for stability If it can, Russia is seeking to find ties to the Taliban too. Talking about aid and recognition and also trying to secure the countries to the South that are former parts, infraction stands. But it faces a real question as to the stability of its broader security pacts in the region. They have nothing to do with Afghanistan and the Taliban. China too is seeking stability and ties through aid and recognition it does in the far North chair a corridor into Afghanistan. It's very narrow and it already has deployed troops and was defending that corridor before the collapse of the government. There's been talk about minds there has been a tension between China and India. Just as it was between Pakistan and India in its role in Afghanistan. But so far China has no major economic interests in Afghanistan and no clear reason to see it as something that really has a clear rooted to try to build strong relations.

Impact on Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)?
Source: Adapted from Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization

There are two security arrangements. One is Russian. It's the collective security treaty organization and it sounds a little like NATO. But if you look at its membership you

see that what in many ways it is, is the former Soviet Union. And it has, at least today, had no military impact outside the former Russian territory. It has recently intervened in Kazakhstan; but not because of Afghanistan, but because of instability in Kazakhstan.

Impact on Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)?

The **Shanghai Cooperation Organization** (SCO), also known as the **Shanghai Pact**, is an Eurasian political, economic, and security alliance. It is the world's largest regional organization in geographic scope and population, covering three-fifths of the Eurasian continent, 40% of the world population, and more than 20% of global GDP.[1] The SCO is the successor to the **Shanghai Five**, a mutual security agreement formed in 1996 between China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. On 15 June 2001, the leaders of these nations and Uzbekistan met in Shanghai to announce a new organization with deeper political and economic cooperation; the SCO Charter was signed on 7 July 2002 and entered into force on 19 September 2003. Its membership has since expanded to eight states, with India and Pakistan joining on 9 June 2017. Several countries are engaged as observers or partners.

Member states
- China
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Russia
- Tajikistan
- Uzbekistan
- India
- Pakistan

Observer states
- Afghanistan
- Belarus
- Iran
- Mongolia

Dialogue partners
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Cambodia
- Nepal
- Sri Lanka
- Turkey

Guest attendances
- ASEAN
- Turkmenistan
- CIS
- UN

Source: Adapted from Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation.

Impact on Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)?
Source: Source: Adapted from Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation.

There also is the Shanghai Cooperation organization. This is in some ways a discussion group. There's no evidence that it has taken on a military or security character. It includes countries which are arrivals. It basically has been useful to Russia and China in creating a strategic dialogue. But again, we're all Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and the "-Stans"
Source: Adapted from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Central_Asia#/media/File:Map_of_Central_Asia.png.

As for the countries immediately around Afghanistan. The bulk of Afghanistan's population is ethnically and in some ways religiously, at least in sectarian practices, different from any of the countries on its boarder. And each of these countries, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan has its own internal tensions, its own internal problems, a leadership which is in some ways product of the heritage of the former Soviet Union. But it does not have major commitments to any of the ethnic minorities in Afghanistan in the north. It is unclear how much influence anyone at the Taliban could have in any of the Stans.

Obviously, it is unfair to try to summarize five countries in a sentence or paragraph. But none of them again is tide in any clear way to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is not only one of the least developed countries in the world it also has some of the most marginal trade.

Kazakhstan: No common border. Authoritarian state. Ongoing internal leadership crisis. Minimal ties to Afghanistan.

Kyrgyz Republic: No common border. Some democratic progress. Continuing concerns include democratization, endemic corruption, a history of tense – and at

times violent – interethnic relations, border security vulnerabilities, and potential terrorist threats.

Tajikistan: Electoral system rife with irregularities and abuse. President Emomali Rahmon, who came to power in 1992 during the civil war and was first elected president in 1994. Banned the last major opposition political party in December 2015, Rahmon had himself declared "Founder of Peace and National Unity, Leader of the Nation," with limitless terms and lifelong immunity.

Turkmenistan: Gas exporter, but weak economy. President for life Saparmurat Niyazov died in December 2006, and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, emerged as new president. Berdimuhamedow won Turkmenistan's first multi-candidate presidential election in February 2007, and again in 2012 and in 2017 with over 97% of the vote.

Uzbekistan: Has diversified agricultural production, developed mineral and petroleum export capacity, and increased manufacturing base. Uzbekistan's first president, Islam Karimov, led Uzbekistan for 25 years until his death in September 2016. His successor, former Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has improved relations with Uzbekistan's neighbors and introduced wide-ranging economic, judicial, and social reforms. Mirziyoyev was reelected in October 2021 with 80% of the vote.

Impact on Terrorism

We keep often focusing on terrorism. Here I think one of the mistakes the United States made and it was a very serious one. Was talking about the Taliban as a terrorist group. Remember that it had been the actual government of Afghanistan before the US invaded. The US invaded because of Al Qaeda not because of the Taliban. In the years that have followed the Taliban certainly has been a hard line. Very dedicated Islamist insurgency group. Its ties to outside terrorist groups it's been minor. They have not sponsored them. And here again, the difficulty is going from an Insurgent movement, which in many ways reflects a significant set of Afghans, particularly among questions in the South and a terrorist or extremist movement.

Countries with Active Terrorism Extremist Incidents in 2020

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM

VERY HIGH	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	VERY LOW	NO IMPACT	NOT INCLUDED
10	8	6	4	2	0	

Countries with Active Terrorism Extremist Incidents in 2020
Source: Adapted from START, Global Terrorism Index, November 2020,
https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf

And again, when we talk about terrorism one of the difficulties is this is not an Afghan problem. It is a global problem, and it is a global problem at this point concentrated at least as much in the Middle East and Africa and in some ways in Asia as it is in Afghanistan. In an almost every case where there is a major terrorist activity the main goal of that group is not international terrorism. In many cases, it's committed almost no broader acts of international terrorism. It is to seek power or influence in the country where it operates. Are there international links in terms of money, communication, cooperation? yes. But the level of actual international terrorism has not risen. What has risen in very different ways is the level of violence and civil war. And if you look at a lot of red countries on this map. Countries like Libya, Syria, or Yemen these are much more civil wars than exercises in terrorism. Here you have to be very careful about semantics, because if you label you're enemies as terrorists, because you don't like them or for propaganda purposes you distort your perception of the threat and your ability to fight it.

Impact of Afghanistan

I think it's hard for people who have not been in Afghanistan, it was hard for many people who fought there or who tried to change it, to face the problem is that actually

65

occurred there. One problem, is in spite of our efforts to reform the Government, give it a new democratic constitution, it failed. We did not have a successful Afghan government, we had a corrupt, incompetent structure that did not govern, in much of the country even when the Taliban, and not come back and reasserted itself. That wasted much of the aid money it was given and could not unite even at the local level. Now the problem is for the Taliban, it is inherited a country that did not have a real economy other than dependence on aid. That did not have a real government but it is coming back to power after some 20 years without having anyone who is actually govern. Who has experience with the Afghanistan that has changed so much in the last two decades. And where the political leadership of the Taliban and the fighters are often divided and where the factions both within the Taliban and outside it are divide. The domestic economy is essentially based more on narcotics exports than any other source of hard currency that can be traded with its neighbors. Since at least 2014, according to the World Bank long before the collapse with the decision to leave Afghanistan it's per capita income which already was among the lowest in the world was dropped. Over day was rising and now we face not only the near collapse of financial system but near famine, both for financial reasons because of drought.

You had deep divisions even within local areas in some cities, for example there were rival power brokers. Sometimes more than ten groups in a given major city. The modernization efforts did succeed to some extent. One problem was that the United States and its allies often claimed far more progress than actually occurred. For example, Afghanistan at the highest infant mortality rate in the world. This is a very basic measure of human development. These figures comes from the United Nations. Population pressure, this is a problem in naturally developing world. With the rate of population growth in Afghanistan to go from these figures: 22 to 25 million in 2000 to 36 to 39 million 20 years later. Even a developed country it found be almost impossible trade. There were dreams on pipelines, the new Silk Road with Asia and Europe, on mining development and none of that happens. Oddly enough, the Taliban was actually earning more money from mining before the collapse of the government than when the government was. Any efforts that people are talking about now, which presumably might not even ask for the Taliban, involve massive sums of money to meet the requirements outlined by the UN

and other groups. But understand humanitarian aid doesn't bring development. It simply ensures the survival and well-being of people. It doesn't offer solutions. In the planning before the collapse, estimates were that it would take some 2.5 to 4 billion a year to keep the country in its existing state and move toward development. And it is extremely unlikely that the Taliban it's going to come to even a fraction to this amount of money.

Some quick metrics:

Terrible Governance 2021: Minimal civil capability to survive and improve
Source: Adapted from the World Bank, Governance Indicators, 1996-2020,
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports.

These are the World Bank governance ratings, voice and accountability is freedom of the media, freedom of speech. Political stability and the absence of violence speaks for itself. That flat line on the bottom is perhaps a rival with Somalia and Yemen for the worst performance of any country in the world government effectiveness. Remember these are ratings by group based in the United States with an outstanding reputation for its objectivity, It has no bias is an ideological level and again, Governance, Rule of law and Control of corruption over a period that includes Russian presence and the presence of Taliban orders in turn. Again, some of the worst performance in the world.

World Bank & IDB Estimate of Demographic Pressure
Source: Adapted from World Bank,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=AF

The slide gives you an idea of the population pressure. Now, very often this is something that in today's world people try to ignore but look at the figures for 1960 and look at the figures for 2020. This is an almost unimaginable level of Population pressure. If you wondered why governance failed quite aside from sectarian and ethnic rivalry you get an idea of the incredible difficulties the Taliban now faces; and faces without a structure even as weak as the government I showed you earlier.

Lessons for Strategic Partnerships

But very quickly and let me close with this, a couple of points about strategic partnerships. One of the points that I found very difficult in dealing with when I was working in Afghanistan and with people in the US command is they focused on the Taliban and the enemy. But insurgencies do not appear by magic. In most cases, the government that you are working with and trying to fight an insurgency fails with these people, fails to be unified and failed to be effective. It is as much an enemy to a successful counterinsurgency campaign as the actual Taliban or insurgency was. We came to this country with almost no background, no real or recent experience in dealing with nation building. Without a clear set of priorities as to what it was that we were seeking to

accomplish in strategic terms. It is the case in far too many other insurgencies. There was a country backing the enemy, the Taliban. Even though in many ways it was supposedly our partner. That was Pakistan in to a lesser extent, Iran. I think the failure on the part of counterinsurgency campaigns to address the civil issue, the causes of the insurgency, rule of outside powers in any formal or effective way or above all the threat posed by the strategic partners weakness. It Is something that should be a lesson to everyone. To the US it is a lesson to intervene only when you can trust your partner. To the countries that seek US aid it is basically that we cannot help a country that will not help itself. There are examples of that in Latin America and other parts of the world.

The Cost of War FY2000-FY2021 ($US billions)
Source: Adapted from SIGAR, Quarterly Report, October 30, 2021,
p. 44, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-10-30qr.pdf.

These is what I think are a warning. You see the massive buildup that occurred after the Taliban had already in many ways come back. The Blue lines are the military lines, the brown lines are the money spent on development. If you focus on the military dimension and ignore the civil level you are likely to lose, like we did.

Key U.S. Force Building ($81B) and Economic Development Aid ($21B)

Key U.S. Force Building ($81B) and Economic Development Aid ($21B)
Source: Adapted from SIGAR, Quarterly Report October 30, 2021, pp. 47, 53,
https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-10-30qr.pdf

This gives you an idea of the aid programs. This is the money that went directly from the US. On the left side, they sort of yellow figures are the money that went to develop the military. Which is you can see it's far higher than the development aid levels spending on the right which are the economic levels. Note that the economic aid program went down far faster than the military aid program. This is almost a recipe for loosing. You don't get this spending patterns and assume you are on the route to success.

U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan 2002-2021

Adapted from SIGAR, *Quarterly Report October 30, 2021,* p. 79, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-10-30qr.pdf.

a Projected for 2018 based on public statements of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. According to USFOR-A, the publicly releasable U.S. troop level, as of March 1, 2018, remains 14,000.

b On January 15, 2021, the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan was 2,500; the number dropped to 650 by late June/early July as U.S. forces withdrew; peaked at 5,784 in late August as the U.S. deployed forces to assist with the Noncombatant Evacuation Operation; and went to zero on August 30, 2021.

U.S. Troop Levels in Afghanistan 2002-2021
Source: Adapted from SIGAR, Quarterly Report October 30, 2021,
p. 79, https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2021-10-30qr.pdf.

We were able to use air power and advisory groups building on the Taliban to keep fighting from 2011 to 2021. The problem was as in the case in Vietnam, we could win virtually every major battle. But we could never hold on to the areas where we had won and there was no government to build. General McChrystal used the slogan *win, hold and build,* when we won we didn't hold and build.

Afghan Force Development vs. Afghan Violence: 2004-2010

Number of average daily attacks per month

ANA force size goal increased to 171,600

ANA force size goal increased to 134,000

ANA force size goal increased to 80,000

Total average daily attacks
Average daily attacks against ISAF and coalition forces
Average daily attacks against civilians
Average daily attacks against ANSF
Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Adapted by the author from GAO, *Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined*, GAO 11-66, January 2011, pp. 4, 6.

Afghan Force Development vs. Afghan Violence: 2004-2010
Source: Adapted by the author from GAO, Afghanistan Security: Afghan Army Growing, but Additional Trainers Needed; Long-term Costs Not Determined, GAO 11-66, January 2011, pp. 4, 6.

But the fact is that this collapse that you see dramatized in so many maps of how sudden the collapse was is not an honest picture of what really happened. In case after case the Taliban had taken over the countryside. It didn't control the district capital, but the district capital had become corrupted tide to the Taliban and was not functioning as a government. You lost control over the major roads, you lost control over the economy. As we go back and examine the lessons, one of the problem was we kept talking about winning because we have won individual engagements, but we lost the countryside. Which again is the history of fight to many areas of insurgent defeat.

So, there is an overview of what I think will happen Most in terms of regional and local interests in at least some of the causes that I watched developed there over 20 years. Again, I suppose I have a strange experience as a background because my wife and I drove through Afghanistan as tourists in 1972. Let me say the last thing on Earth I thought we would face is having spent two weeks as tourists driving from Iran to the capital It would become a country we ended up fighting for 20 years then

Thank you.

SECURITY TRENDS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Alix Boucher[1]
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
National Defense University
(Lecture)

I like to start here with this slide, which just provides an overview of the continent. Africa has 54 countries. The Sahara Desert is the largest hot desert in the world (it's about the size of US). The continent has the world's newest country in South Sudan. The Nile is the longest river in the world. Nigeria is the most populous country in the Continent with 206 million people expected to have 205 billion by 2050.

Figure 1: Africa at a Glance

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[1] As an Assistant Research Fellow, Alix Boucher focuses on good governance, peace operations, and transnational threats. Her areas of expertise include peace operations in Africa, building the rule of law in conflict and post-conflict states, security sector reform, and UN sanctions. Before joining the Africa Center, Ms. Boucher served as an expert adviser for the High-Level Review on United Nations Sanctions, an international effort to assess the effectiveness of UN sanctions. She was also a member of the Targeted Sanctions Research Consortium. She previously worked at the Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations program, the National Defense University's Center for Complex Operations, and the Global Center on Cooperative Security. She received a B.A. in international relations from Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley, Massachusetts, and an M.A. in International Relations and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. She is a native French speaker. Areas of Expertise: Peace operations, stability operations, UN sanctions, UN expert panels, countering violent extremism, counterterrorism, West Africa, Central Africa, and the Sahel Africa.

The population is very young, and the life expectancy is approximately 59 years. They have great wealth & poverty; 75% of the population lives on less than $2 a day, but the country has the best mineral wealth with: platinum, chromium, diamonds, cobalt, manganese and proven oil reserves.


Figure 2: Africa's Colonial Legacies

This map shows Africa's colonial legacy. As you all know much of the continent was colonized by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and to a lesser degree Spain, Italy and Portugal. So, this legacy most of the countries achieved independence in the late 50s, early 1960s. These behind quite a few legacies from these relationships many of the countries continue to use their colonizers language as one of their official languages. They also maintain those colonizers legal traditions in many cases. So, for instance, the Napoleonic Code for former French colonies versus a Common Law for former British colonies, and they have maintained strong trade relationships as well as history of military intervention in some of the continent's conflicts from the former colonizing powers.

Figure 3: Autocracy and Instability in Africa

I think I'd like to use this map as an introduction to somewhat of a backdrop to the discussion that I want to have today. This map shows the link between autocracy and instability in Africa. The countries in a dark green are considered to be democracies, and then in the lighter shade of green that they are democratize. That means that they have, it's typically had, several rounds of peaceful and democratic elections, but for example, they haven't yet necessarily have had a peaceful transition of power after a term limit has expired for president. So, they're still establishing their democratic traditions. The light yellow are semi authoritarian countries and orange ones are autocratic countries.

These last couple years, and this year really with the COVID-19 pandemic as a backdrop, you can really see in these maps of these several important dynamics that are work on the continent. And it's striking how closely correlated autocracy and instability are across the continent. In 2021 alone, for instance, we've seen some severe democratic backsliding in Mali, Guinea, Chad and Sudan. Starting in November 2020 and through now there has been a civil war in Ethiopia.

We have also seen continuing activity of militant Islamist groups into the Sahel that's in West Africa, just to the south of the Sahara, notably in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. And we have also seen those kinds of activities in the Lake Chad, that's on the

border of Chad, Nigeria, and Northern Cameroon. Of course, there has been an increase in insurgency North of Mozambique and finally continuing insurgency in Somalia. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in the center of the continent, there has also been continuing civil conflict and insurgency in the eastern part of the country. And finally, there is also conflicts in the western regions of Cameroon. So, as you can see from this map and from these conflicts that I've just detailed there really is a strong link between autocratic governments and instability on the continent.

Figure 4: Share of African Countries in Conflict by Regime Type

This slide provides a little bit more detail on these dynamics that I was just describing. The 3/4 of the African countries facing armed conflict, 12 out of 16 have either autocratic or semi-authoritarian governments. Of the 12-armed conflict with authoritarian leading governments, 8 are political conflicts or civil war. Before democratizing governments that are experiencing on conflict, by contrast, are all facing militant Islamist insurgency. Armed conflict in Africa's authoritarian leading countries have been ongoing for roughly twice as long on average as those in democratizing ones. Seven of the nine autocracies facing armed conflict have leaders who have come to power via coup or prolonged their time in office by evading or eliminating limits on their terms in office. Eight of the ten countries of origin for Africans record levels of forced displacement are autocratic or semi authoritarian. Nine of the ten African countries facing the most acute

food insecurity are autocratic or semi-authoritarian. And overall, nine of Africa's 16 autocracies (56%) are experiencing armed conflict. By contrast, none of Africa's democracies are in conflict.

Figure 5: Constitutional Term Limits for African Leaders

As I was alluding to a little bit earlier related to this instability is the issue of reversing norms in terms limits since 2015. Since that time. The leaders of 13 countries have evaded or overseen further weakening of term limit restrictions that had been in place. This has happened in Algeria. Burundi, Chad Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Guinea, the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Togo and Uganda.

Leaders in power for more than 20 years

Country	Leader	Years
Gabon	Bongo dynasty	53
Togo	Gnassingbé dynasty	53
Equatorial Guinea	Teodoro Obiang	41
Cameroon	Paul Biya	38
Eswatini	King Mswati III	34
Uganda	Yoweri Museveni	34
Chad	Idriss Déby*	30
Eritrea	Isaias Afwerki	27
Republic of the Congo	Denis Sassou-Nguesso**	23
Djibouti	Ismail Omar Guelleh	21
Morocco	King Mohammed VI	21
Rwanda	Paul Kagame	20

* Subsequently deceased.

** Sassou-Nguesso led a single party regime from 1979–1992 prior to regaining power in 1997, thus has held power for a total of 36 nonconsecutive years.

Figure 6: Leaders in power for more than 20 years

These shows the leaders across the continent who has been in power for more than 20 years. It's this really reflects a setback for good governance on the continent. The leaders in countries that have term limits have been in office on average for only three years. Those that have modified or eliminated these terms have been in power for around 12 years. This really shows that, and evading these norms poses a problem for security across the continent. All 8 of the African countries that face civil war, excluding insurgencies by militant Islamist groups, are those without term limits. And of the ten African countries that are the largest source of Africa's 32 million refugees and internally displaced people, 7 are countries that lack term limits. Here again, we can see yet another aspect in which lack of respect for democracy and lack of respect to these norms contributes to all kinds of instability across the continent.

Figure 7: African Countries Generating the Largest Share of Forced Displacement

In 2021, Africa experienced another record year of forced displacement. This continues a steady upward trend that we have seen since 2011. As I just saying more than 32 million Africans are either internally displaced refugees or asylum seekers. This is up from 29 million in 2020. The sources of Africa's population displacement are highly concentrated; 10 African countries account for 88%. That's 28 million of all force displaced people on the continent. Each of those top ten countries of origin are in conflict. These conflicts are driven by a combination of government repression against citizens, extremist group violence, and the militarization of politics. Seven of the 10 have governments that are autocratic, and of these 32 million forcibly displaced 3/4 are internally displaced, so 24 million internally displaced people IDP's. This means that most displaced Africans have fled to the first safe place that they could find. Sometimes this involves crossing the border, but most of the time it does not. This detail matters because there are more laws or international laws that protect people once they're outside of their country of origin than if they stay inside their borders. This poses additional threats to them if they don't cross the border.

With more than 6 million forcibly displaced people, the democratic of the Congo has at least a third more displacement than any other country in Africa, South Sudan nearly 4,000,000 forcibly displaced people makes it the African country with the highest proportion of this population that is displaced. South Sudan is also a distinctive that the majority of its displaced or refugee's asylum seekers, most of them living in Uganda, Sudan and Ethiopia. In 2021, Ethiopia saw the largest jump in sides of its forcibly displaced population with about 1.8 million people displaced due to the conflict in Tigray. Ethiopia also hosts about 800,000 refugees from surrounding countries. Then in Nigeria, in the Northeast region, violent attacks by various militant Islamist groups have resulted in the displacement of two and a half million Nigerians. And Sudan with two and a half million of its own internally displaced people also host about 1.1 billion refugees from South Sudan and Eritrea.

Figure 8: 10 African Countries Facing the Most Acute Forced Displacement Crises

This slide just shows the top ten African countries with most acute forced displacement crisis as noted in the previous slides, it's really telling that those countries were leaders do not face term limits and are autocratic, for example, DRC, South Sudan,

Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sudan and Cameroon are those that face the most acute forced displacement crisis.

Figure 9: Military Islamist Violence and Forced Displacement in Burkina Faso

I just wanted to highlight two countries that have faced an increase in militant Islamist violence and where this has resulted in an explosion in the forced displacement that these countries face. In Burkina Faso as a result of militant Islamist group violence growth generated in neighbor Mali, 1.2 million people have become displaced, which is a nine-time increase from 2019. The insurgents have mounted increasing attacks on community leaders, schools, passing military convoys, police, and shut down even state institutions. In June 2021, for instance, armed men attacked the village of Stoneham in Northeastern Burkina Faso, killing 160 people, including twenty children. In August, these militant Islamists attacked a village in Bukuma killing 80 people including 65 civilians and 15 young arms. In November an attack in Inata killed 53 and at least 20 more are presumed dead because they're missing. Survivors from that attack said that they had run out of food and water, and that despite numerous requests, they hadn't been re-supplied in months, forcing soldiers to hunt in the forest and rely on the local population. Over all in Burkina Faso more than 2000 people have been killed in violence since 2015, including around 500 members of the security forces. More than 2000 schools have

closed at 300 and 5000 children are out of school, and it's estimated that almost 3 million people (2.8 million) are in need of food assistance as a result of these displacements.


Figure 10: ASWJ Insurgency and Forced Displacement in Mozambique

The insurgency Ahlu Sunna Wa Jama (ASWJ) in northern Mozambique has caused a severe displacement and humanitarian crisis. Mozambique is the only southern African country that faces such a displacement crisis. Its displaced population was tripled in the last years. So that tripling went from about 200,000 or so to almost 700,000 in the past year. More than 3000 people, civilians, security forces, and suspected insurgents have been killed since the movement began. This violence led the regional organization in Southern Africa SADC to announce that it would deploy rapid deployment forces, around 2000 to 3000 troops, to trying help secure the region. Uganda, which is not part of this regional organization, announced that it would deploy about 1000 soldiers to help with this mission as well.

Figure 11: Climate Change Amplifies Instability in Africa

Another dynamic that's at work on the continent is climate change, which amplifies stability across the continent and this slide shows just a couple of examples of the ways in which communities across the continent are affected by climate change. Our research found that with every .5 degree Celsius increase in local temperatures, the risk of conflict increases by up to 20%. And globally, the period from 2011 to 2020 was the hottest decade ever recorded. The Sahel, region just South of Sahara was particularly affected, with temperatures rising 1 1/2 times faster than the international average. Eight of the ten countries most vulnerable to climate change in the world are in Africa, and six of those eight are facing armed conflict. So this is another serious dynamic that's play on the continent.

Figure 12: The evolution of Africa's Militant Islamist Groups

Here I wanted to show the few most recent years of the evolution of Africa's militant Islamist groups on the continent. As you can see here, we had data starting in 2012 and this is available on our website, so you'd like to go and take a look there if you'd like more details, please do so, but I don't think we'd have to find time to go through all of this since 2012. So it's just to give you an idea of different areas of activity of militant Islamist groups. The red and blue dots in the Western part of the continent, there are Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. The green ones are in Lake Chad Basin where groups are more active. In Somalia, on the eastern side of the continent, is where is most active.

Figure 13: The Evolution of Africa's Militant Islamist Groups

In 2021 when we analyzed the trends in violence for this past year. We found that there is great variance in the levels and types of violence, in particular, militant Islamist group violence continues to be primarily concentrated in five main theaters: Somalia, Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, Northern Mozambique, and the Sinai Province. Just over 51 hundred violent events linked to these groups in 2021, and this represents really just a 3% increase from the record of 4,956 violent episodes that were totaled in 2020. This is a slowdown from the 43% increase that was recorded in 2019, and the average 20% increase per year that we'd seen over the past four years. This relative leveling off in militant Islamist group activity in Africa belies stark differences in trajectories between and within the respective theaters. Nearly all the increase in violent activity are concentrated in 2 of the five main regions. Mainly, in Sahel and Somalia. So violent activity in these areas is closely tied to the Macina Liberation Front in the Sahel and Shabaab in Somalia.

Figure 14: Trends in Militant Inslamist Group Violence in Africa

The Sahel region is on track for about a 33% rise in militant Islamist activity from 2020. This is a relentless escalation of violent events in this region since 2016. As you can see here, the Sahel is the red on this graphic. Notably nearly all of this increase is being generated by the Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) coalition of militant Islamist groups, primarily FLM. This pattern is also reflected in fatality rates. Fatalities linked to the JNIM coalition are on track to increase by about 20% in 2021, that's more than 2,400 deaths. This is largely driven by FLM. Fatalities surpassed their 2020 level and are tracking double in 2021. Importantly, 3/4 of the FLM-linked fatalities are associated with battles against security forces and other militant groups. This really is an ongoing trend.

By contrast, violence linked to other main driver of militant Islamic group activity in the Sahel, the Islamic State in the Sahara is projected to have decreased by about 25% and to have about 10% fewer fatalities than in 2020. The militant Islamist group violence in the Sahel is also expanding geographically on the last several years, pushing further into Burkina Faso and towards the borders of coastal states. In Somalia militant activity track for a 16% rise. Al Shabab remains the most active group in Africa and it have been involved in about 2000 violent events in 2020. In the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa is experiencing a decrease in momentum. But still you can

see them, and activities have been important. In Mozambique, Aswj is also on track for declining activity despite the high profile attack on Palma in March of 2021.


Figure 15: Main countries identified as source and transit locations of cocaine shipments, as described by reported seizures, 2015-2019
Source: UNODC World Drug Report 2021

Here I just wanted to bring a link between Western Hemisphere and the African continent. This map from UNODC World Drug Report 2021 shows the main countries identified as source transit locations of cocaine shipments as described by reported seizures from 2015 to 2019. The quantity of cocaine seized in Africa almost quadrupled from 2018 to 2019 and increased eightfold compared with 2009, to reach close to 13 tons, a record high (0.9 per cent of the global total). Around 11.1 tons, or some 86% of the cocaine seized in Africa in 2019, was reported by countries in West and Central Africa, in particular Cabo Verde, where 11 tons are seized, followed by countries in North Africa (1.8 tons), in particular Morocco where 1.5 tons are seized. Far less was seized by countries in Southern Africa (0.2 per cent of the African total) and East Africa (0.05 per cent). Overall, the cocaine seized in Africa were likely to have been larger in 2019 than those reported by the Member States to UNODC, because although a number of African countries did not provide annual seizure data, individual drug seizures, information on many of which were collated from media reports. So this points to the possibility that the

traffic is much higher. So as I was saying, cocaine trafficking in Africa, especially West Africa, continued in 2020.

Figure 16: Significant individual seizures of cocaine, Africa, 2018-2020
Source: UNODC Drug Monitoring Platform
This one just shows significant individual cocaine seizures in 2018 and 2020.

Figure 17: Major Multilateral Peace and Security Operations in Africa
Source: Council Foreign Relations

This is a map from my colleagues at the Council of Foreign Relations, which just shows major multilateral peace and security operations across the continent, and I found that this would be of interest to all of you. There are currently 6 UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa, in Western Sahara, Mali, Central Republic, Sudan, South Sudan and DRC. The largest trip contributed to you in missions in the Western Hemisphere is Uruguay, which contributes just over 1000 troops to UN missions. And then there are several regional missions, for example, the West Africa Regional organization has about 1000 troops in the Gambia, the tiny country that's nestled in Senegal.


Figure 18: COVID-19 in Africa
Source: Africa CDC

I just want to end with a quick overview of COVID-19 pandemic has unfolded on the continent on this slide just shows the number of reporting Covid-19 cases across the continent. As of early January, there had been almost 9.8 million COVID cases in the continent and about almost 230,000 deaths. As you can see, the pandemic has been perhaps less deadly in Africa than it has in other places, but nonetheless, as you can see the continent is currently experiencing a fifth wave of COVID-19.

Figure 19: Share of people fully and partially vaccinated against COVID-19

This slide shows that that Africa is the least vaccinated region in the world.

As of January early January 2022, all countries on the continent, except Eritrea, had begun vaccination campaigns. And about 320 million doses have been administered on the continent, about 189 million people are partially vaccinated and 127 million people so are fully vaccinated, and half million people or so and received a booster dose. So as you can see on the continent only about 9.5% of the population are fully vaccinated. This vaccine inequity has been caused mostly by lack of access.

I wanted to provide additional resources if anybody is interested. Most of the material I used here is from our publications, which are available on our website.

Our website: afrecacenter.org, where our publications (short analytical articles, infographics, and research publications) are available in English, French and Portuguese (for the research publications). Our Youtube.channel has videos of our events (most of these have translations in English, French, and Portuguese). Follow us on Twitter@AfricaACSS, and Linkedin

THE "STRATEGIC SURPRISE" IS LOOKING RIGHT AT US

Peter Warren Singer[1]
New America Foundation
(Lecture)

So, I was asked to speak to you about the future, and in particular the future of technology as it relates to global security questions. And there is a challenge in that. We often get the future so wrong so frequently that many people say we ought not to try to predict the future. A senior US defense leader, for example, said that trying to predict the future is like driving in the dark in your car with your headlights off. That it is something that you just ought not to do. Now there's a problem with that: we don't have a choice. Whatever role you play in government in the military, whether you are a person who works in training, budgets, strategy, acquisitions, doctrine, whatever role you play in the organization, you have to make assumptions about the future, you have to make decisions about the future. Whatever role you play in organization, you have to be someone who thinks about the future.

But there is a second issue that plays out. When we look not towards the future, but towards the past and when we've gotten it wrong, when we've made mistakes trying

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to predict the future there is a pattern to it. And the pattern is that when we get the future wrong, it's not because of, what is often called in English, for the *black swan*. The black swan i the idea that there is something that is unpredictable, that there is something that is unimaginable. Instead, when we look at why we keep getting the future wrong, whether it is in defense policy, the events of Pearl Harbor, the events of 911. Whatever the situation is consistently, it is not because it was unimaginable, but rather it's something that we think of that's in English, it's often thought of as what they called the *Gray Rhino*. It's the idea of something that is big it's obvious if it's in the room with you, but it's just uncomfortable to look at. It's uncomfortable to admit that it's right there with you as if you're standing in a room with a rhinoceros, so that's the pattern that we see when we wrestle with the future. It usually isn't because we can't. imagine it properly, but rather it is because there are trends. There are technologies out there that are happening today, but it's just very uncomfortable for us to wrestle with what they truly mean for us.

So what is the technology that is like that today? I would argue it's artificial intelligence. Now this moment that we are in with artificial intelligence and a broader field of technology known as autonomous robotics. Is something that we've been talking about for almost all of human history? You can go back and find discussions of what would it be like if we had artificial intelligent technology. There are mentioned in ancient Greek mythology, robotics are talked about in ancient Jewish texts. Maybe you are not a person

of faith, you can also find discussion of them in science fiction for over 100 years. So it would seem we've been thinking about this moment. We've been wrestling with this moment again for as long as we've been human, so we would seem that we understand it, we're ready for it. Similarly, if you look around at how we are looking at this moment in terms of organizations, all sorts of organizations are thinking about what does artificial intelligence mean for them?

You see, right here, an image from a NATO project, but it's the same thing if you look at organizations within Latin America or within the US military, within Southern Command, there are all sorts of different parts of them that are looking at applications of artificial intelligence. It's very similar if you look not just at culture, not just at organizations, but even at individuals. There was a survey taken of senior leaders and they asked the senior leaders what do you think is the most important game changing technology out there? So what is the technology that is most likely to change the world around us? And of these senior leaders, people much like you, over 90% of them (if I recall it was 94%) answer Artificial Intelligence and robotics. AI and robotics is the most important game changing technology. So the leaders were saying this is important. We believe this is important. It's changing the world around us.

But, I will argue that we are no where near to what those means for us, what is the kind of changes that will come out of AI and robotics for what we do. I think there is a

historic parallel to where we are today, and it's illustrated by this picture here of a battleship in the late 1930s. This is the battleship USS Arizona.

BB-39 Arizona mid-1930s. 80-G-1021398

Now the battleship captains of the day had a debate relative to the new technology of airplanes, and in that debate they originally had denied that airplanes matter, and they said we don't need to buy airplanes, Navies don't need them, battleships will dominate. But by the 1930s, the battleship captains changed what they said and they went from saying airplanes don't matter to they said yes, we get it airplanes matter. And we in fact we're embracing airplanes. We are putting airplanes on the ducks of our battleships, so we're giving up valuable space, we're giving up valuable budget, and the reason is because we, the battleship captains, believed that airplanes we're going to make our battleships more lethal than they've ever been before.

The airplane is gonna allow my battleship to site to the enemy fleet of battleships at a greater distance. The battleship captains would talk about how the airplane is going to make my cannon on my battleship more accurate than it's ever been before, so they said. I am ready for the future, I am embracing change. The problem was they were embracing change just enough, not to change. If you know the history of the USS Arizona it was one of the battleships that was sunk at the Battle of Pearl Harbor. That is: the airplane need more for the battleship than just layer it on top and it will make it a little bit

better. Now some of you have a background on the ground forces, side as opposed to the seaside.

Well, this is a picture from 1931 of a U.S. Army training exercise. In it you see here a machine gun. Now again, if you know your military history, the machine gun is first used in war in the 1880s by 1914 it's used to devastating effect in World War One. And the machine gun changes everything from tactics all the way to doctrine, has colossal effect on warfare. And yet, as late as 1931 the US Army here is saying machine gun: We get it, it's new, it's important. And that's why we're putting machine guns on the back of our horse drawn wagons. Here again, embracing change just enough not to change. Here again taking the new and just putting It on top of the old, both physically, but also taking the new idea and just putting it on top of the old idea.

So let's go from that period in history to today. What is happening out there? There's so much that's happening out there with the technology of AI and robotics, and you see examples here of the different realms that they're used in everywhere from space to the kitchen. You see the different rolls and shapes they have. They are everything from a tracked machine gun mounting robot to a robot that is essentially a copy of a snake. But it's not just about the number of rolls, so the number of forms that matters. It might be the wide range of sizes, a robotic system that is bigger than pretty much any vehicle that you would drive to a robotic system that is microscopic in scale that is at the level of cells. It's not just though a number in terms of roles and forms and sizes, it's also how they might be bundled together and different kinds of numbers. On the top left side that is a picture of a Chinese People Liberation Army's Truck system that fires off a swarm of Kamikaze drones. That is, each truck fires off a swarm of around 50 armed drones. That number sounds a lot. Well bottom right corner that is the current world record holder of an autonomous drone swarm. It is the Genesis car company that made this design by flying together over 3000 drones at the same time.

As these examples show, it's not just United States our partners and allies that have these technologies, its adversaries out there like for example, Russia or China. The shift goes beyond that. Don't just think of robotics as the physical robot out in the field. It's how it's used to shape all sorts of different jobs. There was a study taken by Oxford University and they examined 702 different occupational specialties, so 702 different professions. And they found that out of these 700 professions, 47% of them are at risk for complete replacement, reduction or redefinition over the course of our lifetimes. So basically about half the types of jobs out there, whether it's a truck driver or a Logistician roughly half of their job roles will be either redefining, reduced or completely replaced. And every one of those types of jobs on the civilian side have military equivalents of them, so again, don't just think of it as the drone flying out there. It's how does AI and robotics affect medicine? How does AI robotics affect logistics, and supply? All sorts of different rules.

ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

Washington 25, D.C. April 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Affiliates of the Intergalactic Computer Network

FROM: J. C. R. Licklider

SUBJECT: Topics for Discussion at the Forthcoming Meeting

1969   1970   1972   1977

There's another huge change. We've talked about hardware robotics physical form. There's also a change going on in software that is momentous. On your screen st the top you see one of the most important military memos written in all of human history. It's a memo written in 1963 by a man named Licklider. He was a Pentagon scientist and he proposed the idea that computers could be something other than what they were in the 1960s, which was big mathematical calculators. That's what computers were used for, they were used for mathematics. He said, what if we could use computers as in the English what he said was "communication devices". The idea that it could use a computer to communicate. He went on in the same memo and said if we could turn a computer into a communication device, we could also use it in a way different than a telephone or a Telegraph.

We could create a network of these computers where people could communicate across a network. He originally proposed this network as you see here, should be called "Intergalactic Computer Network." Now, fortunately his proposal was funded, unfortunately, they didn't keep the name intergalactic computer network, and instead we call it the Internet today. Now the Internet has changed so much in our worlds. It's created new realms of conflict, Cyber security, which I think you've heard about. It's changed the way we have social relationships. Roughly, one study found 39% of the young men and

women that you lead in your organization meet their wife or husband or girlfriend or boyfriend through the Internet, not face to face, so it's changed the way we meet our loved ones. It's also, as we're doing right now, change the way we work. We can work remotely using this computer network. But it's starting to change.

In 1999 there was a new concept created called "Internet of Things." And the idea of the Internet of Things was the Internet could be used not merely for communication between humans, but you could use it to operate things. You could use the Internet to run machines. That idea is created in 1999; here in 2022 it's become real. Most of the new devices that are entering the Internet are not you and I communicating with them like a smart phone, they're a smart car, a smart power grid, a smart lightbulb. Even it's individual parts, so for instance, a modern jet engine has over 30 parts within the jet engine that are linked to the Internet. The Internet of Things is powerful. It's creating changes in business, and government, it's expected to yield roughly $11 trillion worth of economic value. It's also though, changing the way we operate and relate, and even know one another.

The organizers of this conference asked me to not just talk to you about all the good stuff, but also the security stuff, the scary stuff. And one of the other changes that comes out of the Internet of Things is new types of cyber threats where you are not merely stealing secrets using the Internet, hacking email, you are also hacking the physical objects and causing physical change. And as was very kindly mentioned, this is some work that we did in a book called *Burn In* that looked at how you could utilize this type of hacking to go after the technologies within a major city, like for example Washington DC. How you could use cyber means to attack Hospitals, buses, food supply, water supply, and again this is something new when we think about the power of a criminal, the power of a terrorist, the power of another government.

There's another change that comes out of this in terms of all of this information collection is that each one of those devices is collecting information in a way that didn't happen previously. The picture that you see on the left of your screen is the first server the first computer used in the modern Internet. It is the size of a refrigerator. On the right you see young Mark Zuckerberg using his computer to write the software for Facebook. Now both those computers lack, they do not have what we call sensors. Neither one of those computers, even though one is able to create the Internet, one is able to create Facebook, neither one of these computers that you see are able to collect information about the world beyond that computer. Today, pretty much every computer has an ability to collect information beyond that computer.

Your smartphone, for example, has a camera that takes pictures of the world around you. These pictures are sent to a data center on a computer. Where in the world is that computer? And, therefore, where in the world is the person who is using that computer? That creates something that we call *Like War*. And the idea of it is that cyberwar is the hacking of networks breaking into the network. Like war is the hacking of people on the networks. Like war is driving ideas viral through social media likes, social media shares, social media lies. And you can see examples of how like war, how this weaponization of social media, has affected the world around us. In the top left corner you see the use of it by ISIS and extremist groups. That is a picture from Isis's takeover of the city of Mosul. On the bottom left corner you see an example of the battle over coronavirus misinformation. Which is in part why we're still not able to go back to normal. In the United States, in fact, one study found that almost 200,000 Americans are needlessly dead right now due to misinformation about coronavirus. Not believing the truth about mask or vaccines over 200,000 people are dead because of the falsehood that surrounds this disease. Top right corner, how social media helped drive the lies that surrounded the 2020 election in the United States and then led to the insurrection, the violent riot and attempted takeover of our Capitol building on January 6 completely spread motivated and organized using social media. The bottom right corner, is from Myanmar, where there was a mass killing that went after 600,000 people, it was organized, coordinated, motivated online.

It's challenging as the weaponization of social media has been growing through the weaving of artificial intelligence into this space. AI though is not just about happening beyond us, it's also how it affects our own decisions. AI shapes everything from what news you see on your social media to what movies and TV shows you watch on Netflix, to how your students, and your children research, what they find to be the answers.

Again, this it's not just about happening beyond a replacement, it moves over into the military. So think about the roles of everything from a military doctor to a maintenance person on a helicopter. Both of them now are increasingly shaped, increasingly deciding what to do based on what a machine tells them they ought to do. It's even moving into the realm of battlefield operations.

This is from a project of movement technology. It's called a ways map. Many of you might have this or a similar version where you enter in a destination and it suggests a route you should take in your car to get there to avoid traffic. We're now creating a version, I saw the US Marine core test this out, that does the same thing for patrols on the battlefield, but it doesn't recommend the route based off of how quickly it recommends the route based off of how many casualties that patrol might take. So it suggests which way the unit should move on the battlefield. That will save lives, but it also raises some very deep moral legal, ethical questions.

Even when using technology AI to control our tools, so if you think about human history tools were things that we put in our hands: a hammer, a gun. Now we have the potential of using our mind to control the tool, this gentleman flew a drone, flew a plane only using his mind, not his hands.

What's the result of all this? I would argue that it yields a massive rethink of the battlefield. Now that's very bold for me to say. But why should we think that AI and robotics won't have less of an effect on war than the machine gun did in 1914? Why should AI have less of an effect on war than the airplane and the tank did in 1939? In fact, should AI have a greater effect because it is a technology that's always becoming better. AI is always improving in its intelligence and its autonomy. It's learning, so it really should have a greater effect than this. So what, then, are some of the implications that we need to think about in the world of security?

One is this technology has what we would call very low barriers to entry. It is something that you don't have to be a great power to get. You don't even have to be a state government to get use of AI, use of robotics. We've seen actors that range from weakened small states to non state actors. Ethiopia just built out an Air Force of drones in the matter of about six months. That's allowed it to turn its war around against Tikrit. Certainly as we talk about everyone from ISIS to drug cartels have flown drones or think of all the different actors that have cyber capabilities. So very low barriers to entry characterize this technology despite how advanced it might seem.

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The second issue, it's not just that many different actors can get it, it's also that how good that technology is will be rewritten. During the Cold War the United States and our allies in the free world, we competed against the Soviets and their allies but we consistently had better technology. The Soviet Union, for example, never built a stealth plane, they never even built a personal computer or a good car. By contrast, China is building very remarkable technology and everything from robotics to hypersonics to quantum, and much like thought in the Cold War, it's not just that a China might have the same or even better technology, it's how they might sell it to other actors. So the same way that the Soviets provided AK-47 and MIG-21 around the world, including in Latin America. An actor might be able to buy Chinese technology on the open market, but it could end up being better than that American made or Swiss made or Brazilian made technology, meaning here again a non state actor could get something that's not just equivalent but even better.

Next issue, almost all of the battles will be what we call multi-domain because of this low barrier to entry aspect of it, pretty much any actor, whether they are a government or a non state actor, will be able to operate not just in the land, but maybe in the air, maybe in cyberspace, maybe even in outer space. And again, we've seen that in everything from ISIS flying drones to the Saudis battling against rebels in Yemen who are conducting cyber operations back at them and flying back ballistic missiles, drone strikes. You name it. So very different way of thinking about insurgency, thinking about hreats, multi-domain right now.

A NOVEL OF
THE NEXT WORLD WAR

GHOST
FLEET

P.W. SINGER
AND
AUGUST COLE

Another issue though is multi-domain in terms of government on government warfare. And this is from our project called *Ghost Fleet* that as you see here, it is a novel of what a future war might look like. But different than a normal novel it is actually sharing real-world research, so it is a future war story, but utilizing real-world research. And in it we tell how a future war will have these multi-domain battles. Where a key to multi-domain battles is, first, small actions in one domain can have big effects in another domain, so a small move in cyber can cause a win or a loss in an air battle or in a land battle. Another issue of multi-domain is the timelines are different, so that small movement cyber might happen 10 months ago but it's effect will be felt on land or in the air 10 months later. That's how to think about multi-domain and it's coming again for both non state and state conflict.

It also means we need to think and train differently. It is no longer linear warfare land versus land, air versus air. It's as you see, multi-domain is basically like playing multi-dimensional chess. Now given that, think about how much have we changed our professional military education for this kind of systematic change that's out there?

Another lesson learned, it's not how much of a new technology you have that matters. It's not how good your technology is that matters. It is also your doctrine that matters, it is how you bring it all together. So if you look back in history in World War II, at the start of it, the Germans didn't have the most tanks. Their tanks were not the best tanks, but they had the best concept for using them, the Blitzkrieg and that's why they win.

So with AI and robotics, what are our concepts for using them? One idea as you see here is that AI and robots are tools for us. We control it, it's a tool. A second idea, it's not a tool, it is part of the team. It is a partner for us in some way, shape, or form. It works alongside us.

Intelligent drone swarms

A third concept is, it's truly autonomous and we send it out there to operate on its own without us. And part of that is that we can have it operate on its own in numbers that we would not be able to individually control it, such as a swarm. These are three very different concepts of how we might use AI robotics. Which one is the right concept? Which one is your military going to choose? I don't know the answer to that, not for even my own military, for the US military.

I do find it interesting what China is doing and they are very openly talking about the importance of the "intelligentization" that is from a document, "the 19th People's Congress" where China's civilian leaders order their military leaders to implement an intelligentization agenda basically to move the Chinese military into a world of, and they describe (the quote is) "it's not human on human warfare, but the machine on machine and machine on human warfare." They've described the importance of (other translation) "The new concepts". The new concepts are something written by some Chinese army strategists to describe their vision for using robotics, electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and in the new concepts they describe. (The quote is, this is them saying not Peter saying) Chinese officer saying "the future of war is the small, but many, defeating the big, but few"

Let me say that again "the small, but many, defeating the big, but few" is the Chinese concept of the future war.

So in closing, what can we do about this? There are several key steps that I think we all need to take. First, as leaders, we need to lead a learning agenda. Go back to when I told you about the survey of leaders who thought AI was important. Now over 90% of them said AI is important, 17% of them said they understood AI. So 90% say AI, it's the most important thing that's happening out there in technology, 17% say I understand it. That is a big gap. And I'm not just saying specific to AI, I'm seeing you as a leader you need to determine what is important in your organization. What is the important changing force? But also, how well do you, how well do those that you leed understand it? How can we make good decisions if we don't even understand it?

Second issue, you've heard from me about technology, but I kept talking about the humans, and that's because the key to success is the human side. So if we are having so much change, new technologies, new battles, what are we doing to change talent management? What are we doing about human resources? How are we changing the way that we train, the way that we recruit, the way that we evaluate? If we're not changing the human side we're not going to be successful at the technology side.

Next issue, we need to change the way that we train, and war-game. Too much of our training and wargaming is about validating existing skills, getting better at what we already do right now or getting better at being nice to each other. Being good allies, going out and having good joint exercises. Those are valuable, but we also need to understand the need to learn.

This is an image from the 1940 Louisiana maneuvers. They're very important in U.S. military history because they are when the US Army learned the difference between operating with horses versus operating with tanks. This exercise though, was not just about learning tactics of tanks. It was about learning everything from the maintenance of tanks, the logistics to what kind of officer did well with tanks versus did well with horses. We need these similar kinds of true learning exercises, not just generic training exercises. Importantly, history also tells us: you don't have to be wealthy, you don't have to be rich to do this. In fact, you don't even need the technology themselves.

This is from what we're called the fleet marine exercises in the 1930s. During them the US Marine core in the 1930s learned how to do amphibious landings. But you'll look at this and you'll notice they don't have the technology that they would use from amphibious landing. It didn't matter, they still weren't able to figure out the key concepts of it.

Another key in the testing an exercising. You want to learn not only what works, but also what doesn't works before you commit to it. These are two US Navy warships from the 1920s, both of them are aircraft carriers. The one on the left was the US Navy aircraft carrier for blends US Paducah, the one on the right was the US Navy aircraft carrier for airplanes, that's the US Langley. They figured out which one was better and then, only once they figured out which one was better, did they actually move forward and buy what we now call aircraft carriers, which are really airplane carriers. Too much of what we do today is we pre decide which ones is better, go ahead and buy it and then we test it.

You also should learn from the private sector. Again from history, on the left, this is a technology that was featured in Life magazine in 1938. It was a tractor that could cross swamp. The US military write about it in *Life Magazine*, and said that might be useful for us and they created what you see on the right: the amtrak. All of it, came out of the civilian sector. What are we doing today to learn from the civilian sector?

Next issue, what are we doing to learn from other people's wars? The blitzkrieg that took over World War II, the Germans, should not have been a surprise because they tested it out in the 1930s in the Spanish Civil War. So today, what are the other wars out

there that we ought to be learning from? The wars in Yemen, the wars in Libya, the wars in Armenia and Azerbaijan that you see here. What lessons can we learn from them? In the Azerbaijan-Armenia war the Azerbaijan forces used drones to help take out 93% of Armenia's artillery and missile systems. 93% it's a very powerful use of drones.

Another thing we ought to do is utilize new ways of visualizing and talking about the future. I reference this idea that we call *useful fiction,* is a blend of nonfiction research and analysis, a strategy paper, a white paper, a memo, but taking the lessons of that and sharing it through a scenario. So taking the nonfiction, but sharing it through a story. A different way of thinking about useful fiction is it is a military version of a smoothie. A smoothie tastes really good, but it's got fruit and vegetables in it at the same thing. We did this with our, as I mentioned, with *Ghost Fleet*. We did it with this project called Burn-In. It's a novel, but it actually teaches you about how this AI works. It teaches you about the future of cyber security.

The very last suggestion that I would make to you is we need to do what in English is called *Kill your sacred cows*. What is it? That is so valuable, so important that you're not willing to give up but it turns out, it's actually already outdated. What today is like the battleship in 1941? So just what today is like that horse drawn wagon with the machine gun on it in 1931? And it's not just I'm talking about technology, but what in your organizations is like that? And if you could identify that, you can identify where you want to change. So I know I've given you lots to think about. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you. I would just end with this one lesson: given all of the change that's going on around us, if we don't change, we will lose the future.

CONCLUSÃO

Capt. Marcio Borges Ferreira, Ph.D.[1]
Head of IADC's Research Division

A dinâmica dos acontecimentos no mundo moderno exige o contínuo estudo da geopolítica que rege o cenário de defesa e segurança. A evolução tecnológica e a inserção de ameaças multi-domínio exigem ainda a reinvenção de diversos conceitos clássicos e a atenta avaliação do impacto da atuação de diferentes atores, não apenas militares, para o processo de tomada de decisões estratégicas.

O mundo na atualidade é completamente conectado. Sendo assim, conflitos, operações especiais, políticas diplomáticas e acordos bilaterais em regiões distantes do Hemisfério Ocidental são capazes de interferir, de maneira direta ou no futuro próximo, em diversos aspectos de segurança multidimensional dos países situados no continente americano.

O Colégio Interamericano de Defesa (CID), por sua natureza e por primar pela excelência do Curso de Mestrado em Defesa e Segurança Interamericana, não poderia olvidar em prover a seus alunos relevantes conhecimentos transmitidos por especialistas em diferentes regiões e continentes distantes. Tais conhecimentos e fóruns de discussão permitiram importantes reflexões quanto ao estado da arte da geopolítica mundial.

Este "*Proceedings*" sumariza os principais estudos apresentados durante a Conferência de Situação Mundial realizada no CID, com a análise de renomados especialistas que trataram com profundidade desde aspectos relevantes de regiões extracontinentais, como a China, a África e a Europa, até missões estratégicas de suma

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importância para a paz mundial, como a conduzida no Afeganistão. Além disso, foram abordados novos conhecimentos e desafios do mundo moderno ao analisar a influência da Inteligência Artificial em nosso cotidiano e, principalmente, a necessária reavaliação do nosso pensamento em aspectos de segurança e defesa para compreender as limitações e utilizar da melhor maneira esta inevitável tecnologia, empregando o pensamento crítico adequado para a correto estudo dos cenários e desafios de segurança da atualidade, especialmente com relação às ameaças híbridas.

Cabe ressaltar o fundamental apoio do US Southern Command, por meio de seus profissionais, que assistiram à Conferência juntando-se aos alunos do CID, e de recursos financeiros que possibilitaram a organização de tão relevante evento.

Novos desafios virão e o mundo em constante evolução nos obriga a estudar os cenários de defesa e segurança incessantemente, o que requer a realização regular de Conferências de Situação Mundial como essa, sendo estes inigualáveis fóruns capazes de fomentar discussões acadêmicas relevantes para a busca de soluções hemisféricas para os problemas hemisféricos em comum em nosso continente americano.

Para más información sobre el CID, por favor, visite nuestra web www.iadc.edu.Publicada en Washington, D.C. (EE. UU.)